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God does not burden any soul with more than it can bear.  
(Qur’an, 2: 286) 
                                                        
 The edition of The Qur’an used here is translated by M. A. S. Abdel Haleem, reprinted with corrections (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2010). 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
What is politically at stake when citizens of Muslim faith are publicly presented as perma-
nent aliens in contemporary European societies? On what grounds is such exclusion or ‘exter-
nalisation’1 based? What requirements can European citizens be reasonably expected to meet? 
These are among the most theoretically pressing questions in the inflamed and often confus-
ing discourse about Muslims’ citizenship in contemporary Western European societies. To be 
clear, such questions are part of one of the most controversial, intricate, passionate, entangled, 
and multifarious debates in academic fields as diverse as political theory, sociology, law, reli-
gious studies and so on, not to mention in everyday political discussions. To begin with, the 
nature of the questions that should be raised is not altogether clear. Moreover, which approach 
to follow in dealing with them is a highly contentious issue. What is more, these two prob-
lems are intertwined: the chosen approach influences the nature of the questions under con-
sideration and vice versa. Thus, choosing one of them is never an entirely innocent act. Such a 
choice always has important consequences in terms of one’s underlying assumptions, theoret-
ical goals, as well as the scope of the research and its associated implications. 
                                                        
1 Jocelyne Cesari, Why the West Fears Islam: An Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013), 140.  
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In this study, I analyse the subject of Muslims’ citizenship in contemporary European soci-
eties from the perspective of normative political theory,2 and more precisely from the view-
point of John Rawls’s political liberalism, in particular in light of the ‘idea of public reason.’3 
As I have just underlined, this choice is not without consequences. Approaching this issue 
from the angle of political liberalism means considering the questions mentioned above in a 
particular way, which is at the same time more general and more specific than one would 
probably think at first sight. In fact, as I will explain, by its very nature political liberalism 
does not prescribe a single model for being Muslim in contemporary Europe. Thus, one may 
wonder if it is too vague as a point of departure for the analysis. On the other hand, however, 
political liberalism specifies a peculiar evaluative framework that allows citizens to answer 
the above-mentioned questions in a distinctively political way and, ideally, to solve the politi-
cal and social problems from which those questions spring. This is in a nutshell the main the-
sis of my research. I do not provide here a full description of how I have formulated the re-
search problem or of how it can be solved, because I devote chapters one and five respective-
ly to these issues, while I refer the reader to the general conclusions for an exhaustive over-
view of the main arguments of this study and their connections. In anticipating concisely the 
conclusions of my research, I can say that in what follows I will argue that public reason pro-
vides a common discursive platform that establishes the ground for a public political identity 
and for shared standards for social and political criticism. Together, these two elements solve 
the two dimensions of the problem of stability in contemporary European societies, because 
they secure both the political inclusion of Muslims on an equal footing as citizens and civic 
assurance that they will remain committed to fair terms of social cooperation (infra). After 
                                                        
2 In this work, I use “political philosophy” and “political theory” interchangeably. In doing so, I obviously focus on 
normative thinking in political theory. See the introduction by Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit to A Companion to 
Contemporary Political Philosophy, edited by them (Oxford and Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1993), 1-2. Andrew F. 
March [“What is Comparative Political Theory?,” The Review of Politics 71, no. 4 (2009), 533-534] has pointed out the 
‘fruitful, fortunate, and productive absence of a settled consensus on the meaning and purpose of political theory,’ and 
he emphasises that ‘there is no single such thing as political theory. “Political theory” is the name given within the 
academy to a number of different types of intellectual activities, some of them mutually hostile, which have in common 
only the fact that they do not aim at empirical explanation or prediction and instead deal with the realms of ideas, con-
cepts, texts, values, and norms.’ One such activity is normative political philosophy. There would be no reason to dis-
cuss here the status of political theory within political science or the relation of the former to the latter. See, inter alia, 
David Leopold and Marc Stears, eds., Political Theory: Methods and Approaches (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008); John S. Dryzek, Bonnie Honig and Anne Phillips, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), introduction by the editors; Ross J. Corbett, “Political Theory within Politi-
cal Science,” PS: Political Science & Politics 44, no. 03 (2011), 565-570. 
3 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, expanded edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). Hereafter: Politi-
cal Liberalism; different editions will be specified each time. 
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having compared public reason citizenship with two prominent normative alternatives, I will 
then conclude that the former is an adequate ideal conception of citizenship for European so-
cieties. Finally, I will apply the justificatory evaluative methodological framework developed 
in chapter two (whose requirements I will specify starting from the idea of public reason) to a 
conception of citizenship elaborated by one of the most renowned Muslim intellectuals in Eu-
rope: Tariq Ramadan. I will justify the choice of this author in sections 2.3 and 6.1, but I will 
also return to this point later in this introduction. The purpose of such evaluative work is two-
fold. Firstly, it aims at examining whether and how the idea of public reason accounts for a 
version of European citizenship for Muslims coming from Muslims themselves. Secondly, it 
aims at disclosing whether what such a Muslim conception of citizenship in Europe says 
about the two dimensions of ‘stability for the right reason’ of the system of social cooperation 
(namely, inclusion and ‘mutual assurance’) is consistent with the provisions of public reason 
citizenship. 
This also makes clear two significant assumptions underlying this work. First, since I adopt 
the perspective of normative political philosophy, here I consider only ideal conceptions of 
citizenship and not the different national models of citizenship historically realised in Europe-
an countries (for instance, the contemporary or past approaches to the issue of citizenship ac-
tually implemented in France, Germany, or the United Kingdom). In other words, the discus-
sion developed here is situated on a high level of philosophical abstraction, because the kind 
of questions that I will address are related to how things should be, and not to how things are 
or have been up until now. Therefore, I will deal with theoretical models of ideal citizenship: 
for example, public reason citizenship, ‘liberal multicultural’ citizenship, ‘critical republican’ 
citizenship (infra), and so on. Second, the evaluation carried out in this research will be main-
ly concerned with (a specific version of) Sunni Islam in Europe. This is simply because the 
only case to which I will apply the justificatory evaluative framework comes from the “Sunni 
world.” I am aware that considering other cases would have been extremely interesting and 
probably very helpful, but, as an accurate reading of chapter six can easily show, it would 
have exceeded by far the structural possibilities of this study. Nonetheless, this does not imply 
that other Islamic doctrines or views (different interpretations of Sunni Islam, Shi‘a, Sufism 
and so on) are less important or less likely to achieve an ‘overlapping consensus’ (infra). Nor 
does this infer that such different doctrines and views find it more difficult to comply with the 
requirements of public reason citizenship. Simply, they are beyond the material reach of this 
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research: the latter does not take them into consideration, thus it cannot take a position on 
them. It is completely possible that they −or at least some of them− may pass the evaluative 
test laid out here. The objective of my work is to demonstrate that public reason citizenship 
can be understood as expressing a justificatory evaluative framework and that through the lat-
ter it can help solve the problem considered in chapter one, not to exhaust all the possible ap-
plications of such a framework. I repeat again that this is not to say that Islam in Europe is a 
monolithic, unchanging, and undifferentiated entity, nor that alternative Muslim conceptions 
of citizenship in Europe are less reasonable from the perspective of public reason. Quite the 
contrary (I will return at length to this aspect in chapter one). However, as it will become 
clear, evaluating a conception of citizenship in the light of public reason’s evaluative re-
quirements is not an easy task: it requires a deep knowledge of both the roots and the content 
of the requirements themselves and, above all, of the overall theory to which they must be ap-
plied (in this case, Tariq Ramadan’s theory). Thus, once more one has to make a choice. The 
plausibility principle presented in chapter two seems to me a reasonable criterion for choosing 
which Muslim conception of citizenship should be primarily analysed (see 2.3 and 6.1). 
The last observation brings me to a further methodological point. I do believe that any en-
deavour in political philosophy should start from a careful exegetical consideration of the 
texts on which it is based. This explains the extensive use of quotations and textual comments 
in this study. This also partially explains why this research is much longer than I initially in-
tended. As far as possible, I tried to avoid repetition and to focus on the essential. I also pro-
vided many cross-references within the text and several summarising figures and tables. Fi-
nally, I made the effort of recapitulating the crucial aspects of my view more often as the ar-
gument proceeds and becomes deeper, so that the reader does not get lost. This work has been 
conceived as a unitary block with a linear structure from chapter one to chapter six. The three 
parts of which it is composed support each other. The first methodological part illustrates the 
overall approach and the grounds of the second reconstructive part and the third evaluative 
part of the research. The two chapters of each part are fairly autonomous because they deal 
with different topics (with the partial exception of chapters three and four), but they are also 
tightly connected because each of them is necessary to achieve the goal of the part in which 
they are placed. As I have just asserted, I tried to design the structural elements of this re-
search in a straightforward and liner manner (I justify the structure adopted in 1.2.b). The first 
chapter deals with the research problem and questions and presents different kinds of litera-
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ture about the question of Muslims’ citizenship in Europe, while also trying to provide clarity 
by putting them in some sort of order. The second chapter outlines my methodological ap-
proach: justificatory evaluative political theory. In the second part, chapters three and four re-
construct the idea of public reason and specify from this standpoint the fundamental require-
ments of the justificatory evaluative approach. In chapter four I also explain my interpretation 
of the ‘wide view’ of public reason: I will present an extensive interpretation of the ‘proviso’ 
and a bifurcate model of the ‘duty of civility’ (infra). In doing this, however, these two chap-
ters also present a broad overview of the existing literature about public reason and the main 
objections raised against it. In the third part, chapter five bridges the reconstructive and the 
evaluative tasks of the research and compares public reason citizenship with alternative ideal 
conceptions. Its goal is to demonstrate that public reason not only could, but also should be 
adopted as a regulative ideal of citizenship in European societies. Finally, in chapter six the 
evaluative framework is applied to the conception of citizenship elaborated by Tariq Rama-
dan, in order to assess the congruence of the latter with the requirements of public reason citi-
zenship. This is briefly the general structure of the research. However, I divided the text in 
many specific sections so that a partial reading is also possible. In particular, those who are 
interested in the philosophical arguments can get the main ideas by focusing directly on sec-
tions 1.1.a.1, 1.2.a, 1.2.b, 2.1, 2.2.b, 2.3, 3.2, 4.2, and chapters five and six in their entirety. 
Those more interested in my reading of Ramadan’s citizenship theory may find it useful to 
centre their attention on 1.1, 1.2.a, 2.3, 5.1, and obviously chapter six in its entirety. Notwith-
standing those facilitating efforts, as I have said, the reader should be aware that the line of 
argument presented here is developed throughout the whole text as it is structured.  
In chapter one, I will begin from some empirical observations about the role of perceptions 
and identities in relation to the issue of Muslims’ citizenship in contemporary Europe. I will 
claim that from this point of view Islam seems to “make problem” in a very specific sense. 
This does not mean that Islam is a problem, but that Islam is frequently publicly presented 
and perceived as a problem. This is the background problem from which my work starts. I 
will explore some dimensions of such a problem. This is not yet a satisfactory formulation of 
the research problem and questions, but I will postpone the latter to a more advanced stage 
(see 1.2.a and 1.2.b). Now, with reference to the background problem (which is also related to 
the so-called ‘backlash against multiculturalism,’ infra) one may immediately wonder wheth-
er a normative philosophical approach –which, as I have mentioned, is located on a high level 
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of abstraction− is able to tackle very real social problems such as economic, political, and 
even urban exclusion and discrimination or the legacy of colonial domination. I will analyse 
such question in more detail in 1.1.b and I will refer to it as objection O1.3. In this introduc-
tion I shall limit myself to some concise remarks. Whilst I acknowledge the importance of a 
closer analysis of the empirical dimensions and cases of the subject considered here, I also 
think that philosophically the solution of such political problems must be sought at a higher 
and more general (and, unfortunately, more complex) level that concerns the conception of 
citizenship itself. The single issues that are today so divisive and about which so much has 
been said (e.g., wearing the veil in public schools, public funding to religious schools, and so 
on) would probably be less controversial (even though not uncontroversial, given the fact of 
‘reasonable pluralism,’ infra), if there were not a wider predicament about the status of Mus-
lims as citizens. Whilst I do not deal directly with the first kind of questions (i.e., the place of 
the veil in public schools and so on), I focus on the second higher-order problem: the political 
status of Muslims as citizens. Notice that the above-mentioned predicament can go both 
ways: not only are prejudices often reciprocated, but many times criticism of traditional dis-
criminatory social arrangements should also work in both directions. What I argue here is that 
the priority must be to adopt a conception of citizenship that can secure the two dimensions of 
‘stability for the right reasons’ (infra) in European societies :political inclusion of citizens on 
an equal standing and the solution of the ‘mutual assurance problem’ (infra). I will claim that 
public reason citizenship can effectively secure both of them because it provides the bases for 
citizens’ public political identity and shared standards for political criticism. I will maintain 
that the availability of a common political identity and of shared standards for social and po-
litical criticism is a criterion for evaluating normative theories of citizenship. This is so be-
cause they are necessary to achieve both mutual assurance about other citizens’ loyalty to fair 
terms of social cooperation and political inclusion on equal footing. If, as it seems plausible to 
assume, something like Rawls’s ‘stability for the right reasons’ is an important social good, 
then I will try to show that a conception that provides both the ground for a public political 
identity and shared standards for social and political criticism protects and enhances that so-
cial good. This is in the interest of citizens as such, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. However, 
I will also argue that the availability of shared standards for denouncing unjust discriminatory 
treatment is particularly in the interest of those whose voices are usually less likely to be 
heard in public debates, like Muslims and members of other minority groups. In light of this 
criterion I will try to show that public reason citizenship performs better in terms of stability 
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for the right reasons than liberal multiculturalism (as some leading liberal multicultural theo-
rists admit) and critical republicanism. 
What is the meaning of the expression public reason citizenship? As I will explain in the 
introduction of chapter four, on my interpretation public reason expresses both a regulative 
moral political ideal of citizenship (which works also in non-ideal conditions, see 5.2.a) and a 
justificatory standard for a civic practice of public justification. Taken together, these two el-
ements shape a normative model of citizenship (public reason citizenship), from which one 
can derive the evaluative requirements enunciated in chapters three and four. As I have antic-
ipated, in chapter four I will provide my own interpretation of the wide view of public reason. 
Such an interpretation tries to combine and render consistent two positions usually thought to 
be in contrast: namely, a strong commitment to the moral foundation of public reason (what I 
call “reciprocity of the reasonable”)4 and a more inclusive stance toward the role of religious 
convictions in politics. In line with this reading of public reason, in chapter five, as I have 
said, I will emphasise the role of public reason both (1) in (re)constructing the public political 
identity of citizens and (2) in providing shared standards for social and political criticism. 
This makes a decompression of the public space possible: public reason frees the public space 
from those forces that would prevent citizens from the possibility of exercising effectively 
their two moral powers (the ‘capacity for a sense of justice and for a conception of the good’)5 
as free equals. In this sense, public reason tries to reconcile ideal political consensus and the 
fact of reasonable pluralism on a public political ground. I believe that this is the deepest 
meaning of what Rawls calls ‘reconciliation through public reason’ (infra): its aspiration is to 
reabsorb reasonable pluralism politically without annihilating it. 
Now I would like to say something more about the aim and the theoretical relevance of the 
analysis carried out here. Public reason is about coherence. It is about coherence not only with 
regard to certain justificatory requirements and procedures, but also with regard to a certain 
conception of society and the person and, then, certain political values. In one word, public 
reason is about coherence with a certain ideal of citizenship. More precisely, a liberal political 
ideal of citizenship. Therefore, an inquiry into the relations between European Muslims and 
                                                        
4 The criterion of reciprocity of the reasonable expresses the reciprocal recognition between reasonable free and equal 
cooperating fellow citizens who possess the capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of the good. 
5 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 19. 
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the idea of public reason can be best understood as an inquiry about the coherence between 
European Muslims’ public political claims and those justificatory requirements and political 
conceptions and values. Undoubtedly, such an inquiry is needed. It addresses some compel-
ling theoretical questions that are not exhaustively developed in the predominant literature. 
Indeed, the topic “Islam and liberalism” is so enormous that there is no scarcity of literature. 
On the contrary, the latter is so broad that one might even wonder if, strictly speaking, “Islam 
and liberalism” represents a “topic.” No doubt, the first task is to narrow the focus: the refer-
ent and the approach must be defined more appropriately. Thus, any researcher in this “area” 
should consider at least the following questions. What does “Islam” mean for my research? Is 
it the proper subject of my study or am I studying something else? Why do I assume that it is 
problematic from a liberal perspective? To which “liberal perspective” am I referring? How 
can I analyse the relation between those two concepts? Is there a common element? Where, 
when, and how do they meet each other? What element of one of the two may I use to “grasp” 
the other? The theoretical importance of these questions is self-evident, but answering them is 
not so clear-cut. Above all, one should acknowledge that one’s own answer is nothing but an 
answer. Nevertheless, some answer is necessary. Moreover, one should be conscious that 
such a “topic” has inescapably a political dimension. This is not to say that a rigorous analysis 
is not possible, or that its political exploitation is nearly unavoidable. This only means that 
one should begin her research without “strong” demonstrative expectations or pretensions: ar-
rogance and naïveté are not promising starting points. Nonetheless, a political theorist is not 
an ostrich: one should not bury her head in the sand. To be fair, apparently –I am not an ex-
pert– even ostriches themselves do not do that. A researcher should be aware of the possible 
political implications of her work: personally, I think that she cannot be held completely un-
accountable for them. These considerations are even more relevant in normative political the-
ory than in other fields of research, for obvious and good reasons. To be sure, this may be true 
if and only if we assume that the researcher is able to understand such implications fully and 
in advance, that her work is not misunderstood, distorted, exploited against her will or inten-
tions, and so on. Probably, the most we can ask (and hope) for is awareness and self-criticism. 
Still, even this modest request is not a matter of little or no importance. I have personally 
gained experience of that in working on this study. As the reader will realise, I have openly 
tried to take into account and to reply to most of the objections raised against this study dur-
ing its numerous public presentations or simply imagined −or foreseen− by its author. None-
theless, I am aware that more needs to be said on several counts that here I could only hint at 
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(in 5.2.a I provide a tentative list of some of them that I would like to develop in the future). 
Furthermore, other points that have not been explicitly identified so far will certainly emerge. 
Having said this, while this research is conscious of its own limitations and constraints, its 
theoretical and political aspirations are not excessively humble. Drawing on Rawls, it can be 
argued that public reason as an ideal of citizenship is ‘realistically utopian.’6 An account of 
citizenship is realistically utopian if, on the one hand, it is worked out from something that 
citizens can share and, on the other, it can remove the ‘gravest forms of [actual, real] political 
injustice […] by following just (or at least decent) social policies and establishing just (or at 
least decent) basic institutions,’7 while at the same time it establishes solid and reasonably just 
bases for social stability and civic friendship. Indeed, such an ambition is far from being self-
deflating: ‘political philosophy is realistically utopian when it extends what are ordinarily 
thought to be the limits of practicable political possibility and, in so doing, reconciles us to 
our political and social condition. Our hope for the future of our society rests on the belief 
that the social world allows a reasonably just constitutional democracy [to exist …].’8 
What is the specific importance of this research then? Firstly, it is an attempt to fill a vacu-
um in the existing literature. It is an effort to tackle openly and thoroughly the issue of Mus-
lims’ citizenship in Europe today from the perspective of political liberalism. As I will ex-
plain, it differs from both a liberal conjecture and a Muslim justification of a possible Islamic 
endorsement of a liberal political conception of justice. It tries to develop an ideal of liberal 
citizenship and its requirements through the reconstruction of the idea of public reason and it 
evaluates from this standpoint the coherence and the nature of the political demands and 
claims plausibly coming from a European Muslim perspective. To my knowledge this is the 
first attempt to systematically read the production of a Muslim scholar in the light of Rawls’s 
idea of public reason (a notable but only partial exception is the work of Andrew F. March; 
however, as I will explain at length in chapter two, his analysis is more concerned with the 
ideas of an overlapping consensus and reasoning from conjecture than with the idea of an 
evaluative analysis from the viewpoint of public reason: the two approaches –justificatory 
comparative political theory and justificatory evaluative political theory− are complementary 
                                                        
6 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), in particular 5-9 and 11-23.  
7 Ibid. 7. 
8 Ibid. 6 and 11. 
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but nonetheless different). In my opinion, this is the main methodological contribution of my 
research to the existing literature. Secondly, and in continuity with the first point, whilst the 
two main sources on which this study is grounded (that is, John Rawls’s political liberalism 
and Tariq Ramadan’s conception of citizenship) are classics of contemporary political philos-
ophy and of the debate about Islam in Europe respectively, what is new here is the way in 
which they are put together and the manner in which they may reciprocally contribute to shed 
a new light on each other. Thirdly, while this study is rooted in the wide range of literature in 
political philosophy about the idea of public reason, due to the specific nature of this research, 
I also turned to many contributions from other fields: just to give an example, in the first 
chapter it is possible to find references to a piece of sociological literature concerning Islam 
and Muslims in Europe, one that deals with Islamic and Arab philosophy and political 
thought, another from the field of immigration and security studies and so on. Far from being 
a weakness, taking into account different kinds of contributions is a necessity that mirrors the 
complexity and multi-faceted reality of the issue under investigation here. Fourthly, contrary 
to a longstanding stereotype according to which Rawls’s idea of public reason is too tightly 
connected to its American origins to be appealing in the European context, this research 
shows that –when rightly understood− an ideal of citizenship rooted in public reason can also 
be normatively appealing on the Old Continent. Basically, there are two orders of reasons for 
the normative significance of this ideal model of citizenship in Europe. From a point of view 
which is external to the theory, this model demonstrates itself cable of resolving questions 
that are widely perceived as problematic in contemporary European societies better than rival 
ideal models of citizenship. On the other side, from a perspective which is internal to the theo-
ry itself, this model is centred on an ideal conception, but it aims at functioning as a regulative 
ideal also in existing (non-ideal) European societies. Thus, it would not be necessary to wait 
for European societies to achieve an ideal state of full justice in some indefinite future (if ev-
er) to comply with the political ideal of public reason. This –I believe− makes such a concep-
tion of citizenship all the more attractive from a political standpoint. Fifthly, contrary to an-
other generalisation, the analysis developed here shows that civic unity and friendship do not 
need to rest on homogeneity or uniqueness in reasoning. Within certain limits (specified by 
what I will call the criterion of reciprocity of the reasonable, embedded in the two levels of 
the duty of civility) one may also foster civic friendship by speaking different “moral lan-
guages” or by articulating her reasoning differently according to the context. This is made 
clear in practice thanks to the evaluative investigation of Tariq Ramadan’s discourse about 
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citizenship in Europe: in particular, I will consider his call for a moratorium on ḥudūd pun-
ishments as a paradigmatic example of double discourse which fosters the ideal of public rea-
son. Accordingly, a sixth and final point is that, as I mentioned above, the careful reconstruc-
tion of the idea of public reason is here followed by an interpretation of the latter that tries to 
reconcile two views that are sometimes presented as antithetical: a deep commitment to the 
political moral foundation of the idea of public reason (political reciprocity) and a position 
more open to religious contributions in public discussions about fundamental political ques-
tions. On such an interpretation, those contributions may have a lot to say and there is an am-
ple margin for bringing them into the public forum. On this point, I would like to add that 
many of these pages have been written during the days of the terrorist attacks to the satirical 
magazine Charlie Hebdo (January 7, 2015) and revised during the attacks to the theatre Ba-
taclan, the Stade de France, and in the streets of Paris (November 13, 2015). Needless to say I 
was profoundly shocked by those events, as were millions of people around the world without 
distinction of religion. Moreover, it may be redundant to say that Islam and terrorism are two 
different things, but repetita iuvant, for they are too often conflated and confused. Precisely 
for this reason, however, we need a theory of citizenship which is strong enough to disqualify 
or ban political unreasonableness (both in its extreme forms −like in this case− and in its mi-
nor manifestations) without at the same time stifling religious doctrines that politically are 
peacefully and more or less reasonably practiced by millions of women and men. 
A concluding remark is in order.9 In some respects, this work is the completion of a long 
journey that began eight years ago with my bachelor thesis. At that time, I was dealing with a 
broad research question: is there room for an Islamic Enlightenment? Even though this first 
step was crucial because it deepened my knowledge of contemporary Arab and Muslim polit-
ical thought and I started to sketch out my method, I was aware that a satisfying account of 
the notion of Islamic Enlightenment would have required focusing the attention on more than 
a single philosophical perspective, even if I had tried to assess it critically from different 
viewpoints. Thus, in my master thesis I analysed the concept of Islamic Enlightenment by 
means of both diachronic and synchronic comparison. In few words and simplifying a lot, 
there I argued that we should understand the notion of lumières of Islam as a continuum going 
                                                        
9 The following reflections are a development of some considerations originally presented during the 2014 GEM Annu-
al Meeting in Rome and my 2014 GEM-ULB seminar in Brussels. I would like to thank all the participants for their ob-
servations and comments.  
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from the most universalist claims to viewpoints which present themselves in continuity with 
the Islamic tradition, rather than as a single notion. Yet, another important question arose: was 
my work in line with my aims? Was I looking for a “universal” model or a solution for a nar-
rower –political− question? I realised that I should have clarified several points. Thus, my 
work has shifted in three important dimensions: 
1) First, the scope of its normative claims has been limited: now it plainly focuses on the 
conception of citizenship within European societies. 
2) Second, its object has been revised: now it focuses on the political demands and claims 
about citizenship of Muslims, rather than on their conceptions of Islam as a religion or 
tradition. 
3) Third, with reference to its approach, now it is mainly concerned with working out a the-
oretical framework for evaluating politically those claims and demands. 
These three shifts represented a major change of direction and it was challenging to find a 
perspective allowing me to follow this path. The two main questions were how to frame the 
notion of citizenship and, consequently, how to conceive an evaluative standard. I ended up 
by framing citizenship in terms of a Rawlsian ideal political conception of citizenship and by 
elaborating an evaluative method in line with that conception. This study originated from 
these initial considerations and my hope is that now the reader will find a solid and persuasive 
ground on which to begin the exploration. 
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PART I 
JUSTIFICATORY EVALUATIVE  
POLITICAL THEORY  
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[W]e are all swimming in [the wa-
ters of tradition and modernity], 
Westerners and Muslims and oth-
ers alike. And since [these] waters 
are part of the ocean of history, 
trying to plow or divide them with 
barriers is futile. These are tense 
times, but it is better to think in 
terms of powerful and powerless 
communities, the secular politics 
of reason and ignorance, and uni-
versal principles of justice and in-
justice, than to wander off in 
search of vast abstractions that 
may give momentary satisfaction 
but little self-knowledge or in-
formed analysis. “The Clash of 
Civilizations” thesis is a gimmick 
like “The War of the Worlds,” bet-
ter for reinforcing defensive self-
pride than for critical understand-
ing of the bewildering interde-
pendence of our time.† 
 
     ~~~ 
 
According to the culturalists, Mus-
lims live hermeneutically sealed 
within their homogeneous culture, 
their lives entirely determined by 
it, whereas Westerners exist out-
side any specific culture in the 
universal space of modernity. In 
the West, people make culture; in 
Islam, culture makes people. […] 
In doing so, culturalists displace 
what are essentially political con-
flicts onto a more comfortable cul-
tural plane. The problem is their 
culture not our politics. 
                                                        
† Edward Said, “The Clash of Ignorance,” The Nation, October 22, 2001, available on The Nation website URL = 
http://www.thenation.com/article/clash-ignorance, 9 (page number refers to the printable version of the article). 
 Arun Kundnani, The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror (London and 
New York: Verso, 2014), 58-59. 
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Chapter One 
General Framework 
 
Il mare brucia le maschere 
le incendia il fuoco del sale. 
Uomini pieni di maschere 
avvampano sul litorale. 
 
Tu sola potrai resistere 
nel rogo del Carnevale. 
Tu sola che senza maschere 
nascondi l’arte d’esistere. 
 
In this introductory chapter, I firstly present the problem which is in the background of my 
study. Furthermore, I clarify some fundamental concepts and assumptions. Moreover, I for-
mulate my research problem and questions. The overall purpose of this chapter is to explain 
why I frame my theoretical concern as I do, and to prepare the ground for showing why I have 
chosen the standpoint of public reason in order to deal with the issue of Muslims’ citizenship 
in European liberal societies. In this first chapter, I necessarily just hint at several important 
concepts and their mutual connections. They will become clearer in the following chapters.  
 
 
 
                                                        
 Giorgio Caproni, “Il mare brucia le maschere” (Cronistoria, 1943): in Pier Vincenzo Mengaldo, Poeti italiani del No-
vecento (Milan: Mondadori, 1983), 706. 
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1.1 Preliminary Insights. 
 
1.1.A The Background Problem. Phenomena and Theoretical Viewpoints. 
The first three lustra of the twenty-first century have made it clear that political theory 
cannot just ignore questions concerning perceptions and identity. Perceptions are related to 
the ‘extraction and use of information about one’s environment, […] one’s body,’ and the 
self.10 Obviously, such extraction and use are variously affected by several factors, which are 
related not only to the environment itself, but also to our interpretative framework of refer-
ence, whose formation is in turn highly complex and articulate. In this study, I use the term 
perception as a layman’s term and not in a technical sense, to mean our sense of how things 
are. On the other hand, identity can be simply defined as ‘our sense of who we are.’11 Else-
where,12 I have also defined identity as the set (or combination) of the features −in part innate, 
in part inherited, in part resulting from adaptation to one’s environment, and in part resulting 
from the dialogic exchange with others13− which expresses the specificity and continuity of 
the self over time and which makes self-understanding possible. Perceptions and identities are 
relevant for a normative political theory that aspires to be a ‘realistic utopia.’14 This is because 
perceptions and identities significantly shape reality: as the Thomas theorem suggests, ‘if men 
                                                        
10 See the entry “perception” by Fred Dretske in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi, second edi-
tion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
11 For this definition: Robert D. Putnam, “E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century,” 
Scandinavian Political Studies 30, no. 2 (2007), 159. 
12 See my “Oltre un illuminismo islamico. Due prospettive sulla storia e sulla tradizione,” master’s thesis (LUISS Guido 
Carli – Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche, Rome, 2011), 264.  
13 For the dialogical nature of the self, see Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism: Examin-
ing the Politics of Recognition, edited and introduced by Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 
especially 32-37. 
14 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, in particular 5-9 and 11-23. 
  
 European Muslims and Liberal Citizenship 
Ph.D. Thesis successfully discussed on April 21, 2016.  
The total or partial use of the Ph.D. Thesis is subject to copyright restrictions. 
 
  
21  
 Giovanni Vezzani 
 
LUISS-ULB 
define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.’15 Thus, no normativity can be 
realistic if it does not take into account the importance of perceptions and identities.16 As it 
will become clear, in my understanding, normativity and its context are not reciprocally inde-
pendent.17 
Therefore, I begin this research in normative political theory by acknowledging that in 
contemporary Western Europe a major tension does exist with regard to questions of identity 
and perceptions. This tension concerns Islam and its place and role in European societies. In 
contemporary Europe, one could say, Islam “makes problem.”18 No doubt, in such a concise 
form this affirmation is highly troublesome. It could even appear tranchant in the wrong way. 
                                                        
15 This principle is known as the Thomas Theorem and was formulated by the American sociologist William Isaac 
Thomas in his and Dorothy Swaine Thomas’s book The Child in America: Behavior Problems and Programs [(New 
York: Knopf, 1928), 572], quoted in Robert K. Merton, “The Thomas Theorem and the Matthew Effect,” Social Forces 
74, no. 2 (1995), 380. See also Merton’s article “The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy,” The Antioch Review 8, no. 2 (1948), 
193-210 for an analysis of the implications (and some examples) of the Thomas Theorem. In Merton’s words, ‘[t]he 
first part of the theorem provides an unceasing reminder that men respond not only to the objective features of a situa-
tion, but also, and at times primarily, to the meaning this situation has for them. And once they have assigned some 
meaning to the situation, their consequent behaviour and some of the consequences of that behaviour are determined by 
the ascribed meaning’ (“The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy,” 194). 
16 I am grateful to Tatiana Alekseeva for having discussed this issue with me. 
17 I am indebted to Sebastiano Maffettone for this point. 
18 I use the admittedly inelegant expression “Islam makes problem” contrasting it with the expression “Islam is a prob-
lem.” The difference between “l’Islam fa problema” and “l’Islam è un problema” is altogether clear in Italian. I tried to 
express this opposition in English by translating the first with the expression “makes problem.” Enzo Pace similarly 
maintains that ‘Islam in Europe seems to represent a problem.’ See his L’islam in Europa: modelli di integrazione 
(Rome: Carocci, 2004), 7, my translation [but see also ibid. 117: ‘Muslims are perceived as a danger’ (my translation)]. 
Similarly, Stefano Allievi [“Islam italiano e società nazionale,” in Islam in Europa / Islam in Italia tra diritto e società, 
ed. Alessandro Ferrari (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2008), 43-75] maintains that in Europe there is a ‘cognitive problem’ with 
reference to Islam (65), because ‘a process of substantial integration […] goes nonetheless with a strongly conflictual 
perception, firstly linked to the transnational activities of Islamic terrorism […], but also to a rigorously selective atten-
tion to conflictual aspects of Islamic presence’ (67). See also Marjorie Moya’s article “Islam e laicità –il caso della 
Francia. Tra discorsi e realtà una «laicità interrogata» dall’islam,” Quaderni Laici 8, issue “L’islam in Occidente” 
(2013), 88, 92-93 and 93-99; Arun Kundnani, The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic 
War on Terror, for instance 58. Finally, see Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim: A Study of Islamic Sources in 
the European Context (Leicester, UK: The Islamic Foundation, 1999), 9, 113, 234, 250. Ramadan interestingly adds 
that ‘the European perception of this new presence –often considered as a problem− has been assimilated into Muslim 
minds’ (ibid. 113, italics in the original) and that the ‘question of Islam is above all a problem of presentation and men-
tality’ (ibid. 234). His diagnosis is concise but open and exhaustive: ‘[f]rom the Rushdie affair to the excess of the Tali-
ban, from the violence and killings in the Middle East to the daily horrors in Algeria, all this has engendered a climate 
of fear. This has become more pronounced in the context of the social crisis sweeping Europe as a result of unemploy-
ment, exclusion, and urban violence. It is what makes the debate on the Islamic presence so difficult –some would say 
impossible. Particularly when, under the pressure of crisis, it becomes confused with the problem of immigration. One 
can actually speak of a kind of “Islamophobia”,’ ibid. 250. Elsewhere [What I Believe (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 76], Ramadan argues that ‘throughout Europe […] Islam and Muslims do not symbolize settled citizens 
but eternal immigrants who are to be integrated or stigmatized.’ I address the points raised by Ramadan in what follows. 
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However, let me clarify this assertion. I am not obviously claiming that Islam is (quasi- or 
pseudo-ontologically) a problem in itself. Nor does this means that every single Muslim in 
Europe experiences the reality of being a Muslim as a problem. The quasi-metaphysical and 
theological dimension of the first statement and the intimately personal dimension of the sec-
ond are not discussed here. To be fair, the only thing I could say about these two dimensions 
concerns the second one and is based on –and strictly limited to− my own experience: to my 
knowledge, among my Muslim neighbours, acquaintances, colleagues, and friends, many 
(probably most) of them do not experience or think of their faith as a problem at all. At least 
no more than other people I know who define themselves in religious terms (e.g. as Catholics, 
Waldenses, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists and so on) do. However, this is not an argument and I 
leave this question immediately. My claim is substantially different and narrower. The phrase 
“Islam in Europe makes problem” refers to the theoretical question deriving from the fact that 
today Islam is often (but in no way exclusively) publicly presented, treated, and perceived as 
a problem. As the very famous Muslim scholar and public intellectual Tariq Ramadan (see 
chapter six for a detailed analysis of his thought) points out, ‘the general feeling about the 
Muslim question is that it represents a threat [… Such a] perception is an enormous chal-
lenge, it must be changed,’19 and ‘Europe will begin to change its perception about Islam only 
when it realises that Islam represents a resource and not only a problem: thus, a radical 
change of perspective is needed.’20 Others have emphasised that this perception of Islam as a 
threat and of Muslim residents and citizens as a potential “enemy within” who ‘threate[n] the 
notion of Europeanness itself’21 has been connected both with counter-terrorist measures and 
security policies22 and with ‘moves to roll back multiculturalism and promote monocultural 
homogeneity through assimilation.’23 According to this perception of Islam as a threat or as a 
problem, ‘[a]ll Muslims who practise their faith […] are guilty by association until proved 
                                                        
19 See Tariq Ramadan’s contribution (the transcript of his speech to the Faculty of Law at Università degli Studi 
dell’Insubria, May 27, 2006) in Islam in Europa / Islam in Italia tra diritto e società, 330-331, my translation. Empha-
sis added. 
20 Ibid. 326. My translation. Emphasis added. In the text I translated ‘ricchezza’ as resource, but literally it means 
‘wealth,’ ‘richness,’ ‘asset.’ 
21 Liz Fekete, “Anti-Muslim Racism and the European Security State,” Race and Class 46, no. 1 (2004), 4. 
22 See the literature on the securitisation of Islam cited below. 
23 Liz Fekete, “Anti-Muslim Racism and the European Security State,” 3. These two kinds of policies characterise what 
Fekete calls the ‘European security state.’ 
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innocent –except that the proof is never enough; their allegiance is, at best, irredeemably 
split and, at worst, cover for something far more sinister.’24 However, note that for the mo-
ment I use the word “problem” in an extensive way. In such a broad characterisation, it does 
not necessarily imply hostility and conflict. Rather, it may simply point out a dynamic ten-
sion, an open, sometimes public debate −more often internal among individuals or within or-
ganisations− about one’s own identity (or identities), beliefs, and social, economic, and politi-
cal relationships. Thus, “problems” here firstly mean “open questions.” The aim of this re-
search is not, obviously, to analyse such problematic open questions in their entirety. Person-
ally, I doubt that a final word is possible or even desirable concerning these questions.25 Nev-
ertheless, as I have said, the “problems” in question usually entail not only tacit or open de-
bate, but also some forms of essentialism, stigmatisation, discrimination, and rejection. These 
phenomena are often public. And, as it has correctly been argued, the fact that “Islam makes 
problem” is a problem for Muslims and non-Muslims alike.26 My purpose is to focus on a 
specific part of the theoretical implications of such “problems.” As I will explain at length in 
what follows, the fundamental aim of this research is not to solve an alleged “Islamic prob-
lem,” that is a problem supposedly concerning Islam per se.  
Rather, my general aim is twofold. First, in this chapter I take into consideration the roots 
of the perception according to which “Islam makes problem” and, starting from the tentative 
formulation “the problem is that Islam is perceived as a problem in Europe,” in the last sec-
tions I will restate my research problem (which, as I will explain, I conceive as a relational-
                                                        
24 Ibid. 23. 
25 And, if possible, these would probably be questions that Muslims themselves must decide. In a very debated and crit-
icised article, Bernard Lewis, after having predicted a ‘clash of civilizations’ between Islam and the West conceived as 
two quite homogeneous antagonistic entities (a theme that inspired Samuel Huntington’s theses), nonetheless recognises 
that the ‘movement nowadays called fundamentalism is not the only Islamic tradition. There are others, more tolerant, 
more open, that helped to inspire the great achievements of Islamic civilization in the past, and we may hope that these 
other traditions will in time prevail. But before this issue is decided there will be a hard struggle, in which we of the 
West can do little or nothing. Even the attempt might do harm, for these are issues that Muslims must decide among 
themselves.’ Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why so Many Muslims Deeply Resent the West, and Why 
their Bitterness will not Easily be Mollified,” The Atlantic Monthly, September 1990, available online at URL = 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1990/09/the-roots-of-muslim-rage/304643/, page 21 of the printable ver-
sion. The final remark does not change the main thesis of the article, namely that ‘[a]t times [Muslims’] hatred goes be-
yond hostility to specific [Western] interests or actions or policies or even countries and becomes a rejection of Western 
civilization as such, not only what it does but what it is.’ Ibid. 3. Such a thesis has been persuasively criticised by Ed-
ward Said (“The Clash of Ignorance”), among others. 
26 Sebastiano Maffettone, Un mondo migliore: giustizia globale tra Leviatano e Cosmopoli (Rome: Luiss University 
Press, 2013), 152. 
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discursive problem) more properly and with a greater degree of specificity. Second, in the rest 
of this study I propose a solution for this more specific question. In few words, the problem is 
not Islam or Muslims. Rather, considering why and how Islam and Muslims are perceived as 
a problem is the starting background or general problem of this research. It is not, however, 
its proper object of inquiry, which can be formulated only at a later stage. Therefore, to be 
more precise and give some substance to the claim that “Islam makes problem in Europe” be-
cause it is “perceived as a problem,” let me analyse the empirical background on which these 
affirmations are grounded (1.1.a.1 and 1.1.a.2). Only after having introduced such preliminary 
considerations can I formulate my research problem and questions more precisely (see 1.2).  
1.1.A.1 Representations and Perceptions of Muslims in Europe. 
It would probably be enough to be familiar with European media and popular political dis-
courses to realise that Islam and Muslims are often perceived and depicted as a problem in 
contemporary Europe. Empirical evidence supports such a perception. First, a recent PEW 
survey (2014) confirms this intuition, showing that 63% of Italians, 53% of Greeks, and 50% 
of Poles have negative views of Muslims. Even in those countries in which the percentages of 
unfavourable views are not so high (Germany, France, and the UK), they are still quite rele-
vant (33%, 27%, and 26% respectively).27 In addition, in 2006, the European Monitoring 
Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC)28 published the report “Muslims in the European 
Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia.”29 After having pointed out that ‘European Mus-
lims are a highly diverse mix of ethnicities, religious affiliation, philosophical beliefs, politi-
cal persuasion, secular tendencies, languages, and cultural traditions, constituting the second 
largest religious group of Europe’s multi-faith society’ and that ‘Muslim communities are not 
different from other communities in their complexity,’30 the report analyses the demographic 
                                                        
27 See chapter four of the 2014 PEW Research Centre’s report “A Fragile Rebound for EU Image on Eve of European 
Parliament Elections,” available at URL = http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2014/05/2014-05-12_Pew-Global-Attitudes-
European-Union.pdf.  
28 Established by the European Union in 1997 as an independent body based in Vienna (Regulation EC 1035/97). In 
2007, it was replaced by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA, Regulation EC 168/2007). See the 
FRA’s website, URL = http://fra.europa.eu/en/about-fra/who-we-are.  
29 Available on the FRA’s website, URL = http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2012/muslims-european-union-
discrimination-and-islamophobia.  
30 “Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia,” 3. 
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situation of Muslims in the European Union, their social conditions with reference to em-
ployment, housing, and education, data concerning manifestations of Islamophobia, and pre-
sents an overview of ‘government and civil society activities targeting Muslims.’ The report 
underscores that: 
‘The disadvantaged position of Muslim minorities, evidence of a rise in Islam-
ophobia and concern over the processes of alienation and radicalisation have trig-
gered an intense debate in the European Union regarding the need for re-
examining community cohesion and integration policies. A series of events such 
as the September 11 terrorist attacks against the US, the murder of Theo van Gogh 
in the Netherlands, the Madrid and London bombings and the debate on the 
Prophet Mohammed cartoons have given further prominence to the situation of 
Muslim communities. The central question is how to avoid stereotypical generali-
sations, how to reduce fear and how to strengthen cohesion in our diverse Euro-
pean societies while countering marginalisation and discrimination on the basis 
of race, ethnicity, religion or belief.’31 
Incidentally, I might say that my research is largely grounded in this substantive ‘central 
question,’ as will become clear in this chapter. However, the report goes on and points out 
that in European countries: 
‘Muslims are often victims of negative stereotyping, at times reinforced 
through negative or selective reporting in the media. In addition, they are vulnera-
ble to manifestations of prejudice and hatred in the form of anything from verbal 
threats through to physical attacks on people and property. Many Muslims, partic-
ularly young people, face limited opportunities for social advancement, social ex-
clusion and discrimination which could give rise to hopelessness and alienation.’32  
Furthermore, it adds that: 
‘Muslims in the Member States of the European Union experience various lev-
els of discrimination and marginalisation in employment, education and housing 
                                                        
31 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
32 Ibid. 8. 
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[…] Discrimination against Muslims can be attributed to Islamophobic attitudes, 
as much as to racist and xenophobic resentment, as these elements are in many 
cases inextricably intertwined. Racism, xenophobia and Islamophobia become 
mutually reinforcing phenomena and hostility against Muslims should also be 
seen in the context of a more general climate of hostility towards migrants and 
minorities.’33 
It concludes by stating that ‘the EUMC believes that measures and practices which tackle 
discrimination, address social marginalisation and promote inclusiveness should be integrated 
policy priority.’34 These considerations represent a first order of reasons for arguing that in 
Europe today “Islam makes problem” (in the sense I have specified). These things considered, 
it should be clear now why I have said that the fact that Islam is presented, displayed, and 
perceived as problematic “is a problem for all”. But these remarks do not paint the entire pic-
ture. 
On a more theoretical level, another correlated element is worthy of consideration. In 
2010, Angela Merkel claimed that ‘the approach [to build] a multicultural [society] and to live 
side-by-side and to enjoy each other has failed, utterly failed.’35 Her position was endorsed in 
2011 by David Cameron, who affirmed that, while ‘Islamist extremism and Islam are not the 
same thing,’ a ‘doctrine of state multiculturalism’ encourages ghettoization and alienation. 
Thus, he argued that ‘we need […] a much more active, muscular liberalism [… that] believes 
in certain values and actively promotes them. […] Freedom of speech. Freedom of worship. 
Democracy. Equal rights, regardless of race, sex or sexuality. [A liberal country] says to its 
citizens: This is what defines us as a society. To belong here is to believe these things.’36 Af-
ter having been considered a viable solution for the question of citizenship in societies charac-
terised by sharp and irreconcilable divisions to such an extent that one may have thought that 
                                                        
33 Ibid. 19. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Angela Merkel’s declaration in Potsdam, October 17, 2010. See “Merkel Says German Multicultural Society Has 
Failed,” BBC News website, URL = http://bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11559451. 
36 See David Cameron’s speech in Munich, February 5, 2011. See “State Multiculturalism Has Failed, Says David 
Cameron,” BBC News website, URL = www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12371994. 
  
 European Muslims and Liberal Citizenship 
Ph.D. Thesis successfully discussed on April 21, 2016.  
The total or partial use of the Ph.D. Thesis is subject to copyright restrictions. 
 
  
27  
 Giovanni Vezzani 
 
LUISS-ULB 
‘we are all multiculturalists now’,37 multiculturalism is today under increasing criticism.38 
Multiculturalism is mainly criticised with reference to immigrants and citizens with immi-
grant origins (including second and third generations), rather than with reference to sub-state 
minorities (e.g. South Tyrol in Italy, or Basque in Spain) or indigenous people (e.g. American 
Indians): ‘[i]n the last years there have been no particular problems in connection with sub-
state minorities and indigenous people. Words like retreat, backlash, and crisis apply to multi-
culturalism only if we have in mind […] the case of migrants. For sub-state minorities and in-
digenous people there has been nothing similar.’39 In a similar vein, it has been observed that 
‘[t]he greatest challenge to multiculturalism may not be philosophical but political. At the 
start of the twenty-first century, there is talk of a retreat from multiculturalism as a normative 
ideal and as a set of policies in the West. There is little retreat from recognizing the rights of 
minority nations and indigenous peoples; the retreat is restricted to immigrant multicultural-
ism.’40 This observation has a double importance. On the one hand, it confirms the idea that 
contemporary attacks on multiculturalism mainly concern a specific group: immigrants. On 
the other hand, it emphasises the fact that contemporary debates on multiculturalism are main-
ly focused on factual considerations and political departures from multicultural policies and 
institutions. In other words, today both defenders and critics of multiculturalism seem to focus 
more on actual shifts in policies and institutions than on philosophical arguments in favour of 
or against multiculturalism. Here I follow a similar line of reasoning rather than proposing a 
                                                        
37 As Nathan Glazer points out in the title of his work We Are All Multiculturalists Now (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1997). Note, however, that Glazer does not uncritically embrace multiculturalism. On the contrary, he 
openly says that the expression ‘“we are all multiculturalists now” […] harks back to others that have been pronounced 
wryly by persons who recognized that something unpleasant was nevertheless unavoidable; it is not employed to indi-
cate a wholehearted embrace’ (ibid. 160). Glazer thinks that multiculturalism in U.S.A. is a necessary but temporary 
strategy for including groups (in particular African Americans) that previous assimilationist approaches were unable to 
incorporate. See in particular ibid. 20-21 and 147-149. 
38 See for instance Sebastiano Maffettone, “From Liberal Multiculturalism to Multicultural Liberalism,” proceedings of 
the international symposium Les minorités: un défi pour les États (Brussels: Académie Royale de Belgique, May 22 and 
23, 2011) [a revised Italian version is now included in his book Un mondo migliore, 147-173], 127-131. Jocelyne Ce-
sari, “The Securitisation of Islam in Europe,” CEPS (Centre for European Policy Studies) CHALLENGE programme 
(Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security) research paper no. 15 (April 2009), available on the CEPS’s 
website URL = http://ceps.eu/book/securitisation-islam-europe, 5-6, 11. Olivier Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2007), xi, xiii, and 33-34. Other critical theoretical positions can be found in what 
follows.  
39 Sebastiano Maffettone, “From Liberal Multiculturalism to Multicultural Liberalism,” 130. 
40 Sarah Song, “Multiculturalism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Spring 2014), URL 
= http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/multiculturalism/, 7 (page number refers to the printable pdf version). 
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philosophical analysis of multiculturalism. That is, I am more concerned with the fact that –
with reference to the specific case of Muslims in contemporary Western Europe− such criti-
cisms against multiculturalism do exist and that they are paralleled by very real phenomena of 
discrimination and exclusion (supra and infra), rather than with the overall soundness of the 
philosophical foundations of multiculturalism as a political doctrine.41 [Note that, however, in 
chapter five I will provide a philosophical argument that seems to undermine liberal multicul-
turalism as a theory of citizenship for Muslims in contemporary Western Europe: I will argue 
that liberal multiculturalism seems unable to secure stability for the right reasons (infra) be-
cause it does not solve the ‘mutual assurance problem’ (infra). Nonetheless, it must be under-
scored that this claim is not intended as a confutation of liberal multiculturalism as a philo-
sophical view in general. Rather, it only means that, for a political theory to be plausible, it 
should seriously consider the question of social stability for the right reasons, and that liberal 
multiculturalism fails to provide a suitable political account of social stability, even if –as far 
as I am concerned− it may be so only with reference to the case of Muslim citizens in con-
temporary Western Europe. This would be enough to argue that, with reference to this par-
ticular case, political theorists should look for better alternatives. As one can see, my philo-
sophical objection to liberal multiculturalism is very narrow in scope and rests mainly on po-
litical considerations that are known to multicultural philosophers like Kymlicka (infra)]. In-
deed, some authors doubt that the rhetorical and politically oriented criticism of multicultural-
                                                        
41 For philosophical defences of multiculturalism, see Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of 
Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) and Tariq Modood, Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea, second 
revised edition (Cambridge, UK and Malden, Mass.: Polity, 2013). For an egalitarian critique of multiculturalism, see 
Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2001). For two different critical approaches from a liberal feminist perspective, see Susan Moller Okin, “Is Mul-
ticulturalism Bad for Women?” in Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? ed. Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard, and Mar-
tha C. Nussbaum, 7-24 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) and Anne Phillips, Multiculturalism Without Cul-
ture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). 
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ism is associated with a real retreat from multicultural policies and institutions.42 Moreover, 
others claim that such a criticism represents a strategy for passing over in silence situations of 
real exclusion, discrimination, and alienation. For instance, Charles Taylor affirms that ‘the 
European attack on “multiculturalism” often seems […] a classic case of false consciousness, 
blaming certain phenomena of ghettoization and alienation of immigrants on a foreign ideolo-
gy, instead of recognizing the home-grown failures to promote integration and combat dis-
crimination.’43 Thus, this kind of criticism would harm its victims twice: after having failed to 
include Muslims of immigrant origin (or second or third generation of Muslims with an im-
migrant background) and to provide adequate levels of social, political, and economic integra-
tion, European societies de facto shift the blame to them for their own failures.44 However, 
other authors maintain that the theoretical and political criticism of multiculturalism is associ-
ated with actual changes at the level of policies and institutional settings (e.g., the hijab and 
burqa bans in France, respectively in 2004 and 2010,45 the success of anti-immigrant parties 
across Europe, and so on),46 although the causal relations between these two levels remains 
                                                        
42 See, for instance, Will Kymlicka, “Multiculturalism: Success, Failure, and the Future,” Migration Policy Institute 
(2012), available on the website URL = http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/TCM-multiculturalism-success-
failure (here Kymlicka maintains that ‘reports of the death of multiculturalism are exaggerated’ and that ‘the retreat [of 
multiculturalism] may indeed be more a matter of talk than of actual policies,’ 14) and “The Rise and Fall of Multicul-
turalism? New Debates on Inclusion and Accommodation in Diverse Societies,” in The Multiculturalism Backlash: Eu-
ropean Discourses, Policies and Practices, ed. Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2010), 40-43. See also Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf, “Introduction: Assessing the Backlash 
against Multiculturalism in Europe,” in The Multiculturalism Backlash: European Discourses, Policies and Practices, 
in particular 13-21. Also Tariq Modood is deeply sceptical and speaks of the ‘strange non-death of multiculturalism’ 
(see chapter seven of Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea). He reaffirms his support for the idea of ‘civic multiculturalism’ 
saying that ‘[c]ontrary to all those who think that the time to speak of multiculturalism is over, I think it is most timely 
and necessary, and that we need more not less.’ Ibid. 13. 
43 Charles Taylor, “Interculturalism or Multiculturalism?” Philosophy and Social Criticism 38, no. 4-5 (2012), 414. 
44 This point was reaffirmed by Taylor during the conference “La piazza e il tempio” (Il Cortile dei Gentili-Centro Studi 
Americani-Institut Français Centre Saint Louis, Rome, March 6, 2015).  
45 See Joan Wallach Scott, The Politics of Veil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007) and Anne Fornerod’s essay 
“The Burqa Affair in France,” in The Burqa Affair Across Europe: Between Public and Private Space, ed. Alessandro 
Ferrari and Sabrina Pastorelli (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 59-76. For an analysis of the plural meanings of the veil, see 
Renata Pepicelli, Il velo nell’Islam: storia, politica, estetica (Rome: Carocci, 2012). 
46 For example, see Christian Joppke, “The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy,” The 
British Journal of Sociology 55, no. 2 (2004), in particular 247-254, and Rogers Brubaker, “The Return of Assimila-
tion? Changing Perspectives on Immigration and Its Sequels in France, Germany, and the United States,” Ethnic and 
Racial Studies 24, no. 4 (2001), especially 532-533, 535-539, and 542-544. See also Joowon Yuk’s review of the vol-
ume edited by Vertovec and Wessendorf [“Book Review: The Multiculturalism Backlash: European Discourses, Poli-
cies and Practices,” Cultural Trends 20, no. 3-4 (2011)], 338-339. 
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unclear.47 Some of these authors even talk of a ‘wholesale retreat from multiculturalism in 
Europe.’48 However, it is interesting to note that even those who criticise the idea of the death 
of multiculturalism and the reality and/or the extent of the retreat from multicultural policies 
must ‘acknowledge that there are major obstacles to the multiculturalist project,’ and that 
‘certain conditions must be in place for [multicultural citizenship] to have its intended ef-
fects.’49 In particular, Will Kymlicka maintains that multicultural citizenship and its related 
multicultural policies are not likely to work when one or more of the following conditions are 
in effect:  
1. When there is a securitisation of ‘minorities that [are seen] as potential collabora-
tors with neighbouring enemies.’50 Kymlicka acknowledges that this condition is 
present in the case of Muslims in Europe, who are frequently perceived as a ‘secu-
rity threat’51 (see also infra). 
2. When there are concerns about minorities’ commitment to the protection of human 
rights. Again, Kymlicka says that such concerns are present with reference to Mus-
lims in Europe (e.g. about gender equality, freedom of conscience and so on). 
Then, he concludes that ‘states are unlikely to accept minority autonomy if they 
fear it will lead to islands of local tyranny within a broader democratic state.’52 
                                                        
47 Christian Joppke, “The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy,” 239. 
48 Ibid. 244. Joppke concludes that ‘[w]ith this new stress on civic integration […] the liberal state is becoming more 
assertive about its liberal principles, and shows itself less willing to see them violated under the cloak of “multicultural” 
toleration. [… O]ne can interpret the new assertiveness as a shift of emphasis from diversity to autonomy, in whose op-
tic liberalism itself appears as a distinct way of life that clashes with other, non-liberal ways of life. The reasons for the 
new assertiveness of the liberal state in Britain and beyond are complex. One reason, which predominated before the 
most recent concern about terrorism and security, is preparation for envisaged new large-scale immigration. Public con-
sent for this is sought through the scaling-back of multiculturalism, both as social fact and political programme’ (ibid. 
252). 
49 Will Kymlicka, “Multiculturalism: Success, Failure, and the Future,” 21. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 22. 
52 Ibid.  
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3. When ‘citizens fear that they lack control over their borders.’53 This fear too is of-
ten invoked with reference to new Muslim comers (see for instance the heated de-
bates about Turkey’s admission to the EU). 
4. When there is high cultural homogeneity among immigrants, since only in ‘a situa-
tion where immigrants are divided into many different groups originating in distant 
countries, [is there no] feasible prospect for any particular immigrant group to chal-
lenge the hegemony of the national language and institutions.’54 However, this is 
not always the case with regard to Muslims in Europe. While one can undoubtedly 
observe a wide diversity in terms of their regional, national, traditional (and even 
religious or spiritual) backgrounds, one should also acknowledge that in specific 
national contexts (also due to their colonial past) some immigrant groups seem ho-
mogeneous or predominant (e.g. North Africans in France and Spain, Pakistanis in 
the UK). 
5. When the perception that ‘immigrants are holding up their end of the bargain and 
making a good-faith effort to contribute to society’55 is absent. This point is also of-
ten raised in European debates about Muslims’ presence in Europe, in particular by 
stressing the fact that certain groups (e.g. refugees) rely too much on the welfare 
state. Usually, however, such distinctions are not made and the argument is pre-
sented in general terms, as it would concern all Muslims with an immigrant back-
ground. 
Therefore, all the five circumstances that Kymlicka takes into account as potentially nega-
tive factors with regard to the implementation and correct functioning of multicultural policies 
prima facie are present with reference to the case of Muslims with immigrant background in 
Europe. As Kymlicka –the scholar who gave the most important contribution to the develop-
ment of contemporary theories of liberal multiculturalism− acknowledges:  
                                                        
53 Ibid.  
54 Ibid. 23. 
55 Ibid.  
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‘[I]mmigrant multiculturalism has run into difficulties where it is perceived as 
carrying particularly high risks. Where immigrants are seen as predominantly ille-
gal, as potential carriers of illiberal practices or movements, and/or as net burdens 
on the welfare state, then multiculturalism poses perceived risks to both pruden-
tial self-interest and moral principles, and this perception can override the forces 
that support multiculturalism.’56 
Unfortunately, as I have just demonstrated, it seems that these perceptions are widespread 
in contemporary Europe with reference to Muslims with an immigrant background. Thus, as 
Kymlicka himself concedes, multiculturalism and its related policies appear particularly hard 
to uphold in those circumstances and with reference to that specific group.57 Whilst in Cana-
da, ‘multiculturalism serves as a source of shared national identity and pride for native-born 
citizens and immigrants alike,’58 in the case of Muslims with an immigrant background it 
seems unlikely that multiculturalism can represent such a common shared identity in contem-
porary Europe. Also Tariq Modood and Nasar Meer acknowledge that questions related to so-
cial unity and common political identities are more and more relevant in European countries 
with a longstanding tradition of multicultural policies, such as the UK.59 If this is so, however, 
how to fill this shared-identity gap? Kymlicka (rightly) fears that ‘in the absence of multicul-
turalism, national identity is more likely to lead to intolerance and xenophobia.’60 I think that 
the problem of defining a common shared identity is crucial and I return to this point below 
and in 1.2. In 5.2.b I will demonstrate that liberal multiculturalism leaves this question open 
(in fact, as I will explain in chapter five, the italicised sentence in the preceding long quota-
                                                        
56 Will Kymlicka, “The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism? New Debates on Inclusion and Accommodation in Diverse 
Societies,” 46. Emphasis added. 
57 Against the view that I am advocating, see Patti Tamara Lenard, “What Can Multicultural Theory Tell Us about Inte-
grating Muslims in Europe?” Political Studies Review 8, no. 3 (2010), 314-317. However, from a substantive perspec-
tive I do not see any radical opposition between the liberal multicultural principles she invokes and the position I de-
fend. For instance, public reason citizenship fully agrees with the claim that non-discriminatory inclusion involves 
‘abandoning the implicit and explicit privileges extended to Christianity, and the adoption of a genuine commitment to 
equal treatment of all religions. Doing so will require accepting newcomers –of whatever cultural and religious back-
ground− on equal terms in the political sphere.’ Ibid. 317. 
58 Will Kymlicka, “Multiculturalism: Success, Failure, and the Future,” 11. 
59 Nasar Meer and Tariq Moodod, “The Multicultural States We’re In,” in European Multiculturalisms: Cultural, Reli-
gious and Ethnic Challenges, eds. Anna Triandafyllidou, Tariq Modood, and Nasar Meer (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Uni-
versity Press, 2012), 65 and 84-85. 
60 Will Kymlicka, “Multiculturalism: Success, Failure, and the Future,” 11-12. 
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tion is related to the ‘mutual assurance problem’), whilst in 5.2.c I will show that this problem 
is overcome by public reason citizenship. 
Notice that my claim here is limited in scope. As I said, I am not trying to suggest that (lib-
eral) multiculturalism is an inadequate political philosophy: properly speaking, I am not pre-
senting any normative argument in favour of or against multiculturalism in general. Moreo-
ver, I am not concerned with providing quantitative evidence of its retreat in terms of national 
policies and institutional settings. Whether the backlash against multiculturalism in Europe 
corresponds to a change in actual policies and the orientation of public opinion or whether it 
is just a ‘crisis of perception,’61 in either case the crucial point is that –as I said at the begin-
ning− perceptions do matter. Even critics of the reality of the retreat of multiculturalism must 
concede that ‘relentless attacks on multiculturalism […] might not have changed the basis of 
policies radically, but they have certainly fomented a negative atmosphere surrounding immi-
grants, ethnic minorities, and particularly Muslims.’62 In other words, what is important is 
that worries about the implications of multicultural policies specifically refer −in negative 
terms− to immigrants as Muslims [as Ralph Grillo and Prakash Shah have noted, ‘concern 
about the “failure” of Muslims (in general) to integrate is at the heart of the current backlash 
against multiculturalism’63] and that the negative political atmosphere created by such per-
ceptions has very real consequences in terms of exclusion and discrimination, as the previ-
ously mentioned EUMC’s report shows. Thus, in Europe the backlash against multicultural-
                                                        
61 Vertovec and Wessendorf quoting the report of the Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related 
to Cultural Differences led by Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor, in Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf, “In-
troduction: Assessing the Backlash against Multiculturalism in Europe,” 22. 
62 Ibid. 27. Emphasis added. 
63 Ralph Grillo and Prakash Shah, “The Anti-Burqa Movement in Western Europe,” in The Burqa Affair Across Eu-
rope: Between Public and Private Space, 200. For a similar claim, see also John R. Bowen, “Europeans Against Multi-
culturalism,” Boston Review, July/August 2011, available on the Boston Review website, URL = 
http://bostonreview.net/john-r-bowen-european-multiculturalism-islam, in particular 1-2 of the online printable version. 
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ism seems to concern mainly Muslims with an immigrant background,64 who are defined as 
(or identified with) “the other” by definition. 
In fact, it has been observed that in Europe ‘the immigrant has become Muslim’ and that 
this European phenomenon of ‘Islamisation of immigration’65 marks an important difference 
with reference to the United States. In fact, ‘categories of “immigrant” and “Muslim” overlap 
in Western Europe, unlike in the United States, where immigration debates centre on econom-
ic and social concerns such as wages, assimilation and language,’ so that ‘in the U.S. the pro-
totypical immigrant is a low-skilled Mexican or Central American worker rather than a con-
servative Muslim’66 as in Western Europe.67 This is because American Muslims (in contrast 
to European Muslims) show an overall similarity –or even a better positioning in compari-
son− with the rest of the population in terms of education, employment, income and so on.68 
Robert Putnam argues that in the United States ‘survey evidence suggests that for most Amer-
icans their religious identity is actually more important than their ethnic identity, but the sali-
ence of religious differences as lines of social identity has sharply diminished.’69 Along these 
lines, Richard Alba has persuasively demonstrated in his comparative study of social bounda-
ries in the U.S., France, and Germany that in Western Europe religion constitutes a ‘bright 
boundary’ between immigrant minorities (including second and third generations) and native 
                                                        
64 ‘Attacks on multiculturalism have become indirect attacks on Islam and Muslims.’ Ibrahim Kalin, “Islamophobia and 
the Limits of Multiculturalism,” in Islamophobia: The Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st Century, ed. John L. Esposito 
and Ibrahim Kalin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 4. See also Tariq Modood, Multiculturalism: A Civic 
Idea, 4 (‘Muslims have become central to the merits and demerits of multiculturalism as a public policy in western Eu-
rope’) and 12 (‘disillusionment with and anxiety about multiculturalism […] is however strongly associated with the 
presence and activities of Muslims’). 
65 Stefano Allievi, “How the Immigrant has Become Muslim: Public Debates on Islam in Europe,” Revue Européenne 
des Migrations Internationales 21, no. 2 (2005), 135-163, available on the REMI’s website URL = 
http://remi.revues.org/2497 (subsequent quotations refer to the online printable version), 3. 
66 Jocelyne Cesari, “The Securitisation of Islam in Europe,” 2-3 and footnote 5 on page 3. 
67 For the analogy between Muslims in Europe and Spanish language speakers in U.S.A., see also Aristide R. Zolberg 
and Long Litt Woon, “Why Islam is Like Spanish: Cultural Incorporation in Europe and the United States,” Politics and 
Society 27, no. 1 (1999), in which they claim that ‘Islam and Spanish are metonyms for the dangers that those most op-
posed to immigration perceive as looming ahead: loss of cultural identity, accompanied by disintegrative separatism or 
communal conflict,’ 5.   
68 See PEW Research Centre’s report “Muslim Americans: No Signs of Growth in Alienation or Support for Extrem-
ism,” available at URL = http://www.people-press.org/2011/08/30/muslim-americans-no-signs-of-growth-in-alienation-
or-support-for-extremism/.  
69 Robert D. Putnam, “E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century,” 160. 
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populations, whilst in the case of the U.S. race –not religion− is the crucial element on which 
a ‘bright’ demarcation is built.70 According to Alba, a social boundary is bright when ‘the dis-
tinction involved is unambiguous, so that individuals know at all times which side of the 
boundary they are on.’71 On the other hand, in the case of ‘blurry boundaries’ (that is, bounda-
ries ‘involving zones of self-presentation and social representation that allow for ambiguous 
locations’)72 a member of the immigrant group (or of the majority group) has several options 
for redefining his or her position in order to overcome a sharp demarcation and separation 
from the other group. On the contrary, when the boundary between immigrant groups and ma-
jority society is ‘bright’ –as it is in the case of Muslim immigrants (or, more precisely, immi-
grants coming from Muslim majority countries) in the two European countries considered by 
Alba− one can do nothing but ‘cross’ the boundary.73 This entails a considerable cost and a 
great risk for individuals, who have to “choose” −if and when they have the possibility− on 
which side they want to stand and in doing so break many interpersonal relationships.74 In 
case of bright boundaries, then, boundary crossing implies that assimilation in other groups ‘is 
unlikely to be undertaken by large numbers, even in the second generation,’ and it is largely a 
matter of an ‘individualistic pattern.’75 Thus, while in the United States the category of “oth-
erness” is mainly built on racial grounds, in Europe the “other” is primarily perceived on reli-
gious terms as “the Muslim.” If one brings these points together, it seems reasonable to say 
that in Europe worries mainly concern the fact that multiculturalism seems to be conducive to 
an exacerbation of differences and a lack of a shared public political ground, especially with 
reference to Muslim immigrants.76 As I explain in 1.2, in my view this is the crucial question 
                                                        
70 Richard Alba, “Bright vs. Blurred Boundaries: Second-Generation Assimilation and Exclusion in France, Germany, 
and the United States,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 28, no. 1 (2005), 30-35, 37-39, and 39-40. 
71 Ibid. 22. 
72 Ibid. An example of a blurry boundary is religion in the U.S., according to Putnam (see the quotation above) and Al-
ba (30-31). 
73 Ibid. 23-24. 
74 Ibid. 26. 
75 Ibid.  
76 See, for instance, what Jeffrey C. Alexander calls the ‘conservative critique,’ in his “Theorizing the “Modes of Incor-
poration”: Assimilation, Hyphenation, and Multiculturalism as Varieties of Civil Participation,” Sociological Theory 19, 
no. 3 (2001), 237-238. 
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at stake, and it represents the theoretical problem of my research. Let me anticipate an im-
portant question. The reader could ask which implications derive from the claim that today 
multiculturalism is under attack because it seems inadequate –sometimes from the perspective 
of Muslims themselves77− to take on the new challenge represented by an expanded pluralism 
(infra). Do these observations mean that one should promote an assimilationist monocultural 
model of citizenship, as some authors fear?78 I do not think so. One of the main purposes of 
this study is to show that there is a plausible way to take the diversity and specificity of our 
attachments and identities seriously and let them flourishing without compromising the possi-
bility of a shared platform for discussing the most fundamental political questions and for 
shaping our public institutions.  
Coming back to the point, I was saying that “the Muslim” is often perceived and represent-
ed as the paradigmatic “other” in contemporary Europe. As I have said, the “immigrant,” the 
“enemy within,” the “threat” to the very essence of “Europeanness” become just as many 
transpositions of “being a Muslim.”79 Some authors then maintain that both in public dis-
courses and in common perception Muslims are ‘externalized.’80 In other words, even though 
Muslims live within the physical and political boundaries of European societies and even 
when they share the legal status of citizenship, they are often perceived and publicly repre-
sented as citizens outside or even against the citizenry. It has been recently suggested that 
‘[f]raming Islam as a set of values intrinsically incompatible with Europe implies that Mus-
                                                        
77 For instance, see Tariq Ramadan in Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan? (Paris: L’Archipel, 2005), 
155-157. Moreover, concerning the U.S.A., see the PEW’s report “Muslim Americans: No Signs of Growth in Aliena-
tion or Support for Extremism,” in which it is shown that the majority (56%) of American Muslims says that they want 
to ‘adopt American customs and ways of life’ rather than ‘be distinct from the larger American Society.’ Note, howev-
er, that only 33% of the general public thinks that American Muslims want to adopt American life-style, while 51% be-
lieve that they want to live separately or distinctively. This inverted proportion could perhaps be explained by making 
reference to the lack of a shared political discursive platform and be linked with the criticism of multiculturalism I men-
tioned before: people do not know what kind of “public life” (here, I use this expression in a very general way, meaning 
how one desires to live with regard to the rest of society: to assimilate, to live separately, to integrate while preserving 
one’s distinct cultural, religious, linguistic features and so on) others want and this fact is a source of misunderstanding, 
generalisation, prejudice, and fear. 
78 Liz Fekete, “Anti-Muslim Racism and the European Security State,” 18 and 22. See also her article “Where Mono-
culturalism Leads,” published on the Institute of Race Relation’s website (2015), URL = 
http://www.irr.org.uk/news/where-monoculturalism-leads/, which begins by commenting on the Paris attacks of January 
2015 with these words: ‘[i]t may seem counter-intuitive, but far from suffering from an excess of multiculturalism, Eu-
ropean thought and culture are suffering from too much monoculturalism.’ 
79 See also Olivier Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam, for instance 1 and 34. 
80 Jocelyne Cesari, Why the West Fears Islam, xvii. 
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lims must choose between abandoning their religion and remaining outside the boundaries of 
the true European citizenry.’81 As I said with reference to the EUMC’s 2006 report, this per-
ception has not only a symbolic dimension but also material consequences in terms of dis-
crimination and Islamophobia (‘the fear of or prejudiced viewpoint towards Islam, Muslims 
and matters pertaining to them’).82 As Chris Allen puts it, ‘Islamophobia has a very real im-
                                                        
81 John R. Bowen, Christophe Bertossi, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Mona Lena Krook, “An Institutional Approach to 
Framing Muslims in Europe,” in European States and Their Muslim Citizens: The Impact of Institutions on Perceptions 
and Boundaries, ed. John R. Bowen, Christophe Bertossi, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Mona Lena Krook (Cambridge 
and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1. 
82 For this definition, see the Council of Europe’s 2004 publication “Islamophobia and its Consequences on Young peo-
ple”(https://www.coe.int/t/dg4/youth/Source/Resources/Publications/Islamophobia_consequences_young_people_en.pd
f), 6. The report continues by saying that ‘Islamophobia is not a new phenomenon but we know that today many Mus-
lim communities in Europe are experiencing an increasingly hostile environment towards them characterised by suspi-
cion, deep-rooted prejudice, ignorance, and, in some cases, physical and verbal harassment. Whether it takes the shape 
of daily forms of racism and discrimination or more violent forms, Islamophobia is a violation of human rights and a 
threat to social cohesion,’ 6. This document rightly raises the following questions: ‘Is it useful to use the expression Is-
lamophobia? Shouldn’t we simply talk of “discrimination” or “intolerance”? Is it true that the usage of the term Islam-
ophobia can provoke more Islamophobia and hence further victimise Muslims in Europe?’ (5). Here I do not need to 
explore these questions. I do not want to reduce the issue to a mere linguistic matter: words are important. However, in 
this initial stage of my work I am concerned with the core of the problem. Thus, corroborated by the literature presented 
in this section, I fundamentally take for granted that, while one may prefer terms like “racism” or “intolerance” (which, 
I equally take for granted, are repudiated by any minimally decent democratic society), it is also true that it ‘is practical-
ly undisputed that they have […] recently taken a particular religious and “civilizational” connotation’ (ibid.). There-
fore, for the sake of simplicity, here I use the term Islamophobia. The report “Muslims in the European Union: Discrim-
ination and Islamophobia” also quotes (p. 61) the very influential 1997 report by the think tank Runnymede “Islam-
ophobia: a Challenge for Us All,” available online at URL = http://www.runnymedetrust.org/publications/17/32.html, in 
which (p. 5) the following features of Islamophobia are listed: Islam is seen as (1) ‘monolithic and static,’ (2) ‘separate 
and “other”,’ (3) ‘barbaric, irrational, sexist,’ (4) ‘violent, aggressive, threatening,’ (5) ‘manipulative’ and insincere. 
Moreover (6) ‘criticisms made by Islam of the “West” are rejected out of hand,’ (7) ‘hostility towards Islam is used to 
justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims and exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society,’ and (8) ‘anti-
Muslim hostility is accepted as natural and “normal”.’ For an introduction to the concept, see, among others, Abdellali 
Hajjat and Marwan Mohammed, Islamophobie: Comment les élites françaises fabriquent le «problème musulman» 
(Paris: La Découverte, 2013), in particular chapter four for a history of the concept; Ayhan Kaya, Islam, Migration and 
Integration: The Age of Securitization (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 201-218; and Marc 
Helbling, “Islamophobia in the West: An Introduction,” in his edited work Islamophobia in the West: Measuring and 
Explaining Individual Attitudes (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 1-18. For a critical genealogy of the Islam-
ophobic ‘ideology,’ see Mehdi Semati, “Islamophobia, Culture and Race in the Age of Empire,” Cultural Studies 24, 
no. 2 (2010), in particular 265-267. For a comparison between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia (with a specific focus 
on Germany), see Sabine Schiffer and Constantin Wagner, “Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: New Enemies, Old Pat-
terns,” Race and Class 52, no. 3 (2011), 78-79 and 80-82. For a study of Islamophobia in Italy, see Alfredo Alietti and 
Dario Padovan, “Il razzismo come legame sociale nella società dell’eccezione giuridica. Note su antisemitismo e anti-
islamismo in Italia,” in Antisemitismo, islamofobia e razzismo: Rappresentazioni, immaginari e pratiche nella società 
italiana, ed. Alfredo Alietti, Dario Padovan, and Claudio Vercelli (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2014), 69-88, and, from a hi-
storical perspective, Anna Curcio, “Genealogia e metamorfosi del razzismo in Italia,” in Antisemitismo, islamofobia e 
razzismo, 91-106. 
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pact on the daily experience of many European citizens.’83 In the same vein, Ibrahim Kalin af-
firms that: 
‘Islamophobic acts manifest themselves in numerous ways. Some are explicit 
and obvious, some subtle and implicit. They take various forms and display vary-
ing degrees of aggression. Sometimes they come in the form of verbal and physi-
cal attacks on Muslim individuals. In some cases, mosques, Islamic centres, and 
Muslim properties are attacked and desecrated. In the workplace, health services, 
schools, and housing, Islamophobia takes the form of suspicion, staring, hazing, 
mockery, rejection, stigmatizing, and outright discrimination. In other public 
places, it may take the form of indirect discrimination, hate speech, or denial of 
access to goods and services.’84 
In other words, such perceptions and public representations of Muslims as the irreducible 
and threatening other of an alleged “European self” play a functional role in justifying varying 
degrees and forms of Islamophobia.85 However, it is noteworthy that the term Islamophobia 
can be misleading if we understand it too narrowly: it may absorb and overshadow different 
discriminatory patterns. As Jocelyne Cesari rightly emphasises, this term ‘presupposes the 
preeminence of religious discrimination when other forms of discrimination (such as racial or 
class) may be more relevant.’86 In fact, she points out that two important features of European 
Muslims are that they ‘are mostly immigrants’ (as I have said) and that they are too often ‘so-
cially marginalized.’87 Thus, she argues that ‘[b]ecause European Muslims tend to be socio-
economically marginalized, much of the discrimination against them may be due to their class 
                                                        
83 Chris Allen, “‘Tutte le differenti forme di discorsi, parole e atti:’ il problema della comprensione e definizione 
dell’Islamofobia,” in Antisemitismo, islamofobia e razzismo, 34. My translation. 
84 Ibrahim Kalin, “Islamophobia and the Limits of Multiculturalism,” 9. 
85 ‘Insulting, intimidating, and threatening Muslim individuals and communities and in some cases committing violence 
against them is presented as a reaction to what is described as the existential threat of Islamic extremism and terrorism. 
Such justifications give the impression that violent acts perpetrated against Muslims have a reason and thus can be ex-
cused. Islamophobia is used to construct, justify, and sustain racist and exclusivist political discourses […] Islam is pre-
sented as an enemy and as an “other” to construct purist and exclusivist national identities, as well as to justify religious 
exclusivism.’ Ibid. 16. 
86 Jocelyne Cesari, “Islamophobia in the West: A Comparison between Europe and the United States,” in Islamophobia: 
The Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st Century, 24. 
87 Ibid. She adds that those two features of European Muslims ‘stand in sharp contrast to the features of Muslims in the 
United States.’ 
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situation rather than religion.’88 I agree with Cesari’s claim that Islamophobia should be con-
sidered in its open meaning, as a ‘starting point for analyzing the different dimensions that de-
fine the political situation of Muslim minorities in Europe,’89 and that many different factors 
(not only religion, but also immigrant background, social class, racial and national stereo-
types, and so on) play a decisive role in such a discriminatory trend. As I mentioned in the 
opening quotation above, we should avoid culturalist approaches, which ‘displace what are 
essentially political conflicts onto a more comfortable cultural plane [, so that t]he problem is 
[Muslim] culture not our politics,’90 as Arun Kundnani appropriately warns. Also Olivier Roy 
underlines this point, noting that ‘if the banlieue is primarily a problem of Islam, then there is 
no social problem. […] The problems of society are transformed into a debate about ideas.’91 
However, as I have just mentioned, Cesari also claims that public discourses in Europe tend to 
present specifically Islam and Muslims as both an internal and an external threat. She argues 
that, both at the level of European politicians’ public discourses and at the level of citizens’ 
general feelings and perceptions, ‘Islam and Muslims [are put] outside the civilized space of 
the West.’92 Thus, as I have shown so far, it seems that those discourses specifically address 
(at least formally) Islam and Muslims on religious grounds: in those perceptions and public 
representations, they are singled out as Muslims. Then Cesari is right when she maintains 
that:  
‘Due to the complexity of the situation of Muslims in Europe, it is difficult and 
perhaps impossible to untangle the threads of motivation behind [European reac-
tions, policies and discourses about Muslims’ presence in Europe]. Although an 
anti-immigrant sentiment is clearly growing in Western Europe, one wonders to 
what degree this is a result of the fact that so many of the immigrants are Muslims 
and whether a different group of immigrants would have provoked such a strong 
reaction. […] Anti-immigrant sentiment is common in many countries […] How-
                                                        
88 Ibid. 25. 
89 Ibid. 24. 
90 Arun Kundnani, The Muslims are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror, 58-59. 
91 Olivier Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam, 31. 
92 Jocelyne Cesari, Why the West Fears Islam, xvii. 
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ever, in European countries, this predicament can slide into what can more accu-
rately be termed as Islamophobia. [… I]t seems clear that [anti-immigrant rheto-
ric] has become more anti-Muslim.’93  
Several studies based on recent literature and surveys94 support Cesari’s conclusions and 
uphold the idea that in European public discourses ‘an essentialized West and an essentialized 
Islam are fighting each other and in so doing reinforce one another.’95 On a practical level, 
this way of framing the relationships between Western European societies and their Muslim 
citizens and communities have two very important consequences, as Ibrahim Kalin highlights: 
1. Muslims are prevented from actively and ‘fully participating in the political, social, 
cultural, and economic life of the societies in which they live.’96  
2. Self-criticism becomes more costly for Muslims due to surrounding social pressure, 
hostility, and suspicion.97 
Finally, such an opposition also underlies a phenomenon that in the literature has been 
called ‘securitisation of Islam.’98 For instance, Stuart Croft has analysed how the oppositions 
and the interplays between the three categories of the ‘British self,’ the ‘Radical other,’ and 
the ‘Orientalized other’99 are functional to bringing about the ‘ontological security’ of the 
                                                        
93 Jocelyne Cesari, “Islamophobia in the West,” 30-31. 
94 See, for instance, Jocelyne Cesari, Why the West Fears Islam, in particular chapter one. Jytte Klausen, The Islamic 
Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe, paperback edition with new foreword (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 6-7. Jonathan Laurence, The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims: The State’s Role in Minority Integration 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), for instance 6-7.  
95 Jocelyne Cesari, Why the West Fears Islam, xiv. 
96 Ibrahim Kalin, “Islamophobia and the Limits of Multiculturalism,” 16. 
97 ‘Confronted with frontal attacks driven by racist and Islamophobic attitudes, Muslims of various religious and politi-
cal bents shy away from openly criticizing fellow Muslims and end up defending some of the most extreme and illogi-
cal ideas and actions, which would under normal circumstances be rejected as contrary to an Islamic ethos. The fear is 
that they will be betraying their Muslim brothers and sisters in the midst of a war launched against them.’ Ibid. 
98 Stuart Croft, Securitizing Islam: Identity and the Search for Security (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2012), in particular 1-16 and chapter five, Jocelyne Cesari, “The Securitisation of Islam in Europe,” 10-12, 
and Ayhan Kaya, Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization, for instance 7-8. See also Liz Fekete, 
“Anti-Muslim Racism and the European Security State,” in particular 5-14 and Arun Kundnani, The Muslims are Com-
ing! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror, passim. 
99 Stuart Croft, Securitizing Islam, for the two categories of the ‘Orientalized’ and the ‘radical other’, see, 86-90.  
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(British) self, a condition in which ‘humans are able to trust that they can bracket off all sorts 
of possibilities; that they can therefore rely on a social normality, a predictability, which then 
structures their practical everyday interactions as natural, normal and commonsensical.’100 
Thus, ontological security is ensured through a multiplicity of ‘everyday routines’101 which 
must protect the self from events perceived as crises.102 When the securitisation process is 
completed, Croft argues, British Muslims must face the choice between two alternative identi-
ties that are defined in relation to the British self: in other words, Muslims must choose be-
tween being a ‘Radical other’ or an ‘Orientalized other.’103 That is, between personifying the 
“other” ‘that threatens the very existence of the self,’104 or representing the “other” that ac-
cepts ‘to be led, governed, moulded, and taught.’105 Needless to say, whatever the result of 
such a “choice,” in this perspective Muslims’ inclusion as free equals is irremediably jeopard-
ised.  
1.1.A.2 Theoretical Viewpoints. 
How could one conceptualise those phenomena and perceptions from a theoretical view-
point? I believe there are at least five ways to do this. Not only are they profoundly different, 
but it would also be difficult to appraise some of them from the standpoint that I have chosen, 
namely, the philosophical standpoint of John Rawls’s political liberalism. Notwithstanding 
this, I will present some examples for each position. However, in no way can I offer a com-
plete or even a satisfactory overview of the immense and varied literature concerning Islam 
and Muslims in Europe. Such a generalising categorisation is obviously subject to several ca-
veats. Still, I do think that such an attempt is not worthless: it can shine a light on the multi-
faceted approaches to the background problem of my research. I consider now five view-
                                                        
100 Ibid. 21. 
101 Ibid. for instance 23. 
102 Ibid. 249: ‘[s]ecuritizations, of course, do not occur from nothing. They emerge from particular incidents that are so-
cially constructed as crises.’ 
103 Ibid. 259. 
104 Ibid. 86. 
105 Ibid. 90. 
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points, which are openly concerned with the ongoing debate about Islam and Muslims in Eu-
rope: 
1- According to the first perspective, the problem is the incompatibility between democra-
cy and Islam “as such.” These two concepts cannot be conciliated: they are mutually exclu-
sive.106 Frequently, those who endorse this position add that their criticism is oriented toward 
Islamism or Islam (the shift between the two is usually very easy and subtle in these writings), 
not toward individual Muslims. Another common theme is the censure for Europe’s incapaci-
ty to understand and counter the “Islamic threat.” For instance, in his recent book While Eu-
rope Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying the West from Within, Bruce Bawer discusses at 
length the causes of the alleged ‘European integration crisis.’107 To make a long story short, 
Bawer’s thesis is that European societies are going through potentially fatal changes, due to 
their inability to recognise, assess, and tackle the most dangerous of present threats. The prob-
lem, as made explicit by the title, is Islam’s presence in Europe. Not Islam in general, of 
course, but only radical Islam. Reading the book, however, one can wonder if, at the end, at 
least a substantial majority of Muslims are to be held responsible for that deficit of integra-
tion. In fact, in Bawer’s perspective, while radical Islamists play an active role in attacking 
European democracies, mainstream Muslims keep silent and their willingness to integrate 
seems vacillating.108 In his view, moderate Muslims’ silence is partially caused by the weak-
ness of European reactions against assaults by Islamists: since they are unable to distinguish 
between different attitudes among Muslims, European societies fail to gain the support of 
those Muslims who would be able and willing to integrate. Therefore, both sides are under 
scrutiny in Bawer’s work: Europe for its blindness, Muslims for their ambivalences. Having 
lived in Amsterdam for some time, Bawer gives his first-hand account of ‘the division be-
tween the native Dutch and their country’s rapidly growing Muslim minority.’109 According 
                                                        
106 Concerning this account, I would just like to mention the recent book by Hamid Zanaz, Islamisme. Comment 
l’Occident creuse sa tombe (Paris: Éditions de Paris, 2013). Notwithstanding the reference to Islamism in the title, Za-
naz’s effective target is patently Islam tout court: ‘who claims that there is a fundamental difference between Islamism 
and Islam is quite cunning.’ Ibid. 10, my translation. 
107 Bruce Bawer, While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam is Destroying the West from Within, paperback edition with a 
new afterword (New York: Anchor Books, 2007), 2. 
108 See, for instance, ibid. 3-4. 
109 Ibid. 2. 
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to him, ‘[t]hat division was stark: the Dutch had the world’s most tolerant, open-minded soci-
ety, with full sexual equality, same-sex marriage, and libertarian policies on soft drugs and 
prostitution. Yet many Dutch Muslims kept that society at arm’s length, despising its free-
doms and clinging to a range of undemocratic traditions and prejudices.’110 Simultaneously, 
as I said before, Bawer plainly condemns European inability to judge things as they actually 
are, and the stubborn absence of any effective countermeasure. What is the source of this (al-
leged) European passiveness? Why is Europe unable to recognise and contrast this threat? 
Bawer’s answer is unambiguous: Europe lacks critical and effective means because of a kind 
of taboo expressed by the notion of the ‘politically correct’.111 Political correctness is both 
empty rhetoric and risky blindness: 
‘Diversity, respect, dialogue; this, of course, was the mantra of political cor-
rectness, a habit of thought that in America is an annoyance but in Europe is a 
veritable religion –its tenets instilled by teachers and professors, preached by poli-
ticians and journalists, and put into practice by armies of government paper push-
ers. It was political correctness that had gotten Europe into its current mess, and 
only by repudiating political correctness did Europe stand a chance of averting 
what seemed, increasingly, to be its fate.’112 
It is in the light of these considerations that one can understand the existential value that 
Bawer ascribes not only to tragic events such as the Madrid and London bombings (2004 and 
2005 respectively) and the murder of Theo van Gogh (2004), but also to less violent (even if, 
in the long run, more enduring) phenomena −such as the increasing ghettoization of European 
suburbs and the simultaneous expansion of those ghettos, due to family reunification policies 
in the past.113 Leaving aside other kinds of evaluation, this discourse is not particularly prom-
                                                        
110 Ibid. 2-3. 
111 Ibid. for instance 6, 35, 65, and 66. 
112 Ibid. 6. 
113 See, for instance, ibid. 20. 
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ising from a theoretical perspective. Even if a more or less similar discourse is widespread,114 
it shows two unsolvable impasses. On the one hand, it does not provide any meaningful defi-
nition of the concept of “democracy” that it would defend and, consequently, it is deprived of 
any effective strategy concerning how to structure its defence. On the other hand, the “Islam-
as-such”-assumption seems to refer to nothing else but an empty rhetorical (and essentialist) 
entity. Often, as I have underscored, this conceptual emptiness is functional, because it facili-
tates a double shift: firstly, from reality to fiction (or nightmare), and, secondly, from the par-
ticular to the general and vice versa. This position, however, is unlikely to be assessable 
through the lens of political liberalism. The only feasible political liberal evaluation would 
consist of considering which claims are openly unreasonable (because of the refusal of the 
freedom and equality of fellow citizens), and ‘containing’ them (infra). However, I doubt that 
a political liberal theorist would accept to undertake such a project with the spirit that charac-
terises this first viewpoint. The fundamental purpose of political liberalism is the reconcilia-
tion between the need for a form of public justification and the fact of (reasonable) pluralism 
(infra), while the viewpoint that I am considering now starts by overtly or covertly denying 
the reasonableness of Islam and seems to end up with dismissing any possibility of public jus-
tification involving Muslims, precisely because of the fact that they are Muslim. I call this 
perspective Islam-as-an-unsolvable-problem view. According to this view, ‘the notion of 
“Muslim citizens” appears as an oxymoron: their presence as citizens would challenge the es-
sential values constitutive of European civilization.’115 Of course, the main –open or tacit– 
reference of this position is Huntington’s thesis of a ‘clash of civilizations.’116 To be sure, 
                                                        
114 For instance, Ayhan Kaya (Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization, 205-211) argues that ‘Is-
lamophobia has become the mainstream’ in the West. See also the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xeno-
phobia’s 2006 report “Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia,” for instance 108. For a con-
tribution focusing especially on France, see Vincent Geisser, La nouvelle islamophobie (Paris: La Découverte, 2003), in 
particular see chapter 1 (about anti-Islamic arguments in the media) and chapter 2 (about the professionalisation of 
“fear-experts”). See also 13-15 and 15-17 for, respectively, employment discrimination against Muslims and the politi-
cal use of anti-Islamic arguments.  
115 John R. Bowen, Christophe Bertossi, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Mona Lena Krook, “An Institutional Approach to 
Framing Muslims in Europe,” 2. 
116 Samuel Phillips Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993), 22-49, “If not Civiliza-
tions, What? Paradigms of the Post-Cold War World,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 5 (1993), 186-194, and The Clash of Civ-
ilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). 
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while Huntington’s arguments are quite articulate (this is not the same as saying convinc-
ing),117 several contemporary authors simply assume that the clash is there.  
2- Within the second view, I bring together approaches and positions that are so different 
and varied that one might even wonder whether there is any consistency between them. In 
particular, within the second view I gather together multicultural theories and political dis-
courses,118 broadly speaking democratic critical and recognition theories,119 and –among oth-
ers– sociological and historical analyses concerning Muslims’ presence in Europe.120 In spite 
of the obvious differences, these approaches share a fundamental common feature. They are 
                                                        
117 I have discussed several critical points of Huntington’s theses in my previous works “L’Islam dei Lumi: ragione, 
religione e responsabilità nel XXI secolo. La prospettiva di Sadik Al-Azm,” bachelor’s thesis (LUISS Guido Carli – Fa-
coltà di Scienze Politiche, Rome, 2009), 73-78, and “Oltre un illuminismo islamico,” 282-294. 
118 See above.  
119 For some examples specifically addressing the question of Muslims’ presence in Europe, see Cécile Laborde’s criti-
cal republican perspective as formulated in her Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philoso-
phy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). I place her work here because, as I understand it, her critical republican-
ism seems to put together the Anglo-American republican tradition [see for instance Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A 
Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) and his “The Republican Ideal of Free-
dom,” in The Liberty Reader, ed. David Miller, 223-242 (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2006), and Quentin Skinner, 
“A Third Concept of Liberty,” in The Liberty Reader, 243-254] with a more deliberative and critical approach. In her 
Critical Republicanism she conceptualises critical laïcité as follows: egalité as secular impartiality; liberté as non-
domination and right to voice; and fraternité as trans-ethnic solidarity (ibid. 9, 85-89, 152-161 and 230-253). I will ana-
lyse her work in chapter five. See also her “Secular Philosophy and Muslim Headscarves in Schools,” The Journal of 
Political Philosophy 13, no. 3 (2005), 305-329, and the “Review Symposium: The Danish Cartoon Controversy and the 
Challenges of Multicultural Politics: A Discussion of The Cartoons That Shook the World,” Perspective on Politics 9, 
no. 3 (2011), in particular 604-605 [in this article she discusses Jytte Klausen’s book The Cartoons that Shook the 
World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009)]. For a more recent and different formulation of her conception of 
secularism, see her “Justificatory Secularism,” in Religion in a Liberal State, ed. Gavin D’Costa, Malcolm Evans, Tariq 
Modood, and Julian Rivers, 164-186 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). Note, however, that her last ver-
sion of secularism comes closer to Rawls’s idea of public reason which I analyse in the next chapters. With reference to 
the approach I have in mind, see also Joseph H. Carens and Melissa S. Williams, “Muslim Minorities in Liberal De-
mocracies: The Politics of Misrecognition,” in Secularism and its Critics, ed. Rajeev Bhargava, 137-173 (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), and “Islam, Immigration, and Group Recognition,” Citizenship Studies 2, no. 3 (1998), 
475-500. For the interplay between redistribution and recognition within critical theory, see Nancy Fraser and Axel 
Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange (London and New York: Verso, 2003), 
especially 81-82 for a specific reference to the veil question. 
120 Contributions are countless in this field. I will just mention some recent works that are illustrative of the view I am 
discussing for the way in which they frame the question of Muslims’ citizenship in Europe. Stefano Allievi “Conflicts 
over Mosques in Europe: Policy Issues and Trends,” published by Alliance Publishing Trust for the NEF’s (Network of 
European Foundations) Initiative Religion and Democracy in Europe (2009), available on the NEF’s website URL = 
http://www.nef-europe.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Conflicts-over-mosques_NEF-RelDem-RELIGION-
MOSQUES-Final-1.pdf. See also his “How the Immigrant has Become Muslim: Public Debates on Islam in Europe,” 
and his Musulmani d’occidente: Tendenze dell’islam europeo (Rome: Carocci, 2002). Felice Dassetto, “Discours, socié-
tés et individus dans l’islam européen,” in Paroles d’islam: Individus, sociétés et discours dans l’islam européen con-
temporain / Islamic Words: Individuals, Societies and Discourses in Contemporary European Islam, ed. Felice Das-
setto, 13-34 (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2000). Jytte Klausen, The Islamic Challenge. Jonathan Laurence, The 
Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims. Jocelyne Cesari, Why the West Fears Islam. 
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all primarily concerned with the cultural, historical (colonial), social, economic, and political 
conditions that characterise the relationships between Muslim minorities and Western Euro-
pean societies. Since I have no better definition, I call this perspective Muslims-as-a-minority 
view. However, the focus here is on Muslims as actors who bear a specific set of cultural, 
economic, and socio-political claims.  
3- A third view affirms that the problem consists of Muslims’ attitude toward their own 
tradition. Here a remark is in order: taking Muslim reformism seriously means avoiding a 
hodgepodge of profoundly different perspectives. However, for the sake of simplicity and 
clarity, here it is enough to say that if one had to categorise the full range of discourses, she 
could observe a continuum going from the most openly modernist discourses,121 to writers 
more committed to preserving an internal relation and continuity with the tradition.122 Finally, 
                                                        
121 See, among others, Sadik Al-Azm, “A Criticism of Religious Thought,” in Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives, 
second edition, ed. John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 93-99 [a new 
and complete English translation (by George Stergios and Mansour Ajami) of Naqd al-Fikr al-Dīnī is now available 
with the title Critique of Religious Thought (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2015)], “A view from the East: Sadik Al-Azm.” 
Global Knowledge, no. 1 (2006), http://siu.no/eng/Front-Page/Global-knowledge/Issues/No-1-2006/A-View-from-the-
East-Sadik-al-Azm, “Islam, terrorismo e occidente oggi,” in Il Mediterraneo: Ancora Mare Nostrum?, eds. Maurice 
Aymard, Giovanni Barberini and Sebastiano Maffettone, 79-98 (Rome: LUISS University Press, 2004), L’illuminismo 
islamico: il disagio della civiltà, second expanded edition (Rome: di Renzo, 2002), “Science and Religion, an Uneasy 
Relationship in the History of Judeo-Christian-Muslim Heritage,” in Ludo Abicht, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, Sadik Al-
Azm, Tariq Ali, John Bowen, Roger Dilemmans, Mark Eyskens et al., Islam & Europe, Challenges and Opportunities, 
127-158 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2008). Mohammed Arkoun, Rethinking Islam: Common Questions, Un-
common Answers, ed. Robert D. Lee (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), in particular chapters 3, 4, 12 and 16, and “Re-
thinking Islam Today,” in Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook, ed. Charles Kurzman (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1998), in particular, 206, 208-213, 214-215, 217-219. Abdou Filali-Ansary, Islam e laicità: Il punto di vista dei musul-
mani progressisti, ed. Lorenzo Declich (Rome: Cooper & Castelvecchi, 2003), for instance 75, 84, 86-90, 92-109, 111-
115. Bassam Tibi, Euro-Islam: L’integrazione mancata (Venice: Marsilio, 2003), “Islam and Europe in the Age of In-
tercivilizational Conflict. Diversity and the Challenges,” in Islam & Europe, Challenges and Opportunities, 63-83, 
“Muslim Migrants in Europe: Between Euro-Islam and Ghettoization,” in Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Cul-
ture, and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization, ed. Nezar AlSayyad and Manuel Castells (Lanham, Md.: Lexington 
Books, 2002), see 37-43 and 45-49. 
122 See, for instance, Mohammed Abed Al-Jabri, Arab-Islamic Philosophy: A Contemporary Critique (Austin: Center 
for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Texas at Austin, 1999), Democracy, Human Rights and Law in Islamic 
Thought (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2009), The Formation of Arab Reason: Text, Tradition and the Construc-
tion of Modernity in the Arab World (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2011). Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, Islam 
and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari‘a (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008), for in-
stance, 1-7, 97-101, 101-104, 106-109, 125-136, “Toward a Cross Cultural Approach to Defining International Stand-
ards of Human Rights: The Meaning of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,” in Human Rights in 
Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus, ed. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1992), in particular 22-26, 26-29, and 32-36, and Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, 
Human Rights, and International Law (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1990), in particular chapter 7. 
Mohamed Talbi, Plaidoyer pour un Islam moderne (Tunis: Cérès Éditions, 1998), notably 100-128. Abdolkarim So-
roush, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam: The Essential Writings of Abdolkarim Soroush, ed. Mahmoud Sadri 
and Ahmad Sadri (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), in particular chapters 6, 8, and 9. Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, 
Testo sacro e libertà: Per una lettura critica del Corano, ed. Federica Fedeli (Venice: Marsilio, 2012). 
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within this view there is a line of thought that tries to work out an account of citizenship for 
Muslims in Europe.123 I call this perspective Muslims-as-interpreters view. 
4- A fourth view argues that the main problem is moral disagreement between Islam –
understood as a ‘tradition of [moral] argumentation’124– and a conception of political values 
of citizenship for European societies. Here we are very close to the core of political liberal-
ism: such a view can be formulated in a specific way within political liberalism. In Rawlsian 
terms, we could try to consider if within Islam (so conceived) there are adequate resources for 
achieving a full justification (infra) of the political conception that incorporates such political 
values. This is the method of reasoning from conjecture, which I analyse at length in the next 
chapter. If such resources are available in the Islamic tradition of argumentation, then a full 
justification is possible, and, consequently, a public justification can be obtained.125 For this 
reason, I call this perspective Islam-as-a-source-of-justification view. 
5- However, there could also be a fifth view. Such a view is usually overlooked in the lit-
erature concerning the issue of Muslims’ citizenship in liberal democracies. This is the point 
where I hope that my research can improve existing understanding of the issue analysed in 
this study. This perspective argues that we should focus our analysis on European Muslims’ 
modalities of participation in the process of public justification and on their attitude toward 
the ideal of public reason. Therefore, the problem could be conceived as follows. Politically 
                                                        
123 For example, Sadik Al-Azm, L’illuminismo islamico, 54. Bassam Tibi, Euro-Islam, notably 103, and Tariq Ramadan 
Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), for instance 97. 
124 For this concept, see Andrew F. March, Islam and Liberal Citizenship: The Search for an Overlapping Consensus 
(New York: Oxford University Press: 2009), 8-9. 
125 For examples of this approach, see Joshua Cohen, “Minimalism About Human Rights: The Most We Can Hope 
For?” Journal of Political Philosophy 12, no. 2 (2004), in particular 202-210, and Andrew F. March, Islam and Liberal 
Citizenship. Since a great part of the next chapter is devoted to conjecture, I do not analyse it further here. 
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speaking, the problem is neither Muslims citizens’ socio-economic-historical conditions,126 
nor –directly– their relationships with their own tradition (even though, as I will explain in the 
next chapter, with regard to this dimension, political liberals may reason from conjecture, and 
Andrew F. March’s work is a prominent example of this strategy). Rather, the problem is that 
public discourses about the common terms of citizenship are largely mutually incomprehensi-
ble or even highly suspect, because so far the reconciling role that the idea of public reason 
can and should play in European societies (for this, see 1.2 and 5.2.c) has not been fully un-
derstood, theorised, and deployed. In few words, the problem concerns the idea of public rea-
son in both its two fundamental and interrelated dimensions: as a common basis for public 
justification and as expressing common political values (for this point, see in particular the in-
troduction of the fourth chapter). Therefore, an unexplored problem concerns the relation be-
tween European Muslims and the idea of public reason.127 In this research, I develop this fifth 
perspective, which I call Muslims-as-citizens-participating-in-public-justification view. Thus, 
my main aim is to show and theorise the reconciling role that public reason can and should 
play in contemporary Western European societies. 
                                                        
126 This point should be clear, since it is very important. As I have remarked, I am not saying that blatant injustices are 
acceptable or that the colonial past is morally irrelevant. Quite the contrary. Simply, I argue that these concerns are not 
the appropriate considerations for working out a political conception (which specifies the content of the idea of public 
reason) that should govern the basic structure of a democratic society. The ideal of citizenship should be worked out 
free from the constraints of such particular conditions. Only in this way could it serve as a political ideal. However, 
since such an ideal is part of a broader conception of justice, unjust conditions should be remediated according to the 
principles of justice embedded in the political conception. Moreover, in addition to those principles and the related 
‘values of political justice,’ such as equality of opportunity, social equality and economic reciprocity (John Rawls, Po-
litical Liberalism, for instance 224), since the ideal of liberal citizenship expresses a duty of civility and an ideal civic 
friendship (ibid. for instance il, 217, 224, 253) which are based on the criterion of reciprocity and since such a criterion 
‘is normally violated whenever basic liberties are denied’ (ibid. il), I think that such an ideal of citizenship has within 
itself powerful resources for acting against blatant injustices. After all, this is the overall purpose of all Rawls’s work. 
127 I want to make it clear that this problem is not completely unexplored. Sebastiano Maffettone has prefigured a simi-
lar approach in his paper “From Liberal Multiculturalism to Multicultural Liberalism.” Moreover, we discussed it 
countless times together. I am profoundly indebted to him for this idea, and I build on his arguments. Yet, my aim is to 
develop and examine in depth several important points that he just sketched out in that paper. In particular, I would like 
to consider some possible objections (in chapters one, two, three, and four) and draw –as far as possible– a complete 
account of the notion of public reason in the matter of Muslims’ citizenship in European liberal democracies (chapters 
three, four, and five). Even more importantly, I would like to consider this idea from a methodological perspective 
(chapter two) and try to see how it may work (chapter six). In addition, note that I do not consider the question of 
whether it is possible to frame the idea of public reason within (some) Muslim majority societies. For this, see Raja 
Bahlul’s attempt to define an ‘Islam-based public reason, in analogy to Rawls’s liberalism-based public reason’ in 
“Toward an Islamic Conception of Democracy: Islam and the Notion of Public Reason,” Critique: Critical Middle 
Eastern Studies 12, no.1 (2003), especially 46-49, 51, 56-59. See also Fevzi Bilgin’s book Political Liberalism in Mus-
lim Societies (Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2011), where he addresses the difficult question ‘[p]olitical 
liberalism offers a moral framework for divided societies [, b]ut to what extent could it apply to contexts other than the 
democratic West?,’ 46. For his answer, see chapters 4-6. 
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It should now be clear that I do not ask: Is Islam as such consistent with European liberal 
democracy?128 Even if we assume (as I do) from the very beginning that something like an 
ideal-typical form of “European liberal democracy” could be normatively defined and we try 
(as I do) to frame this idea within the Rawlsian idea of a well-ordered society in which social 
unity is grounded in the public acceptance of a liberal political conception of justice,129 such a 
question, I think, is misleading. I have already considered this point when I analysed the Is-
lam-as-an-unsolvable-problem view. What does “Islam as such” actually mean? Moreover, 
political liberalism, the philosophical perspective that I adopt here, does not horn in on the 
                                                        
128 I take Nicholas Wolterstorff’s formulation as an initial and general definition of liberal democracy: liberal democra-
cy is ‘that mode of governance that grants to all people within the territory of its governance equal protection under 
law, that grants to its citizens equal freedom in law to live out their lives as they see fit, and that requires of the state 
that it be neutral as among all the religious and comprehensive perspectives represented in society.’ Nicholas Wolter-
storff, “The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues,” in Religion in the Public Square: The 
Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate, eds. Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Lanham, Md.: Row-
man & Littlefield, 1997), 70, emphases added. Obviously this initial definition will be characterised in a specific way, 
on the basis of the Rawlsian interpretation of liberal democracy developed in this study. 
129 A well-ordered society is a society 1) ‘in which everyone accepts, and knows that everyone else accepts, the very 
same principle of justice,’ 2) its basic structure ‘is publicly known, or with good reason believed, to satisfy these princi-
ples,’ and 3) ‘its citizens have a normally effective sense of justice and so they generally comply with society’s basic 
institutions, which they regard as just.’ John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 35. The idea of a well-ordered society (35-43), 
along with the ‘conception of society as a fair system of cooperation over time’ (15-22), and the ‘political conception of 
the person as free and equal’ (29-35) are the three fundamental ideas of justice as fairness as a liberal political concep-
tion of justice. The latter is defined by two orders of features. It is a liberal conception if 1) it provides ‘a specification 
of certain rights, liberties and opportunities (of a kind familiar from democratic regimes),’ 2) it grants ‘a special priority 
for these freedoms,’ and 3) it adopts ‘measures assuring all citizens, whatever their social position, adequate all-purpose 
means to make intelligent and effective use of their liberties and opportunities.’ Ibid. xlvi. It is a political liberal con-
ception since 1) ‘[w]hile such a conception is, of course, a moral conception, it is a moral conception worked out for a 
specific kind of subject, namely, for political, social, and economic institutions. In particular, it applies to […] the basic 
structure of society. […] By the basic structure, I mean a society’s main political, social, and economic institutions, and 
how they fit together into one unified system of social cooperation from one generation to the next,’ 2) it is ‘presented 
as a freestanding view,’ that is ‘expounded apart from, or without reference to, any [wider comprehensive] back-
ground,’ and 3) ‘its content is expressed in terms of certain fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public political 
culture of a democratic society.’ Ibid. 11-13. Then, as Joshua Cohen points out [“A More Democratic Liberalism,” 
Michigan Law Review 92, no. 6 (1994), 1522], Rawls defines a political conception as ‘autonomous from comprehen-
sive conceptions of the good with respect to scope, content, and justification’ (emphases added). For the definition of 
comprehensive doctrines, see section 2.1. Finally, social unity is based on the following points. 1) ‘The basic structure 
of society is effectively regulated by one of a family of reasonable liberal conceptions of justice […].’ 2) ‘All reasona-
ble comprehensive doctrines in society endorse some member of this family of reasonable conceptions, and citizens af-
firming these doctrines are in an enduring majority with respect to those rejecting each of that family.’ And, 3) ‘[p]ublic 
political discussion, when constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice are at stake, are always, or nearly always, 
reasonably decidable on the basis of reasons specified by one of a family of reasonable liberal conceptions of justice’. 
John Rawls, Political Liberalism, xlvii-xlviii. As it will become clear (see in particular section 2.1 below), for Rawls 
‘social unity is given by a stable overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines,’ ibid. 43, emphasis 
added. 
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debate surrounding comprehensive doctrines judging them true or false.130 At most, one could 
say, political liberals can argue ‘from conjecture,’ that is, they can present good reasons from 
within a given comprehensive view for its members to endorse a liberal political conception 
of justice.131 However, even in this case, the problem is not evaluating Islam as such. In rea-
soning from conjecture, one should openly state that she does not ‘assert the premises from 
which [she argues].’132 Rather, the problem is evaluating what logically follows from those 
premises. Therefore, even in conjecture, political liberals do not deal with Islam “as such,” 
but with Islamic arguments. 
Nevertheless, my purpose is not reasoning from conjecture. My central methodological 
claim is that, along with conjecture, political liberalism may encompass another way to ap-
proach comprehensive doctrines without violating the boundaries of the ‘domain of the politi-
cal.’133 In the following chapter, I will explain in detail the method that I adopt in my work. 
For the moment, let me define my study as an inquiry into the relationships between Europe-
an Muslims and the idea of public reason, where the latter is primarily understood as a nor-
matively salient element of European democratic societies’ public political culture134 and as 
an idea upon which we can structure a normative theory of European liberal citizenship. The 
ideas of public reason and public political culture are expounded in chapter three. Here, I 
would like to point out that such an inquiry should be concerned with the problem of how to 
conceive –from a philosophical and normative point of view− European Muslims as full 
members of European (political) liberal citizenries, committed to an ideal of public reason 
                                                        
130 Ibid. for instance xix-xx and 94. I define comprehensive doctrines later. 
131 See section 2.2.b. 
132 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” in Political Liberalism, 466. See infra. 
133 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, for instance, xviii, xxxviii, 11, and 38. 
134 Rawls assumes that the public political culture of a democratic society is characterised by three facts. 1) The fact of 
reasonable pluralism as ‘a permanent feature of the public culture of a democracy [, since u]nder the political and social 
conditions secured by the basic rights and liberties of free institutions, a diversity of conflicting and irreconcilable –and, 
what’s more, reasonable– comprehensive doctrines will come about and persist.’ 2) The fact that ‘a continuing shared 
understanding on one comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine can be maintained only by the oppres-
sive use of state power.’ 3) The fact that ‘an enduring and secure democratic regime […] must be willingly and freely 
supported by at last a substantial majority of its active citizens.’ Ibid. 36-38. Public political culture is a ‘shared fund of 
implicitly recognized basic ideas and principles.’ Ibid. 8. It ‘comprises the political institutions of a democratic regime 
and the public traditions of their interpretation […], as well as historic texts and documents that are common 
knowledge.’ Ibid. 13-14, emphases added. See also 14, 25, 43, 175. 
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that is rooted in European public political culture and specified by a Rawlsian political con-
ception of citizenship, the core of which I assume to be composed of 1- the acceptance of (and 
respect for) the need for a public justification for the use of coercive political power so that 
the latter can be regarded as politically legitimate, and 2- a kernel of political values and vir-
tues which derive from 1. (For this double dimension of public reason, see the introduction of 
chapter four). 
Consequently, European Muslims –and not “Islam as such”– are my referent. Below, just 
before concluding section 1.1.a.2, I will explain why I prefer talking about European Muslims 
rather than about a “European Islam.” Here, I must clarify how I use the expression “Europe-
an Muslims.” I consider the latter in its twofold meaning, that is, both descriptively and nor-
matively. Descriptively, then, European Muslims are, simply, “those Muslims who are citi-
zens of European democratic societies,” regardless of their social and economic conditions, 
the duration of their stay in Europe, level of political participation, gender, age, and ethnic 
group (but with one qualification that I will explain later). All the subsequent cautions against 
essentialism apply here (see 1.1.b), but I would like to assert once again that I am not taking 
into consideration the case of Muslim citizens because I am persuaded that they are somehow 
intrinsically more problematic than “the others” (if this opposition makes any sense at all). In 
no way do I use the expression “European Muslims and liberal citizenship” to suggest that 
there is a tension or incompatibility between European citizenship and the fact of being Mus-
lim. However, the aforementioned remarks support the idea that we should seriously consider 
the fact that the “compatibility” between being a Muslim and being a European citizen is of-
ten questioned and presented as problematic in public discourses (see 1.1.a.1). Coming back 
to the point, I wish to emphasise the fact that, since political liberalism mainly deals with ‘an 
idea of the politically reasonable addressed to citizens as citizens,’135 and since the relevant 
relationship between members of society for elaborating the political conception of justice is 
the ‘political relation of citizenship,’136 here I consider only Muslims as citizens. I do not con-
sider other possible and more specific status (e.g., Muslims as legal/illegal immigrants, non-
                                                        
135 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 441. Emphasis added. 
136 Ibid. 445. 
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citizen residents, members of a minority group,137 and so on). Neither do I consider the ques-
tion of European converts to Islam, nor the case of Muslim indigenous populations in Europe, 
for instance in Greece. Thus, when I refer to European Muslims, here I have in mind the case 
of European citizens of Muslim faith (I should also specify that I have mainly in mind Sunni 
Muslims, but only because the case study that I will consider in chapter six comes from the 
Sunni world) and with an immigrant background (I include in this definition not only first, 
but also second and third generations). The last specification is justified by the kind of con-
siderations that I mentioned earlier: the critique of multiculturalism and the securitisation and 
externalisation of Islam in Europe apparently concerns mainly the “immigrant-who-became-
Muslim,” to refer to Allievi’s definition. Indeed, these are great simplifications. However, 
since I am concerned with a (politically speaking) liberal theory of citizenship, such a simpli-
fication seems reasonable and consistent with the aim of this research, which, drawing on 
Rawls, focuses on the political relationship between cooperating members of society. Political 
liberalism –for its own purposes– politically defines the person as ‘someone who can be a cit-
izen, that is, a normal and fully cooperating member of society over a complete life.’138 The 
political relationship of citizenship is central for Rawls because it is on the basis of such a re-
lationship that the ‘fundamental organizing idea of justice as fairness’ can be structured. Such 
an idea, as I have said, is that of ‘society as a fair system of cooperation over time, from one 
                                                        
137 For an interesting, pre-September 11th 2001 account of the rights of Muslims as an immigrant minority in Europe, 
see Joseph H. Carens and Melissa S. Williams, “Muslim Minorities in Liberal Democracies: The Politics of Misrecog-
nition;” see in particular 163ff. 
138 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 18, emphasis added. Rawls’s political liberalism openly tries to work out a politi-
cal conception of justice for the basic structure of a ‘closed society,’ which is ‘self-contained’ and has ‘no relations with 
other societies. Its members enter it only by birth and leave it only by death. This allows us to speak of them as born 
into a society where they will lead a complete life.’ He is aware that this is ‘a considerable abstraction, justified only 
because it enables us to focus on certain main questions.’ Ibid. 12. However, he tried to broaden (with some adjustment) 
the scope of his theory by considering the relations between (liberal and non-liberal, with several distinctions) peoples 
in his 1993 essay “The Law of Peoples,” in John Rawls, Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman (London – Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 529-564, and in The Law of Peoples. Rawls’s assumption of a closed society 
and his conception of a ‘law of peoples’ have been criticised in different ways. I do not discuss this point here. For both, 
I just mention Bruce Ackerman’s critique in “Political Liberalisms,” in Political Liberalism: Variations on a Theme, ed. 
Shaun P. Young (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2004), see 94-97. Also Onora O’Neill (“Political 
Liberalism and Public Reason: A Critical Notice of John Rawls, Political Liberalism,” The Philosophical Review 106, 
no. 3 (1997), 419ff) criticises –from a Kantian perspective− Rawls’s abstraction (or, as O’Neill puts it, Rawls’s inade-
quate ‘idealization’) of a closed society. O’Neill maintains that Kant’s practical reasoning ‘does not assume that those 
who reason must share a political identity,’ and thus ‘differs from Rawls’s more Rousseauian conception, in which pub-
lic reason is identified with citizens’ reason.’ Ibid. 423. She concludes that in ‘Kant’s eyes, a Rawlsian conception of 
public reason would not be fully public, nor therefore fully reasoned.’ Ibid. 424. For Kant’s account of public reason-
ing, see chapter two. 
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generation to the next.’139 Notice that the possible objection that this descriptive use of the 
expression is very general and actually is not an adequate description is partially well-
grounded. In fact, here I do not describe European Muslims in terms of their actual legal sta-
tus, economic and social conditions, sex/gender/age profiles, or their actual participation in 
social institutions and political activities. Nor do I describe their actual individual religious 
identification(s), for I do not consider their different forms and degrees of religiosity and reli-
gious practice. How much do they effectively pray, go to the mosque, and fast? Are they Sun-
ni or Shi‘is? Generally, the account provided in this study does not ask such questions and, 
thus, it cannot assist in answering them. However, the qualification that I mentioned before 
comes now to the fore. While I take for granted the idea that a more detailed description of 
European Muslims’ legal, social, economic, and political conditions is necessary for knowing 
who Muslims in Europe are today, I also think that the ideal of citizenship worked out in this 
research would not be affected too much by the introduction of those additional elements. 
Since such an ideal of citizenship embraces all the citizenry (Muslims and non-Muslims alike) 
as it should be, I believe that one may simply assume that an ideal of citizenship for European 
societies can include Muslim citizens even in the absence of a full sociological description of 
their present actual status. To be sure, I am perfectly aware that this assumption may be a 
“strong” one,140 still I do not think that it jeopardises the results of a research that adopts 
Rawls’s political liberalism as its main reference. I must be clear on this point: I am not say-
ing that these facts are not morally, socially, and politically important. Quite the contrary: 
they may represent the kind of political injustices that Rawls’s conception of justice strives to 
eliminate (or at least to reduce robustly). I will explain why public reason may equip citizens 
with standards for social criticism that allow them to cope with unjust economic or social ine-
qualities or exclusion (see 1.2 and 5.2.c). Moreover, I do think that, by its very nature, any 
                                                        
139 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 15. 
140 It may be a strong assumption because in practice there might be a (quite obvious) positive relation between one’s 
longstanding possession of the legal status of citizenship and one’s participation in the “European public political cul-
ture.” Above all, one might argue that if we neglect important socio-economic and historical factors, we risk perpetuat-
ing the ‘relationships of domination which tend to impose a reference framework’ on the ‘formation of identities of Eu-
ropean Muslims’ [Jocelyne Cesari, “Muslim Identities in Europe: The Snare of Exceptionalism,” in Islam in Europe: 
Diversity, Identity and Influence, eds. Aziz Al-Azmeh and Effie Fokas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
49]. This is a serious concern. However, it does not affect per se the normative arguments developed in this study. The 
fact that some Muslims are more likely to share or actually share European public political culture does not affect the 
problem of why and how they should share it, that is, the problem of justification. Moreover, in what follows, I explain 
that one of the main motivations of my work is precisely the need for a normative framework allowing citizens to prob-
lematise –and eventually overthrow− those ‘relationships of domination.’ 
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conception of citizenship grounded in reciprocity and civic friendship (infra) is inclined to 
recognise the importance of knowing who one’s fellow citizens are and how they live. And, 
by my interpretation, public reason citizenship is rooted precisely in political reciprocity. 
Along these lines, my work starts by denouncing actual discrimination and arbitrary inequali-
ties and aims at drawing a normative ideal picture of citizenship in Europe in which there is 
no room for those arbitrary inequalities. However, the process through which we can reach a 
normative ideal of citizenship should not be concerned only with existing conditions. This is 
what distinguishes a ‘critical’ liberal perspective grounded in ideal consensus from a ‘realist’ 
liberal account centred on actual consensus, institutions, and preferences.141 Following 
Rawls’s critical liberalism, the idea is that theoretical priority should be granted to reasonably 
fair considerations (through a fair procedure of political construction) that everyone –
independently from her contingent actual position in society− could accept, so that we can 
work out principles of justice whose “embodiment” in society’s basic structure can eliminate 
(or at least reduce) political injustice. A general idea of justice as fairness is that, for an ac-
count of justice to be fair, it should not be grounded in contingent and (from the viewpoint of 
political justice) morally arbitrary features, endowments, and positions of a specific person.142 
A defining feature of Rawls’s liberalism is the idea that, for an ideal of political justice to be 
justifiable to every citizen in society and to work toward removing political injustices, it 
should not be shaped by embedding existing injustices in the political conception of justice it-
self. What is important is the fact that each person can have the right kind of reasons for en-
dorsing that account. Accordingly, as we shall see, the content of public reason is specified by 
a family of reasonable liberal conceptions of justice.143 Among them, Rawls’s conception is 
worked out in an original position in which nobody knows ‘[f]eatures relating to social posi-
tion, native endowment, and historical accident,’ since they are ‘irrelevant, politically speak-
ing, and hence placed behind the veil of ignorance.’144 Thus, the political moral ideal of liber-
                                                        
141 For the distinction between ‘critical liberalism’ and ‘realist liberalism,’ see Sebastiano Maffettone, “Liberalismo fi-
losofico contemporaneo,” in Manuale di filosofia politica, eds. Sebastiano Maffettone and Salvatore Veca (Rome: 
Donzelli, 1996), in particular 71-80. 
142 See, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, original edition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971) and re-
vised edition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999) [references to A Theory of Justice will be made in the 
following form: original edition/revised edition page numbers], for instance 100-108/86-93, 310-315/273-277. 
143 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, for example 213, 223-227. 
144 Ibid. 79. 
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al democratic citizenship specified by public reason is not worked out on the basis of such 
considerations. Therefore, my previous assumption (“an ideal of citizenship for European so-
cieties can include Muslim citizens even in the absence of a full sociological description of 
their present actual status”) is not too strong. Later on (see 1.1.b), I will take into considera-
tion two possible objections (that I will call respectively O1.3 and O1.2): the first concerning 
the empirical-normative dimension of the problem that I am analysing, and the second related 
to the (alleged) lack of an exhaustive account of power. 
These remarks lead me to the second –normative− use of the expression European Mus-
lims. In this sense, the expression expresses “how a Muslim should conceive her political 
rights, obligations, and values and be committed to an ideal of democratic citizenship as a 
European citizen.” In this work, such an ideal is specified by public reason, which expresses a 
‘criterion of reciprocity.’ The latter, in turn, specifies ‘the nature of the political relation in a 
constitutional democratic regime as one of civic friendship.’145 Thus, on a normative level, the 
question is to see how a citizen who sincerely professes her Muslim faith can endorse this 
common political ideal. Again, I am not assuming that Muslims’ endorsement of such an ide-
al is (by definition) peculiarly difficult or problematic. I am just assuming that, since the issue 
of Muslims’ loyalty to liberal terms of citizenship has been raised and questioned from differ-
ent perspectives, a normative reflection about how this endorsement should be understood is 
part of the tasks of contemporary political philosophy. Again, finally, the normative horizon 
of this research is one of political reconciliation in democracies in which citizens recognise 
                                                        
145 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 447. 
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that the ‘fact of reasonable pluralism limits what is practicably possible under the conditions 
of our social world.’146  
In this work, therefore, I do not use the term citizenship in a legal sense. In this study, citi-
zenship is defined as the political relation specifying the mutual rights and obligations of per-
sons who share that relation in a democratic society. Since ‘citizenship is a social role,’147 it 
imposes on persons ‘role-specific’148 (or ‘role-mediated’)149 obligations: we have certain mu-
tual obligations precisely because we share the political relation of citizenship. Some of these 
obligations have a specifically moral and political character. Each conception of citizenship 
qualifies the nature of the political relation. The former, in turn, is specified starting from sev-
eral assumptions concerning the characterisation of society and persons and it is justified in a 
specific way. I consider some of those assumptions and the procedure of justification peculiar 
to Political Liberalism in chapter two. In this work, then, I am exclusively concerned with a 
                                                        
146 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, edited by Erin Kelly (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2001), 4. In this sense, political philosophy is ‘realistically utopian,’ since it ‘prob[es] the limits of practicable political 
possibility.’ The crucial question is ‘[w]hat would a just democratic society be like under reasonably favourable but 
still historical conditions […]? What ideals and principles would such a society try to realize given the circumstances of 
justice in a democratic culture as we know them?’ Among those circumstances of justice that we can find in our demo-
cratic public political culture, there is the ‘fact of reasonable pluralism,’ a circumstance that arises when reason is exer-
cised under free institutions (for all this, see infra). This circumstance imposes limits on what is politically practicable 
in a democratic society. With reference to the ‘role of reconciliation’ of political philosophy (ibid. 3-4), Rawls specifies 
that, because of the fact of reasonable pluralism, ‘a democratic society is not and cannot be a community, where by a 
community I mean a body of persons united in affirming the same comprehensive […] doctrine.’ Nor, as we will see, 
for the specific kind of reason (namely, public reason) that characterises it, a political society can be understood as an 
association (ibid. 94). Associations (e.g. churches, universities, clubs, and so on), in fact, are characterised by non-
public reasons, and their authority is freely accepted. Rawls specifies: ‘I do not claim that we [recognise a non-public 
authority] by an act of free choice, as it were, apart from all prior loyalty and commitments, attachments and affections. 
I mean that, as free and equal citizens, whether we affirm [a comprehensive view] is regarded as within our political 
competence as specified by the basic constitutional rights and liberties’ (93). On the contrary, since emigration is the 
only way to “back out” of a political society and since it is usually a very expensive step in terms of one’s own identity, 
attachments, and historical, social, linguistic and cultural references, Rawls’s concludes that ‘the right of emigration 
[…] does not suffice to make accepting [public] authority free, politically speaking, in the way that liberty of con-
science suffices to make accepting ecclesiastical authority free, politically speaking’ (94). Finally he concludes the dis-
tinction between society, associations, and communities by saying that, within a political society, associations ‘can be 
communities united on a shared final ends; indeed this is essential: were it not the case social life would lose its point’ 
(94, emphasis added). On the idea that a ‘well-ordered society is neither a community nor, more generally, an associa-
tion,’ see also Political Liberalism, 40-43. Here he importantly adds: ‘a zeal for the whole truth tempts us to a broader 
and deeper unity that cannot be justified by public reason,’ and, later, that in a well-ordered society the ‘nature of social 
unity is given by a stable overlapping consensus,’ 42-43. 
147 Paul J. Weithman, Religion and the Obligations of Citizenship (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 13. 
148 Ibid. 
149 James W. Boettcher, “The Moral Status of Public Reason,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 20, no. 2 (2012), 
166. 
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liberal normative conception of citizenship, that is, how a (conscientious) liberal citizen 
should conceive of her political relation with fellow citizens. In Political Liberalism (and in 
“The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”), conscientious citizens try to behave in accordance 
with a member of the family of liberal political conceptions of justice (see chapter three). To-
gether, the members of the family of liberal political conceptions specify the content of public 
reason. The latter, in turn, represents ‘an ideal conception of citizenship for a constitutional 
democratic regime, it presents how things might be, taking people as a just and well-ordered 
society would encourage them to be.’150 Thus, public reason (as a conception of citizenship) 
qualifies the political relation of citizenship in a specific liberal political way. Thus, the re-
quirements of public reason can be understood as expressing the obligations that are appropri-
ate for conscientious liberal citizens. That is, as appropriate requirements for persons who 
jointly affirm a liberal conception of citizenship grounded in public reason and in political 
reciprocity.151 In my work, then, liberal citizenship can be read as public reason citizenship. 
Therefore, here liberal citizenship is defined as the political relation specifying the mutual 
rights and obligations of citizens of a democratic society who affirm the ideal of public reason 
as the normative standard in their public political lives. Indeed, in this definition many ele-
ments must be further developed (e.g. the scope of the expression “public political lives”). 
Chapters two, three, and four will secure what is needed to this end.  
A final remark that connects my descriptive and normative use of the expression “Europe-
an Muslims” [and may anticipate my reply to the objections concerning the notion of power 
and the normative emphasis in this research (1.1.b, O1.2 and O1.3)] refers to the fact that 
Rawls himself is aware of the risk of bypassing the struggle against existing injustices using 
as an excuse one’s exclusive concern with the elaboration of a normative ideal. He unambig-
uously asserts that a normative approach cannot ignore −and be insensitive to− an unjust sta-
tus quo. Political philosophy cannot justify social, political, and economic injustices by silent-
ly taking them for granted and building over them an ideological apparatus that ends up –
overtly or implicitly− making them more or less acceptable. Such blindness would amount to 
                                                        
150 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 213. For the relevance of such an ideal in societies which are not well-ordered, see 
chapter five. 
151 For a thorough investigation of the moral character of the requirements of public reason, see James W. Boettcher, 
“The Moral Status of Public Reason.” According to Boettcher, ‘requirements of public reason are role-mediated obliga-
tions […] based on the moral duty of mutual respect.’ Ibid. 166. Here, it is not possible to explore this question in fur-
ther details. 
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guilty connivance, because it would understand the role of reconciliation of political philoso-
phy in the wrong way. In fact, Rawls writes: 
‘The idea of political philosophy as reconciliation must be invoked with care. 
For political philosophy is always in danger of being used corruptly as a defense 
of an unjust and unworthy status quo, and thus of being ideological in Marx’s 
sense. From time to time we must ask whether justice as fairness, or any other 
view, is ideological in this way; and if not, why not? Are the very basic ideas it 
uses ideological? How can we show they are not?’152 
Still, he does not dismiss his project, being persuaded of its worthiness: 
‘We must start with the assumption that a reasonably just political society is 
possible, and for it to be possible, human beings must have a moral nature, not of 
course a perfect such nature, yet one that can understand, act on, and be sufficient-
ly moved by a reasonable political conception of right and justice to support a so-
ciety guided by its ideals and principles. […] The focus on these questions no 
doubt explains in part what seems to many readers the abstract and unworldly 
character of [A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism]. I do not apologize for 
that.’153 
This is the core of Rawls’s political ‘critical liberalism’ (supra) which, as we will see, tries 
to reconcile ideal political consensus and reasonable pluralism through the ideas of an over-
lapping consensus and of wide public reason (see chapters two, three, and four). Elsewhere, 
with an unusual but sincere emphatic tone, Rawls adds: 
‘We try to show that the well-ordered society of justice as fairness is indeed 
possible according to our nature and [the requirements of workable political insti-
tutions]. This endeavor belongs to political philosophy as reconciliation; for see-
ing that the conditions of a social world at least allow for that possibility affects 
our view of the world itself and our attitude toward it. No longer need it seem 
hopelessly hostile, a world in which the will to dominate and oppressive cruelties, 
                                                        
152 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 4 note 4. 
153 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, lx.  
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abetted by prejudice and folly, must inevitably prevail. None of this may ease our 
loss, situated as we may be in a corrupt society. But we may reflect that the world 
is not in itself inhospitable to political justice and its good. Our social world might 
have been different and there is hope for those at another time and place.’154 
I will return to these points later. In particular, in 2.1 I will show how Rawls tries to recon-
cile justificatory consensus and reasonable pluralism through the idea of an overlapping con-
sensus, whilst in 5.2.c I will explain how wide public reason works toward political reconcili-
ation.  
Always with reference to the normative dimension of my investigation, an important clari-
fication is in order. If I have said the scope of my analysis is limited to Western European so-
cieties, I must also emphasise the fact that my approach is not comparative. Rather, as I have 
just mentioned, it is normative and situated at a high level of theoretical abstraction. I do not 
consider the question of citizenship in the European Union: my only remarks on this topic are 
admittedly provisional and concise, and they can be found in chapter five. Nor do I consider 
specific models of citizenship as they have been historically experienced in different countries 
in Western Europe such as France, Germany or the UK. In other words, this study does not 
present a comparative analysis of national models of citizenship in Europe155 or of the ways in 
which they deal with Muslims.156 Instead, I adopt the perspective of normative political phi-
losophy. From this viewpoint, I consider some ideal models of citizenship. In particular, I try 
to demonstrate that the model that I defend (public reason citizenship) is normatively more 
appealing and adequate to the resolution of the question that I am analysing if compared with 
alternative philosophical conceptions of citizenship. (For reasons that I will explain further 
on, I will take into account liberal multiculturalism and critical republicanism, see 1.2.a and 
5.2.b). 
                                                        
154 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 37-38. 
155 For an outstanding example of this kind of analysis, see Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France 
and Germany (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992). 
156 See for instance Joel S. Fetzer and J. Christopher Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany 
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). For a comprehensive overview of the different and 
changing realities concerning Muslim citizens, groups, and communities around Europe, see The Oxford Handbook of 
European Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), edited by Jocelyne Cesari. 
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I am aware that my project may engender several objections even at this introductory 
stage. I want now to consider a powerful general objection (GO) to my research. Moreover, in 
the next section (1.1.b) I will consider three other possible arguments against the proposed 
way of framing the question that I am analysing (objections O1.1, O1.2, and O1.3). Finally, in 
the next chapter, after having explained my method by means of comparison with an alterna-
tive method of reasoning within the framework of political liberalism which deals with a 
similar but different issue (namely, “what resources does Islam provide for the full justifica-
tion157 of a liberal conception?”), my hope is that my approach will be clear enough to counter 
other and more detailed objections (see 2.3 for objections O2.1, O2.2, O2.3, O2.4, and O2.5).  
(GO) Let me consider a very serious argument against my research project. It asks why we 
should assume that Muslims are intrinsically more problematic than other religious groups 
from the perspective of liberal democracy. Since there is no evidence that Muslim citizens’ at-
titude toward common terms of liberal citizenship is more challenging than for other religious 
citizens (in fact, some empirical research shows the opposite trend),158 this study would tacitly 
stand on the artificial construction of its own problem. The latter would be the alleged particu-
larly difficult relation between Muslims and European democratic systems. I call this claim 
the artificially-constructed-problem objection. I think that this concern is important and wor-
thy of consideration. The only way to expel it lies in explaining why and how I take into ac-
count the case of Muslim citizens in European democratic societies. The “how” will be ex-
plained in the next chapter. Concerning the “why,” I do not assume that Muslims are intrinsi-
cally more problematic than citizens of faith belonging to other religious traditions. Nor do I 
assume that Islam is more inconsistent with liberal democracy than other religions. As I said 
at the beginning, this research is not concerned with such quasi-ontological considerations 
(“Islam in itself is…,” “by definition, Muslims are…”). Rather, the relevant problem is on a 
different level: the political level. Politics always involves some form of relationship. Then, 
by saying that the problem is political, I mean that we should consider its relational dimen-
sion. Put differently, there are two possible replies to the previous objection. Firstly, I do not 
need to suppose that European Muslims are effectively more problematic than other religious 
groups. The literature considered at the beginning of this chapter shows that a problem does 
                                                        
157 Infra. 
158 For example, some surveys found that Muslims in Paris, Berlin, and London are more supportive of democratic in-
stitutions (e.g. elections and the judicial system) than non-Muslims. See Jytte Klausen, The Islamic Challenge, viii. 
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exist in European societies’ public perceptions, speeches, and real life. These latter (and not 
Islam or Muslims per se) constitute the background problem of my work. Starting from this 
background problem, I specify my research problem (1.2.a) and questions (1.2.b). Thus, such 
a problem could simply be considered as my case study and it would not be any more “con-
structed” than other political phenomena that political scientists, political philosophers, histo-
rians, and sociologists usually investigate (this is a broad question that I do not address here). 
I believe that this is a legitimate answer. Nonetheless, a second and more illuminating reply to 
GO is possible. It refers to the meaning and purpose of my analysis. The latter aims to dis-
close the dimension that is actually at stake when we talk about Muslims in Europe as a prob-
lem. As I have just said, these perceptions and discourses concern the political dimension. In 
few words, this research could help to understand where the problem lies (to state on which 
sphere –the political one– our perceptions, experiences, thoughts, discourses, and claims 
about the so-called “Muslim problem” impact) and how to deal with it (through procedures of 
public justification and a shared commitment to common political values). To avoid any mis-
understanding, let me repeat very clearly that I am not saying that Muslims are a problem. I 
am not claiming that we should look at them as essentially problematic (implying that we 
should assume that differences between them would be less important than their common 
problematic “Muslim essence”), nor am I propose a single solution for that alleged quasi-
ontological “Muslim problem.” For the moment, in this section 1.1.a, I am just saying that Is-
lam is often presented as a problem in European public discourses. Therefore, my theoretical 
concern is with answering to these perceptions and to their practical consequences from a 
normative perspective. Only in 1.2.a will I analyse the roots of such perceptions and extract a 
detailed account of my research problem from this background problem. Moreover, as I will 
explain in the second chapter, my approach openly denies the possibility of a theoretical anal-
ysis of the European Muslim approach to the issue of citizenship. Doing so would amount to 
an essentialist and simplistic understanding of the varied reality of Muslims (as individuals, 
associations, groups, communities, as well as their religious, political, and philosophical 
trends) in contemporary Europe. For this reason, I introduce a methodological principle ac-
cording to which, without dismissing the analytically useful concept of a “European Muslim 
perspective,” the best we can hope for is to consider a plausible European Muslim approach. 
That is, a Muslim approach among others in Europe, which we can plausibly define as a Eu-
ropean Muslim approach because it is widely accepted by Muslims citizens in Europe. In 
these terms, I think, the objection GO is much less paralysing. Finally, if one does not assume 
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that Muslims are more problematic than other religious citizens, then it becomes possible to 
shift the burden of proof. The latter falls on those who affirm that with Muslim citizens there 
is no problem at all in Europe, and that they are not only fully “integrated” within the political 
system, but also publicly recognised, presented, and perceived as fully integrated and cooper-
ating members of society. Not does only the analysis in 1.1.a.1 show that such recognition, 
presentation, and perception is absent, but a similar expectation of “natural” consistency be-
tween citizens’ religious beliefs and their political status as citizens (in terms of their political 
liberties, rights and duties) would starkly contrast with the historical experience concerning 
citizens of faith belonging to other religious groups. In fact, the Rawlsian perspective adopted 
in this research treats citizens of different religions fairly because ‘it does not single out Islam 
for special treatment. Rawls presumes all reasonable citizens undertake the task of reconciling 
their comprehensive views with those of public reason.’159 If one can investigate the level of 
political reconciliation attained with and through the idea of public reason by every citizen (of 
whatever religion or philosophical conviction), then there is no point in targeting Islam and 
Muslims as particularly problematic. In themselves, they are not more problematic than any 
other religion or group of religious citizens from the angle of democratic citizenship. Howev-
er, the point is that in contemporary Europe they are too often publicly presented and repre-
sented as particularly problematic. This work −adopting the viewpoint of public reason− tries 
to show that they are not. 
Moreover, as I will explain in 1.1.b, I am aware that there is a thin red line between the 
kind of considerations developed here, and the kind of arguments derived from an essentialist 
approach that establishes an opposition between “European liberal democratic citizens” and 
“Muslims,” perhaps with a tacit underlying “we” vs. “you” logic, in which the essence of the 
two subjects is homogeneously pre-established. I consider the respect of that red line of capi-
tal importance. The essentialist approach is precisely what the argument developed here tries 
to eradicate −or at least to contain significantly, in order to establish more reciprocally re-
spectful relationships. In 1.1.b I explain the fundamentally different motivations which distin-
guish my approach from an essentialist account of the “Europeans” vs. “Muslims” kind, 
which I find simply nonsense. Moreover, as I have mentioned, in the second chapter I adopt a 
                                                        
159 Mohammad Fadel, “The True, the Good, and the Reasonable: The Theological and Ethical Roots of Public Reason 
in Islamic Law,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 21, no. 1 (2008), 5-69. Available at URL 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1085347##. References are to the version available online: the pre-
vious quotation is from page 9. Emphasis added. 
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methodological principle whose main purpose is to avoid essentialism without dismissing the 
possibility of analysing a plausible (not the) European Muslim perspective on the issue of cit-
izenship. In the text, I have tried to avoid any possible cause of misinterpretation. However, 
for editorial reasons, in more advanced stages of the work I have used shorter expressions 
(such as “European Muslim approach” tout court). So, let me state from the very beginning a 
general principle for interpreting this research: nothing in this study aims to reduce the rich, 
complex, and diverse reality of Muslims’ presence in Europe to a single, unified and perenni-
al “essence,” nor to reduce the relationships between Muslims (in their diversities) and non-
Muslims (in their diversities) to a mere theoretical and problematic core. Moreover, there is 
no binary opposition: I am persuaded that no theory can exhaustively account for the rich-
ness and complexity of human life, interactions, and relationships in their varied and chang-
ing manifestations. I hope that this initial remark will clarify and amend possible ambiguities. 
As I previously mentioned, now I must return to the five perspectives mentioned above 
(see the beginning of this section), in order to clarify a question that I have not yet touched 
upon. One should notice that those perspectives deal with Islam, Muslims, or both. It is note-
worthy that the choice and use of these concepts seems to be particularly relevant in the first 
view, for the shift from a criticism of Islam to a criticism of Muslims in general is grounded 
in the (con)fusion of these two terms. Moreover, as I have remarked, the fourth view is main-
ly concerned with Islam as a tradition of moral argumentation and as a source of justification. 
The third view tries to critically assess the relationship between Islam as a tradition in a 
broader cultural sense and Muslims as believers and historically situated interpreters of that 
tradition. The second view principally focuses on Muslims as a minority, as individuals, and 
as social and political actors, but I have also observed that, so constructed, this category is too 
extensive to draw meaningful conclusions beyond what I said at the preliminary stage of this 
study. However, one can observe that the fifth perspective refers to European Muslims and 
not to European Islam. I do not want to over-emphasise such a distinction: this would be nei-
ther useful nor in line with my aims. Notwithstanding this, I did after all begin by saying that 
“Islam makes problem:” therefore, apparently the first empirical insight of my research re-
ferred to Islam and no preference for the expression European Islam or European Muslims 
was invoked there. So, one might ask why I refer now to European Muslims rather than to Eu-
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ropean Islam. All things considered, is it not true that ‘Islam is what Muslims do with it’160? 
Moreover, sociology does use the expression ‘European Islam,’161 so why does this study opt 
for the expression European Muslims? While the use of the former may be justified in socio-
logical analyses as referring to the phenomenon of Islam as being in, belonging to, and/or 
adapting to Europe,162 when we shift to a normative level I think that the latter is the most ap-
propriate.163 Firstly, one can observe that some references to a ‘Euro-Islam’ in a normative 
                                                        
160 Bassam Tibi, Euro-Islam, 103. My translation.  
161 See, for instance, Stefano Allievi “How the Immigrant has Become Muslim: Public Debates on Islam in Europe,” 8-
9 and “Conflicts over Mosques in Europe: Policy Issues and Trends,” 11. See also Felice Dassetto, “Discours, sociétés 
et individus dans l’islam européen,” passim. 
162 In this sense, Islam may be considered European since: 1) Islam ‘has become the second religious presence in Eu-
rope […,] a presence that can be considered definitive and irreversible,’ 2) European converts and second and third 
generation of Muslims ‘can call themselves European to all effects, and represent […] the first real autochthonous Eu-
ropean Islam (often […] also “citizen” to all effects, and so endowed with full rights).’ Stefano Allievi “How the Immi-
grant has Become Muslim: Public Debates on Islam in Europe,” 8-9. These considerations seemingly justify the refer-
ence to a new sociological “kind” of the phenomenon “Islam.” Allievi (“Conflicts over Mosques in Europe: Policy Is-
sues and Trends,” 10-11) draws a five-stage history of the ‘approximation’ between Europe and Islam. The first stage 
(‘Islam and Europe’) was marked by conflict and it was also the longest-lasting (‘lasting for at least the first ten centu-
ries of Islam’). The second phase (‘Europe in Islam’) was characterised by European colonial power. The third stage 
(‘Islam in Europe’) began with the arrival of the first Muslim immigrants, mainly between the aftermath of the Second 
World War and the 1960s-1970s. In the fourth phase (‘Islam of Europe’), we observe ‘a gradual process of insertion, 
manifested in the processes of integration –initially in the workplace, then in a social and sometimes political context– 
and of generational transition. Together, these contribute to the formation of a middle class and an intelligentsia of Is-
lamic origin: one that still has relations with the countries of origin, but which does not come from outside, and is born 
and socialized in Europe.’ The fifth phase would produce a ‘genuine European Islam, with its own pronounced identi-
ty,’ resulting from ‘a gradual and substantial process of “citizenization” of Muslims residing in Europe.’ However, Al-
lievi recognises that ‘most Europeans countries find themselves somewhere between the third and fourth phases.’ 
163 Interestingly enough, we can observe that, when the focus shifts from sociology to religious studies and history of 
religions, the terminology shifts as well. So, for instance, in the book edited by Felice Dassetto Paroles d’islam: Indi-
vidus, sociétés et discours dans l’islam européen contemporain / Islamic Words: Individuals, Societies and Discourses 
in Contemporary European Islam, the contribution about the normative aspect of Islam deals with Islam in Europe, not 
with European Islam. For this contribution: Jacques Waardenburg, “Normative Islam in Europe,” 49-68. The reason can 
be understood in the light of the first argument I mention below. 
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sense have been persuasively criticised.164 Secondly, I would like to add four arguments that 
justify the preference for the expression “European Muslims.”  
1) Religious internal coherence and unity argument. From the viewpoint of a pious Mus-
lim believer, Islam is a single, unitary religion. Despite the obvious existence of different reli-
gious practices and identities (related to the above-mentioned differences in social, political, 
and historical contexts and traditions), each believer understands Islam −as her own religion− 
as a single and unique one. Islam is a strictly monotheistic religion and the principle of tawḥīd 
(the oneness and uniqueness of God, affirmed in the šahāda, the testimony of faith) profound-
ly shapes it, not only in the sense that it professes that there is only one God, but also in the 
sense that such uniqueness permeates every aspect of the religious.165 Again, this is not to say 
that such a principle has not been debated or that Islam has been historically immutable or en-
                                                        
164 See, for instance, Jocelyne Cesari, “Islamophobia in the West,” 35: ‘Bassam Tibi […] launched the term Euro-Islam 
[…] to express an understanding of Islam in a “European culture of reference” (Leitkultur). Although Tibi does not 
himself promote essentialist visions of Islam, his ideas about the incompatibility of Islam and Europe contribute to an 
understanding of Islam as foreign and dangerous.’ See also Jørgen Nielsen’s criticism of Tibi’s notion of Euro-Islam, in 
“The Question of Euro-Islam: Restriction or Opportunity?” in Islam in Europe: Diversity, Identity and Influence, eds. 
Aziz Al-Azmeh and Effie Fokas, 34-48 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Nielsen argues that Tibi’s ap-
proach is deeply problematic, firstly because, ‘[d]espite the assertion that both sides [Europeans and Muslims] need to 
move, there is precious little discussion of how Europe is supposed to move, other than by encouraging change in the 
right direction by Muslims.’ Moreover, Muslims are expected to ‘meet European standards which Europeans them-
selves have often not met. The expectation of religious tolerance is one which is blind to the continuing national and 
ethnic intolerance which remains endemic in European culture and continues to find expression in national legislation 
and policies.’ Finally, ‘the implication that the European religious scene is one which acknowledges the equality of es-
teem of all religions in the public space is also open to question, especially in countries where some churches hold 
privileged positions in relation to the state and the taxpayer.’ Ibid. 36. Nielsen comes to the conclusion that, since 
‘[t]here is more than one way of being a European when it comes to cultural and religious practice and identity,’ then 
there ‘are necessarily more ways than one for Muslims to become Europeans.’ He argues that such a notion of Euro-
Islam ‘becomes restrictive [, since t]oo quickly and easily it shifts subtly from being a description of the complicated 
process of integration which Muslims of immigrant origin are passing through, to becoming a prescription which im-
plies a dichotomy between “”good” and “bad” Muslims, a dichotomy which is particularly dangerous at a time when 
Islam in the public space is too facilely viewed from the perspective of public security.’ Ibid. 37. At the end of his es-
say, Nielsen argues in favour of other conceptions of the ways in which Muslims can rethink their being Muslim in Eu-
rope. Among those promising approaches, he mentions Tariq Ramadan (ibid. 45). However, for the sake of argument, 
here I just retain his points against Tibi’s Euro-Islam. Note, however, that Nielsen’s arguments may be equally directed 
against some uses of the label “European Muslims.” So, this cannot be the ground for my normative preference for the 
latter. However, I do think that the considerations I will develop in this chapter and in the following one would mitigate 
Nielsen’s concerns about the possibility that my use of the expression “European Muslims” may hide ‘a prescription 
which implies a dichotomy between “good” and “bad” Muslims.’ 
165 See, for instance, Alessandro Bausani, L’Islam: Una religione, un’etica, una prassi politica (Milan: Garzanti, 1999), 
19 and 43. Massimo Campanini, Islam e politica, new edition (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2003), 50-51. Sabrina Mervin, 
L’Islam: Fondamenti e dottrine, edited by Bruna Soravia (Milan: Bruno Mondadori, 2004) [Original edition: Histoire 
de l’islam. Fondaments et doctrines. Paris: Flammarion, 2000], 5 and 55. Alberto Ventura, “L’islām sunnita nel periodo 
classico (VII-XVI secolo),” in Islam, ed. Giovanni Filoramo, Economica Laterza edition (Rome and Bari: Laterza, 
2007), 120-121. 
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tirely coherent.166 However, the oneness and uniqueness of God and, consequently, of His re-
ligion is a fundamental pillar of Islam. Therefore, normative political theory should seriously 
take into account the fact that it is very likely that a believer would perceive her faith as a 
commitment to Islam tout court, and not to a Europe-based “tailored” Islam. For instance, 
Tariq Ramadan claims that his reformism must be understood as an effort to revitalise the 
original dynamism of the universal message of Islam, which must always be put in its context, 
and not to create a new “branch” of Islam: he argues that ‘[t]he point is not to create a new Is-
lam but to reconnect Islam with its original dynamism, creativity, and confidence, which ena-
bled the faithful to observe and integrate positively all that was good and positive in the cul-
tures they encountered.’167 Thus, pace Tibi, normatively speaking the presumption should be 
that, while many (how many is a question that normative political theory alone is unable to 
answer) Muslims could accept to define themselves “European Muslims,” very few would a 
priori define their faith as a “European Islam.” We should not assume that Muslims in Europe 
are currently revising (or should revise) the fundamentals of their religion in order to work out 
a new or different Islam.168 By choosing the expression “European Muslims,” then, my first 
aim is to avoid the risk of “forcing” Muslims to redefine their own faith (by means of an ad-
jective) as a necessary condition for honouring the normative terms of citizenship.  
2) Political liberalism coherence argument. As I have said and I will explain later, political 
liberalism does not horn in on the issue of comprehensive doctrines, since ‘it is constrained by 
                                                        
166 For example, for some considerations about Mu’tazila’s doctrinal formulation of the internal unity and singleness of 
God, see my previous work “Oltre un illuminismo islamico,” 70 and 74-76 and Ida Zilio-Grandi, “Temi e figure 
dell’apologia musulmana (‘ilm al kalam) in relazione al sorgere e allo sviluppo della falsafa,” in Storia della filosofia 
nell’Islam medievale 1, ed. Cristina D’Ancona (Turin: Einaudi, 2005), in particular 145. For additional bibliography on 
this subject, see the contributions mentioned in my work. 
167 The full passage reads as follows: ‘[w]e are witnessing the birth of a Western Islamic culture within which Muslims 
remain faithful to fundamental religious principles while owning up to their Western cultures. They are both fully Mus-
lim as to religion and fully Western as to culture, and that is no problem at all. The point is not to create a new Islam but 
to reconnect Islam with its original dynamism, creativity, and confidence, which enabled the faithful to observe and in-
tegrate positively all that was good and positive in the cultures they encountered while remaining critical and selective 
when those cultures could result in insularity, in questionable behavior and usage, or in systematic discrimination.’ 
What I Believe, 42-43. 
168 As Bhikhu Parekh puts it (and Andrew March appropriately reminds in Islam and Liberal Citizenship, 76): ‘[m]any 
of these cultural communities are not averse to self-criticism and change, but they do so in a spirit of humility rather 
than self-creation, and in terms of the central values and principles of their culture rather than some allegedly transcul-
tural norms autonomously derived by an unanchored and self-sufficient reason.’ Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multicul-
turalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 107.  
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its own agnosticism about the nature and truth of comprehensive doctrines.’169 In Rawls’s 
view, since a political conception of justice must be ‘freestanding,’170 ‘[i]t does not provide a 
specific religious, metaphysical, or epistemological doctrine beyond what is implied by the 
political conception.’171 However, as Larmore states it, ‘[a]lthough the moral basis of liberal-
ism must be minimal, it cannot be trivial.’172 Political liberalism is a ‘minimal moral concep-
tion;’173 that is, a moral conception limited to the domain of the political. Let me add –in a 
provisional form− an important point, which I will explore in chapters two and three. In this 
study, I provide an interpretation of (wide) public reason which mainly focuses on its ideal 
and moral (rather than strictly epistemological, formalistic, or institutional) dimension. This 
interpretation seems the most fitting with Rawls’s ideas of reasonableness and public reason. 
For example, in Political Liberalism Rawls says: ‘[o]bserve that here being reasonable is not 
an epistemological idea (though it has epistemological elements). Rather, it is part of a politi-
cal ideal of democratic citizenship that includes the idea of public reason. The content of this 
ideal includes what free and equal citizens as reasonable can require of each other with re-
                                                        
169 Micah Schwartzman, “The Ethics of Reasoning from Conjecture,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 9, no. 4 (2012), 523. 
170 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, see, for example, 10, 12, 24-25 note 27, 133, and 144. 
171 Ibid. 144 (see also 10). For an influential critique see Joseph Raz, “Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Absti-
nence,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 19, no. 1 (1990), in particular 14-15, 18-20, and 22-24. 
172 Charles Larmore, “Political Liberalism,” in Political Liberalism: Variations on a Theme, 63. 
173 Ibid. 57. While I do not discuss the moral foundations of political liberalism here, one clarification is in order. Lar-
more argues that ‘political liberalism is to be understood as a correct moral conception and not just as an object of con-
sensus.’ Ibid. 70. The correctness of political liberalism as a moral conception stems, according to Larmore, from its 
moral justification, which is based on the two moral norms of rational dialogue and equal respect (ibid. 58, 63-65). In 
Larmore’s understanding, the idea of an overlapping consensus is morally grounded in something like his ‘norm of 
equal respect.’ In fact, Rawls affirms that ‘justification is addressed to others who disagree with us, and therefore it 
must always proceed from some consensus, that is, from premises that we and others publicly recognize as true; or bet-
ter, publicly recognize as acceptable to us for the purpose of establishing a working agreement on the fundamental 
questions of political justice. It goes without saying that this agreement must be informed and uncoerced, and reached 
by citizens in ways consistent with their being viewed as free and equal persons.’ John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Po-
litical not Metaphysical,” in John Rawls, Collected Papers, 394, emphases added. Thus, Larmore contends that the 
norm of equal respect ‘serves to define the sort of consensus that, for [Rawls] counts as a legitimate basis for political 
principles. This norm is therefore assumed to be correct and not merely agreed on,’ and he concludes that Rawls should 
make clear this moral foundation of political liberalism more resolutely (‘Rawls should be more explicit about the role 
that the norm of equal respect plays in his political theory’). Charles Larmore, “Political Liberalism,” 72. For a similar 
point, see also his “The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism,” The Journal of Philosophy 96, no. 12 (1999), in particular 
605-611. 
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spect to their reasonable comprehensive views.’174 In this sense, justice as fairness is not pro-
cedurally neutral: the reasonable orients the rational choice toward certain substantive princi-
ples of justice.175 Justice as fairness openly appeals to certain moral values and virtues, name-
ly, political moral values and virtues: ‘the virtues of civility and toleration, of reasonableness 
and the sense of justice.’176 Nor justice as fairness claims to be neutral concerning its influ-
ence or effect: since ‘it may […] affirm the superiority of certain forms of moral character and 
encourage certain [political] moral virtues,’177 ‘it is surely impossible for the basic structure of 
a just democratic regime not to have important effects and influences as to which comprehen-
sive doctrines endure and gain adherents over time.’178 Since it is legitimate for a constitu-
tional democratic regime to admit ‘these [political] virtues into a political conception [, be-
cause this] does not lead to the perfectionist state of a comprehensive doctrine,’179 it is likely 
that some comprehensive doctrines will gain while others will lose adherents, depending on 
                                                        
174 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 62. Emphasis added. With reference to the status of the idea of reasonableness, this 
point has been restated –for critical purposes− by Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift [“Rawls and Communitarianism,” 
in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 482-
483] in these terms: ‘[t]he notion of “the reasonable” does not mark out a set of epistemological constraints that must be 
respected on pain of irrationality or ignorance of uncontroversial fact; rather, it contributes to the specification of the 
moral constraints that partly determine what it is to live up to the duties and obligations imposed by participation in a 
fair system of social cooperation based upon mutual respect.’ 
175 ‘Justice as fairness is not procedurally neutral. Clearly its principles of justice are substantive and express far more 
than procedural values.’ John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 192. Procedural neutrality is defined as ‘a procedure that can 
be legitimated, or justified, without appealing to any moral values at all.’ Ibid. 191. Rawls specifies that these substan-
tive principles of justice are political principles. Thus, his conception can be considered procedurally neutral only after 
having specified that nonetheless it expresses substantive political values and a political conception of person and socie-
ty. As he states in “The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good” (in John Rawls, Collected Papers, in particular 459), 
the consequence is that if ‘we do apply to it the idea of procedural neutrality, we must do so in virtue of its being a po-
litical conception that aims to be the focus of an overlapping consensus. That is, the view as a whole hopes to articulate 
a public basis of justification for the basic structure of a constitutional regime working from fundamental intuitive ideas 
implicit in the public political culture and abstracting from comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines. 
It seeks common ground –or if one prefers, neutral ground− given the fact of pluralism. This common or neutral ground 
is the political conception itself as the focus of an overlapping consensus.’ The (added) emphasis points out the obvious 
fact that the idea of neutrality in question concerns a constitutional democracy (and not some other kind of regime) and 
works within its public political culture. Therefore, it embeds the political values derived from the public political cul-
ture of such a regime. Only in this sense can one say that the political conception is procedurally neutral, making an ap-
peal to “neutral” (better, political) values (see the next chapters). 
176 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 194. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid. 193. 
179 Ibid. 194. 
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their “ability to accommodate” political and comprehensive values.180 Still, justice as fairness 
is neutral in aim: the state ‘is to secure equal opportunity to advance any permissible concep-
tion [of the good],’ since ‘so long as the basic structure is regulated by [a political conception 
expressing the priority of right over the good], its institutions are not intended to favor any 
comprehensive doctrine.’181 In line with these considerations, a political liberal theory should 
not a priori favour a comprehensive understanding of “European Islam” over any other kind 
of Islam. It cannot assess the comprehensive premises of Islam as a doctrine and try to “ad-
just” them. Two remarks are in order. First, this is not to say that political liberals cannot en-
ter at all within the comprehensive doctrine. As we will see, they can reason from conjecture. 
In this case, however, they enter only in the argumentation that stems from those premises, 
not in the premises themselves. Moreover, as I will explain, political liberals can politically 
evaluate the reasonableness (that is, a political moral feature) of a comprehensive doctrine. 
Second, this is not to say that a comprehensive doctrine cannot change, develop, or evolve. 
Simply, politically speaking, as long as social cooperation and the justification of the political 
conception are not called into question, this fact is irrelevant for political liberalism. 
3) Closely related to the second argument, I introduce a methodological argument, which I 
develop in the next chapter. As I have outlined, if we take into account the problem of the full 
justification of the political conception and we try to reason from conjecture, then we are 
dealing with the Islamic ‘tradition of argumentation.’182 Within this tradition, it could be pos-
sible to consider a specific trend or pattern of argumentation (among many others) that we 
might call European Islam.183 However, since my horizon is the public justification (which 
concerns the political relationship between citizens), my referent is not Islam as a tradition –
                                                        
180 Therefore, clearly, it may be that in the long run liberal institutions have some effects on the way in which Muslim 
believers approach their religion. However, it is both difficult and unnecessary to say which effects from the beginning. 
Hence, I think that we can use the expression European Islam only in an ex post and descriptive meaning. 
181 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 193. Emphasis added: according to Rawls, a conception of the good is permissible 
if it respects the principles of justice (ibid. and “The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good,” 457). 
182 Andrew F. March, Islam and Liberal Citizenship, 9. 
183 See for instance Andrew F. March, who says that, in looking at Islam as a tradition of moral argumentation, we 
should expect that a pious Muslim believer might regard (e.g.) Tariq Ramadan’s arguments as Islamic doctrine. None-
theless, ‘it is never the case that these sources (or indeed any single nonrevelatory source) are invoked as authoritative 
in their own right. Rather, they are invoked as representative positions of a certain pattern or trend in Islamic discours-
es.’ Ibid. 83. 
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with its different trends and branches– but citizens and, among them, citizens of Muslim faith. 
That is, European Muslims. 
4) Finally, I would like to discuss what I call the “What come first, the chicken or the 
egg?” argument. It claims that we should avoid using the expression “European Islam” (in its 
normative meaning), at least at the beginning of the research, because it is not clear whether it 
is a solution or a part of the problem that we are analysing. It could be that part of the confu-
sion about ‘Islam as an identity’ and ‘Islam as a set of beliefs’184 is due exactly to a reciprocal 
misconception of the idea of public reason. One might guess that the more stringent and per-
emptory are Europeans’ demands about the “Europeanisation” of Muslims’ Islamic beliefs, 
the more Islam will become an identity, and that the more Muslims’ identity is expected to 
become “European,” the less they will be willing to reconsider their beliefs. This phenomenon 
is called “reactive identity.”185 As David Hollenbach rightly underscores, ‘the pressure to treat 
religion as a purely private affair may thus be a source rather than cure for the emergence of 
fundamentalist religion as a political force. If fundamentalism is normatively objectionable, as 
I hold it to be, normative recommendations that religion be kept private will be counterpro-
                                                        
184 Ibid. 8-9. 
185 Political theory should be more aware of the sociological contributions regarding reactive identities. See, for in-
stance, the already mentioned work by Stefano Allievi “How the Immigrant has Become Muslim: Public Debates on 
Islam in Europe,” 11-12. See also Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 1 and 9 (‘Perceived as a problem in secu-
larised societies, Muslim men and women are expected to find solutions in order to adapt their religion and practices. 
Muslims are forced, almost automatically, to adopt a reactive attitude, just as they are quickly tempted to justify their 
beliefs and practices’). See also Akeel Bilgrami, “What is a Muslim? Fundamental Commitment and Cultural Identity,” 
Critical Inquiry 18, no. 4 (1992), 821-842. 
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ductive.’186 Thus, it may be the case that the more one insists on such “Europeanisation,” the 
more one weakens a shared commitment to the idea of public reason. However, the solution is 
not to relinquish any serious normative attempt. Rather, we should avoid imposing any ready-
made European way of believing in Islam and focus on how Muslims in Europe try –in their 
own terms– to participate in a common ideal of citizenship. If they prefer to call those terms 
“Islamic” rather than “European Islamic,” a political theorist should respect their preference. 
The mutual respect that citizens owe to each other also includes this.  
 
                                                        
186 David Hollenbach, S.J., “Politically Active Churches: Some Empirical Prolegomena to a Normative Approach,” in 
Religion and Contemporary Liberalism, ed. Paul J. Weithman (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 
301. For a similar point, see also Paul J. Weithman, “Introduction: Religion and the Liberalism of Reasoned Respect,” 
in Religion and Contemporary Liberalism, 21: ‘[t]he incivility of American politics is a reaction, fuelled by the resent-
ment of religious citizens who rightly think they have been ignored.’ A note on terminology is in order here, because 
the debate is usually characterised by a confusing proliferation of labels often used interchangeably. While I will not 
delve into too many technical considerations, let me make clear that, with reference to the phenomenon of Islam in poli-
tics, I prefer the expression “political Islam” (or “Islamism”) to designate what is often called “Islamic fundamental-
ism,” namely, the political appeal to the ‘Islamic tradition for sources of innovation, renewal, and change.’ See 
Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslims, Bad Muslims: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (New York: Pan-
theon Books, 2004), 46. I agree with Mamdani that ‘it makes more sense to speak of political Islam […] than of Islamic 
fundamentalism,’ because ‘[w]hereas the development of a political Christianity in the United States was mainly the 
work of a “fundamentalist” religious clergy –such as Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, and others− the development of po-
litical Islam has been more the work of nonclerical political intellectuals such as Muhammad Iqbal and Mohammed Ali 
Jinnah in colonial India, and Abul A’la Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, and Ali Shariati in postcolonial Pakistan, Egypt, and 
Iran respectively. The glaring exception was Ayatollah Khomeini.’ Ibid. 47, emphasis added. For the thesis that we can 
transfer the label “fundamentalism” to the Muslim context(s) see Sadik Al-Azm, L’Illuminismo Islamico, 25-30. For a 
detailed analysis of the latter, see my master thesis “Oltre un illuminismo islamico,” 297-301. I assume that political 
Islam, per se, can be either forward-looking or conservative. Moreover, forward-looking political Islam can be either 
reformist or radical. (For these distinctions, see Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslims, Bad Muslims, 46). For the sake of 
simplicity, here I use the expression “radical Islam” just to designate one rough end of this ideal continuum, that is, a 
peculiarly and overtly aggressive form of political Islam. This position can be defined as a ‘highly militant mobilizing 
ideology selectively developed out of Islam’s scriptures, texts, legends, historical precedents, organizational experienc-
es, and present-day grievances all as a defensive reaction against the long-term erosion of Islam’s primacy over the pub-
lic, institutional, economic, social, and cultural life’ of contemporary societies [Sadik Al-Azm, “What Is Islamism?” 
Costruire la democrazia: un progetto mediterraneo, proceedings of the international symposium (Venice: Fondazione 
Cini, June 29 and 30, 2006), 6. Note that Al-Azm is describing what he calls Islamism and what I call radical Islam; the 
difference is mainly terminological]. According to Al-Azm, such an aggressive form of Islamism is characterised (not 
necessarily at the same time) by a plurality of different phenomena: not only an attempt to re-Islamise society (which is 
not, per se, a distinctive feature of the most aggressive forms of Islamism), but also an overt conflict with both ‘apostate 
regimes’ in Muslim majority countries and unbelievers. Ibid. Clearly, among the strategic options of such an extreme 
interpretation of Islamism, there is violence and terrorism. Here I define the latter as the activity intended to hit one’s 
enemy ‘where it hurts most’ (Ibid. 7) and to terrorise its population as a whole by using unconventional aggressive 
means (e.g. a civil airplane or a farm tractor used as a projectile) or conventional aggressive means in unconventional 
attacks against innocent civilians (e.g. bombs and machine guns to kidnap and kill students in a school or people in a 
market, examples sadly taken from reality). Typical features of a terrorist attack are its suddenness, violence, destruc-
tiveness, and its deliberate spectacular nature (see ibid.). For further bibliographical references on these subjects (and on 
the concept of jihād, which I do not analyse here), see my master thesis “Oltre un illuminismo islamico.” Part of this 
radical view (which, as I have said, I consider only in its most extreme form) is an integralist attitude toward reality. In-
tegralism is the view that ‘stresses the unity of religion, politics, the sciences, the economy, and the whole gamut of 
human endeavour.’ See David Hollenbach, S.J., “Politically Active Churches: Some Empirical Prolegomena to a Nor-
mative Approach,” 304. 
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1.1.B Motivations: Against Essentialism. 
In this section, I consider three different but conceptually interrelated objections. Since 
they are of crucial importance, they deserve careful examination. 
(O1.1) The first objection is that my research presupposes an orientalist approach to Euro-
pean Muslims. The objection might be formulated in these terms: “your inquiry disguises it-
self, because it pretends to be academic neutral knowledge, but, in fact, it tries to impose a 
liberal framework on Muslims in Europe.” Such a concern is genuine and not groundless. My 
research openly and frankly deals with European Muslims from a non-Muslim perspective. 
What is more, it tries to frame the problem of Muslims’ citizenship in Europe from the point 
of view of –political– liberal theory. Having said this, however, I do not think that the best we 
can hope for is a collection of self-centred discourses in which Muslims speak for Muslims 
and only for them, liberals speak for liberals and only for them, and so on. ‘[I]s a lack of 
commitment to a culture (or comprehensive doctrine) a reason to refrain from arguing from 
within it’187 (as one does in conjecture), from evaluating it from a political liberal point of 
view (as I do in this work), or even from talking about it? An affirmative answer would be 
paralysing as well as implausible. Indeed, however, Edward W. Said’s criticism of oriental-
ism goes much beyond these trivial points. It mainly deals with the processes through which 
‘a created body of theory and practice’188 about the Orient stems from a ‘flexible positional 
superiority’189 of the West. In those processes, Western power is the enabling condition for 
the dis-covering of the Oriental: ‘[k]nowledge means rising above immediacy, beyond self, 
into the foreign and distant. The object of such knowledge is inherently vulnerable to scruti-
ny; this object is a “fact” which […] is fundamentally, even ontologically stable. […] To have 
such knowledge of such a thing is to dominate it, to have authority over it. And authority here 
means for “us” to deny autonomy to “it”.’190 Western authority means, among other things, 
                                                        
187 Micah Schwartzman, “The Ethics of Reasoning from Conjecture,” 535. Schwartzman argues (535-540) that this lack 
of commitment is not a reason for refraining from reasoning from conjecture. Other possible objections against conjec-
ture are considered in the next chapter.  
188 Edward W. Said Orientalism, 25th anniversary edition with a new preface by the author (New York: Vintage Books, 
2003), 6. 
189 Ibid. 7. 
190 Ibid. 32. 
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the auctoritas of the paternalistic and “civilised” educator, scientist, officer, and so on. The 
very essence of the Oriental descends from such Western authority: ‘[k]knowledge of the Ori-
ent, because generated out of strength, creates the Orient, the Oriental, and his world. [… 
T]he Oriental is contained and represented by dominating frameworks.’191 The Oriental, then, 
is disciplined, contained, enclosed within (and, thus, pre-defined and re-created by) the repre-
sentation produced by the West. 
Said’s famous and compelling analysis is particularly valuable with reference to the ques-
tion of Muslims in Europe. For example, Jocelyne Cesari warns us against the ‘snare of ex-
ceptionalism.’192 She contends that ‘[a]lthough often considered an “exceptional case” (i.e., 
operating according to rules of exceptionalism), Muslims are not always such an excep-
tion.’193 She rightly emphasises the importance of dynamic processes in the formation of Eu-
ropean Muslims’ individual identities.194 Since several and diverse elements influence such 
processes on different dimensions and in different ways,195 there is a multiplicity of European 
Muslim identities. Thus, one should avoid any kind of essentialist predetermination of a single 
European Muslim identity. One cannot monopolise the meaning of the reality of being a Mus-
lim in Europe, or impose her own view about a hypothetically true European or Muslim es-
sence. Furthermore, one should not aspire to contain the rich diversity of meanings encom-
passed by the concept “European Muslim” in a flat and univocal picture. As I anticipated in 
1.1.a and I will explain in the second chapter, my method openly tries to avoid such an essen-
tialist snare. These considerations are crucially important and I refer to them here because 
they represent the very background upon which I will articulate my thesis. However, the polit-
ical liberal evaluation I am beginning to sketch cannot be conceived as an orientalist or impe-
rialist project. It is worked out in order to consider the public political attitude of Muslim and 
                                                        
191 Ibid. 40. 
192 Jocelyne Cesari, “Muslim Identities in Europe: The Snare of Exceptionalism.” 
193 Ibid. 50. 
194 Ibid. 49. Cesari uses the term ‘identification’ to underscore such dynamism. 
195 She maintains that ‘[t]he multiplicity of identities follows from the fact that these identities are distributed according 
to age, gender, and socio-economic level. In the case of Muslim minorities, it is also useful to underline the following 
particular dimensions of identity construction: the meta-discourse on Islam; the influence of dominant cultural and po-
litical frameworks; the complex interaction between religion and ethnicity; the influence of global Islam; the state of 
collusion between religion, ethnicity and social marginality; and the challenge of a theological revival.’ Ibid. 52. For her 
analysis of such elements, see 52-65. 
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non-Muslim citizens toward a shared political ideal of citizenship within European liberal so-
cieties. It would be hard to maintain that European societies cannot legitimately set up a 
standards and criteria valid for all citizens and governing their fundamental institutions. How-
ever, I am not saying that Islam and Muslims’ religious commitments are worthy of consider-
ation just because of the justificatory political problem I am considering. Nor that the Islamic 
political thought and Muslims’ cultural contributions to European history are relevant and 
worthy of being studied only as far as political liberalism goes. I do not insist on these points 
because I take them for granted. Nothing in this work is intended to flatten out or reduce Is-
lam and Muslims’ religious, spiritual, historical, and cultural richness. Moreover, in no way 
should this study be read as an attempt to marginalise or stigmatise Muslims.196 First of all, I 
hope to demonstrate that the theoretical framework that I develop in this research can be rec-
ognised as reasonable by all citizens as citizens. Secondly, and crucially, my justificatory 
evaluative method should not be read as a European evaluation about (against?) Muslim citi-
zens or about their willingness to integrate and be “loyal to the West.” Again, as fellow citi-
zens I think they deserve much more respect than that. Rather, I am trying to work out a 
method that any citizen as citizen could apply in participating to the public justification. The 
final goal is to foster civic trust and friendship, not to encourage stereotypes, suspicion, or 
distrust. Maybe, the best way to answer this objection is to refer to the motivations of my re-
search. In few words (and without any claim of argumentative cogency, at least for the mo-
ment), I am deeply persuaded that both European societies and their Muslim citizens perceive 
that in contemporary Europe there is a problem of civic trust and social unity. The literature 
cited above represents evidence of the existence of such a problem (1.1.a). Plausibly, it can 
also be argued that Muslims are the most disadvantaged in this situation. On the other hand, 
European societies do not know exactly what they should ask for and expect from Muslim cit-
izens. In such a deadlock, mutual accusations trigger a vicious cycle in which civic trust and 
friendship become weaker and weaker (for more details, see the formulation of my research 
problem in 1.2.a). I prefer not to overstate the alarmist tone of these remarks (we are not lack-
ing alarmist discourses): indeed, not all European societies and not all Muslim citizens are in 
the same situation. However, the normative problem deserves very careful consideration. 
Therefore, my research stems from the desire to reconstruct a common ground for public dis-
courses on fundamental issues and, above all, a common ideal of citizenship in European 
                                                        
196 For a similar point, see Andrew F. March, Islam and Liberal Citizenship, 62-64. 
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democratic societies. This is in the interest of all,197 especially in the interest of those who 
have lacked a voice so far. This intention is not paternalistic: all can participate –if they wish– 
to this effort. Indeed some proposals have already been formulated by Muslim authors (I con-
sider one of them in chapter six). Thus, the problem consists of sharpening the appropriate 
theoretical tools to be able to understand (and answer to) those proposals and demands, since 
they concern the recognition of Muslims as equal citizens and not merely as potentially dan-
gerous aliens settled more or less durably within the physical European space. The issue at 
stake is not to read Muslims’ discourses and arguments as a liberal judge could, but to read 
them as another reasonable and rational free and equal person who shares a political relation-
ship of citizenship based on reciprocal social cooperation could. Finally, note that essential-
ism is an insidious “snare” in both directions: even Said was criticised for his “essentialist 
drifts” in Orientalism.198 Thus, one may also wonder if I am trying to impose a single unify-
ing model of public reason citizenship on the rich diversities of European societies and tradi-
tions. In this case, the essentialist view would concern European societies and not Muslims. I 
can only reply that, as I said above, I am considering a normative ideal and its normative al-
ternatives, not the models of citizenship that have been historically experimented with in dif-
ferent European societies. To a greater or lesser extent, normative ideals always claim (or 
should claim) to be abstract and general/universal. I will consider this point in chapter five. 
(O1.2) A second kind of criticism that could be raised is that here I do not provide an ac-
count of power. Is my work blind to the issue of power relationships? If with the expression 
“account of power” the critic means the question of how the exercise of power should be kept 
within the limits of political legitimacy, then the critique is pointless, because this is exactly 
one of the fundamental concerns of political liberalism. However, if with this expression the 
critic means a theory of how ‘arbitrary interference’ or ‘domination’199 works in our societies, 
then the criticism is out of place. In line with Rawls’s view, my research does not assume re-
lationships of arbitrary interference and domination as a fixed or unchangeable. From the 
standpoint of a normative theory, such relationships should be excluded for the future, as long 
                                                        
197 Sebastiano Maffettone, Un mondo migliore, 152. 
198 This is Sadik Al-Azm’s criticism to Said in his article “Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse,” reprinted in Orien-
talism: A Reader, ed. Alexander Lyon Macfie (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 217-238. 
199 ‘One agent dominates another if and only if they have a certain power over that other, in particular a power of inter-
ference on an arbitrary basis’, see Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, 52. 
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as the principles that it specifies are appropriately satisfied (that is, in the ideal case). Such a 
theory aims at a peaceful social and political life based on some kind (specified by the theory 
itself) of just grounds, civic trust and friendship. Its normative horizon does not end by sub-
suming the perpetuation of domination and mistrust. This does not mean being naïve, but 
making normative political philosophy. Saying this, however, does not exclude citizens’ vigi-
lance (on the contrary, the latter is crucial for maintaining and supporting just social institu-
tions). Nonetheless, being vigilant does not entail perpetual mistrust. A political liberal ideal 
of citizenship as a ‘realistic utopia’ requires that citizens are able both to comply with the 
principles of justice and to eliminate unjust relationships of domination and to politically trust 
one another on the basis of that political conception of justice and the common political ideal 
it specifies. This makes it possible that, if some injustices occur in what Rawls calls a nearly 
just society (that is, in a society in which the gravest forms of social and political injustice are 
excluded and whose political institutions generally comply with the principles of justice, see 
infra), they do not radically undermine citizens’ mutual trust, because the latter know that 
they have appropriate means −principles of justice, along with public guidelines and values 
specified by the ideal of public reason− to solve them. In this sense, a theory of domination 
may help but it is neither sufficient nor necessary to remedy them. The purpose of a family 
doctor is to provide an effective treatment for her patients, not to provide a description of the 
morphology of the virus affecting them. This is a task for the microbiologist, not for the fami-
ly doctor. To be sure, all the better if the family doctor knows microbiology, but this is not 
strictly necessary for her primary task. What is important is to recognise the disease and to 
treat the patient with appropriate drugs. The description of the virus and the history of its dif-
fusion may be important, but logically they are neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition 
in order to find a treatment for the disease. Similarly, if the task of political liberal theory is to 
provide an account of how citizens should live together in a fair system of cooperation and 
how they ought to deal with disagreement, it does not need to include a description of how 
(and/or a genealogy of why) things go wrong today. Reasonable disagreement will not fade 
away. The problem, then, is to assure fair terms of social cooperation in conditions of reason-
able disagreement. Moreover, the problem is to know what to do when disagreement is not 
reasonable. 
(O1.3) Let me conclude this section by taking into account another possible criticism. It af-
firms that this study has little hope of success, because I am trying to solve problems which 
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have an important empirical dimension merely by theoretical, normative, and abstract means. 
Let me interpret the expression “empirical dimension” in the sense of those material socio-
economic-political conditions that characterise Muslims’ real lives in European countries at 
different levels –individual, domestic, associational, local, national, and supranational. As I 
have repeatedly said, empirical reality provided the motivation and the background for my 
theoretical effort. Additionally, as I have made clear several times, I am perfectly aware that 
nowadays there is an inclination to subsume every issue to a cultural dimension, producing a 
‘culturalization of political, social, and economic conflicts.’200 My work, however, is norma-
tive rather than descriptive: its object is a normative ideal. For such a research, then, the em-
pirical dimension is a fundamental requisite in the preparatory diagnostic stage and a neces-
sary component of the solution (that is, in the implementation of the ideal). Still, it does not 
monopolise the latter. Here there is room for a normative ideal theory that should orientate the 
process of resolution. The obvious caveat is that a normative proposal cannot claim to be the 
immediate panacea. Otherwise, it would amount to a more or less sophisticated form of intel-
lectual divertissement. Rather, it aspires to direct reforms and policies that impact on the em-
pirical level. However, as I mentioned a few lines above, the leading idea is that, once –if ev-
er− the normative ideal were achieved, the empirical dimension of the problem would be 
solved. This is a common assumption in normative ideal theory. The latter moves from the as-
sumption that we are not fatally bound to existing injustice. Concerning the issue that I am 
discussing, I do think that a normative reflection is not only legitimate, but also necessary: as 
Tariq Ramadan aptly emphasises, ‘recognizing that there are victims is one thing; maintaining 
a victim mind-set is another. [… B]ecause there are actual victims, people must resist the 
temptation to feel victimized and take it upon themselves to demand their rights.’201 Let me 
conclude with this remark. By “empirical dimension,” the critic could also mean a concrete 
referent on which the research is grounded. Then the criticism could sound more like a ques-
tion: to which European Muslims are you referring precisely? I devote the entire sixth chapter 
                                                        
200 ‘The supremacy of cultural-religious discourse in the West is likely to frame many of the social, political, and eco-
nomic conflicts within the range of religious differences. Many of the ills of migrants and their descendants such as 
poverty, exclusion, unemployment, illiteracy, lack of political participation and lack of will to integrate are reduced to 
their Islamic background, which is stereotypically believed to be in clash with Western secular norms and values. Cul-
turalization of political, social, and economic conflicts has become a popular sport in a way that reduces all sorts of 
structural problems to cultural and religious factors.’ Ayhan Kaya, Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Secu-
ritization, 217. 
201 Tariq Ramadan, What I Believe, 75. 
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to the analysis of such a referent (Tariq Ramadan), while in the next chapter I justify my 
choice, firstly explaining the rationale of my method, then adopting a precise methodological 
principle.  
In the rest of the chapter, I will try to extract and detail my research problem and questions 
starting from the background problem analysed in 1.1.a. 
 
1.2 Specifying the Problem and the Object of the Research. 
 
1.2.A The Research Problem.  
To understand the core problem of this research, we should go back to the phenomena that 
I described at the beginning of this chapter (1.1.a). Drawing on those remarks, one could ar-
gue that contemporary Western European societies are characterised by the following fea-
tures:  
1. Islam has become highly visible, and, more generally, the religious dimension 
plays an important and divisive role in public debates. For instance, Randall Han-
sen writes that: 
‘The Europe of today is in one sense surprisingly similar to its sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century predecessor: religion is a foundation of social conflict. It 
might even be the most important foundation of that conflict. […] The major cul-
tural clashes over the last 20 years –the Rushdie affair in Britain, the hijab debates 
in France, the question of Sikhs wearing crash helmets, the Danish cartoon con-
troversy− have all been about religion. And most of them have been about one re-
ligion in particular.’202 
 Note, however, that saying that major political and social conflicts in contemporary 
European public debates seem to turn on religion does not imply a quasi-
eschatological perspective à la Huntington, according to which European societies 
                                                        
202 Randall Hansen, “The Two Faces of Liberalism: Islam in Contemporary Europe,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration 
Studies 37, no. 6 (2011), 891. 
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must necessarily pass through a destructive clash-of-civilisation phase. On the con-
trary, as we will see, political and social conflicts are not only compatible with, but 
are also a fundamental component of life under free and democratic institutions. In 
fact, Hansen himself continues:  
‘The fact of conflict is itself not an indicator of a lack of cultural integration 
among Muslims. […] Liberal societies are perfectly consistent with a high degree 
of conflict. Indeed, the great strength of liberal institutions is that conflict in an 
important sense sustains them; they derive their legitimacy in part from the rou-
tinised and institutionalised debate […] that liberal institutions make uniquely 
possible.’203 
This is precisely the horizon beneath which this research is developed: the 
preservation of (reasonable) disagreement within the common framework of 
liberal institutions. 
2. Additionally, in contemporary European societies there is a sort of equation be-
tween Islam and religion when the latter is publicly portrayed as irreducibly “oth-
er,” “problematic,” and “threatening” (as suggested by Hansen’s phrase ‘most of 
[the major cultural clashes in Europe] have been about one religion in particular’). 
In public discourses, there is a tendency to describe Islam as a problem. Exclusion, 
securitisation, and very real acts of discrimination are apparently the “natural” con-
sequences of such a predicament with Islam and Muslims.  
3. These discourses focus on the anxiety that moral disagreement with this “irreduci-
ble other” could undermine the fundamental terms of social and political coopera-
tion in European democracies.204 Again in Hansen’s words, ‘[w]hat is more worry-
ing is that there is emerging evidence that some Muslim communities in Europe are 
deeply mistrustful of the other participants in those debates –their fellow citizens,’ 
and vice versa.205 Then, European societies seem to be concerned with some form 
                                                        
203 Ibid. 
204 For some references concerning these perspectives, see what I call “Islam-as-an-unsolvable-problem” view in sec-
tion 1.1.a.2. 
205 Randall Hansen, “The Two Faces of Liberalism: Islam in Contemporary Europe,” 891. 
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of a ‘mutual assurance problem’206 about citizens’ continued commitment to hon-
ouring the common fair terms of social cooperation: ‘if citizens are to act from their 
sense of justice consistently, each must have some assurance that others will con-
sistently act justly as well.’207 Without this kind of assurance, they fear not only a 
potentially destructive instability, but, more importantly, that stability cannot occur 
for the right reasons (for a full description of the ‘mutual assurance problem,’ and 
its implications and solution, see infra, 4.2, and 5.2.c).  
4. Multiculturalism is criticised precisely because it seems unable to answer this prob-
lem (see 1.1.a.1 and 5.2.b). 
If I am right, then one can certainly say that the problem that Western European societies 
and their Muslim citizens are facing ‘is more than a breakdown of communication,’ and that 
the ‘existing conceptual frameworks at work in Muslim-West relations […] have so far failed 
to establish a common ground and inspired a shared horizon.’208 This could represent a first 
general formulation of my research problem. However, I can now specify the nature of the 
latter in greater detail. Before explaining my research problem, I try to summarise it in Figure 
1. 
                                                        
206 See in particular Paul Weithman’s book Why Political Liberalism? On John Rawls’s Political Turn (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) and his recent article “Inclusivism, Stability, and Assurance,” in Rawls and 
Religion, ed. Tom Bailey and Valentina Gentile (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), passim. For Rawls’s 
formulation of the assurance problem, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 269-270/237-238, 336/295-296 (see also 
496-497/434-435). 
207 Paul Weithman, Why Political Liberalism?, 46-47.  
208 Ibrahim Kalin, “Islamophobia and the Limits of Multiculturalism,” 4. Emphasis added. 
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Figure 1 The theoretical problem. 
 
Main theoretical problem: the relations between Western European societies 
and their Muslim citizens are affected by a crisis of their shared normative 
conception of citizenship.
This requires a common discursive platform.
New forms of pluralism in Europe. 
Two dimensions of stability for the right 
reasons: Assuring both inclusion and en-
during compliance with the terms of social 
cooperation (mutual assurance). 
Such pluralism must be reab-
sorbed without being annihilat-
ed (political reconciliation). 
To solve the mutual assurance 
problem and providing effec-
tive means of inclusion, we 
need both: 
1) A common public political identity, which 
allows one’s self-recognition within a political 
consensus. 
2) Shared social and political critical stand-
ards, which make the public uncovering of un-
reasonable and unjust demands easier and more 
effective. Thus, such standards are important 
empowering and inclusive instruments, espe-
cially for members of minority groups. 
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It seems that Western European societies are facing a serious political problem. Certainly, 
it is not a matter of a clash of cultures,209 but the risk is the emersion of a culture of clash. My 
thesis is that, from a political standpoint, the problem is represented by a citizenship crisis. As 
I mentioned above, Muslims are often represented as outside or even against the liberal dem-
ocratic citizenry. The very possibility that they genuinely become European citizens is fre-
quently presented as deeply problematic or even unlikely: apparently, there is no room for 
Muslims in the existing normative models of citizenship in European societies. This crisis of 
the normative models of citizenship210 is rooted in the fact that Western European societies in 
the last two to four decades (depending on the national contexts) are going through a new 
form of pluralism.211 Obviously, this is not to say that European societies have never experi-
enced Muslims’ presence before. This would simply be false. However, this kind of pluralism 
is new for Europe because it combines three features at the same time: (1) the character of 
this pluralism, which: a) is not confined within Christianity, b) concerns (to different extents) 
the entire continent, and c) is likely to endure for the foreseeable future, (2) the numbers con-
cerned, and (3) the high visibility of the debates provoked by such pluralism (the “Muslim 
question” debate).212 To my knowledge, in European modern history there is no previous ex-
ample of pluralism combining these features at the very same time. Therefore, it is not sur-
prising that European societies are still uncertain and vacillating about what is the most ade-
quate approach to face this new situation. Nonetheless, it seems safe to say that, once we take 
seriously the fact that reasonable pluralism is ‘the work of free practical reason within the 
framework of free institutions’213 (see chapter two), the only way for facing such new plural-
                                                        
209 Bruna Soravia, “Lo scontro che non c’è stato. Guerre di civiltà, guerre di parole e il Medio Oriente, 1979-2001,” in Il 
nuovo disordine internazionale. Conflitti politici, cambiamenti tecnologici ed evoluzioni strategiche (Rome: Fondazio-
ne Magna Carta, 2015), 171-190. I am grateful to the author for having provided me with an advanced draft of the arti-
cle. 
210 Remember that I am concerned with a normative account of citizenship from the perspective of political philosophy. 
I am not concerned with an analysis of the models of citizenship historically experimented in the single national con-
texts. 
211 See for instance Tariq Ramadan, What I Believe, 80 and “They Live in a Bleak, Devastated Universe,” interview 
with Erich Follath and Romain Leick published in the Der Spiegel issue 46/2005 November, 2005 and available at URL 
= http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/spiegel-interview-with-tariq-ramadan-they-live-in-a-bleak-devastated-
universe-a-384900.html, page 2 of the printable version. 
212 For some of these points about the new kind of pluralism caused by the contemporary Muslim presence in Western 
Europe, see Enzo Pace, L’islam in Europa: modelli di integrazione, 58, 64, 118, and 121-122. 
213 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 37. 
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ism compatible with liberal democratic principles and institutions is a political effort to reab-
sorb without annihilating it. This means that all parties must undertake an effort of political 
reconciliation (see 3.2.b.1). Such an effort involves the capacity of providing at the same time 
a full inclusion of Muslim citizens based on the equal status of citizenship and the assurance 
that the social cooperative system is stable for the right reasons, and not only based on con-
tingent circumstances or compromise (for what Rawls calls ‘stability for the right reasons,’ 
see in particular chapter two). European Muslim citizens’ allegiance to a shared ideal of citi-
zenship is continuously called into question: mutual confidence seems lacking.214 To solve 
this problem means solving a ‘mutual assurance problem:’215 each citizen must know that 
every other citizen is sufficiently motivated to respect the same fair terms of social coopera-
tion (see chapter four). The problem of citizens’ fair inclusion and the problem of mutual as-
surance are thus the two crucial dimensions of ‘stability for the right reasons.’ However, they 
cannot be solved unless we first answer two compelling demands. The first demand concerns 
the lack of a public political identity (in what follows, I use the expressions “public political 
identity,” “common political identity,” “shared political identity,” “public identity,” and “in-
stitutional identity” as synonyms; I do the same with the expressions “public political morali-
ty,” “public morality,” and ‘institutional morality;’216 for all these notions, see below). I have 
already mentioned this element in 1.1.a.1. There I said that even liberal multicultural theorists 
                                                        
214 See, for instance, Tariq Ramadan, The Quest For Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism (London: Allen 
Lane, 2010), ix, where he suggests that lack of mutual knowledge leads to a ‘conflict of perceptions,’ which in turn ex-
plains the lack of confidence. See also Jocelyne Cesari, Why the West Fears Islam, in particular 6-20 and Ibrahim Kalin, 
“Islamophobia and the Limits of Multiculturalism,” especially 16. Mutual lack of confidence is also revealed by the fact 
that, according to the FRA’s 2009 “Data in Focus Report: Muslims” (available at URL = 
http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2010/eu-midis-data-focus-report-2-muslims), 59% of Muslims who did not report 
their experiences of discrimination (and note that ‘one in four Muslims experienced discrimination and did not report 
their experiences anywhere’) explained their silence by saying that ‘nothing would happen or change by reporting’ (8-
9).  
215 Here I follow Paul J. Weithman (Why Political Liberalism? and “Inclusivism, Stability, and Assurance”). In order to 
solve the problem of defection from terms of social cooperation and to stabilise them, ‘individual conceptions of the 
good must support’ them (“Inclusivism, Stability, and Assurance,” 83). In Rawls’s theory, this is the role of the idea of 
an overlapping consensus (see chapter two of this research). However, as Weitheman rightly emphasises, ‘the individu-
al rationality of compliance is not enough. If preemptive defection is to be avoided, the fact that each citizen recognizes 
the individual rationality of compliance must itself be a matter of public knowledge. In sum, each must have some as-
surance that others accept the terms of cooperation and will not defect’ (“Inclusivism, Stability, and Assurance,” 83, 
emphases added). For a more detailed account of Weithman’s theoretical position, see his book Why Political Liberal-
ism? Rawls’s solution for this second part of the problem of stability for the right reasons is his wide view of public rea-
son (see chapter four of this research). I will return to the mutual assurance problem in chapter four. For how wide pub-
lic reason solves this problem, see chapter five.  
216 Sebastiano Maffettone, “Political Liberalism: Reasonableness and Democratic Practice,” Philosophy and Social 
Criticism 30, no. 5-6 (2004), 555. 
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are aware of the fact that social unity and cohesion and the right kind of stability are crucial 
social goods. For instance, Kymlicka is deeply concerned with the social unity of his ‘multi-
nation states,’ and agrees that what really matters is ‘the idea of a shared identity.’217 He also 
acknowledges that the most relevant critical points about multiculturalism concern Muslims 
with an immigrant background in Europe (see 1.1.a.1, below in this section, and 5.2.b). In the 
same vein, it has been argued that ‘the fundamental question raised by post-immigration di-
versity for a variety of nation-states [is]: what is the identity of citizenship itself and what 
does it imply for other identities that citizens may have or want to have?’218 However, 
Kymlicka does not provide a comprehensive answer to the question of social unity and stabil-
ity. What he says is just that ‘[t]he great variance in historical, cultural, and political situations 
in multination states suggests that any generalized answer to this question will probably be 
overstated,’219 and that ‘it is not clear how […] multination states could try to create […] a 
level of solidarity where it did not already exist.’220 I claim that from a normative standpoint 
political philosophy can and should aspire to something more than this hesitant answer. In 
fact, with reference to the issue of Muslim citizens in Western Europe, a more resolute answer 
is needed if one wants to solve the mutual assurance problem and foster better relations of 
mutual trust, a communal sense of political belonging, social cooperation, and joint civic par-
ticipation. For instance, one may venture to guess that it is precisely from this lack of a shared 
political identity that suspicious questions such as “are you loyal to your country or to the Is-
lamic umma (Islamic community)?” originate. Understandably, this is a question that many 
Muslims (and many non-Muslims as well) find offensive.221 The second demand concerns the 
lack of a shared evaluative standard for critically assessing other citizens’ political views, 
                                                        
217 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 188. Emphasis omitted. 
218 Anna Triandafyllidou, Tariq Modood, and Nasar Meer, “Introduction: Diversity, Integration, Secularism and Multi-
culturalism,” in European Multiculturalisms: Cultural, Religious and Ethnic Challenges, 11. 
219 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 189. 
220 Ibid. 191. 
221 See, for example, Tariq Ramadan, Noi musulmani europei (Rome: Datanews, 2008), 22; To Be a European Muslim, 
162-163; What I Believe, 36. In the latter, Ramadan says that, when Muslims are questioned about whether they are first 
“Muslim” or “Italian,” “French,” “American,” and so on, ‘[t]he question explicitly addresses [Muslims’] definition of 
their identity whereas implicitly, and more seriously, it has to do with loyalty. Since one can only have one identity, one 
can only have one loyalty. A clear, unqualified, unambiguous answer must be given! Yet the question itself is meaning-
less.’ 
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claims, contributions, and proposals. For instance, in a passage that I have already quoted in 
1.1.a, Tariq Ramadan maintains that he does not  
‘speak of integration anymore. Integration of Islam, of Muslims as European 
citizens has already been accomplished: Islam is nowadays a European religion. 
Instead, the actual problem is to know what their contribution is, not only for 
themselves, but for Europe. Europe will begin to change its perception about Is-
lam only when it realises that Islam represents a resource and not only a problem: 
thus, a radical change of perspective is needed.’222 
Hence, if one takes seriously this kind of request coming from leading Muslim intellectuals 
themselves, citizens need shared standards for social and political criticism, so that in public 
discussions they can more easily and effectively recognise positive contributions, reject un-
reasonable demands, and reform unjust laws, policies, and institutions. Indeed, only if such 
standards are publicly available is it possible to uphold with some reasonable hope of success 
the claim that ‘because there are actual victims, people must resist any temptation to feel vic-
timized and take it upon themselves to demand their rights.’223 
I have just demonstrated that (according to Muslims themselves) the availability of a com-
mon political identity and of shared standards for social and political criticism is an im-
portant social good for citizens, because it is necessary to achieve both mutual assurance 
about other citizens’ loyalty to fair terms of social cooperation and political inclusion in the 
terms set by reasonable Muslim citizens themselves. Therefore, one can legitimately claim 
that the availability of such political identity and shared standards is a salient criterion for as-
sessing political theories with reference to those two dimensions: the stability for the right 
reasons of European societies and their capacity for political inclusion toward Muslim citi-
zens. Other things being equal, a political theory that provides both a common political identi-
ty and shared standards for social and political criticism is better placed with regard to social 
stability (for the right reasons) and inclusion of Muslim citizens than theories that provide on-
ly one of them or both but at a lesser extent. 
                                                        
222 In Islam in Europa / Islam in Italia tra diritto e società, 326, my translation and emphasis added. 
223 Tariq Ramadan, What I Believe, 75. 
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The problem illustrated in Figure 1 is thus a multifaceted and complex one. How to solve 
it? As I will explain in 5.2.b, from the perspective of political philosophy two prominent 
families of theories of citizenship seem today unable to answer these demands.  
1) Multicultural citizenship (which I consider only in its liberal version) is under at-
tack. As observed in 1.1.a.1, notwithstanding the uncertain causal relations between 
theoretical critiques and effective downscaling in terms of policies and institutional 
settings, it seems that (at least with specific reference to the case of immigrants and 
in particular of Muslims with an immigrant background in contemporary Western 
European countries) temptations to commit such downscaling are real, as Kymlicka 
himself acknowledges. The reason for this is that apparently multiculturalism has 
underestimated the extent to which the unsolved problem of mutual assurance puts 
political identities and institutions under pressure. Political speeches against multi-
culturalism may also be populist, but they capture perceptions and feelings that are 
widespread in European streets. Political theory should critically address, scruti-
nise, deconstruct, and –possibly− rectify such perceptions and feelings. But in the 
case of European Muslims multiculturalism alone seems unable to do that, because 
it does not address the problem of mutual assurance, in terms of a common political 
identity and shared standards for social and political criticism.224 
2) Republican citizenship (which I consider in the version theorised by Cécile La-
borde, since it openly and systematically addresses the question of Muslims’ citi-
zenship in contemporary Western European societies, see 1.1.a.2 and 5.2.b) seems 
more capable of solving the problem of stability, but actually this is not the case, 
because it neglects the second perspective that should characterise political recon-
ciliation, namely, fair inclusion of citizens of faith. I do not go into details here 
since I devote 5.2.b to the analysis of Laborde’s arguments. However, to put it 
simply, one can wonder why Muslim citizens should accept her critical republican 
perspective qua Muslims, since Laborde’s theory does not presuppose any properly 
Islamic (or, in general, any religious or philosophically non-republican) ground for 
its endorsement. In other words, at the end of the day, it seems that either Muslims 
                                                        
224 Note that I am not saying that, once one has solved the problem of mutual assurance liberal multiculturalism is a 
philosophically inadequate view. In this research I do not analyse the question of the consistency between Kymlicka’s 
multicultural citizenship and Rawls’s public reason citizenship. 
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are born critical republican citizens (that is, either they end up by endorsing critical 
republicanism only as citizens but not also as Muslims, and this would be problem-
atic in terms of guaranteeing both reasonable pluralism and social stability), or they 
must find some strategic reasons to abide by her conception in a modus vivendi (but 
also in this case critical republicanism would not be able to provide an account of 
social stability for the right reasons). 
Then, I argue that we need a theoretical model able to do what in present circumstances 
liberal multiculturalism and critical republicanism seem unable to do, that is, both to include 
Muslims’ voices and perspectives and to solve the problem of mutual assurance. Liberal mul-
ticulturalism overlooks the latter in favour of the former. On the other hand, critical republi-
canism does not adequately recognise the question of including Muslims’ voices as Muslim 
voices, because it neglects the role of an overlapping consensus and so it does not solve the 
‘generalised prisoner’s dilemma,’ because it does not show that it would be individually ra-
tional for Muslims to comply225 with its normative principles (for these points, see 4.2, 5.2.b, 
and 5.2.c). Therefore, neither liberal multiculturalism nor critical republicanism can secure 
stability for the right reasons. Then, in the context of contemporary Western European socie-
ties, both critical republicanism and liberal citizenship are unstable normative conceptions of 
citizenship. 
Thus, I argue that we should adopt a third normative conception of citizenship, which is 
capable of reconciling inclusion and assurance within the framework of a society that is stable 
for the right reasons. I propose to adopt an ideal of citizenship based on the idea of public rea-
son. The main claim of this research is that public reason citizenship is able to resolve the 
complex problem outlined before. This is because it is able to accommodate within its norma-
tive horizon both dimensions of political reconciliation: inclusion and mutual assurance. This 
is possible because public reason represents a common discursive platform which provides 
shared standards for social criticism and which is the basis on which a common political iden-
tity can be structured. By combining these two elements, public reason citizenship secures so-
ciety’s stability for the right reasons. Such political reconciliation guarantees that in Europe 
the new form of pluralism is politically reabsorbed without being annihilated, because it is in-
                                                        
225 As I will repeat in the next chapters, for this point I draw on Paul J. Weithman’s use of the expression ‘individual 
rationality of compliance’ in “Inclusivism, Stability, and Assurance,” 83. 
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cluded within a common normative conception of citizenship. The argument supporting this 
central claim can be found in chapter five. 
It should be clear, then, that the problem at stake here is a political one. The general prob-
lem I am interested in is the political relationship between citizens and how this relationship is 
affected by the fact that Muslim citizens are often perceived and presented as outside such a 
relationship.226 Here, I take into consideration the normative issue at stake when Muslims are 
publicly portrayed as citizens outside the citizenry and potentially against a shared normative 
conception of citizenship. This study tries to take seriously into consideration from the per-
spective of political philosophy what is needed to overcome the present widespread and un-
critical attitude of portraying Islam and Muslims as “a problem.” This study focuses on the 
normative grounds of such ‘externalising’ public discourse (for the latter, see 1.1.a.1). In this 
sense, it does not aim at analysing political (in a non-normative meaning), social, economic, 
and historical reasons of such ‘externalisation.’227 Rather, it is a work in political theory that 
focuses on the normative requirements for Muslims’ inclusion as free equal citizens in a rea-
sonably just and stable democratic society. Note that it is surely true that ‘a striking gap exists 
between the image of Islam as it is constructed in binary public discourses and the multifacet-
ed reality of Muslims across countries and localities,’ and it may be true that, while being ‘in 
plain sight and highly scrutinized,’ ‘the “Muslim” has become the invisible man (and woman) 
of western societies, [… due to] people[’s] incapacity to see the reality of Muslims of flesh 
and blood.’228 However, the perception of Islam and Muslims as a normative problem or as a 
threat for European societies’ normative horizon is an important question largely unanswered. 
It represents the general concern of this work. Moreover, the two questions are related. In 
fact, the main aim of this research is to address the question of what normative theory is the 
                                                        
226 For an account of the politicisation of the issues around immigration and citizenship (understood as ‘the set of rights, 
duties, and identities linking citizens to the nation state’), with a specific focus on Muslim groups, see Ruud Koopmans, 
Paul Statham, Marco Giugni, and Florence Passy, Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 2-7 and chapter four. 
227 Those reasons are numerous and different. For example, Cesari argues that the main causes of the ‘externalisation’ 
of Islam and Muslims in European public discourse are not all ascribable to the West (Why the West Fears Islam, 140: 
‘the putative opposition of Islam and the West is not just a construct of the West. It is also the outcome of a specific 
theology [–Salafism–] in which Islam is cast into a narrative defined, point-by-point, in opposition to the Western narra-
tive’). In particular, Cesari pinpoints three ‘structural conditions that shape and solidify the symbolic boundaries be-
tween the West and Islam: the international context of war on terror, the crisis of secularism, and the global visibility of 
Salafism.’ Ibid. xvii. See xvii-xviii, and, respectively, chapters five, six, and seven. 
228 Ibid. xiv. 
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most reasonable in order to achieve a shared and stable notion of citizenship in European lib-
eral democracies. Only once such a notion (and its normative requirements) is fully developed 
can Muslim presence in Europe be conceived not just in terms of a mere expectation of inte-
gration, but in terms of a loyal, cooperating, and trustworthy membership into the citizenry. 
Pinpointing such a normative theory crucially means defining the conditions of possibility of 
citizenship for Muslims (like for any other citizen, since citizens are conceived –by assump-
tion– as free and equal persons) in reasonably just and stable European societies. As I have 
said, this requires a common discursive platform that can function both as the ground for a 
common political identity and as a shared standard for political criticism. Thus, public reason 
is a very important empowering instrument, especially for members of minority groups. 
Sometimes Muslims’ discourses about citizenship in Europe seem difficult to assess from a 
public perspective. Even if Muslim thinkers, reformers, scholars, and public intellectuals try 
to elaborate some notion of citizenship consistent with both Islam and European citizenship, 
often such attempts are not framed within a shared public perspective. Thus, a gap originates 
from this omission: frequently their demands, proposals, and discourses fail to be persuasive 
for European societies at large, or they look off-centred and difficult to evaluate in a language 
familiar to the European public political culture (the existence –but not necessarily the abso-
lute internal coherence and continuity– of which I take for granted). As Tariq Ramadan ob-
serves, it is often difficult to assess the merits of such Muslim contributions from a public 
perspective.229 He repeats that ‘no doubt, the most serious difficulty for Muslims living today 
in the West […] is to translate their aspirations and their hopes into a language that is under-
standable, clear, “audible”.’230 Moreover, if the standards provided by public reason for pub-
licly exposing discrimination and exclusion are shared, then the majority cannot turn a blind 
eye to such phenomena. Public reason clearly distinguishes between questions that concern 
religious pluralism and reasonable comprehensive convictions and questions of political jus-
tice. Therefore, political injustices cannot be justified anymore by appealing to arguments that 
                                                        
229 Tariq Ramadan in Islam in Europa / Islam in Italia tra diritto e società, 326. 
230 Tariq Ramadan, De l’islam et des musulmans: réflexions sur l’Homme, la réforme, la guerre et l’Occident (Paris: 
Presses du Châtelet, 2014), 61, my translation. 
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confusedly melt reasonable disagreement, unreasonable views, and political oppression.231 
Thus, I think that developing a common discursive platform is in the interest of all, in particu-
lar of those whose voices are less likely to be heard in public debates. 
Two concluding remarks are in order. Firstly, as I will explain in chapter three and four, a 
public reason conception of citizenship crucially involves both on the one hand the acknowl-
edgment of the need for (and the participation in) a public justification of the use of coercive 
political power so that the latter can be regarded as legitimate, and on the other hand a kernel 
of common political values. The idea of public reason incorporates both elements. It includes 
both ‘guidelines of inquiry that specify ways of reasoning and criteria for the kinds of infor-
mation relevant for political questions’232 (that is, what is relevant to publicly justify a funda-
mental political decision), and ‘values of public reason [which] fall under the guidelines for 
public inquiry, which make that inquiry free and public [, … such] political virtues as reason-
ableness, and a readiness to honor the (moral) duty of civility, which as virtues of citizens 
help to make possible reasoned public discussion of political questions.’233 In this sense, the 
pivotal concern of my study is the relation between European Muslims and public reason both 
as a regulative moral ideal of citizenship and as a standard for a civic practice of public justi-
fication (see chapter four).  
Secondly, however, Rawls says that ‘the idea of public reason […] belongs to a conception 
of a well-ordered constitutional democratic society.’234 Now, so far my argument has implic-
itly assumed that the idea of public reason should be recognised as normatively binding in ex-
isting European democracies. However, it would be hard to maintain that existing European 
societies are well-ordered democracies. In fact, those constitutional democracies do not fully 
                                                        
231 I have already quoted these remarks by Ibrahim Kalin: ‘[i]nsulting, intimidating, and threatening Muslim individuals 
and communities and in some cases committing violence against them is presented as a reaction to what is described as 
the existential threat of Islamic extremism and terrorism. Such justifications give the impression that violent acts perpe-
trated against Muslims have a reason and thus can be excused.’ See his “Islamophobia and the Limits of Multicultural-
ism,” 16. 
232 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 223. 
233 Ibid, 224. 
234 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 440. Emphasis added. 
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display the features of a Rawlsian well-ordered society.235 Moreover, it would be difficult to 
maintain that one of those democracies exemplifies the European model of well-ordered soci-
ety. Indeed, those societies show a plurality of different models and forms concerning the or-
ganisation of the state and of sub-state entities, citizenship acquisition, recognition of minori-
ties, welfare provisions, and so on. A choice of any of them would be arbitrary and unsatisfy-
ing in some respects. I will try to demonstrate that, while they are not well-ordered, European 
societies are “well-ordered enough” to enter in a dynamic normative tension toward the reali-
sation of the ideal of public reason. Thus, I will argue, the ideal of public reason is normative-
ly relevant as a regulative ideal not only for fully well-ordered societies, but also for existing 
European democracies. More precisely, as I will show in 5.2.a, contemporary European con-
stitutional democracies do satisfy the threshold for public reason’s normative salience. In oth-
er words, these constitutional democracies do possess the minimum required to be governed 
by the regulative ideal of public reason, even if they are not fully just. Thus, public reason can 
work as an ideal conception of citizenship also in the European non-ideal context. 
 
1.2.B Research Questions and Structure.  
Bearing in mind the formulation of the research problem developed in 1.2.a, I can state the 
main research question as follows: 
(Q) Which ideal conception of citizenship should provide the common normative perspec-
tive in contemporary Western European societies, which are characterised by both (1) de-
mands of inclusion of Muslims and (2) the need for solving the problem of mutual assurance 
concerning citizens’ commitment to the fair terms of social cooperation specified by a politi-
cal conception of justice, so that those societies can be stable for the right reasons? 
In 1.2.a, I argued that a joint solution of these two apparently conflicting demands requires 
an effort in political reconciliation. Only such political reconciliation can secure stability for 
the right reasons by combining inclusion of Muslims and citizens’ mutual assurance. Moreo-
ver, I argued that such reconciliation must be based on a common discursive platform, which 
serves both as a ground for a common political identity and as a shared standard for political 
                                                        
235 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 35 and supra. 
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and social criticism. In this research, my purpose is to show that public reason can provide 
such a common discursive platform and perform this role of political reconciliation. To 
demonstrate this, I must firstly develop a normative model of citizenship based on public rea-
son. Thus, after a methodological chapter (chapter two), the second part of this work (chapters 
three and four) is devoted to a reconstructive task, which aims at answering the question: 
(Q1) How can we reconstruct the idea of public reason so that we can identify its most sa-
lient normative requirements? 
Subsequently, I must explain why my normative conception of citizenship is appealing for 
contemporary Western European democracies. This is done in chapter five, which aims at an-
swering the question: 
(Q2) How can we put together the requirements identified in the reconstructive part into a 
coherent ideal of citizenship, so that it can effectively represent a ‘normative yardstick of 
evaluation’236 for considering the issue of Muslims’ citizenship in Europe from a public per-
spective?  
Finally, I must demonstrate that this normative conception of citizenship effectively works. 
Therefore, chapter six is concerned with the practical application of the model of citizenship 
based on public reason. In particular, in that chapter I will apply the approach that I call justi-
ficatory evaluative political theory to a political perspective concerning citizenship that can be 
plausibly defined as a European Muslim perspective (for justificatory evaluative political the-
ory and the plausibility principle, see 2.3). Then, chapter six will deal with the question: 
(Q3) What if we evaluate European Muslims’ claims concerning citizenship in Europe 
from the public standpoint specified by public reason? 
Here, the pronoun “we” refers to political theorists, but also ideally to any citizen who is 
willing to undertake such a theoretical effort. Obviously, answering these questions presup-
poses a method. As I have said, in the next chapter I will develop my justificatory evaluative 
method. For the moment, I just underline that answering Q3 involves an evaluation of Mus-
                                                        
236 I borrow this expression from Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism, 156. 
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lims’ political views and claims along three strongly interrelated –but conceptually different– 
dimensions (see 2.3 and 5.1): 
1) The acknowledgment of the need for a public justification in public discussions 
about fundamental political questions (what I call the reciprocity requirement, RR). 
2) The consistent participation in public justification, that is the consistency between 
the standards of public reasoning that Muslims present as “fully justified” (infra) 
from an Islamic perspective and the conception of public reason required for political 
or pro tanto (infra) justification (what I call the consistency requirement, CR). 
3) The modalities in which public reason is concretely honoured in those discourses 
(what I call the civility requirement, CiR). 
Again, “evaluation” here does not mean a judgment based on distrust or “presumption of 
guilt.” On the contrary, such an evaluation should work as a kind of reciprocal disclosure of 
discourses about citizenship, and should enhance mutual trust and friendship. Moreover, as I 
will explain in a short while, evaluation is a means, not an end: the final aim of my research is 
not evaluation per se. Instead, such an evaluation is functional in solving the complex prob-
lem of inclusion and assurance that I mentioned in 1.2.a. Through this kind of evaluation, I 
can show that public reason can both effectively represent the ground for a common political 
identity and provide shared standards for political and social criticism, which equally empow-
er Muslim and non-Muslim citizens. The aim of justificatory evaluative political theory, then, 
is to show that public reason may represent the common discursive platform that is apparent-
ly lacking in European democracies today. 
 
1.2.C Aims.  
What are the tasks involved in answering my three questions? While in the next chapter I 
discuss my method, answering Q1 means undertaking a reconstructive task. I devote the sec-
ond part of my study to this. Then, in chapters three and four I will try to reconstruct the idea 
of public reason and to point out the most relevant critiques. 
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In order to answer Q2 I must bridge the reconstructive and the evaluative tasks. Thus, in 
chapter five (the first chapter of the third part) I will try to specify a conception of liberal citi-
zenship grounded in public reason for Western European democracies. Such a conception 
identifies the requirements that liberal citizens should satisfy in order to comply with the 
normative model of public reason citizenship (5.1). This chapter will also show that public 
reason is the most reasonable candidate among alternative conceptions of citizenship which 
are nonetheless close to it, because it solves the problem described in 1.2.a and secures stabil-
ity for the right reasons, while the other conceptions fail in this respect. For this reason, I will 
argue that public reason citizenship should be considered as the normative ideal of citizenship 
for Western European societies (5.2). 
Finally, answering Q3 means undertaking an evaluative task. In chapter six, I will consider 
a European Muslim proposal concerning citizenship in Europe from the standpoint of public 
reason. If the result of this evaluative analysis turns out to be that there is a certain level of 
consistency between those views and proposals and the ideal of citizenship underpinned by 
public reason, then there will be strong evidence for maintaining that those who advance them 
should be prima facie considered as belonging (politically speaking) to the European norma-
tive conception of citizenship. If this is true, then I will be able to maintain that public reason 
effectively represents the common discursive platform required for solving the problem out-
lined in 1.2.a. 
What are the aims of this research? I summarise them according to their level of depth: 
1) On the first and most obvious level, I would like to provide a precise account of what 
public reason is and defend it as the most reasonable theoretical approach for understanding 
the issue at stake. 
2) On the second level, I would like to make clear what normative demands European so-
cieties can legitimately make toward Muslims citizens when they ask them to abide by a 
common ideal of citizenship specified by the idea of public reason. 
3) On the third and deeper level, I would like to fill a gap in the existing literature concern-
ing political liberalism. I do that by introducing the idea of a political liberal evaluation as a 
tool for strengthening civic trust and the social stability of democratic societies. Its core is a 
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consistency-evaluation between the claims of particular groups and a common liberal ideal of 
citizenship grounded in the need for a public justification of the use of coercive power. 
4a) On the fourth level, and in continuity with the third point, I would like to demonstrate 
that public reason could represent a persuasive common perspective from which one can ap-
proach and try to understand the political value of Muslim contemporary reformism. Through 
public reason, the public dimension of Muslim reformist proposals may be disclosed to out-
siders (that is, to non-Muslim citizens). Thus, I believe that public reason can fill the gap that 
I mentioned in 1.2.a. Citizens’ respective normativities cease to be egotistic or simply unable 
to enter into dialogue and they can interact within a public space where pluralism is “decom-
pressed,” that is, politically reabsorbed without being dismissed or degraded.  
4b) Remaining on the fourth level, I would like to argue that, politically speaking, we 
should distinguish European fears of Muslims’ alleged ‘doublespeak’237 from the possibility 
that they resort to a “double discourse,” since the latter per se is not politically problematic. 
Doublespeak ‘consists in saying one thing in front of an audience to flatter or mislead them, 
and something else, different in content, elsewhere, to a different audience or in a different 
language.’238 Indeed, as we will see in chapters three and four, public reason allows (and phil-
                                                        
237 Caroline Fourest, Frère Tariq. Le double discours de Tariq Ramadan, second revised edition (Paris: Grasset, 2010). 
Sometimes, Muslim intellectuals are criticised for their discourses (or mere silences) also through the allegation of 
taqiyya: for instance see Lionel Favrot, Tariq Ramadan dévoilé (Lyon: Lyon Mag’ hors série, 2004), 94 and Paul Lan-
dau, Le Sabre et le Coran. Tariq Ramadan et les Frères musulmans à la conquête de l’Europe (Monaco: Rocher, 2005), 
138. According to the entry “dissimulation” by Devin J. Stewart in The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political 
Thought, edited by Gerhard Bowering (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), taqiyya is ‘the technical term for 
dissimulation, is an Islamic legal dispensation that allows the believer to commit an act that would ordinarily be forbid-
den or to omit an act that would ordinarily be required in cases of danger from a hostile or potentially hostile audience. 
[…] Throughout Islamic history taqiyya has been most strongly associated with the Twelver Shi‘i tradition, which has 
the most developed literature on this topic […]. The social use of taqiyya by persecuted groups such as the Moriscos of 
16th-century Spain or Shi‘is under the rule of the Ghaznavids, Seljuqs, Mamluks, Ottomans and other oppressive Sunni 
regimes may be linked to a dramaturgical discipline that guided members of a minority group to manage their identities 
and adjust their behaviour not only in cases of severe duress, such as at heresy trials, but also in their everyday encoun-
ters with the majority.’ The latter is precisely the core of the argument advanced by critics when they invoke an en-
larged (and de-historicised) concept of taqiyya: while not being persecuted or threatened in Europe, some European 
Muslim intellectuals resort to “dissimulation” so that they can conceal their real aims and intentions to the non-Muslim 
majority for strategic reasons. For example, Landau claims that, while Tariq Ramadan pretends to disapprove of jihād 
(literally “struggle”), he actually endorses an expansionist and aggressive notion of it (see Le Sabre et le Coran, 138). 
238 This definition is formulated by Tariq Ramadan (often himself accused of doublespeak, as I will explain in chapter 
six) in What I Believe, 2. The same definition can be found in an interview conducted by Aziz Zemouri, a Figaro Mag-
azine and Le Point journalist: see Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 65. 
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osophically argues for) a particular form of “double discourse.”239 One could even say that 
this idea is based on the need for a double discourse. The arguments we use with other per-
sons as fellow members of associations in the ‘background culture’ are politically irrele-
vant.240 What is important for political liberalism is the way in which we address our fellow 
citizens when we publicly discuss fundamental political questions. Therefore, a double dis-
course is not (per se) something that public reason abhors. The problem with ‘doublespeak’ is 
obviously different and concerns the sincerity of the arguments publicly expressed. My evalu-
ative method cannot answer the question of personal sincerity in public discourses. It can just 
require it. We are forced to assume that what we read or hear corresponds to the sincere inten-
tions of the writer or speaker; otherwise, any evaluation (or conjecture) would be impossible. 
But this is a perfectly normal assumption that we often make in our daily lives. As a matter of 
fact, deception and disguise cannot be neutralised by normative theory. The latter should 
equip citizens with critical tools for evaluating public political discourses. Nonetheless, if de-
ception occurs and they are able to detect it, this is possible not only thanks to the internal re-
sources of the theory. 
5) On the fifth level, I would like to argue that an analysis of the arguments publicly made 
by European Muslims concerning citizenship enables us to examine: (a) if they acknowledge 
the need for a public justification of fundamental political decisions involving the use of coer-
cive political power, (b) if they actually take part in this public justification consistently, and 
(c) how they honour the ideal of public reason [what is the nature of their claims within the 
boundaries of public reason? Are they purely public arguments, or are there also some argu-
ments that follow the logic and the structure of ‘declaration’ or ‘witnessing’ in the Rawlsian 
sense (infra)? What is their prevailing attitude?]. 
6) Finally, at the most fundamental level, I would like to show that through public reason 
European societies could achieve stability for the right reasons, not merely by requiring a 
strict integration or assimilation to a (not so well defined) European model of secular or neu-
                                                        
239 Maffettone suggests that the ‘concept [of public reason] imposes a sort of double standard.’ See Sebastiano Maffet-
tone “Religion and Liberalism: Public Reason, Public Sphere and Cultural Pluralism,” in From Political Theory to Po-
litical Theology: Religious Challenges and the Prospects of Democracy, ed. Péter Losonczi and Aakash Singh (London 
and New York: Continuum, 2010), 9. 
240 This is not to say that members of associations in the background culture can trample on fundamental basic rights 
and liberties, as we will see. 
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tral citizenship, but through inclusion in a common political identity and through a shared po-
litical commitment to public reason. In this way, we can outline a normative theory of Euro-
pean citizenship able to secure civic trust and friendship, stability for the right reasons, and 
mutual respect for others’ political claims, expectations, and demands. The idea is that this 
kind of analysis can serve both Muslim believers and (political) liberals: here there is a politi-
cal convergence of interests. As Mohammed Fadel rightly points out:  
‘The fate of Islam in Western democracies […] has not been the only casualty 
of the “war on terror” : liberalism has found itself under increasing attack as irrel-
evant to a world in which, we are told, terrorists can threaten death and destruc-
tion on the scale of Hiroshima or Nagasaki. Ironically, political realities created 
by the “war on terrorism” have created conditions […] in which both liberals and 
Muslims have a mutual interest in effecting a meaningful rapprochement.’241 
On the one hand, this work shows that Muslim believers can be good citizens in European 
liberal democracies. On the other, it demonstrates that political liberalism is a powerful and 
appealing242 framework for political reconciliation of citizens as citizens.  
I think that a more defined and stable conception of public reason is in the interest of every 
citizen, but in particular in the interest of citizens belonging to a minority group. First, the 
boundaries within which the requirements of public reason apply are limited and clear. This 
means that the call (sometimes one could say the obsession) for integration can be confined to 
the political sphere (for its Rawlsian definition, see the next chapters): if a citizen honours the 
ideal of public reason, she is integrated politically speaking,243 and society should not contin-
uously ask for additional proof of her civic loyalty outside the boundaries of the political. 
Moreover, Muslims and non-Muslims are bound in the same way by the idea of public reason. 
                                                        
241 Mohammad Fadel, “The True, the Good, and the Reasonable: The Theological and Ethical Roots of Public Reason 
in Islamic Law,” 6. 
242 ‘It is precisely Rawls’s recognition that individuals with incommensurate moral theories may nevertheless agree on 
fundamental political questions while each retains her moral conception of the good that should make political liberal-
ism categorically more appealing to committed Muslims than thicker conceptions of liberalism which would require 
Muslims to revise their moral and theological commitments in so many cases that it would strain credulity to accept the 
sincerity either of those revisions or their continued adherence to Islam as a comprehensive doctrine of the good,’ ibid. 
65. 
243 Here I do not directly tackle the problems related to present socio-economic or deeper individual integration, alt-
hough, as I have said, I think that general compliance with the idea of public reason may help to mitigate those prob-
lems. 
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This entails Muslims being equally and reciprocally able to evaluate non-Muslims’ political 
demands on the same bases and without fear. Once again, I wish to reinforce the fact that here 
the perspective is political and normative. I acknowledge that social and economic disad-
vantage may be a ground for asymmetries in citizens’ capacity for public argumentation and 
evaluation. Nonetheless, as I have said, on the one hand we need simplifying assumptions, 
and on the other I think that part of these asymmetries –namely, those asymmetries that are 
bluntly unjustifiable– can be removed through a shared commitment to public reason thanks 
to citizens’ ability to disclose political demands that conflict with public reason. Let me con-
clude this chapter by quoting a passage from Tariq Ramadan’s book What I Believe: 
‘It is now clear that so long as the two basic rights (freedom of conscience and 
freedom of worship) are recognized and protected, as they are in all Western soci-
eties, Muslims have to respect the law, which is binding on them as it is on all 
other citizens and residents, Muslim Westerners have understood that when secu-
larism and religious neutrality are not instrumentalized by ideologues or intellec-
tuals or political trends opposed to any presence of religion, they guarantee reli-
gious pluralism in Western societies and protect their legitimate rights.’244 
This quotation clearly illustrates the perspective centred on equal rights from which I have 
claimed that a more robust and stable conception of public reason is in the interest of all and 
of Muslim citizens in particular. 
 
                                                        
244 Tariq Ramadan, What I Believe, 52, emphases added. 
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Chapter Two: 
Toward a Justificatory Evaluative Political 
Theory 
 
 
Ceux qui sont dans le dérèglement 
disent à ceux qui sont dans l’ordre 
que ce sont eux qui s’éloignent de 
la nature, et ils croient la suivre: 
comme ceux qui sont dans un vais-
seau croient que ceux qui sont au 
bord fuient. Le langage est pareil 
de tous côtés. Il faut avoir un point 
fixe pour en juger. Le port juge 
ceux qui sont dans le vaisseau; 
mais où prendrons-nous un port 
dans la morale ?  
 
 
When applied to the study of the possibilities of and requirements for Muslims’ citizenship 
in European societies, the idea of public reason could be understood from the standpoint of 
what I call justificatory evaluative political theory. From this perspective, public reason dis-
closes its full potential in terms of reciprocity, political legitimacy, social unity, and stability. 
In this chapter I explain the justificatory evaluative method that I adopt. In order to pinpoint 
the main features of such a method, I have to: 
                                                        
 Blaise Pascal, Pensées (Paris: Rombaldi, 1935), n. 383 on page 138. 
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a) Clarify what justification and justificatory approach exactly mean. I do that through a 
reconstruction of the preeminent features of John Rawls’s justificatory political liberal-
ism (2.1). 
b) Specify the kind of evaluation that I intend to conduct. To do that, I define it by means 
of comparison with the comparative approach exemplified in Andrew F. March’s “rea-
soning from conjecture” or “comparative ethics” (2.2).245 
c) Put the justificatory purposes and the evaluative strategy together, and explain my own 
methodological perspective, that is, justificatory evaluative political theory (2.3). 
Concerning the first point (a), let me make some preliminary clarifications. Here I cannot 
provide a satisfying (even less a full) account of the notion of justification in contemporary 
political theory. Such an attempt would go far beyond the scope of this study. For what fol-
lows, it would be enough to give some general definitions in order to prepare the ground for 
the reconstructive and evaluative tasks that are the aims of this research. First, justification 
can be defined in these terms: ‘a belief is justified when it is permissibly affirmed. Someone 
who justifiably believes P makes no normative error by believing P.’246 As we will see, the 
central concern of Rawls’s political liberalism (and of many political theorists alongside him) 
is how to provide a basis for the public justification of political institutions, policies, and ac-
tions which involve or are backed by the exercise of state coercive power. As Fred 
D’Agostino and Kevin Vallier put it, ‘[c]oercion is taken to be the object of public justifica-
tion because it is the characteristic feature of political life.’247 The underlying idea is ex-
pressed by Charles Larmore in these terms:  
‘The democratic ideal consists in placing a certain constraint on [the] use of 
coercion. It requires that political principles be such that those whom they bind 
must also be able to find reason to accept them. Only on this condition do they 
                                                        
245 Andrew F. March, Islam and Liberal Citizenship and “What is Comparative Political Theory?” 
246 Kevin Vallier, “Against Public Reason Liberalism’s Accessibility Requirement,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 8, no. 
3 (2011), 370. 
247 Kevin Vallier and Fred D’Agostino, “Public Justification,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. 
Zalta (Fall 2013), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/justification-public/, 1 (page number refers 
to the printable pdf version). 
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become politically legitimate [… This idea has to do] with the sort of respect we 
owe one another in the political realm –that is, in relationships where the possibil-
ity of coercion is involved.’248  
Justificatory liberalism is a variegated family of liberal conceptions of public justification. 
John Rawls is not the only prominent political theorist who can be included within this fami-
ly: Charles Larmore, Bruce Ackerman, Gerald Gaus, Robert Audi, Thomas Nagel, Lawrence 
Solum, Kevin Vallier, Fred D’Agostino, and Micah Schwartzman are just some of the theo-
rists keeping him company. The term was coined by Gerald Gaus: he openly says that ‘public 
justification is the core of liberalism.’249 However, while he distinguishes his “justificatory 
liberalism” from Rawls’s “political liberalism,”250 I use this term in a broader sense, which 
includes Rawls’s political liberalism.251 Although different elements (such as the value of re-
spect in the case of Larmore’s liberalism quoted above) can be emphasised depending on the 
specific conception of public justification, this is the fundamental idea of justificatory liberal-
ism: to be legitimate, coercive power must be publicly justified. As Cristopher Eberle argues, 
at the most basic level, justificatory liberals share a  
‘[C]ommitment to the following claim: because each citizen ought to respect 
her compatriots, each citizen ought to pursue public justification for her favoured 
coercive laws. […] The claim that resect requires public justification provides a 
basis for the central component of the justificatory liberal’s ethic of citizenship: 
the norm of respect imposes on each citizen an obligation to discipline herself in 
such a way that she resolutely refrains from supporting any coercive law for 
which she cannot provide the requisite public justification.’252 
To be sure, the problem is precisely what kind of public justification is required. Anew, 
generally speaking, one may say that ‘a public justification is achieved when members of the 
                                                        
248 Charles Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 86. 
249 Gerald F. Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1996), 4. 
250 Ibid. 
251 On this I agree with Cristopher J. Eberle, Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge Universi-
ty Press, 2002), 11 note 34. 
252 Ibid. 11-12. Italics in the original. 
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relevant public have adequate or sufficient reason to endorse a particular coercive proposal, 
law, or policy.’253 A reason for something can be simply defined as ‘a consideration that 
counts in favour of it.’254 For brevity (and since it does not affect the substance of my work in 
a crucial way), in this study I use the terms “reason” and “argument” for something in this 
broad sense and almost interchangeably (strictly speaking, however, a reason is not an argu-
ment).255 The general definition of public justification has the advantage that it already allows 
the connection between public justification and political legitimacy to be seen. As Kevin Val-
lier points out, public reason liberalism256 ‘combines traditional liberal commitments to indi-
vidual liberty and political democracy with a demand that coercion be justified to citizens in 
terms they can reasonably be expected to endorse.’257 I will return to such a connection in 
what follows. However, the qualification of a reason as an ‘adequate or sufficient’ reason 
(that is, what makes a reason a justificatory reason) is problematic, and it is the point about 
which differences among public reason liberals are more acute. What counts as an adequate 
reason? In what follows, a reason is considered as adequate for public justification if it is a 
conclusive reason. To understand why reasons must be conclusive in order to provide a solid 
ground to public justification, let me quote Gaus’s explanation at length:  
                                                        
253 Kevin Vallier and Fred D’Agostino, “Public Justification,” 1. 
254 Thomas M. Scanlon, What we Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), 17. 
255 In fact, an argument can be defined as ‘a sequence of statements such that some of them (the premises) purport to 
give reason to accept another of them, the conclusion.’ Thus, based on some assumptions, an argument presents one or 
more reasons supporting a conclusion. See the entry “argument” by Richard Purtill in The Cambridge Dictionary of 
Philosophy. Similarly, I use the terms “premise” and “belief” in a broad and roughly equivalent sense, simply meaning 
a proposition that we accept. A fuller definition of belief could be the following: ‘a dispositional psychological state in 
virtue of which a person will assent to a proposition under certain conditions.’ See the entry “belief” by Paul K. Moser 
in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. 
256 Given the approach followed here, in this work I use the expressions “justificatory liberalism” and “public reason 
liberalism” indifferently. However, as Vallier and D’Agostino point out, ‘[n]otwithstanding the characteristic associa-
tion between public reason liberalism and the requirement of public justification, public justification is the genus and 
public reason is the species. The idea of public justification is, at its root, an idea about what justifies coercion. Alt-
hough we can arrive at a state in which some social arrangement is publicly justified by an explicit course of reasoning 
leading to the legitimation of the state, this is not intrinsic to the more general idea of public justification […] In par-
ticular, we can arrive at a state in which some arrangement is publicly justified by non-deliberative, indeed non-
discursive means, and it is for this reason that public reason is a narrower notion than public justification.’ See their 
“Public Justification,” 1. I will focus on a Rawlsian interpretation of public reason liberalism, without claiming to ana-
lyse all the possible variants of the latter. 
257 Kevin Vallier, “Liberalism, Religion and Integrity,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90, no. 1 (2012), 150. 
  
 European Muslims and Liberal Citizenship 
Ph.D. Thesis successfully discussed on April 21, 2016.  
The total or partial use of the Ph.D. Thesis is subject to copyright restrictions. 
 
  
103  
 Giovanni Vezzani 
 
LUISS-ULB 
‘[A]ssume that Alf and Betty are both members of P, and Alf proposes law LA. 
Suppose that Alf can advance a reason R1 for Betty to endorse LA, but Betty’s sys-
tem of beliefs and values is such that while as a member of P she acknowledges 
that R1 is a reason for endorsing LA, she also holds that she has reason R2, which is 
a reason to endorse LB over LA (where LA and LB are incompatible alternatives). 
Suppose that, exercising her reason as a free and equal member of the public, Bet-
ty concludes that R2 outweighs (or defeats) R1, and thus she concludes that LB is 
better than LA. Now some insist that, nevertheless, Alf has provided a justification 
of LA insofar as he has offered a nonsectarian reason R1 in support of LA—a reason 
that, as a free and equal member of the public, Betty can appreciate. Yet, exercis-
ing her capacities as a free and equal person, Betty has concluded that, when 
compared to LB, LA is inadequately justified in the sense that it is not choice-
worthy; as she understands it, she has more reason to endorse LB. For Alf (even if 
Alf is the head of state) to simply impose LA on Betty is inconsistent with treating 
her as a free and equal member of the public. The critical question is not whether 
Betty has some reason to endorse LA, but whether, all things considered, she has 
reason to endorse LA over the alternatives, or even over no law at all. If she has 
some reason to endorse LA, but more reason to endorse an alternative, then what 
economists call the “opportunity costs” of choosing LA exceed the benefits: she 
would be opting for a law that achieves less of what she values over one that 
achieves more. Therefore, only a justification that showed she had conclusive rea-
sons—the benefits outweighed the opportunity costs—would show that she has 
reason to endorse the law.’258 
Thus, we arrive at the special definition of public justification (that I borrow from Kevin 
Vallier) from which I begin the analysis: ‘a coercive action C is justified if and only if every 
member of the public P has a conclusive reason R to endorse C.’ 259 
Note that this definition is “special” only in the sense that it qualifies the requirement that 
justificatory reasons must be “adequate.” However, it leaves many crucial questions unan-
                                                        
258 Gerald F. Gaus, “Coercion, Ownership, and the Redistributive State: Justificatory Liberalism’s Classical Tilt,” Social 
Philosophy and Policy 27, no. 1 (2010), 245-246. 
259 Kevin Vallier, “Liberalism, Religion and Integrity,” 151. 
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swered. For instance, it does not say what is the scope of the required justification; how to 
identify the relevant public P; if the expression “every member has a conclusive reason to en-
dorse” must be interpreted in the sense of reaching a consensus on the same reason R (so that 
the same conclusive reason R is shared by every member of P) or in the sense of a conver-
gence of different reasons (R1, R2, R3 and so on, so that in an extreme case every member of P 
has a different conclusive reason) that justify the same political output C;260 which doctrine of 
restraint is associated to the convergence/consensus view adopted (that is, which reasons –
shared or not− can be presented in public discussions and deliberations) and what to do if we 
are unable to solve the problem linked to C by recurring to shared public reasons; whether or 
not sincerity is required in presenting those reasons, and so on. These considerations are what 
distinguish every particular conception of public justification: those conceptions may be un-
derstood as specifications of the special definition of public justification. Since it is impossi-
ble to provide a detailed overview of different accounts of public justification here, in the next 
section I focus on Rawls’s justificatory liberalism.261 
 
2.1 Rawls’s Political Liberalism and the Problem of Justification.  
 
Indeed, the question of public justification is central to Political Liberalism: 
‘The aim of political liberalism is to uncover the conditions of the possibility of 
a reasonable public basis of justification on fundamental political questions. […] 
In doing this, it has to distinguish the public point of view from the many nonpub-
lic (not private) points of view. Or, alternatively, it has to characterize the distinc-
tion between public reason and the many nonpublic reasons and to explain why 
                                                        
260 For the distinction between convergence and consensus modes of justification, see notes to chapters two and three. 
261 However, several other contributions will be presented throughout the discussion. For a general but thorough analy-
sis of the concept of public justification, its constitutive elements, different interpretations, and the major objections to 
it, see Kevin Vallier and Fred D’Agostino, “Public Justification,” Fred D’Agostino, “Some Modes of Public Justifica-
tion,” Australasian Journal Philosophy 69, no. 04 (1991), 390-414, Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), in particular 256-289 (a list of objections to the idea of public reason can be 
found on 259-260) and, by the same author “Public Reason,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. 
Zalta (Summer 2013), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/public-reason/, 12-18 (page numbers 
refer to the printable pdf version).  
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public reason takes the form it does. Moreover, it has to be impartial […] between 
the points of view of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. This impartiality [en-
tails that, f]or one thing, political liberalism does not attack or criticize any rea-
sonable view. […] It does not criticize, much less reject, any particular theory of 
the truth of moral judgements. […] Which moral judgments are true, all things 
considered, is not a matter for political liberalism, as it approaches all questions 
from within its own limited point of view. […] Further, political liberalism, rather 
than referring to its political conception of justice as true, refers to it as reasonable 
instead. This […] indicates the more limited point of view of the political concep-
tion as articulating political and not all values, while providing at the same time a 
public basis of justification.’262  
To begin with, let me introduce Rawls’s crucial distinction between political (or pro tanto) 
justification, full justification, and public justification.263 I think that the best way to do this is 
presenting the relation between the three kinds of justification, the idea of public reason and 
its values,264 the conception of citizens as free and equal, rational and reasonable persons and 
the ideas of social unity and stability for the right reasons. I consider the integration of such a 
                                                        
262 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, xix-xx. 
263 For a critique of Rawls’s justificatory strategy, see, among others, Fabian Freyenhagen, “Taking Reasonable Plural-
ism Seriously: An Internal Critique of Political Liberalism,” Politics, Philosophy, and Economics 10, no. 3 (2011), 325-
327. Freyenhagen proposes an alternative realist approach leading to a ‘liberalism of fear’ (for his criticism of Rawls 
see 327-334, and for his proposal see in particular 335-337). For the notion of ‘liberalism of fear,’ see Judith Shklar, 
“The Liberalism of Fear,” in Political Liberalism: Variations on a Theme, 149-166. 
264 I analyse these concepts in the following chapter, entirely devoted to the idea of public reason. Here, it will be suffi-
cient to say that the structure of the idea of public reason as defined by Rawls consists of five features: ‘1) the funda-
mental political questions to which it applies, 2) the persons to which it applies […], 3) its content as given by a family 
of reasonable political conceptions of justice, 4) the application of these conceptions in discussions of coercive norms to 
be enacted in the form of legitimate law for a democratic people [that is, the idea of political legitimacy], and 5) citi-
zens’ checking that the principles derived from their conceptions of justice satisfy the criterion of reciprocity.’ See John 
Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 442. Moreover, concerning values of public reason, Rawls says that ‘the 
idea of public reason specifies at the deepest level the basic political values and specifies how the political relation is to 
be understood.’ Ibid. 447. It is enough to say that together with ‘values of political justice’ (values related to: equal po-
litical and civil liberty, equality of opportunity, social equality and economic reciprocity), ‘values of public reason’ ex-
press the ‘liberal political values.’ Values of public reason are expressed in: a) guidelines of public inquiry (free, public, 
well informed and reasonable) and b) political virtues [i.e. virtues of political cooperation, such as ‘reasonableness and 
a readiness to honour the (moral) duty of civility’, fair-mindedness, the virtue of toleration, and a ‘spirit of compro-
mise’]. For political values, see in particular: John Rawls, Political Liberalism, xlviii, 139, 146, 156-157, 163, 190-195, 
223-224, 236; “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 447, 453-454, 474-476; “The Idea of an Overlapping Consen-
sus,” in John Rawls, Collected Papers, 439-440; and “The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus,” in 
John Rawls, Collected Papers, 484-485. See also Samuel Freeman, Rawls (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 
371-372 and 388. For the political virtues sustaining those values, see in particular: John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 
139, 157, 163, 171, 194-195, 199, 224; “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus,” 439, 443-444. 
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(necessarily concise) overview of paramount importance to this introductory part. However, I 
deliberately do not focus on the evolution of the concept of justification in Rawls’s philoso-
phy here.265 I centre my account on Political Liberalism, “Reply to Habermas,” and “The Idea 
of Public Reason Revisited.” 
Rawls develops his political conception266 of justice in two stages.267 First, he presents jus-
tice as fairness as a freestanding political conception.268 In the second stage, however, he 
                                                        
265 For this, and in particular for the notions of reflective equilibrium, original position, and public reason as three ideas 
related to justification in Rawls’s work, see Thomas M. Scanlon, “Rawls on Justification,” in The Cambridge Compan-
ion to Rawls, 139-167. See also Charles Larmore, “Public Reason,” in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, 368-393. 
266 A short account of the idea of a “political conception” is in order here. First of all, as Rawls openly states, a political 
conception of justice applies to the ‘basic structure’ of society, that is, to ‘a society’s main political, social, and econom-
ic institutions, and how they fit together into one unified system of social cooperation from one generation to the next.’ 
John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 11. Moreover, a political conception has three features. First, as I said, it applies to a 
society’s basic structure. Second, it is presented as a ‘freestanding view’, that is, while ‘we want a political conception 
to have a justification by reference to one or more comprehensive doctrines, it is neither presented as, nor as derived 
from, such a doctrine applied to the basic structure of society, as if this structure were simply another subject to which 
that doctrine applied. […] I assume all citizens to affirm a comprehensive doctrine to which the political conception 
they accept is in some way related. But a distinguishing feature of a political conception is that it is presented as free-
standing and expounded apart from, or without reference to, any such wider background […] [T]he political conception 
is a module, an essential constituent part, that fits into and can be supported by various reasonable comprehensive doc-
trines that endure in the society regulated by it. This means that it can be presented without saying, or knowing, or haz-
arding a conjecture about, what such doctrines it may belong to, or be supported by.’ Ibid. 12-13. Finally, a political 
conception of justice has a content that is ‘expressed in terms of certain fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public 
political culture of a democratic society.’ This hint brings us to the notion of ‘background culture’ (infra): while this 
latter represents the context which comprehensive doctrines belong to, the public political culture ‘comprises the politi-
cal institutions of a constitutional regime and the public traditions of their interpretation (including those of the judici-
ary), as well as historic texts and documents that are common knowledge.’ Ibid. 13-14. Public political culture is a 
‘shared fund of implicitly recognized basic [political] ideas and principles’, it expresses ‘a tradition of democratic 
thought, the content of which is at least familiar and intelligible to the educated common sense of citizens generally’, 
ibid. 8, 14 (see also 43, 175 and 220). To my ends, a final and important remark is in order here. According to Rawls, a 
moral conception can be political, general, or (partially or fully) comprehensive. As I said, a moral conception is politi-
cal if it (i) applies to a society’s basic structure, (ii) is presented as a freestanding view, and (iii) its content is expressed 
in terms of fundamental ideas of a democratic society’s public political culture. A moral conception is general ‘if it ap-
plies to a wide range of subjects, and in the limit to all subjects universally.’ A moral conception is comprehensive if it 
includes ‘conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as well as ideals of friendship 
and of familial and associational relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit to our life as 
a whole’; it is fully comprehensive if it ‘covers all recognized values and virtues within one rather articulated system.’ It 
is only partially comprehensive if it covers a lot of (but not all) non-political values and virtues. Ibid. 13. According to 
this interpretation, Islam seems to be a general and more or less fully comprehensive religious doctrine. 
267 Ibid. 133-134. 
268 For the definition of a ‘freestanding view’, see above. Moreover, he specifies that: ‘[p]olitical liberalism […] aims 
for a political conception of justice as a freestanding view. It offers no specific metaphysical or epistemological doctrine 
beyond what is implied by the political conception itself. As an account of political values, a freestanding political con-
ception does not deny there being other values that apply, say, to the personal, the familial, and the associational; nor 
does it say that political values are separate from, or discontinuous with, other values. One aim, as I have said, is to 
specify the political domain and its conception of justice in such way that its institutions can gain the support of an 
overlapping consensus.’ Ibid. 10-11. 
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takes into account the question of reasonable pluralism of comprehensive (moral, religious, 
and philosophical) doctrines.269 In a liberal and reasonably plural society, many non-public 
reasons are present in the ‘background culture.’270 In a society where pluralism is a fact and ‘a 
reasonable comprehensive doctrine cannot secure the basis of social unity, nor can it provide 
the content of public reason on fundamental political questions,’271 we must address the ques-
tion of how it is possible to preserve unity and stability. Since the main question of political 
liberalism is ‘how is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and 
equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and 
moral doctrines?,’272 solving the problem of reasonable pluralism means answering the ques-
tion “how is political liberalism possible?” Up to now, I have mentioned the ‘fact of reasona-
                                                        
269 A reasonable comprehensive doctrine: 1) ‘is an exercise of theoretical reason: it covers the major religious, philo-
sophical, and moral aspects of human life in a more or less consistent and coherent manner. It organizes and character-
izes recognized values so that they are compatible with one another and express an intelligible view of the world;’ 2) 
each doctrine is characterised by the way in which it chooses which values have the primacy and establishes how to 
balance conflicting values: so, it is also an exercise of practical reason; 3) ‘it normally belongs to, or draws upon, a tra-
dition of thought and doctrine.’ Ibid. 59. Persons who are reasonable (see the definition below) affirm only reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines. Ibid. 
270 I can now introduce two important distinctions that Rawls makes, namely, the distinction between public political 
culture and background culture on the one hand, and between public and non-public reasons on the other. As we will 
see, Rawls’s political liberalism, being focused on the conditions of public justification of political power on fundamen-
tal political questions, is concerned mainly with public reasons. Nonetheless, non-public reasons play a crucial role in 
attaining stability and may also be appealed to in public political forums, once we adopt a ‘wide view’ of public reason 
(see chapters three and four). Non-public reasons ‘comprise the many reasons of civil society’ and belong to what he 
calls the ‘background culture’ (ibid. 220). The background culture is ‘the culture of the social, not of the political. It is 
the culture of daily life, of its many associations: churches and universities, learned and scientific societies, and clubs 
and teams, to mention a few.’ Ibid. 14. Non-public reasons may be divided into: (a) social reasons, ‘the many reasons of 
associations in society which make up the background culture’ (such as churches), and (b) domestic reasons, ‘the reason 
of families as small groups in society’. So, non-public reasons are not private reasons (ibid. 220). We could say that 
public reasons : public political culture = non-public reasons : background culture. Importantly, Rawls argues that ‘[a]s 
citizens, we participate in all these kinds of reason and we have the rights of equal citizens when we do so.’ Ibid. 220. 
271 Ibid. 134. 
272 Ibid. 4. 
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ble pluralism’ without defining it.273 Like in the rest of the section, here I closely follow 
Rawls’s arguments.274 It is quite easy to observe that many different religious, philosophical, 
                                                        
273 As Rawls acknowledges (Political Liberalism, 36 note 37), the distinction between the ‘fact of pluralism’ and the 
‘fact of reasonable pluralism’ is drawn from Joshua Cohen’s article “Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus” [in 
Joshua Cohen, Philosophy, Politics, Democracy: Selected Essays (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009), 
38-60], see in particular 52-53. Here, Cohen defines reasonable pluralism as the idea ‘that there are distinct understand-
ings of value, each of which is fully reasonable. An understanding of value is fully reasonable just in case its adherents 
are stably disposed to affirm it as they acquire new information and subject it to critical reflection.’ The lack of agree-
ment on a single understanding of value entails pluralism of understandings of value. Furthermore, as I have said, Co-
hen distinguishes between the simple fact of pluralism, in which ‘the protection of the deliberative liberties will result in 
moral pluralism,’ and the fact of reasonable pluralism, in which pluralism is qualified by the fact that ‘some of the mor-
al conceptions will fall within the set of fully reasonable conceptions.’ Ibid. 53. After having shown that holding a rea-
sonable comprehensive doctrine is not incompatible with believing it true as a matter of faith [since if we acknowledge 
the fact of reasonable pluralism, even if ‘we embrace (not unreasonably) the sectarian view that our moral views are 
true […,] our sectarianism does not require that we condemn as unreasonable everyone who believes what we take to be 
false’], Cohen anticipates Rawls’s differentiation between an ‘overlapping consensus’ and a mere ‘modus vivendi’ (53-
55). As he puts it in “A More Democratic Liberalism” (1505), ‘[i]n a world full of cruelty, depravity, and grief, we 
ought not to dismiss the virtues of a politics of group bargaining within a framework of rules that win general compli-
ance –“a mere modus vivendi.” Still, [Political] Liberalism defends the possibility of doing better: of achieving a con-
sensus on political justice under conditions of fundamental moral, religious, and philosophical disagreement. The key to 
that possibility is that political values […] are extremely important values and can be acknowledged as such by conflict-
ing moral conceptions, by views that disagree with one another about ultimate values and about the best way to live.’  
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and moral doctrines (some of which are ‘not only irrational, but mad and aggressive’)275 coex-
ist in contemporary democratic societies. This is what Rawls calls the ‘fact of pluralism as 
such.’276 However, the notion of ‘reasonable pluralism’ is more specific and qualified. First, 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
274 This remark means that here I do not distinguish between ‘pluralism’ and ‘reasonable disagreement’ as Larmore 
does [see his “Pluralism and Reasonable Disagreement,” Social Philosophy and Policy 11, no. 1 (1994), 62-63, 63-70, 
and 74-79]. In particular, he affirms that ‘pluralism is a doctrine about the nature of value. It asserts that the forms of 
moral concern, as well as the forms of self-realization, are in the end not one, but many. It stands, therefore, in opposi-
tion to religious and metaphysical conceptions of a single source of value [that is, monism]. Liberalism, however, does 
not arise from an acceptance of pluralism. Instead, it seeks to found the principles of political association upon a core 
morality that reasonable people can accept, despite their natural tendency to disagree about comprehensive visions of 
the nature of value, and so in particular about the merits of pluralism and monism. This expectation of reasonable disa-
greement lies at a different, more reflective level than pluralism. It responds to the religious and metaphysical disen-
chantment of the world, not by affirming it, as pluralism seems to do, but rather by recognizing that like other deep con-
ceptions of value this disenchantment is an idea about which reasonable people are likely to disagree,’ 74, emphases 
added. Now these considerations are not troublesome from a Rawlsian perspective. Obviously, when Rawls talks about 
reasonable pluralism, he has in mind something like what Larmore calls reasonable disagreement (Larmore himself 
acknowledges this, ibid. 62). What Larmore seeks to do, is to distinguish the two different notions of value pluralism 
and reasonable disagreement (pluralism) à la Rawls. So, the fact that Rawls uses both the expression reasonable disa-
greement and the expression reasonable pluralism (e.g., Political Liberalism, 55) does not contradict Larmore’s distinc-
tion. I could say that, once we have accepted –even partially− the distinction between comprehensive views (and, 
among them, value pluralism in this form) and the political conception (to which the idea of reasonable pluralism be-
longs as a founding ground) the question is mainly a matter of linguistic preference. So, bearing in mind these points, I 
will follow Rawls and use both terms in Rawls’s sense. With reference to this issue, see also Robert Talisse, Pluralism 
and Liberal Politics (New York: Routledge, 2012). On pages 23-24, he distinguishes between: 1) metaphysical plural-
ism (which has two varieties having in common the fact that they explain the irreducible plurality of goods in virtue of 
‘the nature of the goods themselves’: 1a) Berlin’s value pluralism, according to which ‘goods are viewed as a kind of 
object, and irreducible plurality is understood by means of spatial metaphors –not all goods can co-exist;’ and 1b) what 
he calls psychological pluralism according to which ‘goods are ultimately distinctive kinds of psychological [italicised 
in the original] states’), and 2) epistemological pluralism (which has two varieties having in common the idea that 
‘goods are irreducibly plural due to some fact about moral epistemology that results in our inability to reduce them:’ 2a) 
strong epistemological pluralism ends up in some form of scepticism, since it maintains that ‘epistemic obstacles to val-
ue commensuration are in principle insurmountable;’ and 2b) weak epistemological pluralism which acknowledge that 
‘obstacles to value commensuration are indeed significant and at least at present insurmountable, but makes no claim 
about the permanency of this condition’ emphasis added). Talisse argues that Rawls’s political liberalism holds a kind 
of weak epistemological pluralism (ibid. 25). I fundamentally agree on the fact that an epistemological element is in-
volved in the Rawlsian idea of the burdens of judgment (infra), but, as I will explain in the following lines, the moral 
political dimension of Rawls’s conception of reasonableness (and, hence, of reasonable pluralism) is at least equally 
important (for more details on this point, see 4.2, where I explain why the idea of the burdens of judgment is a funda-
mental component of the concept of reasonableness). Again, this is not to bring back the discourse to some comprehen-
sive view of pluralism, but to strive for grounding the acceptance of pluralism in a core political morality centred on po-
litical reciprocity and grounded in democratic public culture.  
275 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 144. 
276 Without claiming to establish a rigorous parallel, it seems instructive to point out that something similar to the dis-
tinction between the fact of pluralism as such and the fact of reasonable pluralism can be implicitly found in Walter 
Bryce Gallie’s discussion about the consequences of the recognition of the existence of what he calls ‘essentially con-
tested concepts.’ He says that ‘it is important to distinguish clearly such recognition –a somewhat sophisticated “higher 
order” intellectual feat− from the everyday “lower order” recognition that one is using a given concept both aggressive-
ly and defensively. The difference is between recognizing that one has, and presumably will continue to have, oppo-
nents, and recognizing that this is an essential feature of the activity one is pursuing.’ W. B. Gallie, “Essentially Con-
tested Concepts,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series 56 (1955-1956), 192, emphasis added. For the 
link between ‘essential contestability,’ pluralism, reasonableness, and public justification, see Fred D’Agostino, Free 
Public Reason: Making It Up As We Go (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 17-21 and 23-26. 
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reasonable pluralism deals with the diversity of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, that is, 
‘doctrines that reasonable citizens affirm and that political liberalism must address.’277 Sec-
ond, the fact of reasonable pluralism is not ‘an unfortunate condition of human life’, but ‘the 
inevitable outcome of free human reason’278 and ‘a permanent feature of the public culture of 
democracy.’279 Reasonable persons accept the fact of pluralism so qualified (infra). This is the 
central point. In conceiving the relation between the ‘domain of the political’280 and the diver-
sity of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, as reasonable persons we should consider these 
latter as ‘in part the work of free practical reason within the framework of free institutions.’281 
Therefore, when we address the problem of stability by making reference to the support of 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines through an overlapping consensus, we should remember 
that reasonable disagreement is the product of ‘free human reason under conditions of liber-
ty.’282 Why do free institutions lead to reasonable pluralism? What are its sources? Is this plu-
ralism due to narrow personal interests or irrationality? According to Rawls, the sources of 
reasonable disagreement are elsewhere. He observes that ‘reasonable disagreement is disa-
greement between reasonable persons.’283 But what are the features of such reasonable per-
sons? For the moment, it will be enough to say that, according to Rawls, a crucial feature of 
persons is their possessing two moral powers (namely, a ‘capacity for a sense of justice’ and 
‘a capacity for a conception of the good’) and ‘the powers of reason’ (the intellectual powers 
                                                        
277 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 36. I define the notion of reasonableness below. 
278 Ibid. 37. See also 144. 
279 Ibid. 36. 
280 Rawls identifies the domain of the political in a constitutional regime by pointing out the two special features of the 
‘political relationship in a constitutional regime.’ First, such a relationship ‘is a relationship of persons within the basic 
structure of society’ (supra). Second, in this political relationship ‘political power is ultimately the power of the public, 
that is, the power of free and equal citizens as a collective body. This power is regularly imposed on citizens as individ-
uals and as members of associations, some of whom may not accept the reasons widely said to justify the general struc-
ture of political authority –the constitution– or when they do accept that structure, they may not regard as justified many 
of the statutes enacted by the legislature to which they are subject.’ Ibid. 135-137. 
281 Ibid. 37. 
282 Ibid. 144. 
283 Ibid. 55. 
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of judgment, thought, and inference).284 Let me add here that persons are politically conceived 
as free because they have these two moral powers (thus, they are free moral beings in this 
sense) and as equal because they have these powers to the minimum degree required to be ful-
ly cooperating members of society.285 Rawls continues by saying that ‘citizens are conceived 
as thinking of themselves as free in three respects:’ first, as having the moral capacity for a 
conception of the good, second, as ‘self-authenticating sources of valid claims’ (that is, they 
perceive themselves as being entitled to make valid claims), and third as ‘capable of taking 
responsibility for their ends […] and adjusting their aims and aspirations in the light of what 
they can reasonably expect to provide for.’286 The last point means that citizens are to 
acknowledge ‘that the weight of their claims is not given by the strength and psychological 
intensity of their wants and desires, [… but that] they can adjust their ends so that those ends 
can be pursued by the means they can reasonably expect to acquire in return for what they can 
reasonably expect to contribute’287 in a system of cooperation. For the purposes of chapter 
three, it is important to note here the fact that he adds that ‘[t]he idea of responsibility for ends 
is implicit in the public political culture and discernible in its practices.’288 
Reasonable disagreement should be conceived as disagreement between persons endowed 
with common human reason, powers of inference, judgement, and thought.289 Why do rea-
sonable persons disagree, then? Rawls specifies six sources of reasonable disagreement, that 
he calls ‘the burdens of judgement,’ that is, ‘the many hazards involved in the correct (and 
conscientious) exercise of our powers of reason and judgement in the ordinary course of polit-
                                                        
284 Ibid. 19. ‘A capacity for a sense of justice is the capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from the public concep-
tion of justice which characterizes the fair terms of social cooperation. [… It] also expresses a willingness, if not the de-
sire, to act in relation to others on terms that they also can publicly endorse. The capacity for a conception of the good is 
the capacity to form, to revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of one’s rational advantage or good.’ In addition to 
these moral powers, citizens also have ‘at any given time a determinate conception of the good that they try to achieve.’ 
285 Ibid. 
286 See ibid. 29-34. 
287 Ibid. 34. 
288 Ibid. 
289 Ibid. 55. 
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ical life.’290 Persons can disagree (and usually disagree) even when their judgements are fully 
reasonable, because of those sources of reasonable disagreement in judgment.291 Only the op-
pressive use of state coercive power could suppress such disagreement, and establish and pre-
serve unanimity about one comprehensive doctrine.292 Therefore, reasonable persons should 
recognise that reasonable disagreement is a normal consequence of the free use of human rea-
son within a democratic institutional framework and not a regrettable accident. They should 
allow reasonable disagreement and the diversity of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, be-
cause it is not unreasonable to affirm one of them, but it would be unreasonable to use politi-
cal power to repress others’ reasonable comprehensive doctrines.293 Thus, the burdens of 
judgement represent a reason for endorsing the principles of toleration, freedom of con-
science, and freedom of thought.294 Consequently, reasonable people should recognise the 
burdens of judgement and ‘accept their consequences for the use of public reason in directing 
the legitimate exercise of political power in a constitutional regime.’295 This last remark is 
important for what I will say about public reason. Now I am able to define reasonable persons 
and reasonable comprehensive doctrines more exhaustively.296 With reference to reasonable 
persons, note that: (i) according to the general political conception of persons as free and 
equal, they possess the two moral powers (a sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of 
the good) and the powers of reason,297 and (ii) more specifically they are both (iia) willing to 
recognise the burdens of judgment and their consequences,298 and (iib) ‘ready to propose 
principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the 
                                                        
290 Ibid. 55-56. The burdens of judgements are listed in ibid. 56-57. 
291 Ibid. 58. 
292 Ibid. 37. 
293 Ibid. 60. 
294 Ibid. 59, 60 and 61-62. See also Sebastiano Maffettone, Introduzione a Rawls (Rome and Bari: Laterza, 2010), 104. 
295 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 54. 
296 For a detailed account of Rawls’s notion of reasonableness and some main objections, see, among others, Sebastiano 
Maffettone, “Political Liberalism: Reasonableness and Democratic Practice,” 542 and 557-573. See also his Rawls: An 
Introduction (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), 237-249. 
297 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 19. 
298 Ibid. 54. 
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assurance that others will likewise do so. Those norms they view as reasonable for everyone 
to accept and therefore as justifiable to them; and they are ready to discuss the fair terms that 
other propose.’299 Accordingly, we can define reasonable comprehensive doctrines300 as the 
doctrines affirmed by reasonable persons: as such, they recognise the burdens of judgement 
and the reasonable pluralism, abide by the principle of toleration, and support the idea of pub-
lic reason.301 A reasonable comprehensive doctrine respects the existence of different reason-
able doctrines and finds it unreasonable to repress doctrines that are not unreasonable.302 So 
far, the principle of toleration has been presented as being grounded in the recognition of the 
burdens of judgement and of reasonable pluralism. Understandably, Rawls also wants to es-
tablish a less epistemological and more moral-political foundation for toleration: the criterion 
of reciprocity (for a deeper analysis of this crucial notion, see 3.2.b.1 and 4.2). This latter 
states that ‘our exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the 
reasons we offer for our political action may reasonably be accepted by other citizens as a jus-
tification of those actions.’303 Therefore, if we abide by the criterion of reciprocity, we cannot 
(unreasonably) repress others’ reasonable comprehensive doctrines: this action would not sat-
isfy the reciprocity between reasonable persons. Undeniably, reasonableness and the criterion 
of reciprocity tightly relate to another concept I have already mentioned: the liberal principle 
                                                        
299 Ibid. 49. This definition of the features of reasonable persons is a sufficient to my aims. However, other properties 
can be singled out. Leif Wenar observes that five main attributes of reasonable persons are specified in Political Liber-
alism (for Rawls’s summary of these attributes, see John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 81-82). 1) a- The possession of 
the two moral powers; b- the possession of the powers of judgement, thought, and inference; c- the possession of a de-
terminate conception of the good at any given time (ibid. 19); d- the capacity for being normal, fully cooperating mem-
bers of society over a complete life (ibid. in particular 15-22, 34, and 55). 2) The readiness to propose and the willing-
ness to abide by fair terms of cooperation (ibid. 49). 3) The recognition of the burdens of judgement (ibid. 48-54; 54-
58). 4) The possession of a reasonable moral psychology (ibid. 81-86). 5) The recognition of five essential elements of a 
conception of objectivity (ibid. 110-112). See Leif Wenar, “Political Liberalism: An Internal Critique,” Ethics 106, no. 
1 (1995), 36-37. 
300 For the definition of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, see above. 
301 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 59. See also 61: ‘reasonable persons see that the burdens of judgement set limits 
on what can be reasonably justified to others, and so they endorse some form of liberty of conscience and freedom of 
thought.’  
302 Ibid. 60-61. 
303 Ibid. xliv, emphasis added. See also 16-17: ‘the idea of reciprocity lies between the idea of impartiality, which is al-
truistic (being moved by the general good), and the idea of mutual advantage understood as everyone’s being advan-
taged with respect to each person’s present or expected future situation as things are. As understood in justice as fair-
ness, reciprocity is a relation between citizens expressed by principles of justice that regulate a social world in which 
everyone benefits judged with respect to an appropriate benchmark of equality defined with respect to that world. […] 
[R]eciprocity is a relation between citizens in a well-ordered society expressed by its public political conception of jus-
tice’. For a similar formulation, see also page 50. 
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of political legitimacy. It says that ‘our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it 
is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and 
equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to 
their common human reason.’304 In my view, as I will explain in chapters three and four, rea-
sonableness, reciprocity, the principle of legitimacy and public reason all share a fundamental 
element: they all shape the public political dimension of citizens’ social life. Reasonableness 
does not only represent a political descriptive assumption about the person (along with ration-
ality and society as a fair system of cooperation), while the criterion of reciprocity is the very 
political-moral foundation of political liberalism on which liberal legitimacy is grounded (all 
these elements arise from shared ideas, values, and ideals found within democratic public po-
litical culture, see the next two chapters).305 Those elements are also specified by the political 
conception and deeply rooted in citizens’ comprehensive views through the idea of an over-
lapping consensus. Finally, public reason embeds those elements in its account of political 
values and virtues, adding its “operational” justificatory guidelines to them. What matters here 
is that, since the duty to respect the criterion of reciprocity arises from the account of reason-
ableness of persons,306 and since the principle of legitimacy arises from that duty,307 then 
‘[r]easonableness is the ground for achieving a consensus upon a “liberal principle of legiti-
macy”.’308 Thus, to summarise the previous remarks about the reasonable and to prepare the 
ground for moving forward, it can be maintained that reasonableness ‘has both an epistemo-
logical and an ethical political aspect, and the latter prevails over the former. Being reasona-
ble means that the agreement on a political conception takes into account what other people 
think. The reasonable acceptance of pluralism solves the problem of stability.’309 
                                                        
304 Ibid. 137. See also xliv, 224. 
305 Ibid. xliv n. 14: ‘there is, strictly speaking, no argument here. The preceding paragraph in the text simply describes 
an institutional context in which citizens stand in certain relations and consider certain questions, and so on. It is then 
said that from that context a duty arises on those citizens to follow the criterion of reciprocity. This is a duty arising 
from the idea of reasonableness of persons […].’ Emphases added. 
306 See the preceding note. See chapter four for the “criterion of reciprocity of the reasonable.” 
307 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, for instance, xliv. 
308 Sebastiano Maffettone, Introduzione a Rawls, 107, my translation. 
309 Sebastiano Maffettone, Rawls: An Introduction, 230. 
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On this account, then, reasonableness entails the respect of the criterion of reciprocity 
which, in turn, allows reasonable citizens to recognise the need for a public justification of 
political decisions and actions, and, by means of such a justification, they can legitimately ex-
ercise political power over each other. As has been observed, in this perspective ‘reasonable-
ness presupposes reciprocity (and vice versa).’310 In fact, ‘[p]olitical conceptions to be rea-
sonable must justify only constitutions that satisfy this principle [of reciprocity].’311 In a dem-
ocratic constitutional regime, the constitution and the statues enacted under it cannot, for ex-
ample, unreasonably ban all but one reasonable comprehensive doctrine. Then, the require-
ment of a political justification reasonably acceptable to all fellow citizens entails a commit-
ment to the principle of toleration of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. We can thus under-
stand the internal relation between reasonableness, reciprocity, political legitimacy, and toler-
ation (Figure 2). As will become clear, public reason frames this relation.  
 
Figure 2: Reasonableness, criterion of reciprocity, principle of political legitimacy, and toleration. 
 
Reasonable citizens, then, must take one another into consideration as reasonable persons 
who are members of a society as a fair system of cooperation312 in a regime of reciprocity and 
abide by a principle of political legitimacy. Reasonable persons ‘desire for its own sake a so-
                                                        
310 Ibid. 238. 
311 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, xliv. See also p. 217. 
312 Ibid. mainly 15-22. 
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cial world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others on terms all can accept. 
They insist that reciprocity should hold within that world so that each benefits along with oth-
ers.’313 Hence, the idea of reasonableness is the ground for a fundamental political agreement 
between free and equal citizens. This idea is essentially public.314 Yet, citizens are not only 
reasonable persons, but also rational agents. The rational (defined in opposition to the reason-
able)315 is not public in itself: it applies to individuals as such or as members of associa-
tions.316 The rational agent can be conceived as the agent who uses her ‘powers of judgement 
and deliberation in seeking ends and interests peculiarly [her] own.’317 The rational applies to 
how agents: 1) choose and adopt their ends and interests and rank them, 2) develop a means-
ends reasoning (e.g., choosing the most effective means or the most probable alternative for 
achieving their desiderata), 3) balance their final ends by assessing their importance and co-
herence with reference to their plan of life as a whole.318 Furthermore, a rational agent is not 
always self-interested: ‘rational agents may have all kinds of affections for persons and at-
tachment to communities and places’ (including one’s own religious community) and they 
could use their rationality in order to benefit those persons and communities. In this case, the 
agent is “interested in the interest” of someone/something else: she uses her rationality to pur-
sue her interest in satisfying the interest of someone/something that is important for her.319 
Nevertheless, the rational is always oriented toward the pursuit of the interest of a single and 
unified agent:320 me, my family, my church, my football club, and so on. Thus, rational agents 
                                                        
313 Ibid. 50. 
314 For this point, see Sebastiano Maffettone, Introduzione a Rawls, 104. 
315 For an earlier and conceptually broader distinction between rationality and reasonableness, irrationality and unrea-
sonableness, see W. M. Sibley, “The Rational Versus the Reasonable,” The Philosophical Review 62, no. 4 (1953), in 
particular 555-558. Unlike Rawls, Sibley defines reasonableness in a broader moral sense (that is, not only as political 
reasonableness). Yet, the link between reasonableness and something like the notion of reciprocity and the requirement 
of a justification to others of one’s actions is already present: ‘I must justify my conduct in terms of some principle ca-
pable of being appealed to by all parties concerned, some principle from which we can reason in common,’ 557. More-
over, Sibley –like Rawls− maintains that the reasonable cannot be derived from the rational (558). 
316 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 50; Sebastiano Maffettone, Introduzione a Rawls, 103. 
317 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 50. 
318 Ibid. 50-51. 
319 Ibid. 51. 
320 Ibid. 50. 
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lack ‘the particular form of moral sensibility that underlies the desire to engage in fair terms 
of cooperation as such, and to do so on terms others as equals might reasonably be expected 
to endorse.’321 This moral sensibility oriented toward others as free and equal cooperating 
members of society is the kernel of the idea of reasonableness. For this reason, ‘the reasona-
ble is public in a way the rational is not.’322 Fair social cooperation is possible thanks to this 
reasonable moral sensibility. On the contrary, Rawls even affirms, purely self-oriented ration-
al agents ‘approach being psychopathic.’323 Therefore, as I have already mentioned, ‘reasona-
bleness […] is an ethical-political virtue and, for this reason, it is an aspect of democratic citi-
zenship.’324 However, ‘the reasonable and the rational are complementary ideas … [and] nei-
ther the reasonable nor the rational can stand without the other.’325 In fact, social and political 
agents must be both rational and reasonable so that fair social cooperation can be possible: 
‘[m]erely reasonable agents would have no ends of their own they wanted to advance by so-
cial cooperation; merely rational agents lack a sense of justice and fail to recognize the inde-
pendent validity of the claims of others.’326 This connection between the rational and the rea-
sonable within the person as free and equal member of the society is reaffirmed by their corre-
lation with the above-mentioned two moral powers: reasonableness is related to the capacity 
for a sense of justice, whilst rationality refers to the capacity for a conception of the good. 
This point should be clear. Rationality relates to the determination and pursuit of one’s good 
(the good of the rational agent, of the society or community in which she lives, and so on), 
while reasonableness relates to the capacity for (morally) taking into account fellow citizens 
as free and equal members of a political system of cooperation in a regime of reciprocity. 
‘[T]he reasonable, in contrast with the rational, addresses the public world of others.’327 
                                                        
321 Ibid. 51. 
322 Ibid. 53. 
323 Ibid. 51. 
324 Sebastiano Maffettone, Introduzione a Rawls, 105, my translation. 
325 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 52. 
326 Ibid. Samuel Freeman says: ‘reasonable and rational agents are the basic units of responsibility in social and political 
life. A person who is rational but wholly unreasonable is not fit for social life, and a person who is reasonable but whol-
ly irrational is incapable of concerted action.’ Samuel Freeman, Rawls, 345. 
327 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 62. 
  
 European Muslims and Liberal Citizenship 
Ph.D. Thesis successfully discussed on April 21, 2016.  
The total or partial use of the Ph.D. Thesis is subject to copyright restrictions. 
 
  
118  
 Giovanni Vezzani 
 
LUISS-ULB 
Thus, we are in a situation in which ‘citizens have fundamental differences in their concep-
tions of the good, including their reasonable comprehensive doctrines, still they all have an 
interest in social cooperation.’328 As reasonable and rational persons, citizens both aspire to 
reach an agreement on a public political conception of justice and disagree on their moral, 
philosophical, and religious beliefs. A public political conception of justice is freestanding 
because it does not depend on such religious, philosophical, and moral beliefs. But how can a 
conception be freestanding? It can be freestanding because it is politically justified: ‘[w]hat 
makes a political conception of justice freestanding is that it has a political justification, one 
that is framed in terms of democratic values and ideals that are part of public culture and that 
are independent of the values and reasons peculiar to any comprehensive moral, religious, or 
philosophical doctrine.’329 Therefore, a public political conception is not grounded in moral, 
philosophical, or religious comprehensive reasons, but on shared political values and ideas: 
this is the source of its capacity for being freestanding. Consequently, according to Rawls’s 
conception of justice as fairness, in political justification (that Rawls also calls ‘pro tanto jus-
tification’)330 comprehensive beliefs are put behind a ‘veil of ignorance.’331 In working out the 
political conception that must govern their society, free and equal, rational and reasonable cit-
izens are not allowed to consider (not even to know) their moral, philosophical, and religious 
beliefs (nor their social position, ‘race and ethnic group, sex and gender, and their various na-
tive endowments such as strength and intelligence’). Accordingly, in the first stage, the con-
tent of the political conception arises only from ‘the various fundamental ideas drawn from 
the public political culture of a democratic society.’332 In this sense, the justification of such a 
conception is properly political and freestanding. This is also the “original realm” of public 
reason, where only political values and principles are considered. For the moment, we can just 
observe that public reason governs the domain of the political: its content is given by the po-
                                                        
328 Samuel Freeman, Rawls, 343. 
329 Ibid. 329, emphasis added. For a definition of public political culture, see supra. For the differences between public 
political culture and background culture and between public and non-public reasons, see supra. 
330 John Rawls, “Reply to Habermas,” in Political Liberalism, 386. 
331 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 24-25. 
332 Ibid. 25. 
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litical conception (better, by a ‘family of political conceptions’)333 publicly justified –even 
though we cannot already say how a real and complete public justification can be achieved– 
and it makes reference to political values and principles of public political culture alone in or-
der to justify that political conception politically.334 In this way, public reason expresses an 
‘ideal of democratic citizenship.’335 I define it as a justificatory ideal of citizenship, in which 
reasonable and rational citizens ‘should be ready to explain the basis of their actions to one 
another in terms each could reasonably expect that others might endorse as consistent with 
their freedom and equality.’336 So far, however, we have considered just the first part of 
Rawls’s exposition, in which freestanding principles are worked out: ‘[t]he first stage gives 
the principles of justice that specify the fair terms of cooperation among citizens and specify 
when a society’s basic institutions are just.’337 Such principles do not depend upon compre-
hensive beliefs, but they are politically justified by making reference to political values and 
ideas of public political culture, such as the political conception of society as a fair system of 
cooperation and of persons as reasonable and rational free equal citizens, a political-moral cri-
terion of reciprocity, a political principle of legitimacy, and (according to justice as fairness) 
the ‘device of representation’ of the original position.338 Nonetheless, since reasonable and ra-
tional citizens –who affirm reasonable comprehensive doctrines– are able and willing to agree 
upon and endorse a public political conception, their reasonable comprehensive doctrines 
must be able to endorse the conception politically justified. This shared endorsement is the 
basis of social unity and stability (infra). This last does not rest on a common comprehensive 
belief, but on the fact that the political conception is publicly endorsed through an ‘overlap-
ping consensus’.339 Shortly, the idea of an overlapping consensus aims to solve the following 
problem: as reasonable and rational citizens, ‘we suppose a constitutional democratic regime 
                                                        
333 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 450. See chapter three of this study. 
334 John Rawls, “Reply to Habermas,” 386. 
335 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 216-220. 
336 Ibid. 218. 
337 Ibid. 133. 
338 For the original position as a device of representation, see ibid. 22-28 and 304-324. 
339 ‘A constitutional regime does not require an agreement on a comprehensive doctrine: the basis of its social unity lies 
elsewhere.’ Ibid. 63. See also ibid. 134, quoted below. 
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to be reasonably just and workable, and worth defending. Yet given the fact of reasonable 
pluralism, how can we frame our defence of it so that it can win sufficiently wide support to 
achieve stability?’340 Here, two cornerstones of reasonableness seem reciprocally irreconcila-
ble: the pursuit of a consensus about the public justification of the political conception of jus-
tice on the one hand, and the respect of reasonable pluralism on the other. This dilemma can 
be solved thanks to the idea of an overlapping consensus, through which we can shift from a 
political pro tanto justification to a public justification.341 Through an overlapping consensus, 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines –each of them starting from within its own sources– en-
dorse the political conception that has been presented firstly as freestanding (note that for the 
sake of simplicity in this research I discuss the idea of an overlapping consensus as it would 
simply imply a consensus on a single political conception of justice, but it must be noted that 
Rawls –when he discusses the degree of specificity of an overlapping consensus− says that a 
‘more realistic and more likely to be realized’ possibility is that ‘the focus of an overlapping 
consensus is a class of liberal conceptions that vary within a certain more or less narrow 
range. The more restricted the range, the more specific the consensus.’342 Such a simplifica-
tion does not affect the theoretical structure that I will present in the second and in the third 
parts, except with regard to a clarification that I will make concerning the specification of the 
content of the idea of public reason, which −as I will explain in chapter three− is derived from 
a family of reasonable political conceptions rather than by a single political conception). 
Rawls presents his liberal conception as political and not comprehensive, so that all reasona-
ble religious, philosophical, and moral non-liberal doctrines might be able to endorse it.343 
Reasonable but opposing comprehensive doctrines can overlap in a consensus concerning the 
political conception: they all endorse this conception ‘as giving the content of their political 
judgements on basic institutions.’344 In Rawls’s view, all reasonable moral, philosophical, and 
religious doctrines ‘likely to persist over generations and to gain a sizable body of adherents’ 
                                                        
340 Ibid. 39. 
341 John Rawls, “Reply to Habermas,” 386-387. See infra. 
342 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 164, emphasis added. For recent literature about this point, see the article by Paul 
Weithman “Legitimacy and the Project of Political Liberalism,” in Rawls’s Political Liberalism, eds. Thom Brooks and 
Martha C. Nussbaum (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 81-88. 
343 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, xlv. 
344 Ibid. 39. 
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(Islam among others) take part in such a consensus concerning a reasonable political concep-
tion of justice that should govern a constitutional regime.345 As I have just said, each reasona-
ble comprehensive doctrine specifies its own reasons for endorsing that political conception:  
‘All those who affirm the political conception start from within their own com-
prehensive view and draw on the religious, philosophical, and moral grounds it 
provides. The fact that people affirm the same political conception on those 
grounds does not make their affirming it any less religious, philosophical, or mor-
al, as the case may be, since the grounds sincerely held determine the nature of 
their affirmation.’346  
And: ‘each comprehensive view is related to the political conception in a different way.’347 
Thus, for instance, if Muslims can find sufficient reasons within Islam to support the political 
conception, they can endorse it from an Islamic point of view. Each citizen affirms both the 
political conception and a reasonable comprehensive doctrine and tries to justify the political 
conception from within her own religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine. At this stage, 
however, an overlapping consensus has not yet been reached. Instead, each ‘individual citizen 
as a member of civil society’348 and of its various associations –such as religious groups, 
churches, and so on– tries to embed (or root) the political conception in her own religious, 
moral, or philosophical doctrine, in order to justify it in the light of her doctrine’s sources and 
reasons. If this operation is carried out successfully, the political conception is fully justified 
in her eyes. This is what Rawls calls ‘full justification.’349 The political conception does not 
say anything about how it should or could be embedded in whatever comprehensive doctrine. 
Actually, it does not say anything beyond the limited domain of the political. It is up to each 
and every citizen to justify the political conception from within her reasonable doctrine. If she 
                                                        
345 Ibid. 15. 
346 Ibid. 147-148. 
347 Ibid. 171. 
348 John Rawls, “Reply to Habermas,” 386. 
349 Ibid. 386-387. 
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is able to reach a full justification, this is so because her comprehensive doctrine makes avail-
able sufficient moral motivations for endorsing that political conception.350  
However, full justification is a “one-by-one” justification. Citizens do not take one another 
into account: each one tries to justify the political conception on her own. If the political con-
ception is fully justified, this is so only in her eyes: simply, she does not consider the fact that 
other people might not accept her justification. Then, a further step is needed. An overlapping 
consensus takes place only when ‘all free and equal citizens endorsing reasonable comprehen-
sive doctrines agree on the political conception of justice, on the basis of their own particular 
comprehensive reasons and views.’351 From different comprehensive and reasonable points of 
view and for different comprehensive reasons (thus maintaining their own differences and 
specificity), citizens can reach an agreement on a single political conception. Hence, at the 
end, the political conception is not only politically (pro tanto), but also publicly justified 
through an overlapping consensus. The freestanding political conception previously ‘fully jus-
tified’ by each citizen from within her own view (each for her own reasons) is now ‘publicly 
justified’ through an overlapping consensus in which citizens realise that they all endorse a 
reasonable political conception of justice while they still have different and yet politically rea-
sonable comprehensive views. In this way, justificatory consensus and reasonable pluralism 
are both secured. The main difference between full and public justification is precisely that 
the latter comes after the achievement of an overlapping consensus and entails a mutual 
recognition of other citizens’ endorsement of the same political conception. Accordingly, the 
proper domain of public justification presupposes some shared form of public reasoning: 
‘Public reasoning aims for public justification. We appeal to political concep-
tions of justice, and to ascertainable evidence and facts open to public view, in or-
der to reach conclusions about what we think are the most reasonable political in-
stitutions and policies. Public justification is not simply valid reasoning, but ar-
gument addressed to others: it proceeds correctly from premises we accept and 
                                                        
350 See Sebastiano Maffettone, Introduzione a Rawls, 99-100. 
351 Samuel Freeman, Rawls, 329. 
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think others could reasonably accept to conclusions we think they could also rea-
sonably accept. This meets the duty of civility […].’352  
Therefore, it is important to underscore that this justification is public because all citizens 
take one another into consideration and, consequently, they acknowledge 1) the existence of 
an overlapping consensus353 and 2) the need for public justification through (wide, infra) pub-
lic reason. Moreover, in public justification political values (values of justice and values of 
public reason)354 rooted in the public political culture of a democratic society and specified by 
its political conception of justice can be publicly endorsed by the whole citizenry, both politi-
cally (ideally all in the same way) and comprehensively (each on different grounds) by each 
and every citizen. In addition, the political conception publicly justified is not less “political” 
because of the justificatory role of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. In fact, the contents 
of these doctrines have no normative power in public justification (this power they only have 
in the process of full justification) and nobody looks into the contents of others’ comprehen-
sive views. Therefore, in public justification it is not relevant why every single reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine endorses the political conception of justice. What matters is only that 
all comprehensive doctrines agree –for whatever reason– on a single political conception. 
Thus, public justification depends on reasonable comprehensive doctrines only indirectly.355 
Moreover, public justification both derives from and shapes the public political culture of a 
democratic society. It somehow derives from public political culture because, as I have said, 
the political conception of justice –the object of public justification– is worked out by draw-
ing on this culture and by appealing exclusively to political values and ideas found within 
                                                        
352 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 465. 
353 John Rawls, “Reply to Habermas,” 387: ‘[p]ublic justification happens when all the reasonable members of political 
society carry out a justification of the shared political conception by embedding it in their several reasonable compre-
hensive views. In this case, reasonable citizens take one another into account as having reasonable comprehensive doc-
trines that endorse that political conception, and this mutual accounting shapes the moral quality of the public culture of 
political society.’ 
354 Supra and chapter three. 
355 John Rawls, “Reply to Habermas,” 387: ‘while the public justification of the political conception for political society 
depends on reasonable comprehensive doctrines, this justification does so only in a indirect way. That is, the express 
contents of these doctrines have no normative role in public justification; citizens do not look into the content of others’ 
doctrines, and so remain within the bounds of the political. Rather, they take into account and give some weight to only 
the fact –the existence– of the reasonable overlapping consensus itself.’ 
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it.356 On the other hand, public justification shapes public political culture because citizens re-
alise that free and equal persons affirming different reasonable comprehensive doctrines are 
nonetheless able to justify publicly a single political conception.357 Thus, citizens recognise 
one another as reasonable free and equal cooperating fellow citizens. To conclude, even 
though citizens are divided by their irreconcilable (but reasonable) comprehensive doctrines, 
they are nonetheless able to endorse a common political conception of justice, to cooperate on 
the basis of the principles expressed by it, and to rely upon it in order to formulate their politi-
cal judgements. Importantly, such endorsement does not neglect, disregard, or obscure the 
point of view of their religious, philosophical, or moral beliefs. On the contrary, reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines cannot be excluded or overlooked in the process of public justifica-
tion because they are essential for achieving it through the stages of full justification and 
overlapping consensus. 
So defined, the idea of an overlapping consensus is different from a mere modus vivendi.358 
Effectively, in an overlapping consensus there is much more than a provisional acceptance 
imposed by circumstances. An overlapping consensus between reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines differs from a mere modus vivendi for three reasons.359 First, its object is a moral 
conception –a political conception of justice, not simple acceptance of an existing equilibrium 
of power between conflicting parties, like in Europe in the aftermath of the Reformation. Sec-
ond, it is affirmed on moral grounds, because ‘it includes conceptions of society and of citi-
zens as persons, as well as principles of justice, and an account of political virtues through 
which those principles are embodied in human character and expressed in public life.’ Ac-
cordingly, it is not an “armed peace” between (not only irreconcilable, but also) mutually dis-
                                                        
356 In the political pro tanto justification. 
357 John Rawls, “Reply to Habermas,” 387. 
358 Supra (in particular Joshua Cohen’s considerations about this point). Rawls defines a modus vivendi as follows: a 
‘social consensus founded on self- or group interests, or on the outcome of political bargaining: social unity is only ap-
parent, as its stability is contingent on circumstances remaining such as not to upset the fortunate convergence of inter-
ests.’ John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 147. Rawls mentions the “stability” between Catholics and Protestants in the 
aftermath of the Reformation as an example of modus vivendi: there was a temporary and contingent (depending on cir-
cumstances and on the balance of power) acceptance of the principle of toleration but not a moral consensus on or en-
dorsement of it. ‘In such a case the acceptance of the principle of toleration would indeed be a mere modus vivendi, be-
cause if either faith becomes dominant, the principle of toleration would no longer be followed. Stability with respect to 
the distribution of power is lacking.’ Ibid. 148. See also ibid. xxxviii-xxxix. 
359 Ibid. 147-148. 
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trustful and closed comprehensive doctrines. Third, an overlapping consensus aims at and un-
derpins social unity and stability: ‘to see how a well-ordered society can be unified and sta-
ble, we introduce another basic idea of political liberalism to go with that of the political con-
ception, namely, the idea of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. 
In such a consensus, the reasonable doctrines endorse the political conception, each from its 
own point of view.’360 In this way, ‘those who affirm the various views supporting the politi-
cal conception will not withdraw their support of it should the relative strength of their view 
in society increase and eventually become dominant.’361 Shortly, an overlapping consensus 
between reasonable comprehensive doctrines is a moral consensus on a political (moral) con-
ception and makes it possible to achieve social unity and ‘stability for the right reasons’.362 As 
such, the idea of an overlapping consensus reconciles –for instance− Muslim citizens’ en-
dorsement of the public political conception qua Muslims (that is, as members of a compre-
hensive doctrine in background culture) and qua free and equal, rational and reasonable citi-
zens. In so doing, it radically transforms the nature of such an endorsement: it is not just a 
mediation between the specific views affirmed by different comprehensive doctrines.363 Ra-
ther, it is moral consensus: as a result of it, despite all differences in their religious, philosoph-
ical, and moral doctrines, citizens’ general ‘political values and commitments, as part of their 
[…] moral identity, are roughly the same.’364 This is because citizens reasonably ‘judge from 
within their reasonable comprehensive doctrines that political values are very great values,’ 
and that they normally outweigh ‘whatever nonpolitical values may conflict with them.’365 
                                                        
360 Ibid. 134. Emphasis added. 
361 Ibid. 148. 
362 ‘[T]he idea of an overlapping consensus is moral in its object and motivation, rendering the consensus stable over 
the distribution of doctrines. This gives stability for the right reasons, and distinguishes the idea of such a consensus 
from a modus vivendi.’ Ibid. xli.  
363 ‘[T]he overlapping consensus […] is not a compromise between those holding different views, but rests on the totali-
ty of reasons specified within the comprehensive doctrine affirmed by each citizen.’ Ibid. 170-171. 
364 Ibid. 32. 
365 John Rawls, “Reply to Habermas,” 392-393. See also Political Liberalism, 139-140. 
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Hence, only when an overlapping consensus is present can the political conception be pub-
licly justified.366 A public justification of the political conception of justice, then, relies upon 
an overlapping consensus. Accordingly, because of its role in the public justification of the 
political conception, an overlapping consensus makes it possible to achieve social unity and 
stability for the right reasons and to satisfy the liberal principle of legitimacy. Therefore, so-
cial unity and stability are based on an overlapping consensus367 rather than on the affirmation 
of a single comprehensive doctrine,368 which would require the oppressive use of state power. 
Such a foundation for social unity is very deep, ‘because the fundamental ideas of the political 
conception are endorsed by the reasonable comprehensive doctrines, and these doctrines rep-
resent what citizens regard as their deepest convictions –religious, philosophical, and mor-
al.’369 Social unity is a precondition for stability for the right reasons. Stability for the right 
reasons is achieved when reasonable citizens honour the same standards of public reason-
ing,370 and the endorsement of the political conception is secured through overlapping con-
sensus of their reasonable doctrines.371 Such stability occurs when:372 1) society’s basic struc-
ture is effectively regulated by the most reasonable political conception of justice, 2) such a 
political conception is endorsed through an overlapping consensus of all reasonable compre-
                                                        
366 John Rawls, “Reply to Habermas,” 388. 
367 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 134, quoted supra. 
368 Therefore, Rawls’s political liberalism rejects the idea of political society as a community: ibid. 37, 40, 146, and 
201. 
369 John Rawls, “Reply to Habermas,” 391-392. 
370 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 143. 
371 Ibid., for instance xli and 141. Here Rawls says that stability involves two questions: ‘whether people who grow up 
under just institutions (as the political conception defines them) acquire a normally sufficient sense of justice so that 
they generally comply with those institutions,’ and, second, whether the political conception can be secured by an over-
lapping consensus. The question of the sense of justice involves ‘setting out the moral psychology in accordance with 
which citizens in a well-ordered society acquire a normally sufficient sense of justice’ (echoing the considerations de-
veloped in the eighth chapter of A Theory of Justice), the basis of which in Political Liberalism are sketched out on 81-
88. See in particular 86: According to Rawls: ‘i) besides a capacity for a conception of the good, citizens have a capaci-
ty to acquire conceptions of justice and fairness and a desire to act as these conceptions require; ii) when they believe 
that institutions or social practices are just […] they are ready and willing to do their part in those arrangements provid-
ed they have reasonable assurance that others will also do their part; iii) if other persons with evident intention strive to 
do their part […] citizens tend to develop trust and confidence; iv) this trust and confidence becomes stronger and more 
complete as success of cooperative arrangements is sustained over a longer time; and v) the same is true as the basic in-
stitutions framed to secure our fundamental interests (basic rights and liberties) are more firmly and willingly recog-
nized.’ 
372 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, xlvii and “Reply to Habermas,” 391. 
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hensive doctrines, and 3) public political discussions about fundamental political questions 
are nearly always decided on the basis of public reasons, that is, reasons specified by the po-
litical conception. If these conditions are present, then social unity and stability for the right 
reasons can be preserved. On the contrary, if public reason is too weak (3 is not fulfilled), or 
an overlapping consensus does not hold (2 is not fulfilled), then stability is in danger, for the 
latter is possible only ‘when the doctrines making up the consensus are affirmed by society’s 
politically active citizens and the requirements of justice are not too much in conflict with cit-
izens’ essential interests as formed and encouraged by their social arrangements.’373 Conse-
quently, it is also important that unreasonable comprehensive doctrines do not ‘gain enough 
currency to undermine society’s essential justice.’374 Thirdly, an overlapping consensus 
makes it possible to uphold the liberal principle of political legitimacy. When an overlapping 
consensus is present, diverse reasonable persons may have adequate reasons for jointly af-
firming the same political conception of justice as the most reasonable one for governing their 
political society.375 Hence, they can consider coercive political power legitimately exercised 
when its exercise is consistent with the political conception publicly justified, and with the 
constitution that it shapes. In few words, political power is legitimate only when exercised in 
accordance with a political conception (embedded in the constitution) that all free and equal 
reasonable citizens might reasonably be expected to endorse.376 Therefore, ‘[d]espite the fact 
of reasonable pluralism, the conditions for democratic legitimacy are fulfilled’377 through an 
overlapping consensus. 
                                                        
373 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 134. 
374 Ibid. 39. For this reason, Rawls theorises the notion of ‘containment’ for unreasonable doctrines ‘so that they do not 
overturn political justice.’ Ibid. 64 note 19. See section 4.2 below. 
375 John Rawls, “Reply to Habermas,” 390: ‘[i]f we can make the case that there are adequate reasons for diverse rea-
sonable people jointly to affirm justice as fairness as their working political conception, then the conditions for their le-
gitimately exercising coercive political power over one another –something we inevitably do as citizens by voting, if in 
no other way– are satisfied. [...] We can reasonably affirm and appeal to a political conception of justice as citizens’ 
shared basis of reasons, all the while supposing that others no less reasonable than we may also affirm and recognize 
that same basis.’ 
376 Ibid. 393. 
377 Ibid. 390. 
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To sum up so far, a society has to meet three conditions to be a ‘fair and stable system of 
cooperation between free and equal citizens, who are deeply divided by the reasonable com-
prehensive doctrines they affirm:’378 
1. Its basic structure must be regulated by a political conception of justice (arising 
from the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation, the conception of citizens 
as free and equal, reasonable and rational persons, the criterion of reciprocity, the 
principle of political legitimacy, the fact of reasonable pluralism, and −for justice 
as fairness− the original position as a device of representation). Such a political 
conception of justice specifies the principles of justice and the content of public 
reason (see chapter three: we will see that actually the content of public reason is 
specified by a family of reasonable political conceptions of justice). 
2. An overlapping consensus between reasonable philosophical, religious, and moral 
doctrines must exist, making it possible to achieve a public justification of the po-
litical conception. It is the basis for social unity and stability for the right reasons.  
3. Citizens must affirm and abide by the ideal of public reason, as the application of 
that political conception in society’s daily public political life.379 
 
From the preceding remarks, we can observe that public reason embeds the idea of stability 
in two ways. (I) First, if ‘public reasoning […] proceeds entirely within a political conception of 
justice’380 and reasonable and rational citizens endorse that conception in an overlapping consen-
sus, then they also endorse that kind of public reasoning. Consequently, ‘[c]itizens affirm the 
ideal of public reason, not as a result of political compromise, as in a modus vivendi, but from 
within their own reasonable doctrines.’381 Therefore, the idea and content of public reason are 
publicly justified and durably endorsed by reasonable citizens via an overlapping consensus: sta-
                                                        
378 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 44. 
379 See next chapter. 
380 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 453. 
381 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 218. 
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bility for the right reasons is possible in this way.382 Hence, reasonableness and public reason are 
closely tied, because they are both part of the same political ideal of democratic citizenship.383 
(II) Second, public reason is a source of stability in itself, because it presides over the application 
of the political conception of justice.384 It establishes a publicly justified standard for settling po-
litical discussions about fundamental political questions. Such questions should be decided on 
the basis of political values and the resulting political actions should be justifiable in terms of 
public reason. The idea of public reason specifies both the guidelines of public inquiry (princi-
ples of public reasoning and rules of evidence) ‘in the light of which citizens are to decide 
whether substantive principles properly apply and to identify laws and policies that best satisfy 
them’, and the public virtues (reasonableness and readiness to honour a duty of civility) that 
should ‘make possible reasoned public discussion of political questions.’385 Such an account of 
political values and rules of public reasoning is a public endowment, a shared standard. Accord-
ingly, since it is publicly recognised as binding, it preserves social stability for the right reasons. 
In chapters four and five I will explain how an ideal of citizenship grounded in public reason can 
secure stability for the right reasons in a sophisticated way that refers to both its crucial dimen-
sions. First, public reason citizenship secures the inclusion of citizens on an equal footing, be-
cause it both equips them with shared standards for social and political criticism and involves 
them in the process of justification of the conception of citizenship not only as citizens but also 
as believers, thanks to the idea of an overlapping consensus. Second, public reason citizenship 
solves the problem of mutual assurance, because, in virtue of the common public respect of the 
requirements of public reason (the duty of civility), it establishes the ground on which citizens 
can become aware of others’ commitment to a reasonable political conception of justice, and 
thus it makes publicly known the fact that citizens are stably loyal to the fair terms of social co-
operation. Moreover, public reason citizenship averts the mutual assurance problem also in a 
second way, that is, by establishing a basis for a public political identity in which citizens recog-
nise one another as free equals cooperating on fair terms. In conclusion, I will argue that in this 
way public reason citizenship answers the problem that I have considered in the first chapter. 
                                                        
382 See, for instance, ibid. 143. 
383 Ibid. 62 and 218. 
384 Samuel Freeman, Rawls, 329. 
385 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 224. 
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Figure 3: Rawls’s account of the relations between public reason, overlapping consensus, public justification, stabil-
ity, and legitimacy. 
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2.2 The Place of Comparative Ethics. What after Conjecture?  
 
Having clarified the justificatory structure of Rawls’s political liberalism, I can move to 
the second constitutive aspect of my method, i.e. the evaluative approach. This approach de-
liberately abstains from calling itself “comparative ethics” or “conjecture.” I do not refer to 
conjecture because: 
(i) My object is different from the object of conjecture (i.e., arguments derived from the 
premises of a comprehensive doctrine, that is, for instance, arguments derived from Islamic 
tradition). 
(ii) My aims are not the aims of reasoning from conjecture (i.e., presenting arguments from 
within a particular comprehensive doctrine d –which is not one’s own comprehensive doc-
trine– to d’s members, in order to show them that they can have principled grounds for 
achieving a full justification of the political conception).386 
(iii) Consequently, the limits and rules of my method are not the same of reasoning from 
conjecture. 
In what follows, I analyse Andrew F. March’s comparative ethics in order to define my 
own method by means of comparison. I do not argue that March is wrong or that my method 
is better than conjecture. I simply maintain that the formal objects (but not always the “mate-
rial” objects387) and the demonstrative purposes of the two methods are different. However, as 
I said, I consider them not only as compatible, but even as complementary: they focus on dif-
ferent levels of analysis from within the same theoretical framework, that is, a Rawlsian ac-
count of political liberalism.  
As I have just said, I would like to define my evaluative approach (2.3) through a compari-
son with March’s conjecture. However, before answering the question “what does March’s 
                                                        
386 Infra. 
387 For the conceptual distinction between formal and material object in comparative philosophy, see Kwee Swan Liat, 
Methods of Comparative Philosophy (Leiden: Universitaire Pers Leiden, 1953), 25-26. 
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conjecture (or ‘justificatory comparative political theory’ or ‘comparative ethics’)388 consist 
of?” I have to consider comparative ethics as a part of comparative philosophy. Therefore, the 
presentation of my evaluative approach requires a previous discussion of: 
1. Comparative philosophy: its definitions, aims, limits, and difficulties (2.2.a). 
2. Conjecture as a particular kind of comparative ethics (2.2.b). 
3. March’s reasoning from conjecture with reference to Islam (2.2.c). 
 
2.2.A Methods and Aims of Comparative Philosophy. 
Comparative ethics is a branch of comparative philosophy. A wide definition of this latter 
could be the following: comparative philosophy ‘is a subfield of philosophy in which philos-
ophers work on problems by intentionally setting into dialogue sources from across cultural, 
linguistic, and philosophical streams.’389 Alternatively, ‘comparative philosophy brings to-
gether philosophical traditions that have developed in relative isolation from one another and 
that are defined quite broadly along cultural and regional lines.’390 Or, comparative philoso-
phy is ‘the philosophical study of one or some problems in the light of more than one tradi-
tion.’391 Alternatively, and even more broadly, ‘comparative philosophy is a multiple and in-
tegral approach to the common issues of philosophy.’392 The previous quotations show that 
comparative philosophy is primarily defined by what it does. However, there is little agree-
ment on its nature, methods, and aims. First, let me consider the nature of comparative phi-
                                                        
388 Andrew F. March, Islam and Liberal Citizenship, 3, 13, and part I (see, for instance, 19, 28, and in particular 65-96). 
389 Ronnie Littlejohn, “Comparative Philosophy,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2005), URL = 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/comparat/, 1.  
390 David Wong, “Comparative Philosophy: Chinese and Western,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Ed-
ward N. Zalta (Fall 2011), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/comparphil-chiwes, 1 (page num-
ber refers to the printable pdf version). 
391 Raimundo Panikkar, “What is Comparative Philosophy Comparing?” in Interpreting Across Boundaries: New Es-
says in Comparative Philosophy, eds. Gerald James Larson and Eliot Deutsch (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1988), 122. 
392 Kwee Swan Liat, “Methods of Comparative Philosophy,” Philosophy East and West 1, no. 1 (1951), 12. 
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losophy. For some thinkers, comparative philosophy is simply an impossible discipline.393 We 
cannot, they argue, properly compare philosophies: we lack a neutral philosophical compa-
rans to which we can refer our comparanda (that is, other philosophies).394 Interestingly, 
however, even sceptics try to define comparative philosophy through its possible methodolog-
ical patterns. Therefore, for example, Panikkar analyses –and ultimately rejects– different 
kinds of philosophical approaches on which comparative philosophy could be grounded.395 
Similarly, Liat (an advocate of comparative philosophy) claims that the formal object of com-
parative philosophy ‘must be the phenomenon of philosophy’ and that ‘the systematic study of 
comparative philosophy should proceed through a comprehensive phenomenology of philoso-
                                                        
393 For instance, Raimundo Panikkar suggests replacing comparative philosophy with an ‘imparative philosophy’: that 
is, with an ‘open philosophical attitude ready to learn from whatever philosophical corner of the world, but without 
claiming to compare philosophies from an objective, neutral, and transcendent vantage point.’ See his “What is Com-
parative Philosophy Comparing?” 127. See also his “Religion, Philosophy and Culture.” Originally published with the 
title “Religión, Filosofía y Cultura,” in 'Ilu. Revista de Ciencias de las Religiones 1 (1996), 125-148. Published online 
by Polylog URL = http://them.polylog.org/1/fpr-en.htm. Here (page 22 of the printable English version of the article) 
we read: ‘comparative philosophy is a pure impossibility. […] For an authentically comparative philosophy, we would 
need a fulcrum that is neutral, impartial and hence external to philosophy. Now, by definition, such does not exist. Phi-
losophy as we would like to define it, is characterized by the claim of not admitting a superior authority which orders or 
dominates it. That authority would then be the authentic philosophy.’ 
394 Panikkar defines the comparative effort as an ‘activity of the human mind that takes a stance neutral to the things to 
be compared. Any comparison has somehow to transcend its subject matter. For any comparison, three things are re-
quired: at least two comparanda, and the comparans, which is a third element that has to be equally distant from and 
outside the comparanda, the things to be compared. And here already looms unambiguously the idea of transcendence, 
which some philosophies would like to avoid. If philosophy is an ultimately human affair, comparative philosophy 
could only be handled from a superhuman standpoint. It would need an Archimedean fulcrum outside the contending 
parties.’ Raimundo Panikkar, “What is Comparative Philosophy Comparing?” 122. 
395 He considers the following four implicit understandings of comparative philosophy: transcendental philosophy, 
structural or formal philosophy, linguistic philosophy, and phenomenological philosophy. Ibid. 121-130. I do not ana-
lyse them here. The above-mentioned criticism of “transcendental” comparison is obviously related to the first position. 
I have quoted that passage because Panikkar judges it as the most inappropriate way for understanding what he calls 
elsewhere ‘intercultural philosophy’ (Raimundo Panikkar, “Religion, Philosophy and Culture,” passim). 
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phy.’396 The phenomenon-philosophy might be taken into consideration from different per-
spectives.397 Thus, one could say that comparative philosophy (and, consequently, compara-
tive ethics) is firstly defined by its methods. Nevertheless, since there is nothing approaching 
a single comparative philosophical method, there is not a single comparative philosophy. 
Comparative philosophy is plural under another important viewpoint. Indeed, there is no 
agreement on the aims of such a philosophical exercise. We can observe different trends, from 
the most humble to the most ambitious. I shall identify two extremes of a continuum. Ça va 
sans dire, such extremes are merely conceptual, and nuances are more common than sharp di-
visions. At one extreme, as I said, there are thinkers like Panikkar who claim that “compara-
tive” philosophy is possible only if we understand it as an ‘imparative’398 or ‘intercultural phi-
                                                        
396 Kwee Swan Liat, Methods of Comparative Philosophy, 62. On pp. 26-27 he defines the object of comparative phi-
losophy by contrasting this latter with a purely theoretical approach and a purely historical approach to philosophy. I 
quote this passage at length: ‘the material object in the historical and the comparative [philosophical] approaches is the 
same, namely, the philosophical systems and patterns as they are revealed in the history of human thought, each with its 
own set of problems, themes and methods, and with its basic assumptions and categories. But the formal standpoint, 
from which the material object is viewed, is different in the two approaches. The historiographer of philosophy attempts 
[…] to ascertain by his methods of historical critique the authenticity of texts and documents […] and to reconstruct, 
according to standards of the greatest possible historical objectivity and accuracy, the actual history of human thought. 
The student of comparative philosophy is not satisfied when he knows the historic […] relationships between philo-
sophical systems. […] His task begins there, where, in a certain sense, the historiographer of philosophy has concluded 
his work. [… P]hilosophy, to be philosophy, is concerned with ultimate problems, with some transcendental apriori. 
Theoretical speculations try to grasp this ultimate ground, this apriori, by pure reasoning. Comparative philosophy 
searches for a “positive” starting-point in history. While the pure theoretical speculation lacks the verification of “posi-
tive” historical data, and pure historical criticism neglects the character of ultimacy in philosophic issues, the combina-
tion of the two in comparative philosophy makes allowance for both. [… T]he historical approach is particularizing, 
while the comparative approach is rather generalizing. The task of comparative philosophy is not to investigate the de-
tail, but to understand the whole. But, in order to understand the whole, some knowledge of details is necessary. […] 
Comparative philosophy is philosophy: it is directed toward a re-evaluation of the “philosophies of East and West” 
within a comprehensive and total perspective. […] The formal object in the study of comparative philosophy is the phe-
nomenon of philosophy itself.’ I emphasised the term re-evaluation, because, as we shall see, I consider it as a crucial 
element of both March’s reasoning from conjecture and my own method. According to Liat, ‘[c]omparisons between 
philosophy may be concerned with their function, their contents or their systematic form and method.’ Therefore, for 
Liat the comparative study of the phenomenon-philosophy should focus on three constitutive and distinguishing aspects 
of such a phenomenon: ‘the function, the contents, and the systematics of philosophy,’ ibid. 66. 
397 Liat makes a distinction between historical, sociological, anthropological, philological, logical, psychological and 
transcendental re-evaluative approaches, each of them with its own perspective on philosophy as its formal object (e.g., 
transcendental re-evaluative approach ‘has as its formal object philosophy in its essential meaning’, anthropological ap-
proach studies ‘philosophy as an essential element of culture’, logical approach deals with ‘the logical structure of phi-
losophy,’ and so on). See ibid. 116-118. For a detailed account of each approach, see ibid. chapters 9-12. 
398 Imparative philosophy tries ‘to form its philosophical view of the reality by systematically taking into account the 
universal range of human experience.’ Raimundo Panikkar, “What is Comparative Philosophy Comparing?” 129. But, 
‘there is not an independent comparative philosophy as a discipline of its own.’ Ibid. Instead, we should ‘imparare, in 
other words, learn by being ready to undergo the different philosophical experiences of other people.’ Ibid. 127-128. 
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losophy,’399 based on ‘diatopical hermeneutics,’400 that is, if it aims to im-parare (literally, to 
prepare, provide, acquire, gain, procure, obtain something in one’s own mind, to learn) and 
not cum-parare (to put together, equate). Those who maintain that comparative philosophy is 
possible not as a comparison between entire philosophical traditions, but as a comparison be-
tween theories and texts belonging to those traditions401 could represent an intermediate posi-
tion: ‘[w]e can aim at a comprehensive understanding of the onto-hermeneutic environment of 
a particular philosophical theory […], while realizing that such a massively thorough compar-
ison is not actually possible.’402 Such an ideally general but materially limited comparative 
philosophy (a better definition could be: consciously limited but contextualising comparative 
philosophy) might have several purposes.403 It can disclose the assumptions we unconsciously 
make, or explain how it is possible to come to similar conclusions starting from different 
premises, or to different conclusions starting from similar premises (I call it “revealing func-
tion” of comparative philosophy). It might also display new strategies of thinking and reason-
ing, and, in so doing, it can equip us with new tools we can use (adjusting them to ‘our own 
familiar philosophical territory,’404 if necessary) for getting philosophical answers (I call it 
“opening function,” because it opens our familiar problems to new strategies of inquiry). 
Third, comparative philosophy might challenge ‘our usual assumptions about what “philoso-
phy” itself is, and hence might even be considered to be (or entail) a kind of “meta-
                                                        
399 Raimundo Panikkar, “Religion, Philosophy and Culture,” passim. 
400 ‘Diatopical hermeneutics is the required method of interpretation when the distance to overcome, needed for any un-
derstanding, is not just a distance within one single culture (morphological hermeneutics) or a temporal one (diachronic 
hermeneutics), but rather the distance between two (or more) cultures, which have independently developed in different 
spaces (topoi) their own methods of philosophizing and way of reaching intelligibility along with their proper catego-
ries.’ Ibid. 130. See also his “Religion, Philosophy and Culture.”  
401 ‘I agree that a single statement or sentence in a philosophical text must be understood in the context of the text as a 
whole […], and that particular philosophical theories need to be understood in terms of the philosophical tradition with-
in which they exist, and yet as scholars of comparative literature, comparative religion or comparative musicology, or 
comparative ethnology, etc. can provide valuable insights through their comparison (without undertaking the monumen-
tal, not to say impossible, task of comparing entire literary, musical, religious, and cultural traditions), so likewise can 
one compare different philosophical theories without undertaking to compare entire philosophical traditions. The en-
deavor to see things in their full context must be seen as a limiting concept, an admirable if unachievable goal.’ Jesse 
Fleming, “Comparative Philosophy: Its Aims and Methods,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 30, no. 2 (2003), 259-260. 
402 Ibid. 260. 
403 For working out those functions, I partially build on Fleming’s arguments: see ibid. 260-265. 
404 Ibid. 260. 
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philosophy” –a philosophy of philosophy.’405 This is a “reflective and broadening” function. 
Fourth, we might become aware of new problems or networks of problems. This is a “prob-
lematizing function.” Finally, a more substantive aim of comparative philosophy could be 
called the “mutual understanding function.” How Fleming rightly points out, there is an ap-
parent inner paradox in contemporary comparative philosophy. On the one hand, ‘especially 
in the twenty-first century [differences between “Eastern” and “Western” philosophies] are 
diminishing due to mutual intellectual and cultural influence. For the philosophy of compara-
tive philosophy, this would seem to entail the […] conclusion that “comparative philosophy” 
(defined as comparison of some “Eastern” philosophy with some “Western” philosophy) is no 
longer possible, because there is no longer any purely “Eastern” philosophy or purely “West-
ern” philosophy.’406 On the other hand, however, the increased influences and confluences be-
tween philosophical traditions make such a comparison all the more inevitable and urgent. So 
we need comparative philosophy to understand the others we (increasingly) live with. This 
tension is of crucial importance for my work. Is it reasonable (or possible) to look for a con-
temporary purely Islamic philosophy to be compared with a purely Western tradition? If the 
answer is positive, in what terms can we define this purity (or a threshold of purity)? Moreo-
ver, what is its relation to the notions of past and modernity? If the answer is negative (or 
even partially negative), what should we consider? In addition, are we still performing com-
parative philosophy? Obviously, such a contemporary tension raises several difficulties. Does 
“confluence” actually mean “western hegemony”? Is “mutual understanding” per se a desid-
eratum? How can comparative philosophy work in this sense? Is it really a completely specu-
lative and innocent exercise? Are there (overtly or covertly) social or political goals? I shall 
examine such (and other) objections in a while. I have not developed the second “extreme” of 
my ideal continuum, that is, an “ambitious” conception of the aims of comparative philoso-
phy. Such a conception might be ideally related to the above-mentioned ongoing process of 
mutual influence and confluence between philosophical traditions. For instance, Fred 
Dallmayr plainly states that by the term “comparative political theory” he means: 
 ‘A mode of theorizing that takes seriously the ongoing process of globaliza-
tion, a mode which entails, among other things, the growing proximity and inter-
                                                        
405 Ibid. 261. 
406 Ibid. 264. 
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pretation of cultures and the emergence of what Marshall McLuhan called the 
“global village”. In contrast to hegemonic and imperialist modes of theorizing, the 
term implies that one segment of the world’s population cannot monopolize the 
language or idiom of the emerging “village,” or global civil society. Shared mean-
ings and practices –to the extent that they are possible– can only arise from lateral 
interaction, negotiation, and contestation among different, historically grown cul-
tural frameworks. This, in turn, means that the basic approach favored by compar-
ative political theory is dialogical, or “hermeneutical” –that is, it relies on mutual 
interpretation. […] Comparative political theory clearly departs from what is 
commonly called “formal theory,” which imposes a general, universal “form” on 
diverse phenomena, thereby revealing its debt to the universalist claim of the Eu-
ropean Enlightenment.’407  
Interestingly, Dallmayr’s comparative political theory is said to be “dialogical” and “her-
meneutical,” thus, it seemingly shares some methodological affinities with Panikkar’s impara-
tive philosophy (the method of which the latter calls diatopical hermeneutics, as I have 
said).408 However, the use of the adjective “comparative” by Dallmayr and its rejection by 
Panikkar is not a merely formal difference. Effectively, they have two different conceptions 
of the aims of “comparative” philosophy. While they both start from a general “humanistic” 
premise grounded in the necessity of dialogue, they profoundly differ with reference to the 
epistemic status of such a dialogue and its products. For Panikkar, cultures (and, consequent-
ly, philosophies that develop within them) are not only fundamentally incommensurable, but 
also mutually incompatible:  
‘Acknowledging the primordial function of each culture, which consists in of-
fering a vision of reality which allows man to live his life, we could maybe defend 
an atomised and separated pluriculturalism, i.e. a separate and respectful exist-
ence between diverse cultures, each in its own world. We would have the exist-
ence of a plurality of culture without mutual connection. But what is obviously 
impossible is the coexistence of their fundamental diversity in today’s world. [… 
                                                        
407 Fred Dallmayr, “Beyond Monologue: For a Comparative Political Theory,” Perspectives on Politics 2, no. 2 (2004), 
249. 
408 Dallmayr directly quotes Panikkar: 251-252. 
  
 European Muslims and Liberal Citizenship 
Ph.D. Thesis successfully discussed on April 21, 2016.  
The total or partial use of the Ph.D. Thesis is subject to copyright restrictions. 
 
  
138  
 Giovanni Vezzani 
 
LUISS-ULB 
Since] there is a de facto incompatibility [… between cultures,] multiculturalism 
today is also de facto impossible.’409 
To sum up, according to Panikkar multiculturalism is impossible if we understand it as a 
co-existence of different cultural frameworks, because such frameworks are more or less 
complete and exclusive. Pluriculturalism is possible, but it is not desirable, because it entails 
merely the “side-by-side” separated and secluded existence of different cultures (a ‘discon-
nected plurality’).410 On the contrary, interculturality is both possible and desirable. Cultures 
can communicate even if they are incommensurable:  
‘[T]he fact that the circumference and the radius are mutually incommensura-
ble […], in no way means that they do not condition each other, nor that they can 
become separate. […] To think that cultures are incommunicable because they are 
incommensurable is a rationalistic presupposition which believes that only a 
common ratio mensurabilis can be the instrument of human communication. To 
understand (entenderse) each other does not mean to comprehend each other 
(comprenderse). Intelligibility is not the same thing as awareness (tener conscien-
cia). One can be aware of something that is unintelligible.’411 
Then, imparative philosophy is a philosophy of personal awareness but not necessarily of 
intellectual understanding. Therefore, ideally ‘interculturality is the complete form of human 
culture,’ but, importantly, it does not imply the pursuit or creation of one single culture.412 Ra-
ther, we might say, the Panikkar’s ideal can be caught in the formula in pluribus unum, or, 
more accurately, inter plura unum (in which “unum” is the inter-culturally situated human 
subject). On the contrary, such an un-situated or better dia-topical ideal is not the primary 
concern of Dallmayr’s comparative political theory. While based on “dialogical” and “inter-
pretative” methods, the latter is concerned with ‘shared meaning and practices’413 and aims 
‘to move toward a more genuine universalism, and beyond the spurious universality tradition-
                                                        
409 Raimundo Panikkar, “Religion, Philosophy and Culture,” 15-16. 
410 Ibid. 17. 
411 Ibid. 16-17. 
412 Ibid. 17. 
413 Fred Dallmayr, “Beyond Monologue: For a Comparative Political Theory,” 249. 
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ally claimed by the Western canon […].’414 Therefore, not only can cultures and philosophies 
communicate, but they are also commensurable, if we use the appropriate (non-hegemonic or 
falsely universal) tools. 
The point about commensurability of philosophical traditions or theories brings me to dis-
cuss some major objections to comparative philosophy. Here, I do not try to answer them, 
whilst in the last part of this chapter I shall take into consideration five objections (O2.1-
O2.5) that may be specifically raised against my own method. The first difficulty of compara-
tive philosophy is, as I mentioned, the problem of commensurability. On the methodological 
level, we can consider radical incommensurability (the claim that ‘the questions and answers 
in one tradition cannot sustain meaningful statement in the other tradition’ because of a ‘radi-
cal difference in basic concepts and modes of inquiry’), moderate incommensurability (the 
claim that ‘sometimes we can understand others just well enough to know that we don’t un-
derstand them,’ that is, we understand that the philosophical tradition t2 values x, but we are 
not able to understand x nor to translate it in our philosophical language, so we can make 
judgements about x only from within the horizon of our own philosophical tradition t1), and a 
form of ‘evaluational incommensurability’ (we can fully comprehend x and translate it in our 
philosophical language, but we are not able to settle conflicts or inconsistencies between t1 
and t2 about x because we lack a common standard of evaluation: we cannot make a conclu-
sive decision about x because t1 and t2 differ on what counts as evidence).
415 On the ethical 
level, the problem of commensurability concerns the possibility of making meaningful com-
parison between philosophical traditions ‘on the matters of how people ought to live their 
lives, whether both traditions have moralities and if so how similar they are.’416 Finally, met-
aphysical and epistemological commensurability ‘involves the comparison of traditions on 
their conception of the real and their modes of inquiry and justification.’417 In addition to the 
                                                        
414 Ibid. 253. 
415 For these considerations, see David Wong, “Comparative Philosophy: Chinese and Western,” 2-5.  
416 Ibid. 1. 
417 Ibid. 
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commensurability-problem, comparative philosophy might face several risks.418 ‘Descriptive 
chauvinism’ is ‘the fault which consists in recreating the other tradition in the image of one’s 
own.’ So, for instance, we cannot assume that a text within the tradition t2 (at the time m2) 
makes the same questions or constructs answers in the same way we do in our tradition t1 at 
the time m1. Moreover, ‘normative chauvinism […] is the tendency to believe that [one’s 
own] tradition is best and that insofar as the others are different, they are inferior or in error.’ 
On the other hand, for some authors, ‘normative scepticism’ (the tendency to describe the tra-
dition or theory t2 while at the same time suspending all normative judgment about it) should 
be avoided as well. Finally, we should consider the evolutionary patterns of each tradition 
(that is, we should be aware that they have a present and a past), in order to avoid ‘perennial-
ism.’ This overview of the risks related to comparative philosophy is an introductory caveat 
for what follows. 
 
2.2.B Reasoning from Conjecture. 
As we have seen, comparative philosophy is defined differently on the basis of its different 
aims, methods, and limitations. If this is true, one might say that a single comparative philos-
ophy does not exist, but several comparative philosophies and consequently, several compar-
ative ethics. I would argue that conjecture represents a particular sort of comparative ethics. 
Namely, conjecture represents a distinctively liberal kind of comparative ethics, because it is 
conceived to serve the purposes of political liberalism (reaching an overlapping consensus on 
−and, through it, a public justification of− a political conception of justice) and to work in a 
precise (even if, by necessity, adequately flexible) way. As such, conjecture does not aim at 
neutrality (in Panikkar’s sense), but at sincerity.419 Therefore, pace Panikkar, conjecture steps 
forward as a possible comparative philosophy. Conjecture is overtly and frankly an attempt to 
find within others’ comprehensive doctrines good reasons for endorsing (that is, to fully justi-
fy) a liberal political conception of justice. The crucial point is that such an attempt has to be 
sincere and that such reasons have to be truly good reasons –“good” from the viewpoint of a 
                                                        
418 For what follows: Ronnie Littlejohn, “Comparative Philosophy,” 2-3. The author builds mainly on Martha Nuss-
baum’s Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1997). 
419 For the sincerity requirement, see infra. 
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specific comprehensive doctrine.420 Accordingly, I define conjecture as a peculiar kind of 
comparative political theory, namely, a kind of comparative approach worked out by political 
liberalism in order to deal with the problem of justification. In conjecture, the comparative 
approach and the justificatory purposes are inseparable. These points will become clearer in a 
while. 
In “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” Rawls famously examines a ‘wide view of pub-
lic political culture.’421 As I will explain in chapter four, the latter represents a substantial de-
velopment of what in the original edition of Political Liberalism he called the ‘inclusive 
view’ of public reason.422 In the new introduction for the paperback edition of Political Lib-
eralism (1996) he revised this idea, reformulating it as a ‘wide view of public reason,’423 de-
tailing it further in his 1997 essay “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited.”424 As we will see in 
detail in chapter four, whilst the wide view does not contradict the inclusive view, the two po-
sitions are different. Otherwise, one could not understand why Rawls distinguishes the two 
and says that the last version is ‘by far the best statement I have written on ideas of public 
reason and political liberalism.’425 Moreover, with reference to the conditions stipulated for 
the inclusive view, in the 1996 introduction he says: ‘I now see no need for these conditions 
so far as they go beyond the proviso and drop them. The proviso […] secures what is need-
ed.’426 Thus, he implicitly maintains that the wide view and its proviso should replace the in-
clusive view. As I shall argue, the wide view does not simply involve a widening of the kinds 
of reasons allowed in public reasoning, it also corresponds to a less consensual and more plu-
                                                        
420 See infra and Micah Schwartzman, “The Ethics of Reasoning from Conjecture,” 526 and 529-531. 
421 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 462-466. For Rawls’s definition of public political culture, see 
supra. See also chapter three. 
422 In the original edition (1993) of Political Liberalism, 247-254. 
423 This new introduction is included in the expanded edition, and the wide view of public reason is discussed in §5 
(xlviii-lx, in particular l). 
424 Originally published in University of Chicago Law Review 64 (1997), 765-807. Included in Political Liberalism ex-
panded edition (2005), 440-490. As above, all quotations of “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” are from this last 
edition of Political Liberalism. 
425 See Rawls’s letter to his editor at Columbia University Press included in the 2005 expanded edition of Political Lib-
eralism, 438. 
426 See the 1996 introduction to Political Liberalism, l. Emphases added. 
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ralist and deliberative conception of public reason. This position (epitomized in Rawls’s re-
newed emphasis on the moral salience of the criterion of reciprocity, his clarification about 
the fact that the content of public reason is specified by a family of political conceptions of 
justice rather than just by justice as fairness,427 and, above all, in the statement of the proviso) 
does not radically depart from the inclusive view, but significantly improves the latter in order 
to better answer to Rawls’s deeper concerns. The result is a different interpretation of public 
reason that may also be more fitting to the European focus adopted in my study (see chapter 
five). Now let me recapitulate some points that are helpful for my present purposes. An ‘ex-
clusive view’ of public reason says that ‘on fundamental political matters, reasons given ex-
plicitly in terms of comprehensive doctrines are never to be introduced into public reason.’428 
Nevertheless, Rawls argues, in some circumstances some non-public reasons may ‘strengthen 
the ideal of public reason.’429 Then, in the original edition of Political Liberalism Rawls af-
firms that an inclusive view ‘seems the correct one,’ since it makes room for different scenar-
ios430 and ‘is more flexible as needed to further the ideal of public reason.’431 Crucial to my 
aims here is the fact that, with the 1996-1997 formulation of the wide view (his last and pre-
                                                        
427 See chapter three. 
428 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 247. 
429 Ibid. 
430 I will return to this point at length in chapter four. For the moment, I want just to remind some fundamental ele-
ments. In the account of the inclusive view Rawls writes: ‘[U]nder different political and social conditions with differ-
ent families of doctrine and practice, the ideal [of public reason] must surely be advanced and fulfilled in different 
ways, sometimes by what may look like the exclusive view, at others by what may look like the inclusive view.’ Ibid. 
248. Then, Rawls analyses three different scenarios. A well-ordered society in which ‘public reason […] may appear to 
follow the exclusive view. Invoking only political values is the obvious and the most direct way for citizens to honor 
the ideal of public reason and to meet their duty of civility.’ A nearly well-ordered society, where ‘those of different 
faiths may come to doubt the sincerity of one another’s allegiance to fundamental political values.’ In this case, an in-
clusive view is more effective in strengthening the ideal of public reason, since it allows ‘the leaders of the opposing 
groups to present in the public forum how their comprehensive doctrines do indeed affirm those values. [… T]heir do-
ing so may help to show that the overlapping consensus is not a mere modus vivendi. This knowledge surely strength-
ens mutual trust and public confidence; it can be a vital part of the sociological basis encouraging citizens to honor the 
ideal of public reason.’ Finally, he considers a society that is not well-ordered. In such cases (as the U.S.A. during slav-
ery and segregation times) the appeal to comprehensive reasons may be required ‘to give sufficient strength to the polit-
ical conception to be subsequently realized.’ Therefore, for instance, abolitionists’ arguments based on religious 
grounds further the ideal of public reason, although through non-public arguments. ‘Given those historical conditions, it 
was not unreasonable of them to act as they did for the sake of the ideal of public reason itself. In this case, the ideal of 
public reason allows the inclusive view.’ Ibid. 248-251.  
431 Ibid. 248. For this preference, see also 251-252. 
  
 European Muslims and Liberal Citizenship 
Ph.D. Thesis successfully discussed on April 21, 2016.  
The total or partial use of the Ph.D. Thesis is subject to copyright restrictions. 
 
  
143  
 Giovanni Vezzani 
 
LUISS-ULB 
ferred view),432 Rawls introduces what I shall call a “general threshold for public reasoning,” 
namely, the proviso (which ‘specifies public political culture as distinct from the background 
culture’433), and three non-public forms of discourse: declaration, witnessing, and conjecture. 
The proviso sets a limit for a non-public reason to be used in public political discussions 
about fundamental political questions (constitutional essentials and questions of basic jus-
tice).434 One might say that the proviso sets a provisional admission for religious or philo-
sophical arguments in public political discussions: we can introduce them, ‘provided that in 
due course proper political reasons –and not reasons given solely by comprehensive doc-
trines– are presented that are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines in-
troduced are said to support.’435 Therefore, the proviso allows the introduction of non-public 
reasons (if and only if) supported by public reason in public political discussion about fun-
damental political questions. If we fail to present properly public reasons that support those 
non-public reasons, we fall below the threshold of genuine public reasoning. We are not able 
to address our fellow citizens with reasons that are appropriate for public justification.436 
Therefore, we do not meet the moral duty of civility that the ideal of liberal citizenship im-
                                                        
432 Ibid. 438. 
433 “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 462. 
434 As I will explain in chapter three, in Rawls’s view those are the issues that should be decided through public reason. 
‘[T]he limits imposed by public reason do not apply to all political questions but only to those involving what we may 
call “constitutional essentials” and questions of basic justice […]. This means that political values alone are to settle 
such fundamental political questions as: who has the right to vote, or what religions are to be tolerated, or who is to be 
assured fair equality of opportunity, or to hold property.’ John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 214. According to Rawls, 
constitutional essentials are of two kinds: ‘(a) fundamental principles that specify the general structure of government 
and the political process: the powers of the legislature, executive and the judiciary; the scope of majority rule; and (b) 
equal basic rights and liberties of citizenship that legislative majorities are to respect: such as the right to vote and to 
participate in politics, liberty of conscience, freedom of thought and association, as well as the protections of the rule of 
law.’ Ibid. 227 (see also 228-230). Freeman sums up constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice as follows: 
‘[c]onstitutional essentials include questions of basic rights and liberties as well as constitutional powers and procedures 
of government. Basic justice includes matters related to equality of opportunity, the social minimum, and other all-
purpose means for effectively exercising basic liberties and fair opportunities.’ Samuel Freeman, Rawls, 466. See chap-
ter three. 
435 “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 462. Emphasis added. 
436 See this already quoted passage: ‘[p]ublic reasoning aims for public justification. We appeal to political conceptions 
of justice, and to ascertainable evidence and facts open to public view, in order to reach conclusions about what we 
think are the most reasonable political institutions and policies. Public justification is not simply valid reasoning, but 
argument addressed to others: it proceeds correctly from premises we accept and think others could reasonably accept 
to conclusions we think they could also reasonably accept. This meets the duty of civility, since in due course the provi-
so is satisfied.’ Ibid. 465. 
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poses, that is, ‘to be able to explain to one another on those fundamental questions how the 
principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of 
public reason.’437 The proviso and the duty of civility will be analysed more accurately in 
chapter four (4.2 is devoted to my interpretation of the duty of civility). Here, I would like to 
focus on the three forms of non-public reasoning: declaration, witnessing and conjecture. 
Declaration is a non-public form of reasoning because 1) we do not address other fellow 
citizens with properly public reasons, nor 2) do we expect that our declaration might establish 
a ground for public agreement and justification. This second point is of paramount im-
portance.  
‘[W]e each declare our own comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious. 
This we do not expect others to share. Rather, each of us shows how, from our 
own doctrines, we can and do endorse a reasonable political conception of justice 
with its principles and ideals. The aim of doing this is to declare to others who af-
firm different comprehensive doctrines that we also each endorse a reasonable po-
litical conception belonging to the family of reasonable such conceptions. On the 
wide view [of public reason], citizens of faith […] do no stop there, but go on to 
give a public justification for [the conclusions of their doctrine] in terms of politi-
cal values. In this way citizens who hold different doctrines are reassured, and this 
strengthens the ties of civic friendship.’438 
Therefore, the wide view of public reason allows citizens to declare (for instance): “leav-
ing aside public political values and standards of inquiry, I would like to disclose the fact that 
my religious doctrine d fully endorses the political conception c for the religious reason r1, r2, 
and r3. Having said that, I think that c can also be publicly justified in the light of the public 
political values pv1 and pv2. Thus, we (me and you as citizens) can agree on pv1 and pv2 as 
public reasons for the justification of c. Nonetheless, bear in mind that I have also specific 
non-public and still for me crucial reasons (r1, r2, and r3) for endorsing c.” Such a declaration 
may serve two purposes.439 First, it may have an informative and expressive aim: ‘citizens 
                                                        
437 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 217. 
438 “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 465.  
439 Micah Schwartzman, “The Ethics of Reasoning from Conjecture,” 525. 
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may wish for others to understand the deeper grounds of their political views. Declaration is 
thus a form of free expression. It is not an attempt to gain official recognition, but rather a 
way of informing others about the sources of one’s own ethical, religious, or philosophical 
motivations.’440 Second, it may have an “in-one-another-we-can-trust” aim: ‘declaration 
makes it possible for citizens to gain some insight into where their fellow citizens stand with 
regard to the values they hold in common. The open discussion of comprehensive doctrines 
helps citizens to see how those who disagree with them can nevertheless converge on a rea-
sonable basis for justifying political decisions. For this reason, declaration can be valuable as 
a means of promoting civic trust.’441  
Witnessing is the second non-public form of discourse. It shares with declaration the two 
above-mentioned features: in witnessing 1) we do not address other fellow citizens with 
properly public reasons, nor 2) do we expect that our witnessing might be a ground for public 
agreement.  
‘[Witnessing] typically occurs in an ideal, politically well-ordered, and fully 
just society in which all votes are the result of citizens’ voting in accordance with 
their most reasonable conception of political justice. Nevertheless, it may happen 
that some citizens feel they must express their principled dissent from existing in-
stitutions, policies, or enacted legislation. […] While on the whole these citizens 
endorse reasonable political conceptions of justice supporting a constitutional 
democratic society, in this case they nevertheless feel they must not only let other 
citizens know the deep basis of their strong opposition but must also bear witness 
to their faith by doing so. At the same time, those bearing witness accept the idea 
of public reason. While they may think that the outcome of a vote on which all 
reasonable citizens have conscientiously followed public reason to be incorrect or 
not true, they nevertheless recognize it as legitimate law and accept the obligation 
not to violate it.’442 
                                                        
440 Ibid. 
441 Ibid.  
442 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 466 note 57. 
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Those who bear witness both endorse the political conception of justice and follow public 
reason. Nevertheless, on a single issue or some issues, they might have comprehensive rea-
sons to disagree so strongly with the outcome of the exercise of public reason, that they feel 
compelled to bear witness to their comprehensive doctrine and its reasons. However, they dis-
agree on the outcome of public reasoning, not on the idea of public reason itself. If they could, 
they would reject the outcome, not the ideal of public reason. Therefore, since they recognise 
that such an outcome is the result of the exercise of public reason in a democratic society, 
they do not violate it. As examples, Rawls cites Quakers’ religious pacifism and Catholics’ 
opposition to abortion. He assumes that both Quakers and Catholics accept the idea of public 
reason and do not violate the laws enacted in accordance with it, because they think that those 
laws are politically legitimate. Nonetheless, at the same time they may express the religious 
basis of their opposition to such laws. ‘As long as citizens recognise the legitimacy of policies 
enacted according to public reason, it is reasonable for them to express the religious (or oth-
erwise nonpublic) grounds of their opposition.’443  
To sum up, ‘[t]he difference between witnessing and declaration is that, in the former, citi-
zens register their dissent from the conclusions of public reason, whereas, in the latter, they 
disclose grounds for their support. In both cases, however, the assumption is that citizens act 
in accordance with demands of public reason.’444 Hence, they are both non-public forms of 
discourse in accordance with the idea of public reason. Witnessing is a dissenting non-public 
discourse in accordance with the idea of public reason. Declaration is a confirmative non-
public discourse in accordance with the idea of public reason. As I said, the proviso estab-
lishes a condition for publicly appealing to non-public reasons within the scope of public rea-
son (it is, as I have said, a general threshold for public reasoning). What those three concepts 
have in common is the fact that they play their role during or after the process of public justi-
fication. The proviso conditionally enlarges the range of reasons we can appeal to in publicly 
justifying a policy or a political decision (within the scope of public reason). Declaration al-
lows us to express why and how we can ‘affirm the ideal of public reason […] from within 
[our] own reasonable doctrin[e],’445 and by means of this, our principled reasons for taking 
                                                        
443 Micah Schwartzman, “The Ethics of Reasoning from Conjecture,” 4. 
444 Ibid. 525-526. 
445 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 218. 
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part to the process of public justification. Finally, through witnessing citizens may express 
their principled reasons for dissenting from a legitimate political decision, law, or policy. Be-
ing recognised as legitimate, such a decision, law, or policy is binding. It is legitimate since it 
is the outcome of publicly justified political procedures and processes. For a citizen, such a 
law, policy, or decision ‘may not be thought the most reasonable, or the most appropriate, by 
each, but it is politically (morally) binding on him or her as a citizen and it is to be accepted 
as such. Each thinks that all have spoken and voted at least reasonably, and therefore all have 
followed public reason and honored their duty of civility.’446 Therefore, witnessing, declara-
tion, and the concept of proviso relate to the question of how we should reason in accordance 
with the idea of public justification. If ‘public reasoning […] proceeds entirely within a politi-
cal conception of justice,’447 the proviso conditionally enlarges the kind of reason we can ap-
peal to in public reasoning, while declaration and witnessing allow a non-public reasoning 
which not only does not conflict with, but also might strengthen public reasoning. 
However, along with declaration and witnessing, there is a third form of non-public rea-
soning, which is not in accordance with but for the sake of public reason.448 Rawls calls this 
form of non-public reasoning conjecture. In his definition of conjecture: 
‘[W]e argue from what we believe, or conjecture, are other people’s basic doc-
trines, religious or secular, and try to show them that, despite what they might 
think, they can still endorse a reasonable political conception that can provide a 
basis for public reasons. The ideal of public reason is thereby strengthened. How-
ever, it is important that conjecture can be sincere and not manipulative. We must 
openly explain our intentions and state that we do not assert the premises from 
                                                        
446 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 446. 
447 Ibid, 453. 
448 Note that Leslie C. Griffin [“Good Catholics Should Be Rawlsian Liberals,” Southern California Interdisciplinary 
Law Journal 5, no. 3 (1997), 320] uses the expression ‘for the sake of public reason’ with reference to Martin Luther 
King’s use of religious language for his civil rights campaign, thus, with this example Griffin is referring to the proviso 
(see chapter four), while here I am referring to the case of conjecture. Clearly, the difference is a matter of terminology 
rather than of substance: obviously, I have no problem in recognising that we are acting for the sake of public reason 
also when we satisfy the proviso. My point is simply that the proviso is not external to public reason (this is why I have 
defined it as a general threshold for public reasoning), while declaration, witnessing, and conjecture are part of the idea 
of public reason in a wider sense, but they are not public forms of reasoning.  
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which we argue, but that we proceed as we do to clear up what we take to be a 
misunderstanding on others’ part, and perhaps equally on ours.’449 
Some remarks are in order. First, as I suggested above, conjecture is different from the proviso, 
declaration, and witnessing in one fundamental respect: conjecture is not public reasoning through 
non-public reasons supported by public reasons (as in the case of proviso), nor is it a non-public 
form of discourse in accordance with (within the limits imposed by) public reason (as in the case of 
declaration and witnessing). Rather, conjecture is non-public reasoning for the sake of public reason 
itself: we try to appeal to non-public reasons within others’ comprehensive doctrine in order to 
show ‘that, despite what they might think, they can still endorse a reasonable political conception 
that can provide a basis for public reasons.’ In this way, ‘[t]he ideal of public reason is […] 
strengthened.’ We try to call our fellow citizens’ attention to the fact that they have non-public rea-
sons for endorsing the political conception and that actually their comprehensive doctrines do not 
conflict with the demands of public reason. As Schwartzman puts it, conjecture ‘is a form of rea-
soning. It is not simply an attempt at rhetorical persuasion. The idea is to present people with argu-
ments that give them good reasons, as evaluated from within their own comprehensive views, for 
endorsing a reasonable political conception as the basis for public reasoning. Thus, reasoning from 
conjecture is a form of non-public justification [last emphasis added]. Its purpose is to generate ra-
tional agreement on a shared or public basis for decision-making.’450 Such a rational agreement 
does not appeal to merely strategic interests.451 Rather, conjecture represents a (non-public) justifi-
cation in a much deeper sense, since it is ‘based on the convergence of different sets of moral rea-
sons on common moral and political conclusions.’452 If this is true, one could go even further and 
say that through conjecture we try to show that our fellow citizens have good reasons for acknowl-
edging the priority of the right reasons (that is, of public reason) when fundamental political ques-
tions are publicly debated.453 Thus, conjecture aims to lead to a ‘principled agreement […, a] con-
sensus on the need for a common moral standpoint, at least for the purposes of justifying political 
                                                        
449 Ibid. 465-466. 
450 Micah Schwartzman, “The Ethics of Reasoning from Conjecture,” 526. 
451 Ibid. 526-527. 
452 Ibid. 527. 
453 For the scope of public reason, see chapter three. 
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decisions.’454 In addition, ‘[s]ince political liberalism holds that this standpoint should be specified 
by a reasonable political conception of justice, justifying such a conception becomes the goal of 
reasoning from conjecture.’455 As I have explained above, Rawls makes a distinction between polit-
ical (or pro tanto) and full justification. Schwartzman rephrases this point in different terms. The 
idea is that ‘C has a pro tanto, or political, justification for policy  when that policy is supported 
by a reasonable balance of political values. But she does not yet have a full, or all-things consid-
ered, justification for supporting . If her comprehensive view contains non-public values that con-
flict with the pro tanto justification for , she may decide to give priority to those values.’456 In oth-
er words, in some cases we may achieve a political justification but not a full justification for set-
tling a political question in a certain way. In those cases, Schwartzman continues, ‘[t]he aim of con-
jecture is to bridge the gap between pro tanto and full justification.’457 He says that: 
‘In general, political liberalism leaves it up to individual citizens to determine 
how pro tanto justifications fit within their comprehensive doctrines. But when 
citizens fail in this regard, or when they appear to be unable to reconcile the de-
mands of a reasonable political conception with their comprehensive views, it 
may be possible to continue deliberating on the basis of conjectural arguments. If 
it can be shown that a comprehensive view is at least consistent with a reasonable 
political conception […] then perhaps the weighty values –e.g., mutual respect, 
reciprocity, and political autonomy– that support providing others with public rea-
sons will be sufficient to establish a full justification […] .’458 
In facilitating the full justification of a pro tanto justified political conception, conjecture 
may lead to an overlapping consensus and to public justification. In this sense, I have called it 
“non-public reasoning for the sake of public reason.” 
                                                        
454 Micah Schwartzman, “The Ethics of Reasoning from Conjecture,” 527. 
455 Ibid. 
456 Ibid. 
457 Ibid. 
458 ibid. 527-528. 
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Following Schwartzman in his reconstruction of this Rawlsian concept, a second remark 
concerning conjecture is that conjecturers459 ‘offer arguments based on premises they do not 
accept. They argue from within comprehensive doctrines, other than their own, for the pur-
pose of justifying a reasonable political conception.’460 This point should be clear now: if one 
tries to justify a political conception within her own comprehensive doctrine, she is trying to 
achieve a full justification. If one tries to argue in that direction from within others’ compre-
hensive doctrine, she is reasoning from conjecture. But in no way can she substitute them in 
achieving full justification. Conjecture is about finding out good reasons for others to justify a 
political conception within their doctrine; it is not about replacing them in justifying it. While 
conjecture is (should be) a plainly external attempt to show possible ways for justifying, full 
justification requires an internal effort. This brings us back to the problem of sincerity men-
tioned by Rawls: we should openly say that ‘we do not assert the premises from which we ar-
gue.’ Such a requirement serves a double purpose: it not only ‘reassure[s] others of our sincer-
ity,’ but also calls for others’ serious consideration of our arguments, ‘on the ground that 
these arguments are based on premises to which we believe they are committed.’461 
A last element of conjecture is noteworthy here. Schwartzman suggests that ‘conjecture 
need not be based on arguments that are merely tentative or suggestive.’462 In reasoning from 
conjecture, one ‘may be quite certain that [her] claims are conclusively justified on the basis 
of particular comprehensive doctrines.’463 Therefore, the method of conjecture is not based on 
“conjecturing” (as this word is commonly understood). To be sure, it is likely that in most 
cases the conjecturer’s arguments are really “conjectures” (i.e., ‘merely tentative’ arguments): 
for obvious reasons, when we reason from within the comprehensive perspective of others, it 
is difficult to be sure that our claims are ‘conclusively justified’ from that perspective. A de-
gree of uncertainty remains even when we are familiar with such a perspective.464 I would add 
                                                        
459 I borrow this term from Schwartzman. 
460 Micah Schwartzman, “The Ethics of Reasoning from Conjecture,” 528. 
461 Ibid. 
462 Ibid. 
463 Ibid. 
464 Schwartzman says that ‘[t]his may be simply the natural result of differences in judgment.’ Ibid. 529. 
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that partial uncertainty is even positive, if we understand it as the conjecturer’s awareness of 
the “otherness” of others’ comprehensive doctrines. It seems to me that this respectful aware-
ness is required by Rawls’s overall account of conjecture (otherwise, what could be the real 
meaning of his annotation ‘and perhaps equally on ours’?). Furthermore, such awareness may 
represent a prudential admonition for aiming at those claims that are most likely to be justifi-
able within others’ doctrine. However, the crucial feature of conjecture is that ‘conjectural ar-
guments have a certain status in virtue of the fact that their premises are not shared by those 
who advance them. [… C]onjecture is (or should be) defined […] by the kind of reasoning in-
volved, and not by the degree of confidence expressed by that reasoning.’465 In few words, 
what characterises conjecture is the attempt to reason from within a different religious, ethi-
cal, or philosophical perspective, in order to show how its members could justify the political 
conception from that standpoint. If one “unfolds” the phrase “to reason from within others’ 
comprehensive doctrine” as “to reason from within others’ ethical, philosophical, or religious 
viewpoint”, she may realise that the important point that Rawls has in mind is precisely the 
conjecturer’s effort/attempt/disposition toward the other, in order to help466 her in finding out 
reasons for justifying the reasonable conception that should govern their lives as cooperating 
members of the same society. 
Some objections may arise against such an account of conjecture. Schwartzman considers 
three of them: 
1. ‘Conjecture is not a form of justification but rather an insincere mode of argument 
designed to manipulate people into accepting liberal political principles.’467 As I 
have pointed out, Rawls’s political liberalism requires sincerity in reasoning from 
conjecture. But what does sincerity mean exactly? Schwartzman takes into consid-
eration an initial definition of sincerity, as ‘believing what you say.’ Then, he con-
tinues, conjecturers meet such a sincerity requirement only ‘if they disclose the fact 
                                                        
465 Ibid. 528-529. 
466 I use the verb “to help” in the sense of “assisting,” or, best of all, “working together.” In no case, as I have said, can 
the conjecturer replace the members of a comprehensive doctrine in providing a full justification, nor can she dictate a 
justificatory pattern. If a full justification is not possible at all, the conjecturer should recognise this fact and stop her 
attempt, because members of the comprehensive doctrine cannot be obliged to provide a full justification. In this case, 
however, those who take part in the public justification may regard that doctrine as unreasonable. In this case, then, the 
problem is how to treat it and its members. For this, see chapters three and four. 
467 Micah Schwartzman, “The Ethics of Reasoning from Conjecture,” 529. For his reply, see ibid. 529-534. 
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that they do not assert the premises from which they argue.’ This is the ‘principle 
of disclosure.’468 However, such a principle is a necessary but not sufficient condi-
tion for sincere reasoning from conjecture. If I (the conjecturer) tell you (a member 
of the comprehensive doctrine d) that you should endorse  because of the compre-
hensive reason r in which you believe, and I add that, however, I do not share your 
commitment to d and, consequently to r, and that I endorse  for different reasons, 
then I meet the principle of disclosure and my reasoning is sincere. But what if I 
know that the reason r to which you are committed is groundless or unjustified 
from the perspective of d itself? What if, for example, I know that your commit-
ment to r (and, consequently, to ) is based on a misinformed interpretation of d? 
In this case, I would know that, from the viewpoint of d, r is actually a bad reason 
for endorsing . Intuitively, one may say that if I simply omitted to tell you that 
there is strong evidence that r has no grounds within d, I would not be sincere with 
you. Then, the principle of disclosure is not sufficient. As I have said, conjecture 
aims at justification. And ‘[i]f we accept that justification is about giving others 
good reasons, even when the “goodness” of the reason is judged from within their 
perspectives, then the principle of disclosure is insufficient to guarantee the sinceri-
ty of conjecture.’469 To face this problem, Schwartzman presents the ‘principle of 
full disclosure.’ It says that ‘reasoning from conjecture is sincere and non-
manipulative if, and only if, conjecturers (i) disclose that they do not believe the 
premises from which they argue, and (ii) disclose whether they believe their argu-
ments are justifiable from within the comprehensive views of their intended audi-
ence.’470 The second point (ii) averts the problem that I have just mentioned. 
2. ‘[E]ven if conjecture is sincere and non-manipulative, it is an attempt to impose al-
ien interpretations on particular comprehensive doctrines.’471 Firstly, Schwartzman 
observes that the ‘lack of commitment to a culture (or comprehensive doctrine) [is 
                                                        
468 Ibid. 530. 
469 Ibid. 531. 
470 Ibid. 
471 Ibid. 529. Discussed on 534-539. 
  
 European Muslims and Liberal Citizenship 
Ph.D. Thesis successfully discussed on April 21, 2016.  
The total or partial use of the Ph.D. Thesis is subject to copyright restrictions. 
 
  
153  
 Giovanni Vezzani 
 
LUISS-ULB 
not] a reason to refrain from arguing from within it.’472 Secondly, he points out the 
fact that ‘the need for Islamic [or otherwise comprehensive] authority does not nec-
essarily preclude the possibility of reasoning from conjecture.’473 Indeed the con-
jecturer may appeal to a ‘contextual authority.’474 In arguing that others should en-
dorse a conception of justice, we are obviously making a normative demand on 
them. This requires that ‘we claim a kind of normative authority for ourselves.’475 
But why should they recognise our normative authority? We cannot just impose our 
authority, since others must be persuaded that they have good reasons to take into 
consideration our claims. Schwartzman argues that ‘one way to answer the question 
of normative authority is to say that what we are demanding is simply what follows 
from norms, values and beliefs to which they are already committed. Our authority 
is premised on our claim to have reasoned properly from their ethical or religious 
perspective.’476 Thus, the normative authority of our claims is grounded in the con-
text in which we are reasoning.  
3. ‘Conjecture lacks epistemic credibility.’477 After all, it may seem that adherents of 
a comprehensive doctrine d are the best judges and interpreters of d. ‘Why should 
C accept A’s interpretation of her own comprehensive view? To answer this ques-
tion, A needs to explain why she knows better. That is, she has to give a justifica-
tion for her epistemic authority. If A cannot give a justification, then presumably C 
has good reason to trust her own interpretation of the beliefs and values to which 
she is committed.’478 The conjecturer has three options.479 She might admit that she 
                                                        
472 Ibid. 535. 
473 Ibid. 536. 
474 Schwartzman borrows this concept from Alan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1990), 174. Quoted in Micah Schwartzman, “The Ethics of Reasoning from Conjecture,” 536. 
475 Micah Schwartzman, “The Ethics of Reasoning from Conjecture,” 537. 
476 Ibid. Importantly, he adds that ‘the view that Islamic reformation should be based on traditional religious sources 
seems consistent with conjectural arguments that proceed based on similar, contextual grounds.’  
477 Ibid. 529. Discussed on 540-542. 
478 Ibid. 540. 
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is not an “insider” and that she is just speculating (conjecturing in the ordinary 
sense). Alternatively, she might try to become an authority on a particular doctrine. 
Lastly, she might challenge ‘the reasonableness of excluding an outsider, or a non-
believer, solely on the basis of epistemic considerations.’ Schwartzman argues that: 
‘Recall that the purpose of conjecture is to try to reconcile conflicts between 
non-public and public values. If a person, or a community, asserts that non-public 
values should take priority in cases of conflict, then it is reasonable to ask for a 
justification for that view. Perhaps a justification can be given that will at least be 
intelligible, if not defensible, to outsiders. But if the proffered justification is not 
even intelligible, if an outsider cannot even hope to understand the beliefs or val-
ues on which that justification is based, then there are strong grounds for ques-
tioning whether it is an appropriate basis for justifying the exercise of political 
power.’480 
 
The last point is very relevant to my aims. It unambiguously links reasonableness and in-
telligibility. Kevin Vallier defines intelligibility in these terms: ‘A’s reason X is intelligible to 
the public if and only if members of the public (at the right level of idealization) can see that 
X is justified for A according to A’s evaluative standards.’481 He mentions three alternative 
necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for a reason to be counted as a justificatory reason. 
Satisfying one of these alternative requirements is a necessary condition for a reason to enter 
into what he calls ‘the justificatory pool,’482 that is, to be counted as a relevant reason for 
providing a justification, say, of a policy, but this is obviously not a sufficient condition to say 
that the same reason actually provides a justification for that policy. First, if we favour a re-
quirement based on accessibility, then we should admit into the justificatory pool only rea-
sons that are accessible to the relevant public, and ‘A’s reason RA is accessible to the public if 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
479 Ibid. 540-541. 
480 Ibid. 541-542. 
481 Kevin Vallier, “Against Public Reason Liberalism’s Accessibility Requirement,” 388, emphasis added. See also 
Kevin Vallier and Fred D’Agostino, “Public Justification,” 9-11. 
482 Kevin Vallier, “Against Public Reason Liberalism’s Accessibility Requirement,” 372. 
  
 European Muslims and Liberal Citizenship 
Ph.D. Thesis successfully discussed on April 21, 2016.  
The total or partial use of the Ph.D. Thesis is subject to copyright restrictions. 
 
  
155  
 Giovanni Vezzani 
 
LUISS-ULB 
and only if all members of the public regard RA  as justified for A according to common evalu-
ative standards’483 (the reason is not shared, but we can evaluate it from shared standards). 
Alternatively, we could prefer a stronger ‘shareability requirement,’ which demands that we 
must count in the justificatory pool only the reasons that the relevant public regard ‘as justi-
fied for each member of the public […] according to common standards’484 (we all share both 
the reason and the evaluative standards). Finally, we could adopt a shallow intelligibility re-
quirement, according to which we should count as permissible reasons those reasons that the 
public can see as justified for its member A according to A’s standards (neither the reason nor 
the standards are shared). Vallier points out that if we adopt an intelligibility requirement 
(which he favours, for reasons that I do not need to analyse here), ‘public reason will lean to-
wards “convergence” conceptions of public reason.’485  
I agree on this point, and for this reason I mention intelligibility while discussing conjec-
ture: in conjecture there is certainly an element of convergence that makes intelligibility rele-
vant. Nonetheless, here I treat this notion from a different perspective (thus, I depart from 
Vallier’s notions of intelligibility and convergence). In particular, I do not analyse intelligibil-
ity as a requirement for including a reason in the justificatory pool. Rather, I consider intelli-
gibility as a qualifying feature of the reasonable when arguments are brought to the attention 
of the public. In other words, when politically reasonable persons publicly discuss fundamen-
tal political questions, their arguments (whether public reasons or non-public reasons aiming 
at satisfying the proviso) should be at least intelligible to other politically reasonable persons. 
In chapter four, I will build my interpretation of the proviso on this link between reasonable-
                                                        
483 Kevin Vallier and Fred D’Agostino, “Public Justification,” 10. Emphasis added. 
484 Ibid. 11. Emphasis added. 
485 Kevin Vallier, “Against Public Reason Liberalism’s Accessibility Requirement,” 389. For the distinction between 
‘consensus’ views and ‘convergence’ (sometimes also called ‘distributive’) views of public reason, see in particular 
Gerald Postema “Public Practical Reason: An Archeology,” Social Philosophy and Policy 12, no. 1 (1995), 69-70, Kev-
in Vallier and Fred D’Agostino, “Public Justification,” 7-8 and Fred D’Agostino, “Some Modes of Public Justification,” 
391. Here D’Agostino says: ‘[o]n the consensual reading public justification involves providing a reason R which is a 
reason both for A and for B to accept the proposal Π. On the distributive reading, public justification involves providing 
a reason RA  which is a reason for A to accept the proposal Π and a reason RB which is a reason for B to accept the pro-
posal Π, where RA is not necessarily the same as RB.’ Some of the most relevant examples in recent literature on the 
convergence view are Kevin Vallier Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Separation (New York: Routledge, 
2014), see in particular chapter 4, and Gerald F. Gaus The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality 
in a Diverse and Bounded World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), see in particular 283-292 and chapter 
7. For a strong interpretation of the consensus view, see Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, see 261-273. I 
will concisely come back to this distinction in the footnotes at the beginning of chapter three. 
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ness and intelligibility: for the proviso to be satisfied, the non-public reasons advanced in 
public discussions must be intelligible in this sense from the perspective of other reasonable 
fellow citizens. Thus, postponing until chapter four the analysis of the proviso, let me now 
concisely explain the issue of intelligibility within a Rawlsian framework. What follows aims 
to: 1) clarify some points about conjecture and 2) prepare the ground for the development of 
my view of the proviso. 
In reasoning from conjecture (and, I add for the purposes of section 2.3, in justificatory 
evaluative political theory), the reasonableness of a given comprehensive doctrine (also) in-
volves the latter being at least intelligible to outsiders when it deals with political values.486 
Intelligibility does not require full comprehension (or access), even less endorsement. How-
ever, I argue that a reasonable comprehensive doctrine cannot be completely unintelligible to 
outsiders during the process of full justification of the political conception. Remember that 
comprehensive doctrines are an exercise of both practical and theoretical reason.487 Now, if 
‘the content of the reasonable is specified by the content of a reasonable conception,’ the 
‘idea of the reasonable itself is given in part […] by the two aspects of persons’ being reason-
able: their willingness to propose and abide by fair terms of social cooperation among equals 
and their recognition of and willingness to accept the consequences of the burdens of judg-
ment.’488 Add to this that the procedure of political construction (through which the content of 
the political conception is worked out) is based essentially on ‘the principles of practical rea-
son in union with conceptions of society [as a fair system of cooperation] and person [as free 
                                                        
486 This specification is crucial. According to political liberalism, comprehensive doctrines do not have to be reasonable 
in areas that are not relevant for achieving an overlapping consensus, that is, in areas that do not belong to the ‘domain 
of the political,’ to which the political conception is limited. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism, for example 10-11 
and 38-39. In those areas, then, as far as political liberalism is concerned, comprehensive doctrines could be completely 
unintelligible to outsiders. Examples of such potentially unintelligible areas could be: a conception of how God’s sub-
stance and attributes are related, a conception of the Trinity, a conception of reincarnation, a cosmogony, a conception 
of eternity and creation, and so on, as far as they do not call into question the domain of the political. In such areas, per-
sons are not concerned with the demand of being politically reasonable, so the problem of the double exercise of practi-
cal reason (see below) does not arise. In Rawls’s words: ‘[i]n a particular comprehensive doctrine, in particular a reli-
gious one, the ranking of values may not be what we might expect. Thus, suppose we call transcendent such values as 
salvation and eternal life –the Visio Dei. This value, let’s say, is higher, or superior to, the reasonable political values of 
a constitutional democratic society. These are worldly values and therefore on a different, and as it were lower, plane 
than those transcendent values. It doesn’t follow, however, that these lower yet reasonable values are overridden by the 
transcendent values of the religious doctrine. In fact, a reasonable comprehensive doctrine is one in which they are not 
overridden; it is the unreasonable doctrines in which reasonable political values are overridden.’ John Rawls, “The Idea 
of Public Reason Revisited,” 483. 
487 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 59. 
488 Ibid. 94. Emphases added. 
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and equal].’489 Thus, ‘political constructivism specifies an idea of the reasonable’490 by work-
ing out a reasonable political conception that follows from the two aspects of the reasonable-
ness of persons articulated through principles of practical reason in union with conceptions of 
society and person. Political constructivism makes a political justification possible by impos-
ing reasonable limits (the veil of ignorance) on the rational choice of agents in the original po-
sition.491 Furthermore, thanks to the fact that it appeals to the idea of the reasonable and not to 
the concept of truth,492 political constructivism ‘secure[s] the possibility of an overlapping 
consensus on […] fundamental political values,’ since it ‘develops the principles of justice 
from public and shared ideas of society as a fair system of cooperation and of citizens as free 
and equal by using the principles of their common practical reason.’493 Finally, political con-
structivism ‘represents an order of political values proceeding from the values expressed by 
the principles of practical reason, in union with conceptions of society and person, to the val-
ues expressed by certain principles of political justice.’494 In this way the political conception 
can be defined as an ‘autonomous political doctrine,’ that is: 
 ‘[O]ne that represents, or displays, the political principles of justice –the fair 
terms of social cooperation– as reached by using the principles of practical reason 
in union with the appropriate conceptions of persons as free and equal and of so-
ciety as a fair system of cooperation over time. The argument from the original 
position exhibits this line of thought. Autonomy is a matter of how the view pre-
sents the political values as ordered. […] A view is autonomous, then, because in 
its represented order the political values of justice and public reason (expressed by 
its principles) are not simply presented as moral requirements externally imposed. 
Nor are they required of us by other citizens whose comprehensive doctrines we 
do not accept. Rather citizens can understand those values as based on their prac-
                                                        
489 Ibid. 90. 
490 Ibid. 94. 
491 Ibid. 93. 
492 Ibid. 94. 
493 Ibid. 90. Emphasis added. 
494 Ibid. 95. 
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tical reason in union with the political conceptions of citizens as free and equal 
and of society as a system of fair cooperation.’495 
Secondly, when citizens honour those politically-constructed principles of justice, they can 
be said to be politically autonomous, that is, autonomous ‘in a way compatible with their rea-
sonable comprehensive doctrines.’496 In few words, political constructivism works out a polit-
ical conception that can be the focus of an overlapping consensus because of its being politi-
cal in a way that reasonable persons can endorse. Then, apparently, reasonableness plays its 
role both during political justification (e.g., through the idea of the veil of ignorance in the 
original position) and in making an overlapping consensus possible. But, as we have seen, for 
a comprehensive doctrine to take part in an overlapping consensus, it must fully justify the 
political conception. In the overlapping consensus the practical reason of citizens qua mem-
bers of different comprehensive doctrines must converge (on the basis of their different full 
justifications) on the conception of justice politically justified by the exercise of practical rea-
son of citizens qua citizens. Then, the principles of practical reason applied in full justifica-
tion cannot radically contradict the principles of practical reason applied in the political justi-
fication of the political conception. Otherwise the comprehensive doctrine could not ‘support 
a reasonable balance of political values’ and it would ‘run afoul of public reason.’497 I call it 
“the problem of double exercise of practical reason.” As I have argued, this problem is solved 
by a “unified” account of political reasonableness. It implies that, as reasonable persons, our 
practical reasoning in fully justifying a conception of justice cannot be completely unintelligi-
ble to other reasonable persons, since reasonableness requires that our common practical rea-
soning is able to justify the same political conception and its political values politically. In 
few words, this account of political reasonableness is “unified” because it “covers” and guides 
practical reason both in the political and in the full justification of the political conception of 
justice. When political values are at stake, then, a reasonable exercise of practical reason in-
volves the application of practical reason to such values within reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines being intelligible to outsiders as reasonable persons. To be sure, Rawls openly states 
that the political justification in the original position is a ‘hypothetical and non-historical’ sit-
                                                        
495 Ibid. 98. 
496 Ibid. 90. 
497 Ibid. 243 and 253. 
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uation.498 So, one might say, not each person is actually supposed to give a political justifica-
tion and, for those who do not do that, the problem of the double exercise of practical reason 
would not arise. The answer to this objection is that it neglects the real meaning of Rawls’s 
social contract. Even if the initial agreement is only hypothetical, such a ‘device of represen-
tation’499 is conceived to set the appropriate conditions for the initial agreement. Here, the 
reasonable ‘is represented by the various restrictions to which the parties are subject in the 
original position and by the conditions imposed on their agreement.’500 In Rawls’s social con-
tract theory, reasonableness is required for grounding the publicity of the rational agreement 
between free equals:  
‘[J]ust as the validity of a contract does not turn solely on the terms agreed to, 
but also on the fact of agreement, so justice consists in more than the proper dis-
tribution of rights and assets. Principles of justice should also be public, each of 
us affirming them in light of the fact that others affirm them too. More is neces-
sary […] than just a scheme of distributive justice, even one that each of us has 
reason to endorse. Equally important is the publicity of its defining principles –
that our reason for accepting them turns on others having reason to accept them 
too. […] The contractarian metaphor has the merit of combining in a single image 
two essential conditions which the principles of justice should satisfy –their justi-
fiability to reason and their publicity.’501  
In this way, in the original position both persons’ moral powers are represented: the ca-
pacity for a conception of the good (the rationality of the parties) and the capacity for a sense 
of justice (the reasonableness embedded in the restrictions imposed by the veil of ignorance). 
Reasonableness is the sine qua non condition for the publicity of the agreement reached by 
free and equal citizens and it allows citizens to justify a politically reasonable public concep-
tion of justice. Then, hypothetical or not, the kind of justification sketched out in the original 
position can be reached by reasonable persons. Consequently, the question of what I have 
                                                        
498 Ibid. 271-275. 
499 Ibid. 24. 
500 Ibid. 305. 
501 Charles Larmore, “Public Reason,” 370-371. 
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called the double exercise of practical reason arises from the very fact of being reasonable 
(and, then, able to give a proper public justification): reasonable persons are able to justify a 
conception of justice both politically and fully. As a consequence of this, it can be argued that 
the principles of practical reason used by reasonable members of a comprehensive doctrine to 
balance political and non-political values should be at least intelligible to reasonable outsid-
ers. Reasonableness entails a certain degree of “consistency” (at least understood as “non-
incommensurability”) between these two exercises of practical reason by reasonable persons. 
If those two exercises of practical reason were absolutely incommensurable and one of them 
(the one concerning the full justification within a particular comprehensive doctrine) were un-
intelligible to politically reasonable outsiders, how could another politically reasonable per-
son (the insider) perform both of them? Unity of practical reason is assured by the fact that 
both exercises are equally performed by politically reasonable persons, as citizens who pro-
vide a political justification for a conception of justice and as members of a particular com-
prehensive doctrine who try to fully justify that conception. In this sense, reasonableness par-
tially “discloses” the exercise of practical reason within one’s comprehensive doctrine when it 
deals with political values. The crucial point is that for the rest it could easily (and reasona-
bly) be the case that a comprehensive doctrine is unintelligible to outsiders (because political 
reasonableness is not concerned). However, when it comes to settling political values within a 
reasonable comprehensive doctrine, the way in which the latter does so must be to some de-
gree intelligible to reasonable persons: we could say that for insiders the way in which a rea-
sonable comprehensive doctrine does this is shared knowledge and goes much beyond mere 
political intelligibility, while for outsiders it must be at least politically intelligible. But for 
political liberalism this is what is required. Since reasonableness requires that reasonable citi-
zens are able to order political values through practical reason (and the above-mentioned po-
litical conceptions), this fact involves reasonable citizens sharing politically reasonable prin-
ciples of practical reason in dealing with political values. Those principles, then, are common 
to both insiders and outsiders as reasonable persons. Then, reasonableness is a political vir-
tue502 that should be displayed in working out a political justification and which is latently 
traceable in the capacity for achieving a full justification. Practically, this means that reasona-
ble outsiders must reasonably be able to know if a full justification is achieved (not necessari-
ly the details of why and how it is achieved, since political liberalism leaves the “why and 
                                                        
502 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, for instance 224. 
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how” question to adherents,503 apart from the –limited– case of conjecture). I think this is a 
fundamental element of stability for the right reasons. Remember that such a stability occurs 
when:504 1) society’s basic structure is effectively regulated by the most reasonable political 
conception of justice; 2) such a political conception is endorsed through an overlapping con-
sensus of all reasonable comprehensive doctrines; and 3) public political discussions about 
fundamental political questions are nearly always decided on the basis of public reasons. 
Then, if we want to know whether our society is stable for the right reasons, we must know if 
an overlapping consensus is present. In order to know that, however, we must know whether a 
given comprehensive doctrine takes part in that consensus or not. Furthermore, if a full justi-
fication of the political conception does not occur, outsiders must be able to understand which 
comprehensive values have the priority over the political ones. Moreover, only if the basic 
functioning of practical reasoning within the comprehensive doctrine is intelligible to outsid-
ers can they know whether reasoning from conjecture is possible. If this is the case, they can 
try to present other reasons to adherents of the specific comprehensive doctrine, so that they 
can give a full justification of the political conception. If a full justification is not possible at 
all (because comprehensive values irreparably conflict with political values), then the com-
prehensive doctrine is not reasonable.505 However, in the absence of a full justification,506 
there could be a third case, namely the case of the alleged complete political unintelligibility 
of the comprehensive doctrine to outsiders. But, if practical political reasoning within the 
comprehensive doctrine were completely unintelligible to outsiders and they were completely 
unable to understand where the conflict between the comprehensive doctrine and the political 
conception arose, the primacy of such “unintelligible” comprehensive values could not be 
plausibly justified to outsiders (that is, to other citizens): simply, they could not recognise 
such a doctrine as politically reasonable. In my understanding, however, even if the conclu-
sion is the same in the second and in the third case (namely, that the doctrine is politically un-
reasonable), in the third case there is an additional element which is morally and politically 
                                                        
503 See, for instance, John Rawls, “Reply to Habermas,” 386. 
504 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, xlvii and “Reply to Habermas,” 391. 
505 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, for example 243 and 253. 
506 Only in the absence of a full justification does the unintelligibility problem raise a question of reasonableness. If a 
full justification is successfully provided, we must assume that there is no fundamental conflict between the practical 
reasoning exercised in the pro tanto justification and the practical reasoning exercised during the full justification. 
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relevant: the denial of the capacity for a common (reasonable) exercise of practical political 
reasoning is allegedly embedded in the very essence of the comprehensive doctrine, and not 
simply in one of the arguments derived from it. For this reason, I call this case “ontological 
unreasonableness:” a doctrine is ontologically unreasonable if its members deny from the very 
beginning and because of its very nature any possibility of approaching it in terms of political 
reasonableness and justification. This is not to say that political liberalism passes judgment on 
an ontological question, namely, the ontological status of a particular comprehensive doctrine. 
Such a judgment would go beyond the domain of the political. Instead, the notion of ontologi-
cal unreasonableness refers to the political consequences of what the same members of that 
particular comprehensive doctrine say about it, that is, that its political stance is absolutely in-
accessible to reasonable outsiders. Therefore, ontological unreasonableness is only a particu-
lar case of political unreasonableness: it simply discloses the grounds on which the members 
of a particular doctrine locate the source of what other citizens can define political unreasona-
bleness. I summarise these ideal-typical cases in Figure 4. In few words, as I have said, in my 
understanding the idea of reasonableness partially “discloses” the exercise of practical reason 
within comprehensive doctrines for ordering and balancing political and non-political values, 
at least as a threshold of minimum intelligibility when political values are at stake. I will re-
turn to intelligibility in 4.2, and to ontological unreasonableness in 6.2. 
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Figure 4: Reasonableness, full justification, and intelligibility. 
 
 
Coming back to the concept of conjecture, one can observe that several recent works in po-
litical philosophy refer to conjecture as a suitable method for settling alleged conflicts be-
tween the content of a liberal political conception and comprehensive doctrines. This effort 
focuses on different issues (citizenship, human rights, health policies, and so on) and different 
–mainly religious– comprehensive doctrines (not only Islam, but also Christian conservatism, 
Confucianism, and so on).507 For methodological purposes, I discuss March’s approach, for it 
openly considers some important issues at stake in practising justificatory comparative politi-
cal theory. In the light of such considerations, I will be able to explain my justificatory evalu-
ative method. 
                                                        
507 For the following relations, I give just few prominent examples. For Islam and citizenship, see Andrew F. March, 
mainly: Islam and Liberal Citizenship; “Islamic Foundations for a Social Contract in non-Muslims Liberal Democra-
cies,” The American Political Science Review 101, no. 2 (2007), 235-252; “Liberal Citizenship and the Search of an 
Overlapping Consensus: The Case of Muslim Minorities,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 34, no. 4 (2006), 373-421. For 
Islam and Confucianism on the one hand and human rights on the other, see Joshua Cohen, “Minimalism About Human 
Rights: The Most We Can Hope For?,” in particular 202-210. For Christianity and safe sex policies, see Robert S. Tay-
lor, “Religious Conservatives and Safe Sex: Reconciliation by Nonpublic Reason,” American Political Thought 3, no. 2 
(2014), 322-340.  
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2.2.C March’s Conjecture. 
In light of the previous considerations concerning comparative political theory and conjec-
ture, I can now make explicit the role of conjecture as a comparative justificatory project.508 
In a recent article, March remarks that ‘there has been a steady increase in the visibility of 
comparative political theory in the field of political science.’509 Having provided a wide over-
view of recent calls to expand the field of comparative political theory,510 March elucidates 
the two underlying assumptions that characterise any project of comparative political theo-
ry.511 The first assumption is the existence of a ‘specific common object of inquiry.’ Compar-
ative political theory does not aim at a juxtaposition or ‘zoological cataloguing’ of writers, 
texts, theories, arguments, or concepts belonging to different traditions, cultures, or religions. 
Rather:  
‘Meaningful and interesting comparative work […] aims at a specific problem 
or question that is illuminated through multiple examples (“How is liberty pro-
tected through institutions? How is it protected through moeurs?” [...]). Or per-
haps there is a single concept, practice, or phenomenon (liberalism, imperialism, 
democracy, sovereignty, constitutionalism, marriage) about which we know more 
and about which we ask new questions by examining multiple instances of it.’512 
The second assumption is that the compared entities are distinct. A comparative political 
theorist should be able to identify relevant features that distinguish her objects, so that com-
parison ‘is not only possible but meaningful.’ That is, ‘[f]or comparison itself to be the main 
                                                        
508 Such a definition of conjecture should not be read as reducing comparison to a merely instrumental task. Instead, 
within conjecture justification can be achieved by virtue of comparison.  
509 Andrew F. March, “What is Comparative Political Theory?,” 531. 
510 Ibid. 531-532, in particular note 2. See also 538-543. 
511 For the following points, see ibid. 537. 
512 Ibid. March interestingly argues that: ‘[c]omparison must be, in the first place, a method, not just an expedient term 
vaguely suggesting the focus of one’s research interests (e.g., non-Western texts) or substantive concerns and commit-
ments (e.g., critiquing Western hegemony). Those foci and substantive concerns may be legitimate and important, but 
they need not amount to a distinctively comparative method. […] The two most intuitive ways in which political theory 
might globalize itself and undermine hegemonic institutions would be some form of global Habermasian ideal-speech 
situation or a more radical perpetual critique from the perspective of the world’s dominated populations. Neither of 
those, however, is particularly comparative and, I suggest, may in fact run directly against some of the assumptions of 
comparative political theory.’ Ibid. 
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methodological tool, there have to be not only distinct units, but their differences also have to 
be somehow enduring and generative of knowledge or insights greater than what is derived 
from treating them in noncomparative ways.’513  
Later, March points out five mainstream accounts of the purposes and justifications of 
comparative political theory.514 Such accounts largely represent an analytic development of 
the considerations I have sketched in 2.2.a. The first justification of comparative political the-
ory is an epistemic one. If one assumes that political theory is about universal human dilem-
mas and not merely about Western concerns, political theory should be comparative, for it 
‘can make no claims for [the universality of its questions and concepts] without including 
non-Western perspectives.’515 In this perspective, the central issue is ‘the epistemic value in 
encountering the alien.’516 Such a claim could be discerned in Fred Dallmayr’s call ‘to move 
toward a more genuine universalism, and beyond the spurious “universality” traditionally 
claimed by the Western canon.’517 Secondly, comparative political theory is frequently justi-
fied on ‘global-democratic’ bases. The main argument of such a view proceeds as follows: 
‘[i]f the most important questions of contemporary political philosophy are themselves of a 
global nature, how could a “planetary political philosophy” (as Dallmayr calls it) proceed ex-
cept by including a planet’s worth of theoretical perspectives?’518 A further argument for 
comparative political theory is grounded in its ‘critical-transformative’ role. According to this 
perspective, Western questions, concepts, arguments, and frames cannot be extended unprob-
lematically to non-Western contexts. This ‘is not just mistaken but is an act of hegemony and 
domination that ought to be counteracted by exploring the ways in which non-Western think-
                                                        
513 Ibid. 
514 Ibid. 538-546. 
515 Ibid. 539. 
516 Ibid. 
517 Fred Dallmayr, “Beyond Monologue: For a Comparative Political Theory,” 253.  
518 Andrew F. March, “What is Comparative Political Theory?,” 540. He quotes Fred Dallmayr, for instance, “Beyond 
Monologue: For a Comparative Political Theory,” 251. 
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ers discuss political questions.’519 A fourth justification for comparative political theory is that 
it ‘illuminates common problems at the intersection of political theory and comparative poli-
tics.’520 So, for example, one might try to understand the problem of political sovereignty 
through the analysis of Sayyid Qutb’s conception of sovereignty and argue that ‘inasmuch as 
Qutb is engaged with questions about legitimacy of political authority and the moral founda-
tions of political communities, he is something of a “political theorist”.’521 A final source of 
justification for comparative political theory lies in a “rehabilitative” effort: ‘[t]he point here 
is not so much to justify a given norm or practice […] by showing that it can be affirmed by 
multiple traditions […], but to rehabilitate a non-Western tradition or trend by showing that it 
is less alien or hostile than its crudest opponents charge.’522 For instance, Roxanne Euben has 
argued that Islamic fundamentalism is not so much a ‘premodern, antimodern, or postmodern 
phenomenon,’ but it is ‘part of a transcultural and multi vocal reassessment of the value and 
definition of modernity’ in order to ‘simultaneously abolish, transcend, preserve and trans-
form it,’523 so that ‘Islamic fundamentalist political thought […] is part of an ongoing […] 
critique of modernity and rationalism in particular, a critique which Westerners not only rec-
ognize but in which we participate.’524 
March openly calls into question some unreflective tenets of those five motivations under-
pinning a great part of comparative political theory literature. The following quotation is rep-
resentative of the problems raised by these approaches: 
‘Some common tropes or implications are that it is enough for comparative po-
litical theory to point to the mere existence of moral disagreement […]. Or that it 
                                                        
519 Andrew F. March, “What is Comparative Political Theory?,” 541. For an example, see Fred Dallmayr, “Beyond 
Monologue: For a Comparative Political Theory,” 249: ‘[i]n contrast to hegemonic and imperialist modes of theorizing, 
the term [comparative political theory] implies that one segment of the world’s population cannot monopolize the lan-
guage or idiom of the emerging […] global civil society.’ 
520 Andrew F. March, “What is Comparative Political Theory?,” 541. 
521 Roxanne Leslie Euben, “Comparative Political Theory: An Islamic Fundamentalist Critique of Rationalism,” The 
Journal of Politics 59, no. 1 (1997), 32.  
522 Andrew F. March, “What is Comparative Political Theory?,” 542. 
523 Roxanne Leslie Euben, “Premodern, Antimodern or Postmodern? Islamic and Western Critiques of Modernity,” The 
Review of Politics 59, no. 3 (1997), 429. 
524 Ibid. 436. 
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is enough in scholarly terms to demonstrate or suggest that a value-conflict can be 
“understood as” a challenge to existing liberal or secular norms, or to demonstrate 
(note: to fellow Westerners) that some religious or cultural tradition or civilization 
is somehow more complex or polyvalent than the most simplistic caricatures of 
that tradition. Yet, it is not always explained whether comparative political theory 
calls for us to read non-Western authors and examine non-Western views the way 
we are entitled to read and study Western ones (critically, unsentimentally, and 
even disrespectfully if we so wish), or whether their “alien” status requires that 
we treat them differently –with both more, and thus less, respect. […] Non-
Western texts are thus both asserted to be in a dialogue with us but also assumed 
to have to be treated in their own terms. There is a hint that we may have some-
thing to learn from this or that writer being discussed, but often the claim goes no 
further than that he or she is merely evidence of the existence of a certain debate. 
Thus, a great irony […] is that non-Western texts are often not given enough 
weight in the sense of not being seen as eligible for the same critical rejection as a 
Western one would […]. However, they are also often given too much weight in 
the sense of being called on to represent a certain civilization’s, culture’s, or reli-
gion’s difference from (and/or similarity with) so-called Western values.’525 
The main point is that often the existence of moral disagreement is merely acknowledged, 
more or less taken for granted, and that ‘the simple fact of disagreement serves to render ex-
isting norms problematic.’526 But it is not clear how such a disagreement should be “man-
aged” or reconciled. This is a ‘dilemma for comparative political theory: [i]t wants to be rele-
vant, which it achieves by directing itself to important normative disputes. But when the task 
is bringing to light poorly understood moral perspectives on normative disputes that oppose 
dominant Western views […], comparative political theory is often not quite sure what to 
say.’527 Therefore, March’s central claim is that comparative political theory, as an ‘engaged 
activity,’528 should be primarily and openly concerned with political value-conflicts.529 Thus, 
                                                        
525 Andrew F. March, “What is Comparative Political Theory?,” 545-546. 
526 Ibid. 545. 
527 Ibid. 551. 
528 On the distinction between political theory as a ‘scholarly activity’ and as an ‘engaged activity,’ see ibid. 534-535. 
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comparative political theory is engaged because it deals with moral disagreement, but how is 
it comparative? ‘What makes a text, thinker, or tradition “alien”, thus justifying treating an in-
stance of moral disagreement as a problem for comparative political theory?’530 In other 
words, where could comparative political theory find the element of crucial distinction on 
which its comparative exercise may be grounded? March argues that comparative political 
theory is interested in ‘the dispute between two fairly autonomous, more or less identifiable 
traditions of thought,’531 and that what makes a tradition of thought autonomous is the fact 
that it has autonomous (original, originating, and independent) sources of authority: 
‘Traditions of thought are not identified just by their conflicting substantive 
value commitments (such as what characterizes conflicts between liberals, liber-
tarians, Marxists, feminists, and conservatives), but by their mutually incompati-
ble (possibly incomprehensible) sources of authority. An ideal-typical definition 
of two distinct traditions of thought would be that the adherents of one do not re-
gard adherents of the other as part of a common community of moral argumenta-
tion. This is different from regarding others as wrong (as liberals and Marxists 
might hold of one another on many matters); the condition I am describing is one 
where the moral other is not regarded as endorsing the same basic truth claims, 
systems of proof (authority), or moral language such that she could be regarded as 
even within a broad common community of mutual justification.’532 
Understandably, as the main concern of comparative political theory March has in mind 
the moral disagreement arising from what Rawls calls the fact of reasonable pluralism. In 
such a condition, political theory is urged to solve the problem of a “common” justification 
between doctrines that radically differ with reference to their sources of authority and truth 
claims. According to March, comparative political theory is politically engaged in this sense. 
Since ‘there are normative proposals for terms of social cooperation both in domestic and 
global contexts that meet with principled objection from various and mutually incompatible 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
529 ‘Clearly, our engaged comparative interest in non-Western political thought arises largely out of a concern with (po-
litical) value-conflict.’ Ibid. 550. 
530 Ibid. 552. 
531 Ibid. 554. 
532 Ibid. 
  
 European Muslims and Liberal Citizenship 
Ph.D. Thesis successfully discussed on April 21, 2016.  
The total or partial use of the Ph.D. Thesis is subject to copyright restrictions. 
 
  
169  
 Giovanni Vezzani 
 
LUISS-ULB 
moral traditions,’ he believes ‘the main impetus in existing calls for a “comparative political 
theory” to be of a moral, justificatory nature.’533 As I have explained, from the standpoint of 
political liberalism, one way to solve the problem of public justification (through facilitating 
full justification) is reasoning from conjecture, that is, reasoning comparatively –with the 
stipulations I have outlined. Consequently, for March ‘comparative political theory may be 
conceived as “justificatory” comparative political theory.’534 Concisely, the strongest argu-
ment in favour of comparative political theory is the problem of moral conflict and justifica-
tion. I call it the “justificatory justification” of comparative political theory. The latter (under-
stood as conjecture) compares relatively autonomous (mainly religious)535 comprehensive 
doctrines as traditions of moral argumentation with their own mutually incompatible sources 
of authority. The final aim of the comparative method in political theory is to find –if possi-
ble– some basis for a common (public) justification. 
                                                        
533 Ibid. 565. Emphasis added. 
534 Ibid. 560. Emphasis added. 
535 Ibid. 552. 
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How do we compare, then? Let me briefly expose March’s reasoning from conjecture as 
justificatory comparative political theory.536 If every comparative method requires a relevant 
distinction between the comparanda, and if we agree that such a distinction can be grounded 
in the autonomy of the sources of moral argumentation upon which each comparandum con-
stitutes itself as a community of moral argumentation, then it logically follows that the com-
parative political theorist should firstly consider the most orthodox sources. March calls it the 
‘canon first’ principle.537 ‘Epistemic communities develop more or less authoritative bodies 
of doctrines, and outside interpreters should strive to conjecture first from within the more au-
thoritative sources.’538 March presents different reasons for adopting this principle.539 He 
takes into account two moral considerations. The conjecturer’s humility requires that she 
‘should strive to make arguments based on sources, values, and principles that [her] interlocu-
tor is most likely to regard as authoritative because this takes her tradition more seriously than 
if [the conjecturer] first referred to sources or values in which she would probably have less 
trust.’ Second, although authoritative sources might convey particular interests, the conjectur-
                                                        
536 Here I cannot analyse March’s methodological discussion in its entirety: see Islam and Liberal Citizenship, 65-96. In 
particular, I focus only on the main principle of his approach, the ‘canon first’ principle. Three other principles are men-
tioned (76-77): the principle of ‘transparency’ (‘not to exaggerate the authority or intellectual force of evidence one 
finds in favor of compatibility, or being “transparent” in one’s recognition of the contingent nature of consensus’), the 
principle of ‘sympathy’ (‘we assume that our interlocutors or sources […] are sincere in their defense of their values 
and that specific positions or maxims are part of an overall conception of value. The principle of sympathy requires thus 
that we display an understanding of the context in which statements of value or norms are made, the relative importance 
of various norms, and the necessity of using language in different ways’), and the principle of ‘restraint’ (one should 
‘accept from the outset that negative results are also a form of results and that much can still be gained from the process 
of achieving them,’ so that ‘one’s relative credibility can be preserved’). Moreover, here I refer only to the ‘diagnostic 
stage’ of conjecture (see below in the text), but in addition to the latter two other stages are required: the evaluative 
stage and the synthetic stage (ibid. 77-79). In the second evaluative stage of conjecture, we analyse ‘those views [the 
views that are apparently conducive to an overlapping consensus from within a comprehensive doctrine] in terms of the 
nature of their reasoning and argumentation in an attempt to judge whether the underlying foundation for those views 
merits accepting them as principled and stable arguments for accepting liberal terms of social cooperation.’ Finally, in 
the third synthetic stage of conjecture, we try to present ‘as a coherent overall “doctrine of citizenship” or “overlapping 
consensus” a series of arguments or positions drawn from a variety of sources, scholars, and time periods. […] What the 
conjecturer is trying to show is that for any given question, a principled and also authentic and plausible affirmation can 
be given from within the ethical doctrine. The aspiration is that an individual adherent of the doctrine who is also a cit-
izen of a liberal democracy could in good faith articulate a general doctrine of citizenship based on the synthesis of a 
variety of positions’ (emphasis added). Finally, I do not discuss March’s considerations about the depth (degree of 
‘flexibility’ required for analysing ‘how Muslims come to terms with the requirements of liberal citizenship in their 
own language’) and level of detail (level of precision of the points on which an overlapping consensus should be 
reached) for an overlapping consensus (see ibid. 93-95). March argues that we need both a high flexibility and a high 
level of precision in analysing if and how an overlapping consensus can be reached. 
537 Ibid. 73. 
538 Ibid. 
539 For what follows, see ibid. 74. 
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er must ‘assume that they represent the most concerted and sincere intellectual effort to un-
derstand, in this case, texts considered divinely revealed.’ Moreover, there is a third –
pragmatic– reason for beginning with the most authoritative sources: if the conjecturer has ‘an 
interest in meaningful and effective exchange with moral contemporaries, […] that is best 
achieved by mastering their ethical language in the way they speak it, rather than referring to 
more eccentric dialects.’  
The ‘canon first’ principle is part of a wider logic underlying the meaning of reasoning 
from conjecture. Since the ‘conjecturer’s job is not to create Islamic arguments but to find 
them and analyze them in terms of their nature as reasons for action,’540 the conjecturer’s ‘as-
piration is to give good reasons, that is, plausible reasons [one] think[s] can withstand open 
scrutiny within a discursive community.’541 Since it would be (too) difficult to argue that the 
aim of conjecture is to show that truly Islamic arguments support a liberal political concep-
tion,542 the conjecturer should show that there are plausible Islamic arguments that could sup-
port such a conception: 
‘[T]he first aim or principle of conjecture (justificatory comparative political 
theory) is not truth, or even support for liberal principles per se, but “plausibility”. 
We are aspiring to the most plausible interpretation of an ethical or cultural tradi-
tion, in the sense of preserving what are generally held to be the most constitutive 
elements of that tradition –what makes that tradition that tradition and not another 
one– that still allows us to arrive to some sort of consensus.’543 
                                                        
540 Ibid. 83. 
541 Ibid. 70. 
542 March pinpoints three possible objections to conjecture that are more or less grounded in this point (ibid. 67-68). A 
‘religious integrity objection’ (religious doctrines are different from secular ones and conjecture is either factually im-
possible or disrespectful), a ‘banality objection’ (it is always possible to find reinterpretations of religious doctrines, in-
cluding interpretations that are potentially conducive to an overlapping consensus; so it is not surprising that we can 
find an Islamic doctrine of citizenship consistent with liberal democracy), and a ‘polyvalent traditions objection’ (in 
each religious tradition, there are many diverse patterns, trends, and schools and it is not possible to find a single “true” 
Islamic doctrine of citizenship). 
543 Ibid. 68.  
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How can we measure plausibility? March maintains that it can be measured ‘only in terms 
of the reception of a given claim by the discursive community toward which it is directed.’544 
For example, conjecturer’s claims about the possibility of an overlapping consensus are di-
rected toward several discursive communities: liberal citizens, ‘Muslim religious authorities, 
non-Muslim experts on Islam, and conscientious lay Muslims.’545 Thus, the plausibility of her 
claims can be measured by the ‘relative acceptance of such a proposal by members of each of 
those four main discursive communities.’546 Then, with regard to Muslims, conjecturer’s ar-
guments are plausible to the ‘extent to which persons who might find the objections to liberal 
citizenship compelling might also find compelling the efforts to mitigate those objections.’547 
However, March observes, the ‘canon first’ principle apparently exacerbates the ‘paradox 
of comparative ethics,’ as he calls it: ‘[o]n the one hand, we begin with different ethical tradi-
tions that have disagreements, and on the other, we are trying to find ground for agreement. 
If, on the one hand, there is no disagreement worth bridging, then the venture is uninteresting 
and banal, yet if there is no bridging of disagreements, then the venture is futile.’548 But if we 
agree on the ‘canon first’ principle, we should begin by considering the sources that are less 
likely to permit a ‘bridging,’ that is, to present arguments in the direction of a full justification 
of and an overlapping consensus on a liberal political conception. This is precisely because 
‘the operational standard’ for a conjecturer to identify the most relevant sources is to ‘begin 
with doctrines, traditions, patterns of thought, or arguments that represent the point of conflict 
or moral disagreement with political liberalism.’549 Nevertheless, March argues that ‘one must 
first examine and present the more “orthodox” views, if only to better understand the contours 
of the ethical dispute.’550 Thus, the most orthodox views may be especially important in a ‘di-
                                                        
544 Ibid. 
545 Ibid. 
546 Ibid. 69. 
547 Ibid. 95. 
548 Ibid. 74. 
549 Ibid. 85. 
550 Ibid. 75. 
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agnostic stage,’551 when we try to make ‘transparent the range of views, and reasons for those 
views, from within an ethical tradition that serve to reject liberal terms of social coopera-
tion.’552 However, at a second level of the diagnostic stage, we should search for views that 
lead to accept (from within the comprehensive doctrine) the liberal political conception, since 
full justification is the final ambition of reasoning from conjecture. Thus, if we are able to 
find such justificatory views within the most orthodox sources, we can present stronger argu-
ments to the members of that comprehensive doctrine. But if we cannot find such arguments 
within the most orthodox sources, we can gradually turn to less orthodox sources, which are 
more likely to provide arguments toward an overlapping consensus: 
‘However, it is expected that the more orthodox sources will often fail to pro-
vide the resources for an overlapping consensus. At this point, one ought to retreat 
gradually to other sources from within an ethical tradition that are arguing for po-
sitions more conducive to an overlapping consensus. By way of a metaphor, we 
might imagine this as peeling an onion. We thus begin with those “conservative” 
sources that provide the points of contact and disagreement and seek points of 
consensus or congruence as close to them as possible. When one discourse, genre, 
or tradition, shows no resources for consensus, we peel back one layer of the on-
ion (as it were) at a time in search for compatibility, rather than rushing right to 
the most reformist or transformative discourses, that is, those most appealing to a 
popular liberal conscience.’553 
The ‘canon first’ principle serves a fundamental purpose of conjecture: the conjecturer 
should rigorously reason from within the comprehensive doctrine, so that her arguments could 
be regarded as authentically internal to that doctrine. Since reasoning from conjecture aims at 
full justification, it is essential that conjecturer’s arguments sound authentic and genuine. This 
entails that, for example, the conjecturer should stay as close as possible to the most orthodox 
Islamic views, so that Muslims can regard conjecturer’s arguments as authentically Islamic 
(that is, as arguments properly worked out from sources that are genuinely Islamic). In 
March’s words:  
                                                        
551 Ibid. 77-78. 
552 Ibid. 78. 
553 Ibid. 75. 
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‘Ibn Khaldun, Averroës, and al-Farabi may be geniuses writing within Islamic 
civilization, but we do not read their masterpieces as orthodox expressions of Is-
lamic commitments. That “Farabi said so” is not an argument likely to move a pi-
ous Muslim believer. Al-Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyya, on the other hand, may rep-
resent the apex of medieval Islamic thought on par with Ibn Khaldun and al-
Farabi in terms of sophistication but do so from within mainstream Islamic theol-
ogy and jurisprudence.’554 
Significantly, March adds: 
‘[T]his is an important principle if this form of justificatory comparative ethics 
is going to avoid the pitfalls into which most public and popular discussions of the 
“compatibility of Islam and x” fall. There is no shortage of “liberal” or “moder-
ate” Muslim intellectuals. […] Thus, if comparative ethics is going to be doing 
something more interesting, revealing, and challenging than merely pointing to 
the fact that some persons with Muslim names are perfectly capable of presenting 
arguments for the compatibility of Islam and liberalism, it must take seriously the 
sources of moral disagreement and ask cautiously and seriously what is involved 
Islamically in such disagreement being transcended. Thus, if this study puts an in-
ordinate emphasis on a conservative mode of Islamic belief and practice, it is not 
because I regard that mode as more legitimate but rather because it is that mode 
that both has a widespread claim to internal orthodoxy and presents the deepest 
moral challenge to liberalism.’555 
This point is crucial to understanding the methodological difference between conjecture (as 
justificatory comparative political theory) and justificatory evaluative political theory. The 
latter is analysed in the following section, but here I must emphasise that conjecture requires 
that we (as conjecturers) argue from a standpoint that is as close and internal to the genuine or 
authentic tradition as possible, so that we can exhibit genuinely –for instance– Islamic argu-
ments for justifying a liberal political conception of justice. Only these kinds of arguments 
and reasons can motivate Muslims as faithful believers to endorse such a conception, to fully 
justify it, and to join the overlapping consensus. On the contrary, justificatory evaluative po-
                                                        
554 Andrew F. March, “What is Comparative Political Theory?,” 556. 
555 Andrew F. March, Islam and Liberal Citizenship, 75. Italics in the original. 
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litical theory is not so much concerned with the Islamic authenticity and genuineness of the 
arguments presented, because its focus is not on the process of full justification. Rather, its 
focus is on Muslim citizens’ attitude toward the requirements of public justification (notably, 
the idea of public reason). Justificatory evaluative political theory does not ask ‘what is in-
volved Islamically’ in reconciling moral disagreement. Rather, it asks what is involved for cit-
izens in the idea of public justification and honouring the ideal of public reason. The two 
questions are quite close because, at the end, the reconciliation of moral disagreement 
(March’s goal) is conducive to public justification. But there are important differences if we 
consider the respective objects, approaches, and aims. These differences will become clear in 
the following section. 
 
2.3 Justificatory Evaluative Political Theory. 
 
So far in this chapter, I have: a) reconstructed the main points of the idea of justification 
from Rawls’s perspective, and b) analysed a well-known way (i.e., conjecture) in which polit-
ical liberalism can “enter” into comprehensive doctrines. With reference to the last point, I 
have considered conjecture as a justificatory comparative approach to the issue of establishing 
Islamic grounds for achieving a justification of a political conception of liberal citizenship. 
From the very beginning of this chapter, however, I have made clear that I am not arguing 
from conjecture. My object is not a “genuinely Islamic” argumentation in favour of a liberal 
political conception of citizenship, nor does my study aim to “support” Muslim believers in 
their full justification of that conception. Rather, I am trying to work out a new approach from 
within a political liberal perspective for analysing the question of Muslims’ citizenship in a 
liberal democracy. Therefore, previous considerations about conjecture aim to bring out the 
main features of my approach. 
From my perspective, then, the problem is not a historical reconstruction of the notion of 
Islamic citizenship, nor of Muslims’ citizenship in the context of modern nation-states.556 
Nor, as emphasised in the first chapter, am I concerned with a quasi-sociological account of 
                                                        
556 For a recent analysis of these concepts, see Gianluca P. Parolin, Citizenship in the Arab World: Kin, Religion and 
Nation-State (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009). 
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Muslims’ status in contemporary European countries. My point is specifically a normative 
one. I am concerned with framing Muslims’ citizenship in European societies from a political 
liberal viewpoint. From such a perspective, I do not consider the issue of how an Islamic jus-
tification of liberal citizenship should or could be established. Rather, I firstly aim to point 
out what evaluative requirements are involved in the idea of public justification. More accu-
rately, my evaluative approach strives to take into consideration the question of how the justi-
fication produced by European Muslims relates to the liberal standards of public justification 
and how, then, the ideal of public reason is honoured. I presented public justification as a re-
sult of an overlapping consensus. Thus, one might ask, can we say that something like a spe-
cific kind of public justification is required by a political liberal perspective grounded in 
(among other things) the idea of an overlapping consensus? Now remember what an overlap-
ping consensus is (2.1). It is not an average between existing comprehensive doctrines, and it 
is different from a modus vivendi because ‘it is moral in its object and motivation.’557 Its de-
fining feature is that it occurs between reasonable doctrines affirmed by reasonable persons 
who, among other things, want to offer and abide by fair terms of social cooperation on recip-
rocal bases. Thus, an overlapping consensus must provide an adequate (from the perspective 
of political liberalism) basis for public justification. A necessary condition for an overlapping 
consensus to occur is that, obviously, each doctrine participating in it justifies the same politi-
cal conception. To be able to be part of a public justification, the conception of citizenship 
justified from within each comprehensive doctrine (in the full justification) must consistently 
embed the standards of public justification included in the political conception. Otherwise 
there is not, strictly speaking, an adequate full justification, that is a full justification condu-
cive to an overlapping consensus. The overlapping consensus must bear on the ‘agreement on 
the guidelines for public inquiry and on the criteria as to what kind of information and 
knowledge is relevant in discussing political questions, at least when these involve constitu-
tional essentials and questions of basic justice. […] Otherwise the political conception does 
not provide a basis of political legitimacy.’558 So far, nothing new. 
However, the central claim of this research is that we can analyse the problem stated in 
chapter one precisely from such a public perspective. While a conjecturer may say how a po-
                                                        
557 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, xli. 
558 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 89-90. 
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litical conception –including a conception of public reason− is (fully) justified from an Islam-
ic standpoint, my thesis is that contemporary concerns about Muslims’ citizenship in Europe 
may be better answered by starting from that public perspective. Since they are public, we can 
start from the standards of public reasoning without previously addressing the question of 
their congruence within Islam (that is, the question of their consistency with authentic Islamic 
sources). In other words, from a political liberal perspective, not only can we analyse the Is-
lamic grounds for those public standards (as conjecture does), but we can also start from those 
public standards and see whether and how they are affirmed in the conception of citizenship 
proposed by contemporary Muslim thinkers. “Not only” thus reflects the idea that March’s 
work is fully compatible with and complementary to my approach: they simply have two dif-
ferent focuses. Whilst they are complementary, the two strategies are conceptually different, 
and each of them addresses certain kinds of questions more directly. Thus, the choice between 
them is closely related to one’s analytical purposes. Figure 5 accounts for the different per-
spectives of these two strategies, where JCPT means Justificatory Comparative Political The-
ory and JEPT means Justificatory Evaluative Political Theory. 
In other words, the core idea of this study is that we can use public reason as an evaluative 
perspective from which we can analyse citizens’ political public demands, positions, and 
claims. I will then apply this evaluative framework to some proposals concerning citizenship 
coming from Muslim citizens. The relevant criterion for selecting those proposals is specified 
at the end of this section. To understand this idea, it is useful to start from the double role of 
an ideal of public reason pointed out by Lawrence B. Solum: 
‘An ideal of public reason, or standard of civility, is intended to serve a regula-
tive role. More particularly, an ideal of public reason regulates public-reason-
giving practices in two ways: (1) as a standard for self-evaluation and, (2) as a 
standard for political criticism. […] An ideal of public reason serves as a standard 
for self-evaluation in the sense that it can be used by citizens to guide their own 
use of reason in the public sphere. One can ask, “What kinds of arguments should 
I give or refrain from giving in pubic political debate?” An ideal of public reason 
answers this question by articulating a set of reasonable standards of civility to 
one’s fellow citizens. […] An ideal of public reason can serve another role –as a 
standard for the political criticism of argument in the public sphere. One can ask, 
“When is it proper for me to criticize the argumentation of a fellow citizen on the 
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ground that the reasons offered transgress the limits of civility?” An ideal of pub-
lic reason answers this question by defining standards for political criticism of 
reasons given in public.’559 
The fundamental idea of this thesis (namely, employing public reason as specifying a list 
of justificatory evaluative criteria) is quite close to Solum’s intuition that the ideal of public 
reason can function as a ‘standard for political criticism.’ In more detail, in my understanding, 
from Rawls’s conception of public reason we can deduce three specific demands, which we 
can understand as three political liberal evaluative requirements. Such requirements are: 
1) The preliminary acknowledgement of the need for a public justification of the political 
conception of justice, the fundamental laws, policies, political decisions, and institu-
tions that should govern the basic structure of a society in which citizens disagree 
about their views of the good. This requirement stems from the constitutive idea of po-
litical liberalism, the core of which ‘says that in the face of deepseated conflicts about 
the true religion […] those who want to live together in a common structure of social 
cooperation should strive for a kind of consensus through reduction.’560 In my reading, 
this idea is implicit in the Rawlsian notion of reciprocity.561 As Scanlon has observed, 
once the fact of reasonable pluralism is taken into account, justifications ‘that appeal to 
[a particular comprehensive doctrine] will be ones that some citizens (those who do not 
share this view) have no reason to accept. This has implications […] for the kind of 
justifications that citizens should offer one another. Justifications of a society’s basic 
institutions that depend crucially on particular comprehensive views will be reasonably 
resented by citizens who do not share these views. They will not only be destabilizing 
but also fail to show proper respect for these citizens, who are owed reasons that they 
could reasonably accept. […] This requirement, which is central to the idea of public 
reason, is what Rawls calls “the criterion of reciprocity”.’562 Reasonable persons, who 
are willing to offer and abide by fair terms of social cooperation and recognise the bur-
                                                        
559 Lawrence B. Solum, “Constructing an Ideal of Public Reason,” San Diego Law Review 30, no. 4 (1993), 732-733. 
Emphases added. 
560 Rainer Forst, ‘Foreword,’ in Political Liberalism: Variations on a Theme, ix.  
561 Supra and infra. 
562 Thomas M. Scanlon, “Rawls on Justification,” 161. 
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dens of judgement and their consequences, are also able to endorse the moral criterion 
of reciprocity and to accept the resulting liberal principle of legitimacy. Then, based on 
political reciprocity, reasonable persons must recognise the necessity for a public justi-
fication of coercive political power. Thus, I call it the reciprocity requirement (RR).  
2) In line with (1), a second requirement of political liberalism is that all citizens must be 
able to evaluate if there is consistency between the standards of public reason specified 
by a (family of) liberal political conception(s) of justice and the standards of public 
reasoning presented as justified by the members of a certain comprehensive doctrine. 
In case of inconsistency, there would be a gap between public reason in the strict 
Rawlsian sense and the conception of public reasoning held by the members of such a 
doctrine. In this case, they would not properly produce a full justification (in Rawls’s 
sense) for the standards of public reason, and a real overlapping consensus would not 
occur. The possibility of an evaluation of consistency of this kind is a logical requisite 
in a Rawlsian perspective: as I have just made clear, in the case of inconsistency that 
specific comprehensive doctrine would take part neither in the overlapping consensus, 
nor in the public justification and would not support stability for the right reasons. 
Then, if citizens are to know whether or not members of that specific comprehensive 
doctrine effectively take part in the overlapping consensus and support social stability, 
they must be able to know if they speak of the very same conception of public reason-
ing. Only in this way can citizens have the mutual assurance that they will support sta-
bility for the right reasons. As I wish to demonstrate in the next chapters, the underly-
ing idea is that –as Paul Weithman puts it− a wide view of public reason is ‘the weak-
est and least restrictive guideline sufficient to solve the mutual assurance problem.’563 I 
call it the consistency requirement (CR). In chapter three, I will present different di-
mensions (which I will call PR1, PR2, and so on) in which CR can be “unpacked.” In 
other words, PR1, PR2, and so on (which together identify CR) represent different di-
mensions of the idea of public reason expressed by Rawls’s political conception. Con-
sistency must be evaluated from the perspective of such specifications. 
3) After having considered 1) if the members of a comprehensive doctrine are willing to 
participate in public justification, and 2) if what they present as a justified –from their 
                                                        
563 Paul Weithman, Why Political Liberalism?, 331. Emphasis removed. 
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non-public perspective− conception of public reasoning is consistent with the Rawlsian 
idea of public reason, one must evaluate how they honour public reason in practice. If 
is true that ‘[p]olitical liberalism will live or die in an effort to construct a constitutive 
form of public reason –one that allows very different sorts of people to reason together 
on fundamental questions of social justice,’564 and if it is true that public reason is ‘an 
ideal conception of citizenship for a constitutional democratic regime’565 in which 
‘comprehensive doctrines of truth or right [are] replaced by an idea of the politically 
reasonable addressed to citizens as citizens,’566 then liberal citizens must be able to 
evaluate how the ideal of public reason is honoured. In my view, this possibility is in-
volved in the idea of a ‘duty of civility,’ which requires being ‘able to explain to one 
another on [fundamental political questions] how the principles and policies [we] ad-
vocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of public reason.’567 In-
deed, such a duty would be fancy, if it did not require that other fellow citizens can 
evaluate how one’s arguments “fit” into that ideal. I call it civility requirement (CiR). 
Therefore, we can consider these three requirements as political liberal evaluative criteria. 
Such requirements will be analysed in chapters three and four. In those chapters, I will derive 
RR, CR (disassembled into PR1, PR2, and so on), and CiR from Rawls’s conception of public 
reason. In chapter five, I will integrate them into a unitary conception of public reason citi-
zenship. Finally, in chapter six I will employ them as criteria from which I will evaluate the 
conception of citizenship and public reasoning presented from the Muslim perspective I will 
take into account.  
Hence, with reference to my study, we can evaluate:  
1- European Muslims’ acknowledgement of the need for a public justification of a 
conception of citizenship. This evaluation concerns whether RR is satisfied.  
                                                        
564 Bruce Ackerman, “Political Liberalisms,’ 83. 
565 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 213. 
566 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 441. 
567 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 217. 
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2- The coherence between the conception of public reasoning presented as justi-
fied by Muslims in Europe and the idea of public reason specified by political 
liberalism, which is politically (pro tanto) justified and should be the focus of 
the overlapping consensus. This evaluation refers to the fulfilment of CR. 
3- The manner in which European Muslims honour the ideal of public reason (that 
is, if CiR is satisfied). In more detail, this task involves an analysis of the con-
crete attitude displayed by European Muslims in their public reasoning. To 
what extent do they appeal to religious arguments in public forums? Do they 
satisfy the Rawlsian proviso as I reconstruct it (4.2)? Can we understand such 
an appeal in terms of witnessing, declaration, or should we consider those reli-
gious reasons as beyond the domain of public reason, even in its wide view? 
In Figure 6, starting from full justification, I summarise the three evaluative stages (the 
three numbered questions in bold on the right) which characterise my justificatory evaluative 
approach, and I compare this approach to conjecture (on the left). In this figure I have tried to 
make clear the relations between the consecutive logical steps and the analytical results to 
which they can lead. The evaluative analysis developed in chapter six will be structured fol-
lowing the logic illustrated in this general scheme. 
Then, my approach is justificatory because it assumes that the public justification of a free-
standing political conception of citizenship makes it possible for a deeply divided society to 
achieve the right (i.e., political) kind of social unity and stability for the right reasons. There-
fore, I assume that, from a normative point of view, the question of Muslims’ citizenship in 
European liberal democracies can be answered only in terms of their participation in that pro-
cess of public justification. Moreover, my perspective is evaluative because it aims to provide 
a standard of liberal evaluation, enabling free and equal citizens to: 
1. Ascertain the existence of a consensus about the necessity to provide a public justi-
fication, given the fact of reasonable pluralism (evaluation of reciprocity). 
2. Be sure that a specific comprehensive doctrine supports social stability for the right 
reasons. This entails that citizens must be able to test its participation in the public 
justification via an overlapping consensus. In turn, this means that they must be 
able to evaluate the consistency of the conception of public reasoning endorsed 
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from the standpoint of that doctrine with the idea of public reason worked out with-
in a liberal political conception (evaluation of consistency). 
3. Appreciate how the ideal of citizenship expressed by public reason is honoured. 
Citizens must be able to discern other citizens’ prevailing attitude toward public 
reason and the nature of arguments publicly appealed to (evaluation of civility). 
In order to present my approach in greater detail, I now consider some possible objections.  
(O2.1) First, mainly with reference to my second point (CR), one might argue that this 
view is inconsistent with Rawls’s affirmation that in public justification ‘citizens do not look 
into the content of others’ doctrines, and so remain within the bounds of the political.’568 One 
might add that he also maintains that, since ‘[f]or many the true, or the religiously and meta-
physically well-grounded, goes beyond the reasonable [, t]he idea of an overlapping consen-
sus leaves this step to be taken by citizens individually in line with their own comprehensive 
views.’569 In replying to this objection, I repeat that I do not try to evaluate the coherence of 
European Muslims’ arguments from the perspective of their comprehensive view (that is, to 
assess if they are “authentic and genuine Islamic” arguments), then if their full justification is 
well-grounded from an Islamic point of view. Political liberalism leaves this step to the mem-
bers of each view and, partially, to conjecturers. Partially because conjecture is permitted only 
as a last option when a doctrine’s members are apparently unable to provide a full justifica-
tion on their own.570 Rather, the second dimension of my evaluative approach is concerned 
with the consistency of the conception of public reasoning that Muslims present as justified 
from their religious perspective (and which I take as it is presented by them) with the free-
standing political conception of public reason citizenship. However, as I have said, I do not 
consider whether Muslims have adequate religious arguments for maintaining that the con-
ception they present as justified is effectively justified from an Islamic point of view. I leave 
this question to Muslims (and to conjecturers). I only take into account the consistency be-
                                                        
568 John Rawls, ‘Reply to Habermas,’ 387. 
569 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 153. 
570 ‘In general, political liberalism leaves it up to individual citizens to determine how pro tanto justifications fit within 
their comprehensive doctrines. But when citizens fail in this regard, or when they appear to be unable to reconcile the 
demands of a reasonable political conception with their comprehensive views, it may be possible to continue deliberat-
ing on the basis of conjectural arguments.’ Micah Schwartzman, “The Ethics of Reasoning from Conjecture,” 527, em-
phases added. 
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tween the political conception of citizenship (in terms of public reason) and the conception 
that European Muslim citizens present as justified from their religious point of view. What 
matters here is the coherence between these two conceptions of citizenship (more specifically, 
between these two conceptions of public reasoning, because I consider an ideal of citizenship 
grounded in public reason), and not the internal Islamic coherence during the process of full 
justification. In this sense, Muslims and conjecturers’ attempts to provide Islamic grounds for 
a full justification represent a logical precondition for my analysis, but the specific focal point 
of my research is situated on a different level (see Figure 5). 
(O2.2) Second, and in continuity with the first objection, one might also argue that, while 
‘conjecture (justificatory comparative political theory) in fact involves an attitude of respect 
and recognition vis-à-vis [Islam as a religious tradition],’571 justificatory evaluative political 
theory is disrespectful toward Islam because it does not focus on the Islamic tradition. I take 
this objection very seriously. I have extensively discussed some possible implications of the 
relations between Muslims and their religious tradition in my previous works.572 Moreover, 
here I can only reply that my perspective has a specific object which is not Islamic tradition 
per se. As Andrew March rightly argues with reference to his method:  
‘Liberal political theorists cannot perform exegesis of Islamic texts for Muslim 
citizens, but they can say that given arguments derived from such exegesis are in-
sufficiently principled from the standpoint of political liberalism and that they do 
not point to an overlapping consensus. And they can suggest […] what types of 
formulations would be reasonable from a liberal standpoint while preserving the 
language and fundamental concerns of the comprehensive doctrine.’573 
Similarly, I believe that respect for a religious tradition entails –among other things− the 
recognition of the fact that its members are very likely its best and most skilled interpreters. 
On the other hand, I try to pinpoint what political requirements political liberalism can rea-
sonably establish for public reasoning. Then, like conjecture, my evaluative approach does 
not aim to substitute Muslims in their interpretative activity. However, while conjecture aims 
                                                        
571 Andrew F. March, Islam and Liberal Citizenship, 63. 
572 In particular, in my master thesis “Oltre un illuminismo islamico.”  
573 Andrew F. March, Islam and Liberal Citizenship, 79. 
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to ‘suggest what types of formulations would be reasonable from a liberal standpoint,’ evalua-
tive political theory aims to allow a public “scrutiny” of the content of the (supposedly) fully 
justified conception of citizenship, along with the modalities in which the political ideal of 
public reason citizenship is politically honoured. In doing this, then, Muslims are considered 
as the ultimate interpreters of Islamic religious requirements and as citizens on equal footing. 
(O2.3) A third objection could claim that justificatory political theory is always evaluative, 
because it always involves an evaluation of what reasons represent adequate reasons in order 
to justify a principle or a course of action. If ‘a public justification is achieved when members 
of the relevant public have adequate or sufficient reason to endorse a particular coercive pro-
posal, law or policy,’574 then we should always be able to evaluate whether the reason r repre-
sents an adequate or sufficient reason to endorse, say, the proposal p. In this general meaning, 
the objection is not troublesome: it rightly emphasises the overall unity underlying a justifica-
tory evaluative approach. However, if the objection entails that such an approach is redundant 
and, at the end, theoretically fruitless, then it should be noticed that the latter tries to solve a 
specific problem that has not been answered until now. In other words, the evaluative part of 
my approach should be understood as an attempt to provide a public standard from which cit-
izens are able to assess others’ claims and demands concerning terms of social cooperation. 
Public reason is then conceived as citizens’ public standpoint for evaluating those demands 
and claims and as an ideal of citizenship that specifies shared political values. In line with 
these considerations, my overall aim is to provide a public perspective for tackling contempo-
rary anxieties and concerns about Muslims’ citizenship in European societies. Therefore, we 
could say that even if an evaluative element is always present in justificatory political theory, 
in my research the quest for a liberal standard of evaluation represents a specific strategy for 
dealing with contemporary demands. In this sense, the evaluative component of this study is 
genuinely grounded in an engaged conception of justificatory political theory. 
(O2.4) A fourth objection could be raised as follows: we should not be surprised to find 
among Muslims views that are perfectly in line with European concerns. After all, every tradi-
tion is dynamic and subject to different interpretations. Since every tradition is a living tradi-
tion, it would be trivial to attempt to show that Muslims can endorse an ideal of public rea-
                                                        
574 Kevin Vallier and Fred D’Agostino, “Public Justification,” 1. 
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son.575 This objection partially refers to what in the first chapter I have called the “artificially-
constructed-problem objection” (or also the “general objection”, GO). The two objections 
share a common concern about the problematisation of Muslims’ citizenship in Europe. How-
ever, while the first denies my starting assumptions and questions, the latter rejects the strate-
gy I adopt to answer them. For this reason, I have postponed the analysis of such an objection 
at this stage. To it I reply by referring back to the distinction between Islamic arguments for 
justifying a political conception on the one hand, and Muslim citizens’ claims concerning that 
conception on the other. I take for granted that a tradition is dynamic and subject to different 
interpretations that may significantly affect its members’ capacity for achieving a full justifi-
cation. However, I wish to reiterate my main point: the problem is not only whether (and 
how) a full justification can be achieved from an Islamic perspective, but also how those who 
provide that justification actually relate to a broader need for a public justification. Only by 
facing this problem can we strengthen a common ideal of citizenship and translate citizens’ 
reciprocal claims and demands in a shared public language. This goal may be ambitious, but 
it is far from being banal. In particular, it is not banal to pinpoint how specific claims contrib-
ute to the debate about terms of citizenship, strengthening or weakening a common political 
ideal based on public reason. The latter appears even more necessary if we understand this 
strategy (also) as a tool for identifying the responsibilities of each participant in the public 
debate about citizenship in Europe. These considerations are related both to the previous re-
marks concerning an engaged conception of justificatory political theory and to the next point. 
(O2.5) The last objection I wish to consider here is what I call the “one-for-all objection.” 
It says that it is not possible to evaluate European Muslims’ claims and demands from a pub-
lic standpoint because it is not possible to isolate a single European Muslim voice or position. 
To be sure, the reality of Muslims in Europe is certainly diverse and there are several voices 
(supra). Then, a European Muslim discourse is always a polyphonic discourse. Nothing here 
should be read as an attempt to deny this reality or to silence different voices. Nevertheless, 
any public evaluation requires some form of abstraction and generalisation, even though there 
are obvious (moral and political) limits to the possibilities of theoretical abstraction (those 
limits refer to the respect of reasonable pluralism within Islam in Europe). How can political 
theory deal with this problem? If it is not possible to evaluate the European Muslim approach 
                                                        
575 Here I build on March’s ‘banality objection,’ see Islam and Liberal Citizenship, 67-68. 
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to the issue of citizenship, I think that the best alternative is to consider an approach that 
could be plausibly defined as a European Muslim one. Then, my main methodological princi-
ple is the principle of plausibility.576 It allows me to focus on a position that can be regarded 
as plausibly representative of a European Muslim approach, without aspiring to absolute ho-
mogeneity, unity, or unanimity in defining such an approach. As March correctly emphasises, 
the plausibility of a claim x ‘can be measured only in terms of the reception [of x] by the dis-
cursive community to which [x] is directed.’577 Therefore, I assume that a particular view can 
be plausibly considered as working out a European Muslim approach if and only if it satisfies 
the principle of plausibility (PP), which says that: 
(PP): The necessary and sufficient condition for plausibly considering a view x 
as representative of a European Muslim approach to the issue of citizenship is 
that x is widespread among Muslim citizens in European liberal democracies. 
An important caveat is in order: here endorsement and acceptance are measured in terms of 
reception, popularity, and diffusion. Thus, if a claim x is very popular among European Mus-
lims, I assume that they endorse x and I define it as a plausible European Muslim claim. In-
deed, this is a strong and questionable assumption, but it would be very difficult to propose a 
better alternative. Notwithstanding these inescapable limitations, I hope that previous remarks 
have made clear why a justificatory evaluative approach to the issue of European Muslims’ 
citizenship is worthy of consideration. This methodological principle is the best non-optimal 
way for avoiding an essentialist and unified account of the diverse realities of Muslims in Eu-
rope without dismissing the very concept of a European Muslim approach to the issue of citi-
zenship. Why should we throw out the baby with the bath water? Indeed, the burden of proof 
falls on those who maintain that we should. 
 
                                                        
576 I derive this principle from Andrew March’s considerations: see ibid. 68-70. I mentioned March’s position about this 
point above in 2.2.c. 
577 Andrew F. March, Islam and Liberal Citizenship, 68. 
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Table 1 Justificatory Comparative Political Theory and Justificatory Evaluative Political Theory. 
Political liberalism: theoretical approaches to the relation between justification and comprehensive doctrines 
Method Justificatory comparative political theory Justificatory evaluative political theory 
Theoretical horizon Justification of the liberal political conception of 
citizenship 
Justification of the liberal political conception of 
citizenship 
Justificatory focus Full justification - Overlapping consensus Public justification 
Approach Comparative (Conjecture) Evaluative 
Object Islam as ‘a tradition of argumentation about the 
formulation of religious doctrine’ (March, Islam 
and Liberal Citizenship, 9). 
Muslim citizens’ attitude toward public justifica-
tion. 
Analytical purposes 1) Analysis of moral disagreement between Islam-
ic arguments and the liberal political conception 
(March, Islam and Liberal Citizenship, chapter 
three). 
2) Analysis of a ‘reasonable Islamic affirmation of 
citizenship’ (March, Islam and Liberal Citizen-
ship, 136), that is, an ‘ideal-typical doctrinal af-
firmation of citizenship’ (ibid. 135) consistent 
with the demands of political liberalism (ibid., 
chapter four). 
3) Analysis of which ‘very strong and authentical-
ly Islamic arguments’ (March, Islam and Liberal 
Citizenship, 15) may represent principled good 
reasons for Muslims to fully justify the political 
conception (ibid. chapters five-eight). 
1) Analysis of European Muslims’ acknowledge-
ment of the need for a public justification of polit-
ical (coercive) power. 
2) Analysis of the consistency between the con-
ception of public reasoning endorsed by European 
Muslims and the idea of public reason specified 
by political liberalism (does Muslims’ full justifi-
cation actually focus on the same conception of 
public reason politically justified, so that a real 
overlapping consensus on that conception can be 
reached?) . 
3) Analysis of how European Muslims participate 
in the public justification and honour the ideal of 
public reason. 
Aims To argue that a full justification of the liberal po-
litical conception is possible from a genuinely 
Islamic standpoint and that an overlapping con-
sensus can be achieved. Thus, liberal citizenship 
can be endorsed for reasons that are authentically 
Islamic. 
To argue that for stability for the right reasons to 
be obtained, citizens should abide by an ideal of 
liberal citizenship grounded in public reason. In 
turn, this requires a form of “civic evaluative” 
standard and practice. Such an evaluative task 
requires a thorough reconstruction of the ideal of 
public reason, in order to know precisely what 
justificatory demands political liberalism makes. 
If such demands concerning public justification 
are met in European Muslims’ discourses, one has 
strong evidence to claim that they honour public 
reason and, in doing so, they participate in Euro-
pean public political culture and support European 
societies’ stability for the right reasons. 
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Figure 5: Positioning in a Rawlsian framework of: 1) justificatory comparative political theory (conjecture)’s main 
theoretical focus and its implicit consequences and 2) justificatory evaluative political theory’s main theoretical fo-
cus and its necessary premises. 
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Figure 6: Starting from full justification: on the left how conjecture can lead to a public justification; on the right the 
three evaluative stages (in the two boxes with questions 1-2 and 3) within a standard Rawlsian account of an over-
lapping consensus and public justification. Note that: the question under (1) corresponds to the requirement RR, the 
question under (2) corresponds to the CR requirements (PR1, PR2, and so on), and the question under (3) corre-
sponds to the requirement CiR. 
Unreasonableness 
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PART II 
RECONSTRUTING 
PUBLIC REASON 
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In the first part, I framed my research problem in terms of a diffuse call for a common pub-
lic political ground for citizenship, paralleled by diffidence about any over-emphasis on a 
specific Muslim identity, perceived as potentially in conflict with that common public politi-
cal ground. I also suggested that public reason may represent a solution that both 1) answers 
European anxieties concerning social stability and the commitment to the fundamental terms 
of cooperation and 2) allows Muslims to be recognised as fully cooperating and equal fellow 
citizens whose political demands can no longer be arbitrarily ignored. As will become clear in 
the following chapters, in such a scenario public reason’s most important contribution is that 
it enables citizens to engage in political discussion in terms of arguments rather than just in 
terms of feelings. One may even suspect that such feelings could function as a way to hide 
and overwhelm political arguments. In the rest of this study I will try to justify those claims. 
Moreover, in the first part I argued that, from the perspective of political liberal theory, Euro-
pean concerns about Muslims’ citizenship should not be conceived as strictly limited to their 
capacity for fully justifying a liberal conception of citizenship. Even though this is a neces-
sary premise in a Rawlsian scheme, it does not reveal the whole picture. European anxiety al-
so derives from the absence of a standard for evaluating from a public perspective Muslims’ 
participation in the activity of public justification. The problem, then, is not only whether a 
justification of the liberal political conception is possible from an Islamic perspective (a ques-
tion that refers to the idea of an overlapping consensus and to the inclusion of Muslim citizens 
as Muslims). Rather, in order to answer what seems to be the main European concern (that is, 
the mutual assurance of being and staying committed to the fundamental terms of social co-
operation and supporting social stability), what political theory should provide is a public 
standard for evaluating other citizens’ attitudes toward the publicly justified conception of cit-
izenship. Hence, in chapter two, I developed the method that I call justificatory evaluative po-
litical theory, with its three evaluative criteria grounded in public reason: reciprocity, con-
sistency, and civility. Indeed, only after having positively concluded the first two stages of 
such an evaluation −the stage concerning the acknowledgement of the need for a public justi-
fication (reciprocity) and the stage concerning the coherence between the conception of public 
reason citizenship politically justified and the conception of citizens’ public reasoning pre-
sented as justified by Muslims (consistency)− can we say that a real full justification of the 
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political conception has been achieved by Muslim citizens. Only then can we maintain that an 
overlapping consensus and a public justification of the conception of citizenship grounded in 
public reason have actually been reached. Note that though the consistency requirement is 
very close to the main core of conjecture, it starts from a different standpoint. In this case, 
what matters is not the perspective of an outsider who looks for Islamic arguments that sup-
port the political conception. Rather, it is the public perspective of (ideally) each and every 
citizen who considers what her Muslim fellow citizens affirm to be their justified conception 
of public reasoning. Crucially, this public perspective takes the conception offered by Muslim 
citizens as it is (that is, as Muslim citizens present it): unlike conjecture, the public viewpoint 
does not consider the Islamic genuineness or soundness of those arguments. This perspective 
simply considers what fellow citizens present as their comprehensively justified conception of 
public reasoning, but it does not look into the religious arguments that supposedly support 
that conception. It just compares it to the politically justified conception of public reason citi-
zenship (the freestanding political conception). Only in the case of consistency between them, 
when an overlapping consensus is publicly recognised as having been achieved (and the con-
ception of citizenship is truly publicly justified), can we evaluate from a public viewpoint 
how the duty of civility is honoured. That is, how the ideal of citizenship underpinning that 
conception is respected. 
However, before analysing those questions in part three, I must reconstruct the idea of pub-
lic reason, in order to explain why it is fitting to present European needs. In so doing, I will 
answer the first research question Q1. To this task I will devote the next two chapters. Here, I 
will firstly summarise Kant’s conception of the public use of reason, then I will analyse my 
own interpretation of Rawls’s account of public reason (mainly in reference to the wide view 
expounded in “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”), and finally I will consider some major 
objections raised against Rawls’s conception. This second part, then, tries to reconstruct the 
idea of public reason that I will apply in the third part and, in doing so, it establishes the bases 
on which I will develop the ideal of citizenship that I will defend as the most reasonable alter-
native (chapter five) and the analysis of a European Muslim proposal about citizenship (chap-
ter six). 
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Chapter Three 
What is Public Reason? 
 
 
 
Those who can give justice are 
owed justice. 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I begin the reconstruction of the idea of public reason by considering it in 
its Rawlsian form. In the next chapter, I will present my interpretation of the duty of civility. 
In so doing, I will complete the reconstructive part of my work, whose aim is to answer the 
first research question Q1. Then, in the first chapter of the third part (chapter five), I will 
bridge the reconstructive and the evaluative task by presenting an ideal of citizenship ground-
ed in public reason. Such an ideal aims to answer the second research question Q2. Finally, in 
the second chapter of the third part (chapter six), I will analyse from an evaluative perspective 
a plausible European Muslim approach to the issue of citizenship in European societies. In so 
doing, I will answer the last research question Q3. 
This chapter is divided into two main sections. In the first, I consider the Kantian account 
of the public use of reason. In the second, I reconstruct the Rawlsian account of public reason, 
beginning with the idea of publicity. 
 
                                                        
 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 510/446. 
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3.1 Kant’s Public Use of Reason. 
 
It has been argued that ‘the problem of public reason became central to the political theory 
of the early modern period, and continues to be in ours.’578 According to some authors, it 
would be possible to narrate a ‘secret history’579 of the idea of public reason that goes back to 
Hobbes and Locke,580 that is, to even earlier stages of modern political thought than the Kant-
ian roots usually presented as the origin of the “official history” of such an idea. According to 
Duncan Ivison, a common thread would underlie this ‘secret history’ from Hobbes to Locke 
and on to Rawls: the belief that ‘the exercise of a common mode of public reason [is] a pre-
requisite for the maintenance of civil society, and [thus, Hobbes, Locke, and Rawls] similarly 
propos[e] politics as an answer to the pluralism and indeterminacy of political argument in 
conditions of deep diversity.’581 Simone Chambers has conceptualised the fil rouge in the his-
tory of public reason from Hobbes to Kant in terms of an attempt to answer the question about 
                                                        
578 Duncan Ivison, “The Secret History of Public Reason: Hobbes to Rawls,” History of Political Thought 18, no. 1 
(1997), 125. 
579 I borrow this expression from the title of Duncan Ivison’s article quoted in the previous footnote. 
580 Ibid., respectively, 130-136 and 136-140. 
581 Ibid. 144. In a previous article [“The Art of Political Liberalism,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 28, no. 2 
(1995), 203-226], Ivison argued that contemporary ‘[l]iberal regimes require good liberal citizens, and to the extent that 
most of us are not, liberal theories need some account of how we are to come to be. The exercise of power here, or at 
least the process of legitimising its exercise, could be said to be a kind of “liberal discipline,” which appears parasitic on 
the ideals of autonomy and self-restraint (among others). […] By liberal discipline, I mean the way in which in the same 
time as recognizing the ineluctable diversity of comprehensive doctrines, political liberalism seeks to both restrict and 
mould the relations between the comprehensive and political views of citizens. To put it starkly: the way political liber-
alism seeks to domesticate difference into harmless diversity. Only if a claim can be put in the terms of the theory of 
justice will it be recognized.’ “The Art of Political Liberalism,” 223-224. Consequently, Ivison maintains that such a 
‘liberal discipline’ puts a special ‘emphasis on a specific kind of political order resting in agreement on justice, and re-
stricting the kinds of claims that can be made a focus of political discourse.’ He sees political liberalism as a ‘process of 
persuasion’ through the idea of public reason. Thus, the latter is functional to the needs of such ‘liberal discipline’ (ibid. 
224-225). 
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who shall judge in the modern condition of pluralism.582 The historical reconstruction of the 
concept has brought different contemporary interpretations of its requirements583 and 
                                                        
582 For this account of the history of public reason from Hobbes to Locke and Kant, see Simone Chambers, “Who Shall 
Judge? Hobbes, Locke, and Kant on the Construction of Public Reason,” Ethics and Global Politics 2, no. 4 (2009), 
349-368. Chambers stresses the importance of public reason in achieving a final political judgement. According to him, 
‘[p]ublic reason […] refers to the role of the public as judge of public right and not simply to a set of reasons that an ac-
tual public happens to share.’ Thus, ‘concepts of public reason arose in answer to the question “who shall judge?”.’ In 
fact, the ‘religious and moral pluralism unleashed by the reformation led first to the weakening of authoritative common 
forms of reasoning, this in turn and more importantly led to the question who is the final arbiter when a political com-
munity is faced with deep disagreement about political/moral questions.’ Ibid. 349. His thesis is that in all modern con-
ceptions ‘[p]ublic reason is constructed not found.’ Ibid. 354. He contends that ‘[p]ublic reason is more about a public 
having the capacity, space, and right to reason authoritatively. We can hope that that reasoning will construct […] rea-
sons acceptable to all but it is the public as authoritative reasoner that represents the radical change brought about by the 
rise of pluralism and not a trading in of one set of reasons for another.’ Ibid. 350. Then, according to Chambers, Hobbes 
(352-354), Locke (354-359, see in particular his claim that Locke’s central contribution to the idea of public reason 
stems from his conception of the right of resistance, rather than from his conception of toleration: 357-359), and Kant 
(359-364) propose different solutions to a common question: the problem of a public standard of judgement. Then, his 
history of public reason is more a history of how the public distinguishes the good from the bad and the right from the 
wrong in conditions of pluralism than a history of which set of reasons constitutes a set of public reasons. In this sense, 
I think, one can better understand the specificity of Rawls’s public reason, in which this public judgment finally aims to 
become political and concerns the politically right rather than the morally, philosophically, or religiously good. 
583 For example, for two divergent views about how a Hobbesian conception should specify the requirements of public 
reason, see David Gauthier, “Public Reason,” Social Philosophy and Policy 12, no.1 (1995), 19-42, and Michael Ridge, 
“Hobbesian Public Reason,” Ethics 108, no. 3 (1998), 538-568. While Gauthier maintains that ‘Hobbes has provided 
most of the materials needed for an account of public reason’ (“Public Reason,” 36), he also thinks that it is necessary 
to limit the scope of Hobbes’s public standard (or public person) for judgment: ‘[e]ach citizen has good reason, in terms 
of her own deliberative standard, to agree with her fellows to authorize a public person to judge and will in her name, 
on those matters and in those respects that significantly affect the interactions of the citizens and the public goods 
available to them.’ Ibid. 37. Ridge argues that, in order ‘to develop the most plausible Hobbesian account of public rea-
son’ (“Hobbesian Public Reason,” 541), we should change the Hobbesian perspective: ‘[r]ather than focussing on the 
authorization of some public person, or sovereign, as both Hobbes and Gauthier do, this alternative strategy focuses on 
the authorization of some public set of principles.’ Ibid. 539. According to Ridge, while Hobbes and Gauthier focus on 
the primacy of a public person whose reason determines the content of public reason, it would be better to give priority 
to a set of public principles that must guide, direct, and limit the power of the arbitrator who enforces them (see, for in-
stance, ibid. 558): only in this way –in Ridge’s view− does the Hobbesian account of public reason not ‘pu[t] the cart 
before the horse’ (ibid.). For Ridge’s strategy, see in particular 550-553, and 558-566.  
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grounds.584 Unfortunately, I cannot analyse this part of the story here. While certainly inter-
esting and subject to different readings, the latter is not a fundamental component of the theo-
retical structure of this study. This is neither a history585 nor an archaeology586 of public rea-
                                                        
584 For example, in reconstructing the “why?” of public reason, D’Agostino and Gaus [“Public Reason: Why, What and 
Can (and Should) It Be?,” in Public Reason (The International Research Library of Philosophy 21), edited by Fred 
D’Agostino and Gerald Gaus (Aldershot: Dartmouth/Ashgate, 1998), xi-xiii] first argue that –despite the fact that public 
reason may seem to be a post-Enlightenment ideal, since it starts by recognising that not all reason is public, that is, that 
not any true and valid reason is a true and valid reason for every rational being (xi)− the idea of public reason is ‘al-
ready present in great Enlightenment philosophers such as Hobbes and Kant.’ More importantly, they ascribe a different 
rationale to each of the two main conceptions arising from the works of these two authors (see xii-xiii). For reasons that 
I will explain in this section, they argue that for Kant ‘public reason is unconstrained reason, leading to truth and en-
lightenment.’ Kant thus holds what they call an epistemological and moral view of public reason, according to which 
(a) on the epistemological level, ‘the discovery of truth […] results from the exercise of public reason [and i]t is thus 
our epistemological commitments that lead us to use reason publicly,’ and (b) on the moral level, ‘if we are to respect 
others we must not make moral or political claims on them –especially claims backed up by the threat of force− that 
cannot be justified to them.’ On the other hand, for Hobbes the grounds of public reason ‘are political rather than epis-
temic.’ Hobbes is looking for an arbitrator or judge who can provide a public reason to which people’s private reason-
ing must be subjugate if we are to avoid conflict. Then in Hobbes’s view ‘public reason is a distinctively political no-
tion: it is not necessarily truer or better reasoning, but it is reasoning that we all embrace for political reasons [… I]f we 
accept a common public reason we can live together in peace.’ This leads to what D’Agostino and Gaus call the prag-
matic-legitimation view of public reason. According to them, contemporary political liberalism defends some version of 
this view. This is because Rawls is mainly concerned with reconciling the possibility of a just and stable society with 
the fact of reasonable pluralism. However, Gaus and D’Agostino recognise that ‘it is certainly true that Rawls’s con-
ception of political reason contains a normative element missing in Hobbes.’ In fact, Rawls does not aim for mere sta-
bility, but for stability for the right reasons (or, in D’Agostino and Gaus’s words, ‘a stable order of free and equal citi-
zens’). In line with this argument, I believe that Rawls combines the kind of political considerations of a pragmatic-
legitimation view with something like point (b) –the moral dimension− of the Kantian view, that is the mutual moral 
political respect displayed by the practice of public justification. For helpful considerations about how a Hobbesian 
strategy of justification impacts on Rawls’s justification in A Theory of Justice see Thomas Nagel in his “Moral Conflict 
and Political Legitimacy,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 16, no. 3 (1987), 218-221. In this article, Nagel distinguishes 
between a Hobbesian ‘convergence defense of political legitimacy’ (which discloses the possibility of a ‘convergence 
of rational support for certain institutions from the separate motivational standpoints of distinct individuals,’ and ac-
cording to which a ‘political result is thought to be right because it is rationally acceptable to all, rather than being ra-
tionally acceptable to all because it is by some independent standard right’) and a ‘common standpoint defense of legit-
imacy’ (according to which ‘a political result is rationally acceptable to everyone because by [some previously defined 
shared] standard it is right; it is not right because it is universally acceptable’). According to Nagel, in A Theory of Jus-
tice Rawls presents a mixed theory, because ‘true principles of justice are those which can be affirmed by individuals 
motivated both by the impartial sense of justice as fairness and by their fundamental personal interests, commitments, 
and conceptions of the good.’ The last point is entailed in Rawls’s notion of the ‘strains of commitment,’ according to 
which parties ‘cannot enter into agreement that may have consequences they cannot accept […] Since the original 
agreement is final and made in perpetuity, there is no second chance [...] Thus parties must weigh with care whether 
they will be able to stick by their commitment in all circumstances’ (John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 176/153). There-
fore, according to Nagel, even though the parties in the original position do not know their own conceptions of the 
good, due to the strains of commitment ‘each person can choose only such principles of justice as he believes he will be 
able to live under and continue to affirm in actual life, when he knows the things about himself and his position in soci-
ety that are concealed by the [v]eil of [i]gnorance. This introduces an element of convergence.’ Thomas Nagel, “Moral 
Conflict and Political Legitimacy,” 220. 
585 See the historical appendix in Lawrence B. Solum, “Constructing an Ideal of Public Reason,” 754-762. 
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son. I just mention these considerations here in order to avoid the impression that public rea-
son suddenly appears in the history of thought in an unannounced flash. Having said this, one 
should recognise the specificity of each of these conceptions. Even supposing that a fil rouge 
does exist (I do not venture into this question here), this should not obscure the fundamentally 
different backgrounds and purposes of those political theories.  
Why should we consider Kant’s account of a public use of reason, then? In which respects 
is it relevant to the Rawlsian perspective that I am considering here? After all, in Political 
Liberalism and in his 1998 letter to his editor (announcing a revised edition of Political Lib-
eralism after the publication of “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” in 1997),587 Rawls ex-
                                                                                                                                                                                        
586 See Gerald Postema’s contribution “Public Practical Reason: An Archeology.” For his conception of public reason, 
see in particular 68-76. More specifically, he firstly analyses a ‘distributive’ or ‘convergence’ view in which ‘a reason 
R* is said to be shared if it is true that R* is a reason for each member […], but not a reason for all. […T]he fact that 
R* is a reason for other members of the group does not figure among the factors that make it a reason for any particular 
member. It would remain a reason of the same sort and force for any such member even if it was not a reason for any-
one else, or no one else recognized it as such. Reasons of this sort are shared only in the sense that different agents co-
incidentally converge on them’ (69). On the contrary, he endorses a more ‘robust’ conception of public justification, a 
‘consensus’ view in which a ‘public reason R* is shared in the robust sense that R* is a reason for each member in vir-
tue of its being a reason for all.’ In this case, agents ‘would believe that there would be a “reason for us”.’ Ibid. 70. On 
this point, he adds that ‘the reasons I offer you in this spirit are not merely reasons that I (for my own part) find persua-
sive, nor reasons that I believe you do or could find persuasive, but rather reasons I believe we do or could find persua-
sive. They are reasons offered with the implicit claim to be reasons for us.’ Ibid. 74. Then, his robust public justifica-
tion is not argument ad hominem, but rather ‘argument inter homines.’ Ibid. In chapter two, I mentioned other refer-
ences about the distinction between consensus and convergence modes of public justification. 
587 Rawls was not able to complete his project of revision of Political Liberalism because of his illness and death in 
2002. As mentioned in chapter two, his letter to the editor at Columbia University Press is included in the expanded edi-
tion −2005− of Political Liberalism (438-439). 
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plicitly distances himself from a Kantian conception.588 As I shall explain, however, despite 
many important differences, Kant pointed out what will be a fundamental underlying idea in 
Rawls’s conception of public reason: the internal relation between publicity, legitimacy, and 
reciprocity. Thus, an –inevitably concise− investigation of Kant’s public use of reason consti-
tutes a necessary premise to the analysis of Rawls’s public reason. 
In his Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? (1784), Kant famously affirms that: 
‘Enlightenment is the human being’s emergence from his self-incurred minori-
ty. Minority is inability to make use of one’s own understanding without direction 
from another. This minority is self-incurred when its cause lies not in lack of un-
derstanding but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from 
                                                        
588 Some remarks in this direction are already present in his Dewey Lectures (1980) “Kantian Constructivism in Moral 
Theory” (see John Rawls, Collected Papers, in particular 339-340). In Political Liberalism, Rawls specifies ‘four dif-
ferences between Kant’s moral constructivism and the political constructivism of justice as fairness’ (see 99-101). 1) 
‘Kant’s doctrine is a comprehensive moral view in which the ideal of autonomy has a regulative role for all of life. [… 
B]ut as such it is not suitable to provide a public basis of justification.’ 2) Secondly, constructivism is different in Rawls 
and Kant. Rawls’s political view is ‘doctrinally autonomous,’ that is, it represents ‘the order of political values as based 
on principles of practical reason in union with the appropriate political conceptions of society and person.’ On the con-
trary, Kant endorses a ‘deeper meaning of autonomy’ according to which ‘the order of moral and political values must  
be made, or itself constituted, by the principles and conceptions of practical reason.’ It is what Rawls calls ‘constitutive 
autonomy,’ that is, the idea that the ‘order of values does not constitute itself but is constituted by the activity, actual or 
ideal, of practical (human) reason itself. [… Kant’s] constructivism is deeper and goes to the very existence and consti-
tution of the order of values. This is part of his transcendental idealism.’ 3) While Rawls’s political conceptions of per-
son and society are political in the sense that he tries to derive them from the ‘shared fund’ of fundamental political ide-
as that constitutes the public political culture of a democratic society, those conceptions ‘in Kant’s view have […] a 
foundation in his transcendental idealism.’ Nevertheless, according to Rawls, such a “true” (that is, comprehensive) 
foundation cannot be the basis on which a freestanding political conception of justice can be organised. 4) The fourth 
difference is a difference in the respective aims of the two views. Rawls’s conception ‘aims at uncovering a public basis 
of justification on questions of political justice given the fact of reasonable pluralism,’ so it begins ‘from shared funda-
mental ideas implicit in the public political culture in the hope of developing from them a political conception that can 
gain free and reasoned agreement in judgment, this agreement being stable in virtue of its gaining the support of an 
overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines.’ On the other hand, Kant ‘views the role of philosophy 
as apologia: the defense of reasonable faith. This [is the problem of] showing the coherence and unity of reason, both 
theoretical and practical, with itself; and of how we are to view reason as the final court of appeal, as alone competent 
to settle all questions about the scope and limits of its own authority.’ Moreover, specifically with reference to the idea 
of public reason, Rawls says that ‘Kant contrasts the public use of reason, which is free, to the private use, which may 
not be free. I do not mean to endorse this view’ (ibid. 296, note 13, emphasis added). Finally, in the above-mentioned 
letter to the editor, Rawls writes that ‘throughout the original text [of Political Liberalism] the idea of principles of 
practical reason, or simply practical reason, often appears, which to most readers had suggested that Kant’s ideas of 
practical reason were being used. Many readers got the idea that my view is Kant’s or similar to it, but that is a serious 
mistake’ (438, emphasis added). 
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another. Sapere aude! Have courage to make use of your own understanding! is 
thus the motto of enlightenment.’589 
For single individuals, it is often very difficult to achieve enlightenment. For ‘minority 
[…] has become almost nature’ to them. Kant is clear on this point: emancipation requires 
some individual effort, because ‘[i]t is so comfortable to be a minor!’ Several obstacles pre-
vent individuals emancipating themselves: not only their ‘laziness and cowardice,’ but also 
habit and the fear inoculated by their guardians’ self-interested warnings and advice.590 How-
ever, Kant seems more optimistic about the possibilities for a public to enlighten itself: ‘in-
deed this is almost inevitable, if only it is left its freedom. For there will always be a few in-
dependent thinkers, even among the established guardians of the great masses, who, after hav-
ing themselves cast off the yoke of minority, will disseminate the spirit of a rational valuing of 
one’s own worth and of the calling of each individual to think for himself.’591 Then, a public 
can achieve enlightenment if (and only if) it is free. Which freedom is required by this kind of 
enlightenment? Kant argues that ‘nothing is required but […] the least harmful of anything 
that could even be called freedom: namely, freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all 
matters.’592 Thus, for a public to ‘enlarge its cognitions […] and to purify them of errors, and 
generally to make further progress in enlightenment’ in which lies ‘the original vocation’ of 
human nature,593 the public use of reason must be free and unrestricted. The problem is the 
apparently paradoxical conception of the ‘public use of reason’ that Kant offers. 
‘The public use of one’s reason must always be free, and it alone can bring 
about enlightenment among human beings; the private use of one’s reason may, 
however, often be very narrowly restricted without this particularly hindering the 
progress of enlightenment. But by the public use of one’s own reason I understand 
the use which someone makes of it as a scholar before the entire public of the 
                                                        
589 Immanuel Kant, “Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Im-
manuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, edited and translated by Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 17. 
590 Ibid. 
591 Ibid. 17-18. Emphases added. 
592 Ibid. 18. 
593 Ibid. 20. 
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world of readers. What I call the private use of reason is that which one may 
make of it in a certain civil post or office with which he is entrusted.’594 
This formulation has provoked some bewilderment. As Claudia Mancina puts it, ‘the diffi-
culty is the inversion of the typical liberal priority between private and public which Kant –a 
founding father of liberalism− seems to make.’595 In fact, it would seem that reason is used 
publicly by a private (a scholar) who writes to his readers, while reason is used privately by a 
public official. Onora O’Neill suggests that the solution to this puzzle is possible if we con-
sider the distinction in terms of the ‘audience whom an act of communication may reach.’596 
Similarly, Mancina argues that ‘the difference between private and public use is a difference 
of publics: in the second case the public is virtually the entire world, the body of readers, of 
those who are ideal interlocutors of every discourse characterised by publicity.’597 This point 
is made clear by Kant himself: 
‘[F]or many affairs conducted in the interest of a commonwealth a certain 
mechanism is necessary, by means of which some members of the commonwealth 
must behave merely passively, so as to be directed by the government, through an 
artful unanimity, to public ends (or at least prevented from destroying such ends). 
Here it is, certainly, impermissible to argue; instead, one must obey. But insofar 
as this part of the machine [that is, the individual] also regards himself as a mem-
ber of a whole commonwealth, even the society of citizens of the world, and so in 
his capacity of a scholar who by his writings addresses a public in the proper 
sense of the word, he can certainly argue without thereby harming the affairs as-
signed to him in part as a passive member. [… A]s a scholar, who by his writings 
speaks to the public in the strict sense, that is the world […,] he enjoys an unre-
                                                        
594 Ibid. 18. 
595 Claudia Mancina, “Uso pubblico della ragione e ragione pubblica: da Kant a Rawls,” Diritto e Questioni Pubbliche 8 
(2008), 35. My translation. 
596 Onora O’Neill, Constructions of Reasons: Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 32. These considerations were developed in her previous article “The Public Use of Reason,” 
Political Theory 14, no. 4 (1986), 523-551. 
597 Claudia Mancina, “Uso pubblico della ragione e ragione pubblica,” 36. My translation.  
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stricted freedom to make use of his own reason and to speak in his own per-
son.’598 
So, for example, a clergyman as a teacher is bounded to teach ‘in accordance with the 
creed of the church he serves,’ since on this occasion he is making a private use of his reason, 
that is, he is speaking not only to a specific audience, but also making reference to (or speak-
ing in the name of) a specific authority which entitled him to hold that office and task. I will 
return to this conception of authority presently. In this sense, he is merely ‘a part of the ma-
chine,’ and he could be prevented from making free use of his own reason. But the same cler-
gyman who speaks as a scholar ‘to the public in the strict sense, that is, the world,’ must be 
free: only in this way can that public ‘make further progress in enlightenment.’ However, the 
Kantian distinction between public and private use of reason is not endorsed by Rawls. As I 
have already mentioned, he clearly says that: 
‘The public vs. nonpublic distinction is not the distinction between public and 
private. The latter I ignore: there is no such thing as private reason. There is social 
reason –the many reasons of associations in society which make up the back-
ground culture; there is also […] domestic reason −the reason of families as small 
groups in society− and this contrasts both with public and social reason. As citi-
zens, we participate in all these kinds of reason and we have the rights of equal 
citizens when we do so.’599 
Therefore, Rawls distinguishes public and non-public (social and domestic) reason. Reason 
is public when: 1) it is ‘the reason of free and equal citizens, [so it] is the reason of the pub-
lic;’ 2) ‘its subject is the public good concerning questions of fundamental political justice, 
[that is,] constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice;’ 3) ‘its nature and content are 
public, being expressed in public reasoning by a family of reasonable conceptions of political 
justice reasonably thought to satisfy the criterion of reciprocity.’600 Now, it seems that the 
first point is endorsed by both Kant and Rawls. The difference is that, while for Kant ‘the 
public in the strict sense is the world,’ in Political Liberalism for Rawls the “public” refers to 
                                                        
598 Immanuel Kant, “Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” 18-19. Emphases added. 
599 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 220 note 7. Emphases added. 
600 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 442. 
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the political body of fellow citizens. With regard to the second point, ‘matters of basic justice’ 
are obviously not the sole subject of Kant’s public use of reason. However, the main differ-
ence regards the third point and is linked to the previous two. As I will explain presently, for 
Kant the fact that the public is potentially the world at large stems from the prerequisite that, 
for a use of reason to be public, it must refer exclusively to the universal and unconstrained 
authority of reason. On the contrary, as I will demonstrate in the next section, according to 
Rawls the ideal of public reason is derived starting from some “materials” already present in 
the public political culture of a democratic society, since its content is specified by a (family 
of) conception(s) of justice, which is (are) worked out ‘begin[ning] from shared fundamental 
ideas implicit in the public political culture,’ that is, from ‘what is, or can be, held in com-
mon.’601 Thus, Rawls’s ideal of public reason starts from what citizens (can) have in common, 
has a precise scope and subject, and bases its stability on the existence of an overlapping con-
sensus. On the other hand, Kant’s public use of reason also starts from what (the world’s) cit-
izens have in common: reason. Yet, as we will see, the authority of reason must be uncon-
strained, since it is not grounded in something transcendent or superior to it, so it must be free 
to “critically discover” itself. Kant would not accept the limits that Rawls imposes on public 
reason. I return to this claim at the end of the section, explaining how these limits derive from 
Rawls’s focus on the ‘domain of the political.’  
Kant’s idea that the freedom of the public use of reason is the only way for gaining further 
achievements in the process of enlightenment of the ‘society of citizens of the world’ is re-
peated in the essay On the Common Saying: That May be Correct in Theory, but it is of no 
Use in Practice (1793), where we read that: 
‘Freedom of the pen […] is the sole palladium of the people’s rights. For to 
want to deny them this freedom is not only tantamount to taking from them any 
claim to a right with respect to the supreme commander (according to Hobbes), 
but it is also to withhold from the latter –whose will gives order to the subjects as 
citizens only by representing the general will of the people− all knowledge of 
                                                        
601 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 100. See the end of this section. 
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matters that he himself would change if he knew about them and to put him in 
contradiction with himself.’602 
Finally, in the Second Supplement (“Secret Article for Perpetual Peace”) to Toward a Per-
petual Peace (1795), Kant says that the state should ‘allow [philosophers] to speak freely and 
publicly about universal maxims of waging war and establishing peace (for that they will do 
of their own accord, if only they are not forbidden to do so).’603 
Thus, according to Kant, publicity is the true mark of reason in the direction of humanity’s 
enlightenment. In the words of one commentator, the essay What is Enlightenment? makes  
‘Clear Kant’s equation of reason with the aspiration to full publicity. “To use 
one’s own reason” is to be engaged in the quest to address all “citizens of the 
world.” Our judgements and principles are only reasonable to the extent that they 
can be accepted by all –which means, among other things, that they cannot as-
sume the authority of any particular organization or leader.’604  
These considerations bring us back to the question of authority. Authority, publicity, audi-
ence/public(s), uses of reason, and toleration are internally related elements. I concisely fol-
low Onora O’Neill in the reconstruction of such nexus. I start from the concepts of publicity 
and publicisability. Moreover, I consider the problem of authority and how the latter (under-
stood as the authority of reason) is related to the ideas of toleration and legitimacy. 
According to O’Neill, the crucial aspect in the public uses of reason is the publicisability 
of communication: 
‘A communication that presupposes some authority other than that of reason 
may fail to communicate with those who are not subject to that authority; they can 
interpret it, if at all, only on the hypothesis of some claim that they reject. At some 
                                                        
602 Immanuel Kant, “On the Common Saying: That May be Correct in Theory, but it is of no Use in Practice,” in The 
Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, 302. 
603 Immanuel Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace,” in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical 
Philosophy, 337. 
604 Garrath Williams, “Kant’s Account of Reason,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta 
(Spring 2013), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/kant-reason/, 19 (page number refers to the 
printable pdf version). 
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points in the debates about such communications arguments must stop and author-
ity be invoked. But a communication that does not presuppose such an authority, 
and so is in principle accessible to the world at large and can be debated without 
invoking authority may, as it happens, actually be addressed to or understood by 
few. Publicizable communications may or may not receive full publicity. For Kant 
publicizability is more fundamental than publicity. Communications that cannot, 
however disseminated, reach those who do not accept or assume some authority 
are not full uses of reason at all. Communications that presuppose no external au-
thority are, even if they aim at and reach only a small audience, fit to be public 
uses of reason. Hence Kant regards communications between “men of learning” 
who are committed to reasoned inquiry as public […], although the circle of 
communication is small, whereas “enlightenment of the masses” needs publicity 
as well as publicizability.’605  
Therefore, even if the scholar’s writings actually reach only few people, they are nonethe-
less public uses of reason if they could –potentially− reach ‘the society of citizens of the 
world.’ Thus, O’Neill maintains that ‘[p]olitical progress ultimately requires communication 
that is both publicizable and made public. Only if we can communicate in ways that are gen-
erally interpretable is there any point in seeking an unrestricted audience.’606 Therefore, one 
could say that a use of reason –in order to contribute to the enlightenment of the society of 
human beings and to be qualified as a public use of reason− must possess the capacity (or 
quality or potency) for being made universally public (what O’Neill calls ‘publicisability’). 
This is the only real criterion we have, according to Kant, in order to judge the public charac-
ter of the use of reason. A genuine public use of reason entails what I shall call a “perfect” or 
“full” publicisability, that is, the virtual possibility of becoming universally public, since ‘the 
public in the strict sense [is] the world.’ Full or perfect publicisability means that the only au-
thority to which reason is subject in its public use is reason itself. Otherwise publicisability 
                                                        
605 Onora O’Neill, Constructions of Reasons, 34. Emphases added. 
606 Ibid. 
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could not be full (that is, universal). As Chambers puts it, ‘[p]ublic reason, in this Kantian 
sense, answers to no higher authority than reason itself.’607 Alternatively, in O’Neill’s words:  
‘A public use of reason [… must] assume no authority that could not be ac-
cepted by an unrestricted audience. Since “the world at large” accepts no common 
external authority, the only authority the communication can assume must be in-
ternal to the communication. […] What is spoken or written cannot count as a 
public use of reason merely because it is noised or displayed or broadcast to the 
world at large. Communication has also to meet sufficient standards of rationality 
to be interpretable to audiences who share no other, rationally ungrounded, au-
thorities. [… O]ne who reasons publicly must address, and so be interpretable by, 
all others.’608 
Thus, only by grounding our communications in the authority of reason (an authority that 
is internal to our communication) can we reach high standards of publicisability. This confers 
to our communications a public dimension, which is alien to communications grounded in 
particular (e.g., religious, administrative, and so on) authorities. Therefore, the difference be-
tween public and private uses of reasons traces back to a difference between a necessarily par-
ticular and limited audience and a potentially universal (even if, perhaps, actually small) audi-
ence, which in turn traces back to a difference between the reference to a particular authority 
(the authority of the state or a church, for instance) and the reference to the authority of rea-
son. What is relevant here is that this reference to the universal authority of reason explains 
Kant’s argument for toleration and freedom of public uses of reasons. The latter must be free, 
because only the authority of reason can say if those uses can withstand its own judgement. 
Public uses of reason are subject to the judgment of a tribunal in which reason itself is the fi-
nal judge. Precisely in this respect they differ from private uses of reason. Private and public 
uses of reason are subject to different jurisdictions: on the one hand, the universal jurisdiction 
of reason on its own, and, on the other hand, other particular (always limited and for this rea-
son ‘private’) jurisdictions depending on other (less-than-universal) authorities. Then, the au-
thority of reason lies in its capacity for self-criticism, which gradually lets some principles 
emerge as the most robust and agreed upon from a critical perspective:  
                                                        
607 Simone Chambers, “Who Shall Judge?” 362. 
608 Onora O’Neill, Constructions of Reasons, 35. 
  
 European Muslims and Liberal Citizenship 
Ph.D. Thesis successfully discussed on April 21, 2016.  
The total or partial use of the Ph.D. Thesis is subject to copyright restrictions. 
 
  
208  
 Giovanni Vezzani 
 
LUISS-ULB 
‘Reason, on this account, has no transcendent foundation, but is rather based on 
agreement of certain sort. Mere agreement […] would have no authority. What 
makes agreement of a certain sort authoritative is that it is agreement based on 
principles that meet their own criticism. […] Reason’s authority consists simply 
in the fact that the principles we come to think of as principles of reason are the 
ones that are neither self-stultifying nor self-defeating in use. The best way to find 
which principles have this character is to encourage the increasingly public use 
of reason.’609 
The last remark is important. Allowing reason critically to develop its own standards and 
principles means to let reason be the only authority with reference to itself. Then, a necessary 
condition for the development of rational standards and principles is that public uses of reason 
must be free. Kant underlines this point as follows: ‘The very existence of reason depends on 
that freedom; for reason can claim no dictatorial authority, but its decrees are always simply 
the agreement of free citizens, every one of whom may freely express, not only his objections, 
but even his veto.’610 If we want to reason publicly (that is, if we want to make our communi-
cations fully publicisable), we must appeal to the authority of reason. However, such an ap-
peal entails that, with reference to those uses of reason, the only judge in charge is reason it-
self. In turn, this means that no other “judge” could prevent one from publicly using her own 
reason. Then, in Kant’s account, freedom of public uses of reason is internally linked with 
reason’s authority and self-criticism. Without such freedom, reason could establish no tribu-
nal for itself, and the ‘society of citizens of the world’ would make no progress. O’Neill inter-
estingly expounds this correlation between reason’s self-criticism, reason’s authority, and tol-
eration in this passage: 
‘Toleration of public uses of reason is […] necessary for the emergence and 
maintenance of the increasingly generally shared standards of reasoning that fully 
public communication requires. […] In Kant’s view such self-criticism is best 
sustained in the form of free, critical and universal debate. Whereas the external 
authority of a “dictator” destroys the authority of reason, the debate of “fellow cit-
                                                        
609 Ibid. 38. Emphasis added. 
610 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A738/B766. The English edition quoted here is: Critique of Pure Reason, 
translated and edited by Marcus Weigelt, based on Max Müller’s translation (London: Penguin, 2007), 593. 
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izens” sustains it […] Criticism, and the toleration that criticism requires, are fun-
damental for the authority of reason […] To accept and foster the authority of rea-
son is to submit disputes to free and critical debate. Toleration, at least of incipi-
ently public uses of reason, has then quite a fundamental status in Kant’s thought. 
Without it the authority of reason ebbs. […] The development of reason and of 
toleration is interdependent: A measure of publicizability is needed for publicity; 
and publicity in turn is needed for further development of standards of publiciza-
bility. Practices of toleration help constitute reason’s authority.’611 
Thus, the free use of publicisable uses of reason allows them to become more and more 
public, that is, to be increasingly publicised. In turn, the fact that they are publicised allows to 
achieve more advanced standards of publicisability, thanks to the free exercise of reason’s 
powers of self-criticism.  
With this account of publicity in mind, I now consider the relation between the latter and 
the idea of legitimacy. Kant deals with this subject on several occasions, but an important ref-
erence to it can be found in the Second Appendix (“On the Agreement of Politics with Morals 
in Accord with the Transcendental Concept of Public Right”) to Toward a Perpetual Peace. 
As the title of the Appendix suggests, Kant is dealing with the problem of the relation be-
tween politics and morality. These two are mediated by the idea of publicity.612 
‘If I abstract from all the matter of public right as teachers of right usually 
think of it (from the various empirically given relations of individuals within a 
                                                        
611 Onora O’Neill, Constructions of Reasons, 38-39. Emphases added. 
612 ‘The duplicity of politics with respect to morals, in making use of one or the other branch of it for its purposes, abets 
this. Both philanthropy and respect for the rights of the human being are duties: but the former is only conditional duty 
whereas the latter is unconditional duty, commanding absolutely, and whoever wants to give himself up to sweet feel-
ing of benefice must first be completely assured that he has not transgressed this unconditional duty. Politics readily 
agrees with morals in the first sense (as ethics), in order to surrender the rights of human beings to their superiors; but 
with morals in the second meaning (as doctrine of right), before which it would have to bend its knee, it finds it advisa-
ble not to get involved in any pact at all, preferring to deny it any reality and to construe all duties as benevolence only; 
but this ruse of a furtive politics would still be easily thwarted by philosophy, publicizing those maxims it uses, if only 
politics would venture to let philosophers publicize their own maxims.’ Immanuel Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace,” 
351. In the First Appendix, Kant defines principles of public right as ‘politics cognizable a priori,’ adding that ‘it is just 
the general will given a priori (within a nation or in the relation of various nations to one another) that alone determines 
what is laid down as right among human beings; but this union of the will of all, if only it is acted upon consistently in 
practice, can also, in accordance with the mechanism of nature, be the cause bringing about the effect aimed at and 
providing the concept of right with efficacy. Thus it is, for example, a principle of moral politics that a people is to unite 
itself into a state in accordance with freedom and equality as the sole concepts of right, and this principle is not based 
upon prudence, but upon duty.’ Ibid. 345. 
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state or also of states to one another), I am still left with the form of publicity, the 
possibility of which is involved in every claim to a right, since without it there 
would be no justice (which can be thought only as publicly known), and so too no 
right, which is conferred only by justice. Every claim to a right must have this ca-
pacity for publicity, and since one can very easily appraise whether it is present in 
a case at hand –that is, whether or not publicity is consistent with an agent’s prin-
ciples− it can yield a criterion to be found a priori in reason that is very easy to 
use; in case they are inconsistent we can cognize at once, as if by an experiment 
of pure reason, the falsity (illegitimacy) of the claim in question (praetensio iu-
ris).’613 
Such an abstraction from all the matter (empirical or factual relations) to the pure form of 
right (the pure form of publicity), allows Kant to make explicit a ‘transcendental formula of 
public right,’ which says that ‘all actions relating to the rights of others are wrong if their 
maxim is incompatible with publicity.’614 As Kant plainly recognises, this principle is a nega-
tive one: it says what is wrong from both an ethical and a juridical perspective.615 As Mancina 
argues, ‘a maxim that cannot be declared publicly, because it would provoke general opposi-
tion, is unjust. Then, publicity must not be understood as a merely empirical condition, […] 
but as a moral and juridical condition.’616 However, Kant identifies a second –positive− tran-
scendental principle of public right: ‘all maxims which need publicity (in order not to fail in 
their end) harmonize with right and politics combined.’617 Publicity, then, reconciles politics 
and morality. Following Mancina one more time, one could observe that ‘publicity verifies 
the agreement of a political maxim with public right [… P]ublicity [is an ethical category of 
communication only if the latter is understood] as a juridical status, precisely the juridical sta-
tus deriving from the original contract and which can only have the name of public right. Pub-
                                                        
613 Ibid. 347. 
614 Ibid. 
615 Ibid.: ‘For a maxim that I cannot divulge without thereby defeating my own purpose, one that absolutely must be 
kept secret if it is to succeed and that I cannot publicly acknowledge without unavoidably arousing everyone’s opposi-
tion to my project, can derive this necessary and universal, hence a priori foreseeable, resistance of everyone to me only 
from the injustice with which it threatens everyone.’ 
616 Claudia Mancina, “Uso pubblico della ragione e ragione pubblica,” 38. My translation. 
617 Immanuel Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace,” 351. 
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licity then embeds the Rousseauian idea of legitimacy: there is no legitimate power without 
publicity.’618 As the last observation reveals, this interrelation between publicity and legitima-
cy calls into question the concept of a social contract. Kant expresses his conception in On the 
Common Saying: That May be Correct in Theory, but it is of no Use in Practice. Two ex-
cerpts are relevant: 
‘Now this is an original contract, on which alone a civil and hence thoroughly 
rightful constitution among human beings can be based and a commonwealth es-
tablished. [… This contract] is only an idea of reason, which however, has its un-
doubted practical reality, namely to bind every legislator to give his laws in such a 
way that they could have arisen from the united will of a whole people and to re-
gard each subject, insofar as he wants to be a citizen, as if he has joined in voting 
for such a will. For this is the touchstone of any public law’s conformity with the 
right [emphasis added]. In other words, if a public law is so constituted that a 
whole people could not possibly give its consent to it […], it is unjust; but if it is 
only possible that a people could agree to it, it is a duty to consider the law just, 
even if the people is at present in such a situation or frame or mind that, if con-
sulted about it, it would probably refuse its consent.’619 
And:  
‘Here it is obvious what evil the principle of happiness (which is really not fit 
for any determinate principle at all) gives rise to in the right of a state, just as it 
does in morals, despite the best intentions of those who teach it. The sovereign 
wants to make people happy in accordance with his concepts and becomes a des-
pot; the people are not willing to give up their universal human claim to their own 
happiness and become rebels. Had it first been asked what is laid down as right 
(where principles stand firm a priori and no empiricist can bungle them), then the 
idea of the social contract would remain in its incontestable authority, not howev-
                                                        
618 Claudia Mancina, “Uso pubblico della ragione e ragione pubblica,” 38. My translation. 
619 Immanuel Kant, “On the Common Saying: That May be Correct in Theory,” 296-297. 
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er as a fact […] but only as a rational principle for appraising any public rightful 
constitution.’620 
Here I cannot consider the differences between the Rawlsian original position as a ‘device 
of representation’ and the Kantian social contract as an ‘idea of reason.’ Nor, apart from some 
remarks at the end of this section, can I focus on the idea of constructivism.621 What I shall 
say here is that Kant’s understanding of the social contract as a ‘touchstone of any law’s con-
formity with the right’ is clearly not far from Rawls’s conception of the original position, 
where the agreement ‘represents the outcome of a rational process of deliberation under ideal 
and nonhistorical conditions that express certain reasonable constraints,’ thus, the ‘content of 
justice must be discovered by reason: that is, by solving the agreement problem posed by the 
original position.’622 Therefore, both Kant and Rawls see the social contract as a hypothetical 
situation for solving the problem of rational agreement on legitimate laws or principles. Ob-
viously, the ways in which this result is achieved are different, mainly due to the Rawlsian 
political understanding of the notion of reasonableness (see below and next section). Howev-
er, with these remarks on the social contract in mind, I can now make explicit my interpreta-
tion of the link between the latter, legitimacy, and publicity in Kant’s work. As I have said, in 
Kant’s account the social contract is the hypothetical situation for evaluating the conformity 
of laws passed by the sovereign with the right (that is, for appraising their legitimacy). Since 
Kant famously and repeatedly excludes any possibility of revolution against or resistance to 
the ‘supreme legislative power,’623 one could think that the problem of legitimacy risks being 
formulated in quasi-Hobbesian terms: whatever the sovereign decides to be the right is ipso 
facto legitimate, because the commonwealth would be destroyed otherwise. This reading 
seems to be supported by affirmations like the following one: ‘if a people now subject to a 
certain actual legislation were to judge that in all probability this is detrimental to its happi-
ness, what is to be done about it? Should the people not resist it? The answer can only be that, 
                                                        
620 Ibid. 300-301. Emphasis added. 
621 John Rawls, in particular “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory” and Political Liberalism (especially 89-129). 
See also, among others, Onora O’Neill, “Constructivism in Rawls and Kant,” in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, 
347-367. For a “Kantian dialogue” between Rawls and Habermas, see Thomas McCarthy, “Kantian Constructivism and 
Reconstructivism: Rawls and Habermas in Dialogue,” Ethics 105, no. 1 (1994), in particular 54-56 and 58-63. 
622 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 273 and 274. 
623 See, for instance, Immanuel Kant, “On the Common Saying: That May be Correct in Theory,” 298 and “The Meta-
physics of Morals,” in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, 462-465. 
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on the part of the people, there is nothing to do about it but to obey.’624 However, one could 
simply observe that after all the subtitle of this section of Kant’s writing is “Against Hobbes.” 
And Kant’s principled opposition to a Hobbesian interpretation of social stability and legiti-
macy is made clear in the lines that come immediately after those that I have just quoted:  
‘Should the people not resist it? The answer can only be that, on the part of the 
people, there is nothing to do about it but to obey. For what is under discussion 
here is not the happiness that a subject may expect from the institution or admin-
istration of a commonwealth but above all merely the right that is to be secured 
for each by means of it, which is the supreme principle for which all maxims hav-
ing to do with a commonwealth must proceed and which is limited by no other 
principle. With respect to the former (happiness) no universally valid principle for 
laws can be given. [… T]he public well-being that must first be taken into account 
is precisely that lawful constitution which secures everyone his freedom by laws, 
whereby each remains at liberty to seek his happiness in whatever way seems best 
to him, provided he does not infringe upon that universal freedom in conformity 
with law and hence upon the right of other fellow subjects [emphases added].’625 
In other words, the crucial criterion for assessing the legitimacy of laws and on which so-
cial stability must be grounded is the overriding principle of right. The latter has the priority 
and establishes the limits of citizens’ (‘subjects’’) pursuit of their own happiness. Moreover, 
the priority of the principle of right also explains why Kant connects obedience to law with its 
conformity with the right: 
‘[T]he legislator can indeed err in his appraisal of whether those measures 
[which are also directed to citizens’ happiness –prosperity, increased population 
and the like−] are adopted prudently, but not when he asks himself whether the 
law also harmonizes with the principle of right; for there he has that idea of the 
original contract at hand as an infallible standard, and indeed has it a priori (and 
need not, as with the principle of happiness, wait for experience that would first 
have to teach him whether his means are suitable). For, provided it is not self-
                                                        
624 Immanuel Kant, “On the Common Saying: That May be Correct in Theory,” 297. 
625 Ibid. 
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contradictory that an entire people should agree to such law, however bitter they 
might find it, the law is in conformity with right. But if a public law is in con-
formity with this, and so beyond reproach (irreprehensible) with regard to right, 
then there is also joined with it authorization to coerce and, on the other’s part, a 
prohibition against actively resisting the will of the legislator; that is, the power 
within a state that gives effect to the law is also unopposable (irresistible).’626 
In this sense, I think, Kant says that the law must be irreprehensible from the point of view 
of the right: the fact that law is ‘irresistible’ is necessarily premised on the fact that it is ‘irrep-
rehensible’ with regard to the right. Precisely the above-mentioned account of the relation be-
tween publicity, freedom/toleration, reason’s self-criticism and progress contributes to putting 
the problem of legitimation in a new light and distinguishing it from a Hobbesian account. 
We are brought back to the consideration that ‘freedom of the pen is the sole palladium of the 
people’s rights.’ Freedom and publicity “open” the supreme power of the sovereign to a po-
tentially dynamic process of adjustment and revision, consistent with Kant’s conception of 
reason’s self-criticism.627 This idea is embedded in a ‘negative right’ of the people: ‘what a 
people cannot decree for itself, a legislator also cannot decree for a people.’628 Only free pub-
lic uses of reason are able to disclose what is consistent with the right and, thus, legitimate: 
‘[i]n every commonwealth there must be obedience under the mechanism of the state consti-
tution to coercive laws (applying to the whole), but there must also be a spirit of freedom, 
since each, in what has to do with universal human duties, requires to be convinced by reason 
that this coercion is in conformity with right [emphasis added], lest he fall into contradiction 
with himself.’629 
Such a relation between publicity, social contract, and legitimacy entangles another crucial 
notion: the notion of reciprocity. As I understand it (building mainly on Mancina and 
O’Neill), in Kant’s work reciprocity can be interpreted as deeply related to the above-
mentioned concepts of communication and publicisability between rational human beings. A 
                                                        
626 Ibid. 298. 
627 Ibid. 302. 
628 Ibid. 
629 Ibid. 303. 
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hint of this account can be found in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), 
with reference to Kant’s conception of human dignity. The latter can be understood in terms 
of the free subjection of an autonomous will to the universal laws of reason:  
‘Morality is thus the relation of actions to the autonomy of the will, that is, to a 
possible giving of universal law through its maxims. An action that can coexist 
with the autonomy of the will is permitted; one that does not accord with it is for-
bidden. A will whose maxims necessarily harmonize with the laws of autonomy is 
a holy, absolutely good will. The dependence upon the principle of autonomy of a 
will that is not absolutely good (moral necessitation) is obligation. […] The objec-
tive necessity of an action from obligation is called duty. [… A]lthough in think-
ing the concept of duty we think of subjection to the law, yet at the same time we 
thereby represent a certain sublimity and dignity in the person who fulfills all his 
duties. For there is indeed no sublimity in him insofar as he is subject to the moral 
law, but there certainly is insofar as he is at the same time lawgiving with respect 
to it and only for that reason subordinated to it.’630 
Kant develops this conception of dignity while he is discussing the idea of a ‘kingdom of 
ends’ (and stating the formula of universal law).631 Human dignity emerges as the moral out-
come of the participation of free autonomous wills to the universal legislation establishing a 
‘merely possible kingdom of ends.’ The latter is understood as ‘a systematic union of various 
rational beings through common laws [which determine ends in their universal validity –by 
abstracting from the personal differences of rational beings as well as from all the content of 
their private ends−, thus it is understood as] a whole of all ends in systematic connection.’632 
Then, human dignity consists of being able to be member of such a kingdom. This is the dis-
                                                        
630 Immanuel Kant, “Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Morals,” in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel 
Kant: Practical Philosophy, 88. 
631 Here I merely wish to recall this formula. For a discussion about Groundwork’s formulas, see Allen Wood, “General 
Introduction” to The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, xxii-xxiv. Formula of 
universal law: ‘I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a univer-
sal law’ (Immanuel Kant, “Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Morals,” 57). Formula of the law of nature: ‘act as if the 
maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature’ (ibid. 73). Formula of humanity: ‘so act 
that you use humanity, whether in your person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never 
merely as a means’ (ibid. 80). Formula of autonomy: ‘act so that [your] will could regard itself as giving universal law 
through all its maxims’ (ibid. 84). Formula of the kingdom of ends: ‘act in accordance with the maxims of a member 
giving universal laws for a merely possible kingdom of ends, (ibid. 88).  
632 Immanuel Kant, “Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Morals,” 83. 
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tinctive feature of a rational being: ‘the dignity (prerogative) he has over all merely natural 
beings brings with it that he must always take his maxims from the point of view of himself, 
and likewise every other rational being, as lawgiving beings […I]n this way a world of ra-
tional beings (mundus intelligibilis) as a kingdom of ends is possible, through the giving of 
their own laws by all persons as members.’633 At this point, the concept of respect for the 
equal dignity of rational beings as members of a possible kingdom of ends emerges: 
‘[N]othing can have a worth other than that which law determines for it. But 
the lawgiving itself, which determines all worth, must for that very reason have a 
dignity, that is, an unconditional, incomparable worth [emphasis added]; and the 
word respect alone provides a becoming expression for the estimate of it that a ra-
tional being must give. Autonomy is therefore the ground of the dignity of human 
nature and of every rational nature.’634 
In this way, we return where we started in the previous discussion of What is Enlighten-
ment?: that is, we return to the relation between autonomy and the authority of reason, this 
time understood from a more moral and political perspective. Respect is due to other rational 
beings who try to exercise the powers of their reason and who reciprocally regard one another 
as members of the same possible kingdom of ends. From these remarks and from the preced-
ing discussion about toleration, it follows that respect and reciprocity have a moral and pub-
lic-political character. This conclusion is supported by Kant’s emphasis on a faculty of com-
munication (that he calls ‘sensus communis’) ‘which in its reflective act takes account […] of 
the mode of representation of everyone else, in order, as it were, to weigh its judgement with 
the collective reason of man-kind, and thereby avoid the illusion arising from subjective and 
personal conditions.’635 O’Neill calls this faculty ‘public sense,’ which requires other maxims 
‘as guides in our thinking and communicating.’636 Those further maxims are: ‘to think for 
                                                        
633 Ibid. 87. 
634 Ibid. 85. 
635 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, V, 294-295, quoted in Onora O’Neill, Constructions of Reasons, 45. 
636 Onora O’Neill, Constructions of Reasons, 45. 
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oneself,’ ‘to think from the standpoint of everyone else,’ and ‘always to think consistently.’637 
While O’Neill rightly stresses the significance of these maxims with reference to communica-
tion, I would add that at the same time and for the same reasons they also manifest the idea of 
reciprocity between communicating rational beings. In more details, it seems to me that these 
three maxims bring to light three dimensions of reciprocity. The first maxim (‘to think for 
one-self’) underlines the necessary separateness/distinctiveness of each person. Reciprocity 
would be meaningless if it were impossible to identify different subjects. In that case, it would 
be more correct to speak of fusion and (at most) of interactions between identical merged 
components. On the contrary, reciprocity requires some separation. The second maxim (‘to 
think from the standpoint of everyone else’) embeds a tension toward the perspective of the 
other and the kind of “mirroring” that represents the most characterising feature of the con-
cept of reciprocity. Finally, the third maxim (‘always to think consistently’) must be under-
stood, as O’Neill points out, as an ‘unending and exacting task,’ since ‘[i]f reason is to 
achieve consistency between the understanding and judgements of a plurality of inquirers, 
then the maxim of consistent thought is in effect a maxim of seeking to render whole bodies 
of thought coherent, and so appropriately the maxim of an unending philosophical task.’638 
Thus, the third maxim can be understood as the “integrative” dimension of reciprocity, where 
each separate person, after having ‘thought from the standpoint of everyone else,’ tries to 
draw coherent conclusions from that exercise. Coherence must be measured here not as some-
thing internally fixed or stable with reference to the thinker. Rather, as something more dy-
namic: a reflective exercise in which the thinker tries to adjust her own beliefs with the broad-
er context she knew when she ventured into the sea of human otherness. From a Kantian per-
spective, this sea –if properly qualified− is what may bring to a ‘kingdom of ends.’ If this 
short account of publicity, social contract, legitimacy, and reciprocity is convincing, then one 
can understand Mancina’s claim that ‘[i]t is meaningful that Rawls associates [In Italian: ap-
parenti] his criterion of reciprocity with Kant’s original contract: with this, he says that reci-
                                                        
637 Quoted in ibid. 46-47. For the first of those maxims O’Neill refers to Kant’s What is Orientation in Thinking, VIII, 
145; for both the second and the third to Critique of Judgement, V, 294.  
638 Onora O’Neill, Constructions of Reasons, 47. 
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procity determines a political structure based on mutual respect, rather than on mere mutual 
advantage (like in Hobbes’s contractualism).’639  
As I have said at the beginning of this section, a reconstruction of the Kantian conception 
of the public use of reason is an important preliminary step to understanding Rawls’s public rea-
son. The reason for that is that both Kant and Rawls endorse the idea of an internal connection 
between publicity of reason’s use, legitimacy, and reciprocity. Such a link represents a funda-
mental element of the political dimension of human life640 and develops itself in the practical 
sphere. I have already analysed this connection in Kant’s works, and in the next section I will 
analyse it in Rawls’s conception. Apart from this “legacy,” what further conclusions can we 
draw? Here I remember the caveat expressed by Rawls in his letter to the editor: ‘throughout the 
original text the idea of […] practical reason often appears, which to most readers had suggested 
that Kant’s ideas of practical reason were being used. Many readers got the idea that my view is 
Kant’s or similar to it, but that is a serious mistake.’641 However, the references to practical rea-
son in Political Liberalism (to which I referred in chapter two) obviously do not mean that Rawls 
endorses tout court Kant’s conception of practical reason. I think we are not obliged to expunge 
those references, if only we can understand the use Rawls makes of them. In this study, I do not 
aim to reconstruct Rawls’s conception of reason as such. However, here I can simply sketch out 
some considerations. Similarly to Kant,642 Rawls affirms the primacy of practical reason: 
‘The procedure of construction is based essentially on practical reason and not 
on theoretical reason. Following Kant’s way of making the distinction, we say: 
practical reason is concerned with the production of objects according to the con-
ception of those objects –for example, the conception of a just constitutional re-
gime taken as the aim of political endeavor− while theoretical reason is concerned 
with the knowledge of given objects. [… However, theoretical reason] shapes the 
                                                        
639 Claudia Mancina, “Uso pubblico della ragione e ragione pubblica,” 49. My translation. 
640 I cannot analyse here Kant’s doctrine of right and his conception of the relations within the state and among the 
states. For this, see mainly “On the Common Saying: That May be Correct in Theory,” parts two and three; “Toward a 
Perpetual Peace;” “The Metaphysics of Morals,” part two (“Public Right”). For my aims, what I have said with refer-
ence to publicity, reciprocity, and the social contract will suffice. 
641 See the expanded edition of Political Liberalism, 438. 
642 See Garrath Williams, “Kant’s Account of Reason,” 13-15. 
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beliefs and knowledge of the rational persons who have a part in the construction; 
and these persons also use their general capacities of reasoning, inference, and 
judgement in selecting the principles of justice.’643 
Moreover, in “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” Rawls argues that: 
‘[T]he way in which the Reasonable frames the Rational in the original posi-
tion represents a feature of the unity of practical reason. In Kant’s terms, empiri-
cal practical reason is represented by the rational deliberations of the parties; pure 
practical reason is represented by the constraints within which these deliberations 
take place. The unity of practical reason is expressed by defining the Reasonable 
to frame the Rational and to subordinate it absolutely; that is, the principles of 
justice that are agreed are lexically prior in their application in a well-ordered so-
ciety to claims of the good. […] This illustrates one feature of the unity of reason: 
the Reasonable and the Rational are unified within one scheme of practical rea-
soning which establishes the strict priority of the Reasonable with respect to the 
Rational. This priority of the right over the good is characteristic of Kantian con-
structivism.’644 
Now, it is surely true that Rawls made this claim before (in the case of “Kantian Construc-
tivism,” about twenty years before) his proposal of revision of Political Liberalism and his 
“The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” on which I mainly base my understanding of public 
reason. I am aware that the shift from “Kantian Constructivism” to Political Liberalism in-
volved major changes, and that apparently Rawls was more and more careful about making 
clear the difference between his political theory and Kant’s philosophy. Thus, while here I do 
not venture to say to what degree Rawls’s work was Kantian at the beginning and to what ex-
tent it is Kantian at the end, nor to pinpoint where the deepest Kantian legacies lie, I think that 
disclosing some of these points may help to untangle some important knots. Hence, coming 
back to the last quotation, it is noteworthy that, by dismissing the transcendental unity of rea-
                                                        
643 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 93. 
644 John Rawls “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” 319. Emphasis added. See also “Themes in Kant’s Moral 
Philosophy,” in John Rawls, Collected Papers, 510 and 513-516. 
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son,645 Rawls is able to distinguish politically the reasonable from the rational in the proce-
dure of political construction. That is, in Rawls’s political liberal model reasonableness 
emerges as a distinctive category of the political. As I will try to explain in a moment, the dis-
tinctive feature of a Rawlsian account is the eminently political dimension of his conception 
of reason in its public practical use.  
This point is clear if we briefly consider what O’Neill judges to be the main difference be-
tween Kant’s and Rawls’s (with reference to Political Liberalism) constructivism. According 
to O’Neill, Kant not only constructively justifies principles of action through the categorical 
imperative (mainly in the formula of universal law: ‘I ought never to act except in such a way 
that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law,’ supra),646 but he also 
constructively justifies the supreme principle of practical reason (i.e., the categorical impera-
tive) itself: 
‘[For Kant] there is no independent order of reason which lays down a com-
mon plan or procedure that constitutes the principle(s) of practical reasoning: 
“reason has no dictatorial authority.” Since reason is not provided from “on high,” 
we will either dispose of no more than rationality, or must show how a conception 
of reasonableness can be constructed out of the capacities and materials which 
human agents actually have at their disposal. […] As Kant depicts the matter, the 
very predicament of a plurality of uncoordinated agents is all we can presuppose 
in trying to identify principles of practical reason: it is because reason’s authority 
is not given that it must be instituted or constituted –constructed− by human 
agents. […] Yet they need, if they are to organise their thinking and doing togeth-
er, to find −to construct− some common authority. […] Since all they have in 
common is their lack of a given “plan of reason,” all they can do is to refuse to 
treat any of the various faiths and beliefs, traditions and norms, claims and propo-
sitions they variously adhere to as having an unrestricted authority for organising 
thinking and doing. [… Then, they must] adopt the overarching principle of think-
                                                        
645 Claudia Mancina, “Uso pubblico della ragione e ragione pubblica,” 41. 
646 Onora O’Neill, “Constructivism in Rawls and Kant,” 355. 
  
 European Muslims and Liberal Citizenship 
Ph.D. Thesis successfully discussed on April 21, 2016.  
The total or partial use of the Ph.D. Thesis is subject to copyright restrictions. 
 
  
221  
 Giovanni Vezzani 
 
LUISS-ULB 
ing and acting only on principles which they regard as open to, and followable by, 
all.’647 
Thus, there are two steps in this account of Kant’s reasoning. First, he constructively justi-
fies the supreme principle of practical reason (the categorical imperative) as the necessitation 
to act from the representation of the pure form of the moral law, that is, as the sole universal 
and unconditioned ground for constructively justifying principles of action in the second 
stage.648 The justification of the categorical imperative lies in the necessity of a universal and 
(for this reason) unrestricted “supreme principle” of practical reasoning. The authority of rea-
son, as I have already mentioned, is not grounded in something that is antecedent or superior 
to itself. Only on such self-establishing ground can the constructive second step acquire the 
required unconditionality. Yet, according to O’Neill, Rawls denies the possibility of the first 
step of the construction, that is, a constructive justification of the conception of practical rea-
son and of its supreme principle.649 As O’Neill observes, in Themes in Kant’s Moral Philoso-
phy Rawls writes: 
‘First, in moral constructivism, what is it that is constructed? The answer is: 
the content of the doctrine. […] A second question is this: Is the CI-procedure 
                                                        
647 Ibid. 357-358. 
648 The categorical imperative imposes on the will of a rational being the absolute and objective necessity to act in ac-
cordance to the representation of the moral law: ‘[o]nly a rational being has the capacity to act in accordance with the 
representation of laws, that is, in accordance with principles, or as a will. Since reason is required for the derivation of 
actions from laws, the will is nothing other than practical reason. If reason infallibly determines the will, the actions of 
such a being that are cognized as objectively necessary are also subjectively necessary, that is, the will is a capacity to 
choose only that which reason independently of inclinations cognizes as practically necessary, that is as good. However 
[…] if the will is exposed also to subjective conditions (certain incentives) that are not always in accord with the objec-
tives ones […,] in a word, if the will is not in itself completely in conformity with reason (as is actually the case with 
human beings), then actions that are cognized as objectively necessary are subjectively contingent, and the determina-
tion of such a will in conformity with objective laws is a necessitation […] The representation of an objective principle, 
insofar as it is necessitating for a will, is called a command (of reason) and the formula of the command is called an im-
perative.’ Immanuel Kant, “Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Morals,” 66. Imperatives are hypothetic if they repre-
sent the necessity (that is, they command) to act in a certain way ‘as a means to achieving something else.’ On the con-
trary, the categorical imperative commands an action as necessary in itself, ‘without reference to another end.’ It is a 
command that expresses ‘an unconditional and objective and hence universally valid necessity’ and that ‘must be 
obeyed, that is, must be followed even against inclination.’ Ibid. 69. Kant also maintains that ‘the categorical imperative 
alone has the tenor of a practical law; all others can indeed be called principles of the will but not laws, since what it is 
necessary to do merely for achieving a discretionary purpose can be regarded as in itself contingent and we can always 
be released from the precept if we give up the purpose; on the contrary, the unconditional command leaves the will no 
discretion with respect to the opposite, so that it alone brings with it that necessity which we require from the law.’ Ibid. 
72.  
649 Onora O’Neill, “Constructivism in Rawls and Kant,” 356. 
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[that is, the categorical imperative-procedure] itself constructed? No, it is not. Ra-
ther, it is simply laid out. […] The idea here is that not everything can be con-
structed and every construction has a basis, certain materials, as it were, from 
which it begins. While the CI-procedure is not […] constructed but laid out, it 
does have a basis; and this basis is the conception of free and equal persons as 
reasonable and rational, a conception that is mirrored in the procedure.’650 
Rawls adds that Kant does not establish further justificatory grounds for his conception of 
the moral law, since he adopts a coherentist account of the authentication practical reason.651 
In other words, the primacy of pure practical reason does not need to be justified in its turn, 
since it simply completes the ‘constitution of reason as one unified body of principles: this 
makes reason self-authenticating as a whole.’652 This coherence is acknowledged as a ‘fact of 
reason.’653 According to Rawls, Kant’s categorical imperative −as supreme principle of pure 
practical reason− needs no justification, since it is recognised as a fact of reason. This recog-
nition is necessitated by pure practical reason itself, since it shows the practical reality of the 
‘faculty of freedom.’654 In fact, Rawls says that ‘Kant […] accepts the view that pure practical 
reason, with the moral law as its first principle, is authenticated by the fact of reason and in 
                                                        
650 John Rawls, “Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy,” 513-514. 
651 Ibid. 523. 
652 Ibid. 
653 Ibid. 
654 ‘[M]oral law is the only way for us to construct a unified public order of conduct without falling into heteronomy. 
[…] Acting from pure practical reason involves first, bringing about an object the conception of which is framed in the 
light of the ideas and principles of pure practical reason, and second, our being moved (in the appropriate way) by pure 
practical interest in realizing that conception. Since it is in virtue of our reason that we can be fully free, only those ac-
tions meeting these two conditions are fully free.’ Ibid. 521. See Kant’s “Critique of Practical Reason,” in The Cam-
bridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, 177-178: ‘Moreover the moral law is given, as it 
were, as a fact of pure reason of which we are a priori conscious and which is apodictically certain, though it be granted 
that no example of exact observance of it can be found in experience. Hence, the objective reality of the moral law can-
not be proved by any deduction, by any efforts of theoretical reason, speculative or empirically supported […]; and it is 
nevertheless firmly established of itself. But something different and quite paradoxical takes the place of this vainly 
sought deduction of the moral principle, namely that the moral principle, conversely itself serves as the principle of the 
deduction of an inscrutable faculty which no experience could prove but which speculative reason has to assume as at 
least possible (in order to find among its cosmological ideas what is unconditioned in its causality, so as not to contra-
dict itself), namely the faculty of freedom, of which the moral law, which itself has no need of justifying grounds, proves 
not only the possibility but the reality in beings who cognize this law as binding upon them.’ Emphases added. 
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turn by that fact’s authenticating, in those who acknowledge the moral law as binding, the ob-
jective reality of freedom, although always […] only from a practical point of view.’655  
As mentioned, since ‘not everything can be constructed and any construction has a basis,’ 
for Rawls the conception of reasonableness cannot itself be constructed, but must be ‘laid 
down’ starting from ‘shared fundamental ideas implicit in public political culture.’ Therefore, 
as I said before, the reasonable emerges as an eminently political category. In O’Neill’s un-
derstanding, this means that Rawls’s constructivism is more limited and less radical than 
Kant’s constructivism. Since it is “anchored” in public political culture and depends for its 
stability on the overlapping consensus of citizens, it involves restrictions that would be unac-
ceptable to Kant’s view of unrestricted reason.656 As I concisely mentioned in the first chapter 
and I will explain in greater detail in 5.2.c, O’Neill criticises Rawls’s conception of public 
reason by saying that while Kant’s practical reasoning ‘does not assume that those who rea-
son must share a political identity,’ in Rawls’s ‘more Rousseauian conception […] public rea-
son is identified with citizens’ reason.’657 She concludes that in ‘Kant’s eyes, a Rawlsian con-
ception of public reason would not be fully public, nor therefore fully reasoned.’658 From a 
Kantian perspective, O’Neill argues that: 
‘“Outsiders” would legitimately view any claim that principles of reason are to 
be identified with the specific beliefs or norms of groups from which they are ex-
cluded as fetishising some arbitrary claim […]. Ways of organising thinking and 
acting that appeal to such spurious “authorities” –whether edicts of Church or 
State […] or the public culture of a particular democratic society− are not ways of 
reasoning: they are simply arbitrary for foreigners, dissidents, the excluded and 
other outsiders.’659 
Thus, as we saw at the beginning of the section, for the Kantian cosmopolitan view, in the 
constructive procedure the proper public of reason is the world at large. On the other hand, 
                                                        
655 John Rawls, “Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy,” 523. 
656 Onora O’Neill, “Constructivism in Rawls and Kant,” 359. 
657 Onora O’Neill, “Political Liberalism and Public Reason,” 423. 
658 Ibid. 424. 
659 Onora O’Neill, “Constructivism in Rawls and Kant,” 359. 
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due to the role he gives to public political culture and to the cooperative political relationship 
between fellow citizens in his procedure of political construction, Rawls ‘views bounded so-
cieties as in part constitutive of reason, [and] must treat international justice as an appendix to 
domestic justice.’660 Moreover, as mentioned, while Rawls’s political constructivism is lim-
ited to matters of political justice, Kant’s constructivism, ‘which [does not presuppose] shared 
citizenship, can aim at a fuller range of ethical justification.’661 Now, here it is not necessary 
to say which of these two readings of Kant’s constructivism is more plausible. Whether Kant 
proposes a coherentist or a radical version of constructivism is not a question of crucial im-
portance here. What matters is that there are indeed two main differences between a Rawlsian 
and a Kantian constructivist approach: the first refers to the subject (respectively, only matters 
of political justice or broader moral issues) and the second to the public (respectively, only 
fellow citizens or all rational beings). Such differences derive from Rawls characterisation of 
the reasonable in political terms. This is done through the role he ascribes to public political 
culture in developing the political conception and to the overlapping consensus in securing its 
stability. In contrast with Kant, Rawls does not presupposes a mere ‘plurality of uncoordinat-
ed agents’662 who share only the fact that they are all endowed with reason, but a political so-
ciety in which effective social cooperation and a shared political culture do have a role. In 
particular, they characterise reasonableness as a specifically political notion. Thus, for Rawls 
reason in its public practical use is not unrestricted in the Kantian sense. Instead, it is oriented 
by the political domain in which it is exercised. Political liberalism does not deal with Kant’s 
pure practical reason, but with a notion of practical reason confined to and restricted by the 
domain of the political in which it is deployed. In other words, political liberalism deals with 
a “political conception of practical reason,” which shapes the idea of public reason. In this 
way, we can explain why Rawls repeatedly says that he does not endorse Kant’s view: 
‘Justice as fairness aims to uncovering a public basis of justification on ques-
tions of political justice given the fact of reasonable pluralism. Since justification 
is addressed to others, it proceeds from what is, or can be, held in common; and so 
we begin from shared fundamental ideas implicit in the public political culture in 
                                                        
660 Ibid. 360. 
661 Ibid. 361. 
662 Ibid. 358. 
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the hope of developing from them a political conception that can gain free and 
reasoned agreement in judgement, this agreement being stable in virtue of its 
gaining the support of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines. These conditions suffice for a reasonable political conception of jus-
tice.’663 
This also entails a different conception of autonomy. As I have explained, Kant’s autono-
my is an ethical and political ideal necessitated by reason for its own self-criticism and devel-
opment (what Rawls calls ‘constitutive autonomy’).664 In Rawls’s view, on the other hand, the 
distinction between the rational and the reasonable in the process of political construction en-
sures that they can reunite (while remaining distinct) in shaping the political –and not ethi-
cal665− ideal of ‘full autonomy,’ in which the politically reasonable is embedded into the ra-
tional subject, and not imposed on the subject from outside, like in the case of ‘rational au-
tonomy’ in the original position.666 
In this section, I only aimed to present the main elements of Kant’s conception of public 
uses of reason in the broader context of his works. The next section will clarify some of the 
remarks about Rawls’s view of public reason that here I have only sketched out. 
 
3.2 Rawls’s Public Reason. 
 
Rawls has developed his conception of public reason gradually. In fact, even though this 
idea was explicitly stated only in his later works, Charles Larmore claims that ‘the concept it-
self has always been at the heart of [Rawls’s] philosophy.’667 Larmore retraces the unifying 
element of such a concept in ‘the spirit of reciprocity’ underlying Rawls’s conception of jus-
                                                        
663 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 100-101. 
664 Ibid. 99. 
665 Ibid. 77. 
666 Ibid. 72-76, 77-81, 305-306. I report Rawls’s definitions of ‘full autonomy’ and ‘rational autonomy’ below. 
667 Charles Larmore, “Public Reason,” 368. 
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tice as fairness: ‘the conception of justice by which we live is a conception […] we endorse, 
not for the different reasons we may each discover, and not simply for reasons we happen to 
share, but instead for reasons that count for us because we can affirm them together.’668 As he 
points out, the idea of fairness itself ‘denotes that mutual acknowledgment of principles 
which public reason demands and which forms the real import of the language of social con-
tract [Rawls] has used to articulate his conception of justice.’669 In A Theory of Justice, the 
concept of public reason is embedded in the idea of publicity. Thus, in order to reconstruct 
Rawls’s conception of public reason, I shall firstly consider how the idea of publicity is de-
veloped.  
 
3.2.A The Idea of Publicity. 
(1) The idea of publicity is a recurring element in Rawls’s writings. According to Larmore, 
in A Theory of Justice such an idea is tightly related to the idea of social contract. More pre-
cisely, he argues that a better understanding of the idea of contract may ‘highlight the public 
dimension of justice.’670 As he explains, the idea of contract expresses the idea of publicity: 
‘[C]onceiving of the principles of justice as the object of a rational agreement 
comes to more than saying that each individual concerned has a reason to accept 
them. The language of contract also points to the good in each individual’s find-
ing that reason in the reason that others have to accept them as well. This good 
lies at the core of the ideal which Rawls calls “publicity,” and a virtue of the idea 
of contract […] is that it gives expression to this ideal. [Emphasis added] [… J]ust 
as the validity of a contract does not turn solely on the terms agreed to, but also on 
the fact of agreement, so justice consists in more than the proper distributions of 
rights and assets. […] More is necessary […] than just a scheme of distributive 
justice, even one that each of us has a reason to endorse. Equally important is the 
                                                        
668 Ibid. 
669 Ibid. 
670 Ibid. 371. 
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publicity of its defining principles –that our reason for accepting them turns on 
others having reason to accept them too.’671 
As Larmore points out, in A Theory of Justice the concept of publicity plays two essential 
and intertwined roles.672 First, it is a defining feature of a well-ordered society, in which ‘(1) 
everyone accepts and knows that the others accept the same principles of justice, and (2) the 
basic social institutions generally satisfy and are generally known to satisfy these princi-
ples.’673 Second, it is an important element for the argument concerning stability.674 For Lar-
more, the link between publicity and stability makes clear two possible meanings of the for-
mer. The simpler meaning of publicity is that everyone knows that principles of justice are in 
force and that they shape society’s institutions in a certain way. However, publicity in its ‘in-
ner meaning’ implies that ‘the knowledge that others too affirm these principles fosters eve-
                                                        
671 Ibid. 370. 
672 Ibid. 371. 
673 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 4-5/4. 
674 In this research, I am concerned only with the account of stability developed in Political Liberalism (see below). 
With reference to the question of stability in A Theory, here it will be enough to say that, according to Rawls, ‘[w]hen 
the basic structure of society is publicly known to satisfy its principles for an extended period of time, those subject to 
these arrangements tend to develop a desire to act in accordance with these principles and to do their part in institutions 
which exemplify them. A conception of justice is stable when the public recognition of its realization by the social sys-
tem tends to bring about the corresponding sense of justice.’ A Theory of Justice, 177/154. Moreover, he says that 
‘[s]ince a well-ordered society endures over time, its conception of justice is presumably stable: that is, when institu-
tions are just (as defined by this conception), those taking part in these arrangements acquire the corresponding sense of 
justice and desire to do their part in maintaining them. One conception of justice is more stable than another if the sense 
of justice it tends to generate is stronger and more likely to override disruptive inclinations and if the institutions it al-
lows foster weaker impulses and temptations to act unjustly.’ Ibid. 454/398. Thus, Rawls talks about ‘relative stability’ 
(496/434ff): ‘a decision in the original position depends on a comparison: other things equal, the preferred conception is 
the most stable one’ Ibid. 498/436. In fact, according to Rawls, ‘stability is a desirable feature of moral conceptions. 
Other things equal, the persons in the original position will adopt the more stable scheme of principles.’ Ibid. 455/398. 
In A Theory, Rawls aims at ‘inherent stability:’ ‘a society regulated by a public sense of justice is inherently stable: oth-
er things equal, the forces making for stability increase (up to some limit) as time passes.’ Ibid. 498/436. See also 
144/125. Thus, he adds that ‘[t]he stability of a conception depends upon a balance of motives: the sense of justice that 
it cultivates and the aims that it encourages must normally win out against propensities toward injustice. To estimate the 
stability of a conception […], one must examine the relative strength of these opposing tendencies.’ Ibid. 454-455/398. 
Here I do not analyse the argument for stability in A Theory (which is constituted of three parts: 1- the importance of 
publicity, chapter three, section 29, 2- the development of a sense of justice, chapter eight, and 3- the ‘congruence’ ar-
gument, chapter nine): for its reconstruction, see Sebastiano Maffettone, Rawls: An Introduction, mainly 49-51, 253-
259. See also Brian Barry, “John Rawls and the Search for Stability,” Ethics 105, no. 4 (1995), especially 880-890. For 
a restatement of the mutual assurance problem and of the congruence argument in A Theory and how these elements 
have evolved in the transition to Political Liberalism, see Paul Weithman’s book Why Political Liberalism? and his ar-
ticle “Inclusivism, Stability, and Assurance.” See also Larry Krasnoff, “Consensus, Stability, and Normativity in 
Rawls’s Political Liberalism,” The Journal of Philosophy 95, no. 6 (1998), especially 280-290, Kevin Vallier Liberal 
Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Separation, 15, and Gerald F. Gaus, “The Turn to a Political Liberalism,” in A Com-
panion To Rawls, eds. Jon Mandle and David A. Reidy, (Malden, Mass.: Wiley Blackwell, 2014), 235-250. 
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ryone’s conviction that they are valid and worthy of support.’675 This conviction is implied in 
Rawls’s linking publicity and stability: a ‘conception of justice is stable when the public 
recognition of its realization by the social system tends to bring about the corresponding sense 
of justice.’676 This is a self-reinforcing process. In other words, the fact that in a well-ordered 
society the conception of justice is publicly affirmed reinforces everyone’s sense of justice, 
which strengthens stability. This, in turn, strengthens everyone’s sense of justice. For this rea-
son, in A Theory Rawls emphasises the ‘inherent stability’ of a well-ordered society.677 Ac-
cording to Larmore, this inner meaning of publicity is related to the fact the each person finds 
a reason to endorse the conception of justice in the fact that others embrace it as well. That is, 
the public affirmation of the principles of justice embodies some specific social good that rep-
resents for each member of the public a particular kind of reason to endorse them.678 Now 
Rawls says that ‘the public recognition of the two principles of justice gives greater support to 
men’s self-respect and this in turn increases the effectiveness of social cooperation,’ and that 
‘a desirable feature of a conception of justice is that it should publicly express men’s respect 
for one another.’679 According to Larmore, this means that ‘the self-respect each person finds 
confirmed in [the principles of justice] has to be part of a mutual respect which their common 
affirmation displays.’680 In short, Rawls’s claim is that self-respect is ‘perhaps the most im-
portant primary good,’ which includes (1) ‘a person’s sense of his own value, his secure con-
viction that his conception of his good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out’ and (2) ‘a con-
fidence in one’s ability, so far as it is within one’s power, to fulfill one’s intentions.’681 More-
over, there is a ‘duty of mutual respect,’ which is due to each person ‘as a moral being, that is, 
as a being with a sense of justice and a conception of the good.’682 In fact, the basis of equali-
                                                        
675 Charles Larmore, “Public Reason,” 372. 
676 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 177/154. 
677 Supra. 
678 Charles Larmore, “Public Reason,” 373. 
679 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 178/155 and 179/156. Emphases added. 
680 Charles Larmore, “Public Reason,” 373. 
681 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 440/386. 
682 Ibid. 337/297. 
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ty (that is, ‘the features of human beings in virtue of which they are to be treated in accord-
ance with the principles of justice’)683 is constituted by the capacity for moral personality: the 
capacity for having a conception of one’s own good (expressed ‘by a rational plan of life’) 
and the capacity for having a sense of justice, that is ‘a normally effective desire to apply and 
to act upon the principles of justice.’684 Moral personality merely requires ‘a capacity and not 
the realization of it. A being that has this capacity, whether or not is yet developed, is to re-
ceive the full protection of the principles of justice. [… For t]hose who can give justice are 
owed justice.’685 Thus, the basis of equality rests on the moral personality of human beings (in 
this sense, they have an ‘equal dignity’).686 However, equality does not rest on a philosophical 
or religious assessment of the equal intrinsic worth or value of human beings.687 This is be-
cause justice as fairness is not a perfectionist view.688 Justice as fairness expresses the idea of 
respect for the moral personality of persons in this way: 
‘Among other things, respect for persons is shown by treating them in ways 
that they can see to be justified. But more than this, it is manifest in the content of 
the principles to which we appeal. Thus, to respect persons is to recognize that 
they possess an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as 
                                                        
683 Ibid. 504/441. 
684 Ibid. 505/442. 
685 Ibid. 509-510/445-446. 
686 Ibid. 329/289. 
687 See ibid. 329/289, 510/446, and 585-586/513. 
688 ‘The parties do not share a conception of the good by reference to which the fruition of their powers or even the sat-
isfaction of their desires can be evaluated. They do not have an agreed criterion of perfection that can be used as a prin-
ciple for choosing between institutions. To acknowledge any such standard would be, in effect, to accept a principle that 
might lead to a lesser religious or other liberty […] Thus it seems that the only understanding that the persons in the 
original position can reach is that everyone should have the greatest equal liberty consistent with a similar liberty for 
others. They cannot risk their freedom by authorizing a standard of value to define what is to be maximized by a teleo-
logical principle of justice. [… T]he human perfections are to be pursued within the limits of the principle of free asso-
ciation. Persons join together to further their cultural and artistic interests in the same way that they form religious 
communities. They do not use the coercive apparatus of the state to win for themselves a greater liberty or larger dis-
tributive shares on the grounds that their activities are of more intrinsic value. Perfectionism is denied as a political 
principle.’ Ibid. 327-329/288-289. 
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a whole cannot override. It is to affirm that the loss of freedom for some is not 
made right by a greater welfare enjoyed by others.’ 689 
The relation between respect and justification helps us to understand how the former con-
nects publicity and stability. In Larmore’s words, ‘respect is the good in question’ in the pub-
lic affirmation of the principles of justice.690 Connecting the previous remarks about self-
respect and mutual respect, it seems that the public affirmation of principles of justice en-
hances social stability because it (1) demonstrates the mutual respect of those adopting ‘cer-
tain principles of justice for reasons they understand one another to acknowledge,’ thus joint-
ly endorsing them from a shared point of view, and consequently (2) it improves self-respect 
because the ‘mutual respect demonstrated by their allegiance to this common basis is then a 
good which they can regard themselves as having achieved.’691 Thus, it seems that in this ac-
count of publicity mutual respect and self-respect are self-reinforcing and jointly affirmed.692 
(2) The claim that ‘the ideal of publicity grows in his doctrine of “public reason”’693 in 
Rawls’s later works seems to be supported by his statement of the ‘full publicity condition’ in 
“Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory” (1980). Such a condition is satisfied in a well-
ordered society, in which all the following three levels of publicity are present:694 
                                                        
689 Ibid. 586/513, emphasis added. However, while Rawls’s theory of justice expresses the idea of respect, it ‘cannot 
start out from’ this idea or from the notion of inherent worth or dignity. He says: ‘I believe […] that while the principles 
of justice will be effective only if men have a sense of justice and do therefore respect one another, the notion of respect 
or of the inherent worth of persons is not a suitable basis for arriving at these principles. It is precisely these ideas that 
call for interpretation’ (ibid.). Thus, A Theory of Justice tries to specify an idea of mutual respect, but it does not start 
from it, thus it refrains from inserting it explicitly among the conditions of the original position. On this point, Larmore 
(“Public Reason,” 374) argues that, even if Rawls ‘declares that he has not derived the principles of justice from the re-
spect for persons because the very notion of respect calls for interpretation, which only a conception of justice can pro-
vide,’ such a claim ‘does not rule out the possibility that respect, in a specific sense we grasp perhaps only in the light 
of his theory as a whole, is a value on which that theory rests.’ This shows the centrality of the notion of respect in 
Larmore’s understanding of the work of John Rawls.  
690 Charles Larmore, “Public Reason,” 373. 
691 Ibid. 
692 Rawls apparently confirms this point: ‘those who respect themselves are more likely to respect each other and con-
versely. Self-contempt leads to contempt of others and threatens their good as much as envy does. Self-respect is recip-
rocally self-supporting.’ John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 179/156. Emphasis added. 
693 Charles Larmore, “Public Reason,” 375. 
694 John Rawls “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” 324-325. See also Political Liberalism, 66-71. 
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1- ‘Everyone accepts and knows that the others likewise accept the same principles [of 
justice],’ and this knowledge in turn is publicly recognized;’ 
2-  Citizens agree on the ‘general beliefs in the light of which first principles of justice 
themselves can be accepted,’ that is, general beliefs about human nature and the way in 
which institutions work (citizens’ agreement on such believes is due to the fact that the 
latter are ‘supported […] by publicly shared methods of inquiry and methods of reason-
ing […] familiar to common sense and [including] the procedures and conclusions of 
science, when these are well established and not controversial’). 
3- The justification of the conception of justice is ‘publicly available,’ that is, everyone 
can find that justification ‘present in public culture, reflected in law and political insti-
tutions, and in the philosophical and historical traditions of their interpretation.’ That 
is, what is publicly available here is the way in which the justification of the concep-
tion of justice connects the latter with the conception of the person and society that 
characterise public political culture. 
Now, according to Rawls a conception of justice should satisfy the full publicity condition 
for two reasons. Firstly, since such a condition sets ‘more specific constraints on conceptions 
of justice [,… it] is more likely to provide a sharper basis for deciding among conflicting un-
derstandings of freedom and equality and for determining how their claims are to be balanced 
against one another.’695 In other words, the full publicity condition clarifies and limits the 
range of possible interpretations of the relation between freedom and equality. This makes it 
more likely that in a well-ordered society all free and equal persons affirm the public concep-
tion of justice from a common (public) perspective. Secondly, Rawls connects the full pub-
licity condition to the question of political legitimacy: ‘if institutions rely on coercive sanc-
tions […] and influence people’s deepest aspirations, the grounds and tendencies of these in-
stitutions should stand up to public scrutiny.’696 Thus, social arrangements and institutions 
resting on a conception of justice that meets the full publicity condition are more likely to be 
                                                        
695 John Rawls “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” 325.  
696 Ibid. 326. He adds that publicity ‘ensures […] that free and equal persons are in a position to know and to accept the 
background social influences that shape their conception of themselves as persons, as well as their character and con-
ception of their good. Being in this position is a precondition for freedom; it means that nothing is or need be hidden.’ 
Ibid. Emphases added. 
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publicly supported because they are justifiable from a public perspective. Moreover, Rawls 
limits the scope of the full publicity condition to the essential terms of social cooperation. 
‘Moral principles outside the domain of justice need not […] be public in this strong 
sense,’697 because for many moral, philosophical (and, obviously, religious) questions no pub-
lic agreement can be expected. Thus, in a well-ordered society, while with reference to fun-
damental political questions ‘considerations of justice are to have a special role [and o]ther 
reasons are taken not to be appropriate,’ the latter may have their own ‘governing role within 
the life of associations.’698 Thus, while full publicity is the only appropriate condition for fun-
damental questions of justice (which are to be decided from an agreed common point of 
view), it does not apply to what Rawls will call the background culture. This limitation of the 
scope of the full publicity condition ‘is a first statement of the theory of public reason formu-
lated in response to the doctrinal diversity which will be the chief preoccupation of his emerg-
ing political liberalism.’699 
(3) A further development toward the idea of public reason can be found in “The Idea of an 
Overlapping Consensus” (1987). In this essay, Rawls openly deals with an important ques-
tion, namely, whether the public perspective needed for settling questions of justice can 
somehow cohere with citizens’ comprehensive doctrines of the good. In fact 
‘Only if the consensus shaping their public reasoning about justice also forms 
an overlapping consensus, a common element in their otherwise different points 
of view, is the structure of their political life likely to endure. The notion of an 
overlapping consensus serves therefore to connect a conception of justice already 
arrived at, and already marked by a more fundamental kind of consensus, to the 
question of its stability.’700 
Now the overlapping consensus links the idea of a public perspective with the idea of sta-
bility in a political way. This way of framing the problem was already clearly stated in “Jus-
tice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical” (1985), in which Rawls wrote that: 
                                                        
697 Charles Larmore, “Public Reason,” 376. 
698 John Rawls “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” 326. 
699 Charles Larmore, “Public Reason,” 376.  
700 Ibid. 377. See chapter two for the difference between political, full, and public justification. 
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‘[J]ustification is not regarded simply as valid argument from listed premises, 
even should these premises be true. Rather, justification is addressed to others 
who disagree with us, and therefore it must always proceed from some consensus, 
that is, from premises that we and others publicly recognize as true; or better, pub-
licly recognize as acceptable to us for the purpose of establishing a working 
agreement on the fundamental questions of political justice. […T]he aim of jus-
tice as fairness as a political conception is practical, and not metaphysical or epis-
temological. That is, it presents itself not as a conception of justice that is true, but 
one that can serve as a basis of informed and willing political agreement between 
citizens viewed as free and equal persons. […] To secure this agreement we try 
[…] to avoid disputed moral and religious questions. We do this not because these 
questions are unimportant or regarded with indifference, but because we think 
them too important and recognize that there is no way to resolve them politically. 
[…] The aim is free agreement, reconciliation through public reason.’701 
This account and its further development in Political Liberalism and “Reply to Habermas” 
(see 2.1) seem to specify a conception of public justification that Fred D’Agostino has quali-
fied as ‘strongly public.’702 In his view, the Rawlsian account of public justification is not on-
ly ‘addressed to everyone,’ but also ‘addressed to each in the presence of all the others.’703 
Accordingly, the justification of X is strongly public if and only if one has overwhelming rea-
son(s) for endorsing X which can survive the discovery that others may have different rea-
son(s) for endorsing it. In Rawls’s view, as I mentioned in section 2.1, ‘citizens do not look 
into others’ doctrines [… but] take into account and give some weight to only the fact –the 
                                                        
701 John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” 394-395. Emphases added. 
702 Fred D’Agostino, “Some Modes of Public Justification,” 403. ‘[A] justification of a proposal Π is a strongly public 
justification of Π if and only if each of the parties to the justificatory exercise is provided with a reason to accept the 
proposal which survives her/his discovery of the reason(s) which the other(s) have been provided with, whereas a justi-
fication of a proposal Π is a weakly public justification of Π if one or more of the parties to the justificatory exercise is 
provided with a reason to accept the proposal which does not (or would not) survive the discovery of the reason(s) 
which the other(s) have been provided with. So if A is given a reason RA for accepting Π and B is given a reason RB for 
accepting Π, then Π is strongly publicly justified for A and B only if A continues to accept Π, for the reason RA, once 
she/he learns that B accepts it on the basis of RB, while B continues to accept Π, on the basis of RB, once she/he learns 
that A accepts this proposal for the reason RA. Where either or both reject Π once they learn of the grounds on which it 
is accepted by the other, then the justification is not strongly public.’ 
703 Ibid. Italics in the original. 
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existence− of the reasonable overlapping consensus itself.’704 The important idea of a public 
justification via an overlapping consensus is that citizens publicly recognise (together) that 
whatever non-public reasons each of them (singularly) may have to support the conception of 
justice X, they (together) affirm X as their common political ground for cooperating in society 
on fair terms. The fact that each of them (singularly) can find non-public grounds that some-
how embed, express, or absorb that political conception of justice and the fact that these 
grounds overlap on such a conception are what secure the stability of its public affirmation. 
Thus, taking Rawls’s example,  
‘In endorsing a constitutional democratic regime, a religious doctrine may say 
that such are the limits God sets to our liberty; a nonreligious doctrine will ex-
press itself otherwise. But in either case, these doctrines formulate in different 
ways how liberty of conscience and the principle of toleration can cohere with 
equal justice for all citizens in a reasonable democratic society. Thus, [these prin-
ciples] must have an essential place in any constitutional democratic conception. 
They lay down the fundamental basis to be accepted by all citizens as fair and 
regulative of the rivalry between doctrines.’705 
In Rawlsian terms, in public justification we jointly recognise that we are able to endorse 
in an overlapping consensus the freestanding political conception. We are then brought back 
to the questions of respect and stability. First, in public justification ‘reasonable citizens take 
one another into account as having reasonable comprehensive doctrines that endorse that po-
litical conception, and this mutual accounting shapes the moral quality of the public culture of 
political society.’706 Accordingly, D’Agostino maintains that only this kind of public justifica-
tion can properly express the respect for free and equal persons participating in the justificato-
ry exercise.707 Secondly, the satisfaction of the full publicity condition is a necessary premise 
for the achievement of the political (not ethical) ideal of ‘full autonomy’ of citizens of a well-
                                                        
704 John Rawls, “Reply to Habermas,” 387. 
705 John Rawls, “The Idea of public Reason Revisited,” 460-461. 
706 John Rawls, “Reply to Habermas,” 387. 
707 Fred D’Agostino, “Some Modes of Public Justification,” 403. 
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ordered society.708 In fact, ‘[o]nly if the full explanation and justification of justice as fairness 
is publicly available can citizens come to understand its principles in accordance with the idea 
of society as a fair system of cooperation.’709 This requires that the basic ideas from which 
those principles are drawn must be present in the public political culture of society (as re-
quested by the third level of publicity, and, consequently, by the full publicity condition itself, 
supra). In conclusion, it is hardly surprising that in this later stage of Rawls’s work publicity 
is presented once more as a characteristic feature of a well-ordered society.710 In this way, on 
the one hand, Rawls squares the circle opened with A Theory of Justice: publicity appears 
where it did at the beginning.711 On the other hand, its connection with the political interpreta-
tion of such notions as the overlapping consensus, justification, stability, and autonomy char-
acteristic of Political Liberalism has been accomplished by now. Thus, the public dimension 
of Rawls’s justificatory exercise may now be properly presented in terms of public reason. 
 
                                                        
708 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 77 (emphases added): ‘citizens’ rational autonomy is modelled in the original po-
sition by the way the parties deliberate as their representative. By contrast, citizens’ full autonomy is modelled by the 
structural aspects of the original position, that is, by how the parties are situated with respect to one another and by the 
limits on information to which their deliberations are subject […I]t is not parties but citizens of a well-ordered society 
who are fully autonomous. This means that in their conduct citizens not only comply with the principles of justice, but 
they also act from these principles as just. [...] It is in their public recognition and informed application of the principles 
of justice in their political life, and as their effective sense of justice directs, that citizens achieve full autonomy. Thus, 
full autonomy is realized by citizens when they act from principles of justice that specify the fair terms of social coop-
eration they would give to themselves when fairly represented as free and equal persons.’ In this sense, as I have said, 
full autonomy is a ‘political and not an ethical value.’ See also 305-306 (emphases added): ‘[w]hen the principles of 
justice which are adopted by the parties are affirmed and acted upon by equal citizens in society, citizens then act with 
full autonomy. The difference between full and rational autonomy is this: rational autonomy is acting solely from our 
capacity to be rational and from the determinate conception of the good we have at any given time. Full autonomy in-
cludes not only this capacity to be rational but also the capacity to advance our conception of the good in ways con-
sistent with honouring the fair terms of social cooperation; that is the principles of justice.’ Thus, the parties in the orig-
inal position are only rationally autonomous, since they do not possess on their own the capacity to advance their con-
ceptions of the good in ways consistent with honouring the fair terms of social cooperation, but this capacity is “emulat-
ed” by imposing reasonable constraints upon them from outside. On the contrary, ‘it is equal citizens in a well-ordered 
society who are fully autonomous because they freely accept the constraint of the reasonable, and in so doing their po-
litical life reflects that conception of the person which takes as fundamental their capacity for social cooperation.’ 
709 Ibid. 78. 
710 Ibid. 35 (emphases added): a well-ordered society (1) is a society ‘in which everyone accepts, and knows that every-
one else accepts, the very same principles of justice’; (2) ‘its basic structure […] is publicly known […] to satisfy these 
principles’; and (3) ‘its citizens have a normally effective sense of justice and so they generally comply with society’s 
basic institutions, which they regard as just’ (thus realising their full autonomy, for which publicity is a prerequisite, 
supra). Therefore, ‘[i]n such a society the publicly recognized conception of justice establishes a shared point of view 
from which citizens’ claims on society can be adjudicated.’ 
711 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 4-5/4. Supra. 
  
 European Muslims and Liberal Citizenship 
Ph.D. Thesis successfully discussed on April 21, 2016.  
The total or partial use of the Ph.D. Thesis is subject to copyright restrictions. 
 
  
236  
 Giovanni Vezzani 
 
LUISS-ULB 
3.2.B The Idea of Public Reason. 
In the previous part of the chapter, I have tried to show how the grounds of the idea of pub-
lic reason have gradually emerged in Rawls’s work, starting from a number of roots already 
present in his Kantian background, developed in his conception of justice, and fully elaborat-
ed in their specific shape only in his later writings. However, the presentation of such an idea 
in Lecture VI of Political Liberalism represents a distinctive feature of the latter. As has been 
noted, the “The Idea of Public Reason” is ‘the only topic of this book never treated in previ-
ous writings,’712 even though –as I have already underlined− the idea of ‘reconciliation 
through public reason’ is mentioned in “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical” 
(1985)713 and, above all, the notion of ‘free public reason’ is sketched out in “The Idea of an 
Overlapping Consensus” (1987).714 An early statement of this idea can be found in “The Do-
main of the Political and Overlapping Consensus” (1989): 
‘[G]reat values fall under the idea of free public reason, and are expressed in 
the guidelines for public inquiry and in the steps taken to secure that such inquiry 
is free and public, as well as informed and reasonable. These values include not 
only the appropriate use of the fundamental concepts of judgement, inference and 
evidence, but also the virtues of reasonableness and fair-mindedness as shown in 
the adherence to the criteria and procedure of common-sense knowledge, and to 
the methods and conclusion of science when not controversial, as well as respect 
for the precepts governing reasonable political discussion.’715 
As I have underlined, during his final years, Rawls returned several times to this idea, 
above all in 1996 with the new introduction to Political Liberalism, and in 1997 with “The 
Idea of Public Reason Revisited.” This topic is also treated in Justice as Fairness: A Restate-
                                                        
712 Sebastiano Maffettone, Rawls: An Introduction, 274. 
713 John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” 395. 
714 John Rawls, “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus,” 429. Here Rawls says: ‘just as a political conception of jus-
tice needs certain principles of justice for the basic structure to specify its content, it also needs certain guidelines of in-
quiry and publicly recognized rules of assessing evidence to govern its application. Otherwise there is no agreed way 
for determining whether those principles are satisfied, and for settling what they require of particular institutions, or in 
particular situations. Agreement on a conception of justice is worthless –not an effective agreement at all− without 
agreement on these further matters.’ 
715 John Rawls, “The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus,” 484-485. 
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ment (published in 2001, section 26), and in The Law of Peoples (published in 1999, section 
17). For the reasons that I will consider in chapter five, as I have anticipated, I will focus 
mainly on the wide view of public reason. Apart from arguments concerning the specific aims 
of this study, I consider the interpretation focusing on the wide view as the closest one to 
Rawls’s own final position: not only does he clearly understand the wide view as a different 
and improved conception in comparison with the inclusive view,716 but he also reaffirms that 
‘the Chicago article [that is, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”] is by far the best state-
ment I have written on ideas of public reason and political liberalism.’717 Of course, what fol-
lows must be read together with section 2.1 (“Rawls’s Political Liberalism and the Problem of 
Justification”), in which I presented several concepts that are now relevant for an account of 
public reason, and with chapter four, in which some major objections are considered and my 
own view is finally fully stated. As far as possible, I have tried to avoid repetitions in this re-
constructive task, but sometimes they will be unavoidable. In the next three sub-sections, I 
will analyse (a) the ideal of public reason, (b) the conditions in which the idea of public rea-
son works, and (c) its structure. In the meantime, I will present a first set of critiques concern-
ing these points. Since the debate raised by this notion is extremely broad, I have evidently 
selected some critical positions concerning points that are crucial for my evaluative purposes, 
as indicated in chapter two. Then, in the following sections and in the next chapter I present 
all the elements (isolated in the text) that will be employed in chapter five to build my model. 
The latter will be applied in chapter six. 
 
As I define it (see also the introduction of the next chapter), the idea of public reason ex-
presses both a procedure of public justification and a moral political regulative ideal of citi-
zenship grounded in a commitment to political reciprocity between cooperating citizens of a 
liberal democratic regime concerned with the political legitimacy of their fundamental politi-
cal institutions and decisions. These two dimensions of public reason are profoundly interre-
lated. As a justificatory-procedural idea, public reason sets the limits of public debate con-
cerning fundamental political questions so that the political values underpinning that political 
ideal of citizenship are honoured. On the other hand, as a regulative ideal of citizenship public 
                                                        
716 See the 1996 introduction to the paperback edition of Political Liberalism, xlix-l. 
717 See the letter to his editor, included in the expanded edition of Political Liberalism, 438. 
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reason is honoured if citizens provide one another with reasons that other citizens as free and 
equal could reasonably accept. In the remaining part of this chapter and in the next chapter I 
will try to explain this definition in greater detail and to shed light on the two dimensions of 
public reasons. 
3.2.B.1 The Ideal of Public Reason.  
Public reason is first of all a justificatory device.718 As such, it ‘does not concern a deter-
minate object, but rather the limits of the public debate when fundamental questions are at 
stake within a liberal-democratic society.’719 It sets the conditions in which certain fundamen-
tal political questions should be discussed and –eventually− decided so that the normative re-
quirements expressed through the liberal principle of political legitimacy and the criterion of 
reciprocity are satisfied. As I have explained in 2.1, according to Rawls an appropriate public 
justification is required when we are faced with the two problems of ensuring political reci-
procity within a system of fair social cooperation and of establishing legitimate political insti-
tutions in a democratic regime in which people are expected both to disagree in terms of their 
                                                        
718 Thomas M. Scanlon, “Rawls on Justification,” in particular 139 and 160-162. 
719 Sebastiano Maffettone, Rawls: An Introduction, 274. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism, lii note 28: ‘the idea of 
public reason is not a view about specific political institutions or policies, but a view about how they are to be argued 
for and justified to the citizen body that must decide the question.’ 
  
 European Muslims and Liberal Citizenship 
Ph.D. Thesis successfully discussed on April 21, 2016.  
The total or partial use of the Ph.D. Thesis is subject to copyright restrictions. 
 
  
239  
 Giovanni Vezzani 
 
LUISS-ULB 
comprehensive views720 and to be willing to take part in social activities as justice requires. 
Public reason, then, is grounded in the two related concepts of legitimacy and reciprocity.721 
In presenting public reason, Rawls insists on the fact that this ideal arises from the problem of 
ensuring legitimacy to the exercise of political power. The political relationship of citizenship, 
he says, ‘is a relation of free and equal citizens who exercise ultimate political power as a col-
lective body.’722 So, the question is ‘how, when constitutional essentials and matters of basic 
justice are at stake, [can citizens so related] be bound to honour the structure of their constitu-
tional democratic regime and abide by statues and laws enacted under it [?]’723 His answer 
closely connects reasonableness (see again 2.1), reciprocity, and the principle of legitimacy. 
Reasonable persons view one another as free and equal citizens who participate in a system of 
social cooperation over time and are willing to offer and abide by fair terms of cooperation, 
provided that other citizens do the same. Let me establish an important point for what follows. 
The criterion of reciprocity expresses the moral political ideal of fair cooperation between 
free and equal, rational and reasonable citizens who recognise one another as such. It says that 
                                                        
720 For the features of moral disagreement and a deliberative solution, see Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, “Mor-
al Disagreement in a Democracy,” Social Philosophy and Policy 12, no.1 (1995), especially 87-92 and 104-108. See 
also their “Moral Conflict and Political Consensus,” Ethics 101, no. 1 (1990), in which they argue that what is required 
is ‘greater moral disagreement about policy and greater moral agreement on how to disagree about policy’ (64). Here, 
they distinguish between ‘principles of preclusion,’ that is, the principles that determine which issue can be put on the 
political agenda (‘in the sense of being a legitimate subject of legislation’), and ‘principles of accommodation,’ that is, 
principles ‘which govern the conduct of the moral disagreement on issues that should reach the agenda,’ 64-65 (the two 
kinds of principles are discussed, respectively on 65-76 and 76-86). According to the authors, principles of preclusion 
should be less stringent and should open the political agenda to more questions, while principles of accommodation 
should ‘go beyond the idea of toleration [… and should] be understood as resting on the idea of mutual respect, which is 
a prerequisite of democratic deliberation’ (65). For a taxonomy of the ways in which reasonable people can disagree, 
see Simon Caney, “Liberal Legitimacy, Reasonable Disagreement and Justice,” Critical Review of International Social 
and Political Philosophy 1, no. 3 (1998), 24-25. For the thesis that, in conditions of deep-seated moral disagreement, 
liberalism should depends on a ‘higher order impartiality’ see Thomas Nagel, “Moral Conflict and Political Legitima-
cy,” in particular 230: ‘when we look at certain of our convictions from outside, however justified they may be from 
within, the appeal to their truth must be seen merely as an appeal to our beliefs, and should be treated as such unless 
those beliefs can be shown to be justifiable from a more impersonal standpoint. […] This does not mean we have to 
stop believing them –that is, believing them to be true. Considered as individual beliefs they may be adequately 
grounded, or at least not unreasonable: the standards of individual rationality are different from the standards of episte-
mological ethics. It means only that from the perspective of political argument we may have to regard certain of our be-
liefs, whether moral or religious or even historical or scientific, simply as someone’s beliefs rather than as truths –
unless they can be given the kind of impersonal justification appropriate to that perspective […] We accept an episte-
mological division between the private and the public domains.’ See also 231-237. For a markedly contextual and his-
torical-based approach to the issue of disagreement, Joseph Raz, “Disagreement in Politics,” American Journal of Ju-
risprudence 43, no. 1 (1998), in particular 47-52.  
721 Sebastiano Maffettone, Rawls: An Introduction, 276. 
722 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 445. 
723 Ibid.  
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‘when those terms are proposed as the most reasonable terms of social cooperation, those 
proposing them must also think it at least reasonable for others to accept them as free and 
equal citizens.’724 According to Rawls, from this criterion we are driven to recognise a liberal 
principle of political legitimacy, which can be stated as follows: ‘our exercise of political 
power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we would offer for our politi-
cal actions –were we to state them as government officials− are sufficient and we also reason-
ably think that other citizens might also reasonably accept those reasons.’725 If citizens are to 
abide by this principle, they have reciprocally to respect a moral duty of civility: they ‘must 
be able to explain to one another on those fundamental questions how the principles and poli-
cies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of public reason.’726 
In this sense, the duty of civility expresses an ideal of democratic citizenship.727 As Lawrence 
Solum puts it, ‘[a]n ideal of public reason is a normative standard for the use of public rea-
son.’728 Then, as I will explain in the introduction of chapter four, public reason is not merely 
a normative standard for a civic practice of public justification (the idea of public reason as a 
justificatory device), but also a regulative ideal of citizenship which expresses a political con-
ception of public morality (infra), grounded in political reciprocity. Reciprocity and legitima-
cy are then the two grounds around which the ideal of public reason is structured into a coher-
ent idea.729 Rawls summarises this point in this passage, which I think useful to quote almost 
in its entirety:  
‘This ideal [of public reason] is that citizens are to conduct their public politi-
cal discussions of constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice within the 
framework of what each sincerely regards as the most reasonable political concep-
                                                        
724 Ibid. 446. 
725 Ibid. 446-447. As mentioned in chapter two, in Political Liberalism the principle of legitimacy is stated as follows: 
‘our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitu-
tion the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals ac-
ceptable to them as reasonable and rational’ (217). 
726 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 217. 
727 Ibid. 253. 
728 Lawrence B. Solum, “Novel Public Reasons,” Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 29, no. 4 (1996), 1463. 
729 For the distinction between the idea and the ideal of public reason, see John Rawls, “The Idea of Public reason Re-
visited,” 444. 
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tion of justice, a conception that expresses political values that others as free and 
equal also might reasonably be expected reasonably to endorse. Thus, each of us 
must have principles and guidelines to which we appeal in such a way that the cri-
terion of reciprocity is satisfied. [… The role of the latter] is to specify the nature 
of the political relation […] as one of civic friendship. For this criterion, when cit-
izens follow it in their public reasoning, shapes the form of their fundamental in-
stitutions. [… W]e must give [to our fellow citizens] reasons they can not only 
understand –as Servetus could understand why Calvin wanted to burn him at the 
stake− but reasons we might reasonably expect that they as free and equal might 
reasonably also accept.’730 
And elsewhere, he openly connects those grounds with the requirement of restraint from 
appealing to the whole truth: 
‘Since the idea of public reason specifies at the deepest level the basic political 
values and specifies how the political relation is to be understood, those who be-
lieve that fundamental political questions should be decided […] according to 
their own idea of the whole truth […] will of course reject the idea of public rea-
son. Political liberalism views this insistence on the whole truth in politics as in-
compatible with democratic citizenship and the idea of legitimate law.’731 
Finally, Rawls states when the ideal of public reason is realised: 
‘[W]e honor public reason and its principle of legitimacy when three condi-
tions are satisfied: a) we give very great and normally overriding weight to the 
ideal it prescribes; b) we believe public reason is suitably complete, that is, for at 
least the great majority of fundamental questions, possibly for all, some combina-
tion and balance of political values alone reasonably shows the answer; and final-
ly c) we believe that the particular view we propose, and the law or policy based 
thereon, express a reasonable combination and balance of those values.’732 
                                                        
730 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, xlviii-xlix. 
731 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 447. 
732 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 241, emphases added. 
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Notice that I will clarify the meaning of these conditions [especially the conditions (a) and 
(b)] in chapter four, which is mainly devoted to this task. Moreover, Rawls adds that the ideal 
of public reason is fulfilled 
‘[W]henever judges, legislators, chief executives, and other government offi-
cials, as well as candidates for public office, act from and follow the idea of pub-
lic reason and explain to other citizens their reasons for supporting fundamental 
political positions in terms of the political conception of justice they regard as the 
most reasonable. In this way they fulfil what I shall call their duty of civility. [… 
T]he ideal of public reason is realized by citizens who are not government offi-
cials [… when they ideally] think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask 
themselves what statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of 
reciprocity, they would think the most reasonable to enact. […] Thus citizens ful-
fill their duty of civility and support the idea of public reason by doing what they 
can to hold government officials to it.’733 
I will examine several of these points in depth later in this chapter, in particular with refer-
ence to the scope and limits of public reason. However, it is already clear that −in at least one 
plausible interpretation− Rawls’s public reason is quite an institutional and formal idea. After 
all, in Political Liberalism he says that ‘public reason is the reason of the Supreme Court,’734 
and devotes a section to explaining why the Supreme Court is an ‘exemplar of public rea-
son.’735  
However, in such a formalistic interpretation public reason may not seem very appealing 
or strong enough as a normative ideal. To this end, for instance, Bruce Brower has argued that 
Rawls’s ideal of public reason ‘grounds treating the right as prior by placing a constraint on 
acceptable reasons. This is the strength of public reason: it is a formal constraint that yields 
substantive moral results.’736 Rawls’s ideal, he adds, ‘treats the demand for public justifica-
                                                        
733 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 444-445. 
734 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 231. 
735 Ibid. 231-240. 
736 Bruce W. Brower, “The Limits of Public Reason,” The Journal of Philosophy 91, no. 1 (1994), 9. Emphasis added. 
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tion as an overriding deontological constraint.’737 Here I cannot develop Brower’s arguments 
as they would deserve, but the crucial point is that, in his view, Rawls is unable to justify his 
own conception of public reason because ‘any justification he can offer is so closely related to 
what he wants to defend.’738 In particular, Brower rejects Rawls’s notion of reasonableness as 
justifying ground: ‘public reason defined in terms of the reasonable is very weak; it requires 
of public reasons only that they be acceptable to those whose highest motivation is to act on 
public reasons. So defined public reason cannot justify the priority of the right since it appeals 
only to agents who already accept the priority of the right.’739 And ‘Rawlsian arguments will 
be acceptable only to those who have already approved the contractarian ideal of the reasona-
ble person.’740 Thus, according to Brower, to avoid circularity it would be better to conceive 
such an ideal in terms of an ‘open rational dialogue’ in which ‘citizens who treat each other 
with equal respect will share a goal of giving public reasons, and will treat reasons presented 
in conversation as open to rational criticism.’741 In such a dialogue, the development of public 
reasons is a goal that reasonable persons (rephrased as persons ‘who engage in open critical 
dialogue in an attempt to develop public reasons’742) pursue by making reference also to ‘their 
rational life plans and conceptions of the good […] as the basis for reasons open to rational 
criticism.’743 Such a “thin” veil of ignorance would rule out as unreasonable only ‘nonrational 
means of influence,’ such as persons’ ‘rhetorical skills, facts about their coercive desires and 
abilities’ and so on.744 As one can see, Brower ends up with a very different overall concep-
tion, but here I would just point out that if we consider Rawls’s “revisited” view of public 
reason, its underlying ideal can be more easily interpreted in the direction of a more open dia-
logue. This is not to suggest that Rawls’s public reason comes closer to Brower’s rational dia-
                                                        
737 Ibid. 22.  
738 Ibid. 16. 
739 Ibid. 10. 
740 Ibid. 15. 
741 Ibid. 23. 
742 Ibid. 24. 
743 Ibid. 
744 Ibid. 
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logue, but simply that the revised view of public reason is able –I think− to mitigate the con-
cerns underlying Brower’s criticism about an excess of formal constraints established ex ante. 
As we will see, the wide view of public reason opens the discussion to different kinds of rea-
son. Moreover, in the wide view, the emphasis on the “institutional side” of public reason 
seems to be more limited (or at least it is surely less evident), while greater attention is devot-
ed to such notions as reciprocity and civic friendship.745 Therefore, another possible interpre-
tation of the ideal of public reason (an interpretation more in line with the last version of pub-
lic reason) is more deliberative and pluralist. This interpretation has been stated in these 
terms: 
‘[I]t is important to disentangle public reason from too strict a link with the 
role of Supreme Court. This link would, in fact, make public reason too institu-
tional [… T]he true richness of public reason [is] its capability to open a dialogue 
on controversial matters among citizens of a liberal-democratic polity. [Public 
reason is] the anti-chamber of a process of collective deliberation. This interpreta-
tion is favoured by a reading of IPRR [“The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”]. In 
conclusion, the practice of public reason encourages reciprocity among citizens. 
In so doing, it contributes to realizing mutual respect [….], to fixing once and for 
all the discursive and pluralist attitude of the whole approach in PL [Political Lib-
eralsim].’746 
 
These observations lead me to clarify the sense in which the ideal of public reason is a 
moral one. In my understanding of Rawls’s argument, in a democratic public political culture 
(infra), this ideal is moral in the sense that it is rooted in what Rawls calls the ‘public or insti-
tutional identity’747 of the citizens. Now, Rawls distinguishes between an ‘institutional or 
public identity’ and a ‘noninstitutional or moral identity.’ While the former concerns citizens’ 
basic political liberties, rights, and duties, the latter concerns their ‘deeper aims and commit-
ments.’ Concerning the latter, he says: 
                                                        
745 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” for instance 447. 
746 Sebastiano Maffettone, Rawls: An Introduction, 280. 
747 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 30. 
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‘Citizens usually have both political and nonpolitical aims and commitments. 
They affirm the values of political justice and want to see them embodied in polit-
ical institutions […] They also work for the other values in nonpublic life and for 
the ends of the associations to which they belong. The two aspects of their moral 
identity citizens must adjust and reconcile […] These two kinds of commitments 
and attachments –political and nonpolitical− specify the moral identity and give 
shape to a person’s way of life.’748  
We could say that each individual has a larger moral identity, in which she regards herself 
in her moral (political and non-political) entirety. Such an identity can change over time, alt-
hough changes are usually gradual rather than sudden. However, the crucial point is that 
changes in a person’s deeper moral commitments and aims (e.g., a religious conversion) do 
not affect her institutional identity: she ‘still [has] the same basic rights and duties, [she owns] 
the same property and can make the same [political] claims as before.’749 Her political place 
in society does not shift because of changes in the “equilibrium” of her deeper moral attach-
ments and commitments. Indeed, the use Rawls makes of terms is a little ambiguous here. 
However, if we keep in mind that according to him the political is ‘but a part of the domain of 
the moral,’750 we can observe that also the institutional identity of citizens has a moral con-
tent. As I have already said several times, a political conception ‘is a normative and moral 
conception.’751 Thus, we could also adopt the expression public political morality (or ‘institu-
tional morality;’752 for brevity, hereafter I will simply refer to public morality) for describing 
the public and political part of individual morality, that is, the part ‘that is not rooted in the 
deeply held ethical or religious beliefs of each one, but rather in [citizens’] loyalty to the po-
litical-constitutional system within which they live their public lives.’753 To be sure, the ex-
pression public morality could be easily misunderstood, but I think of it as a political module 
                                                        
748 Ibid. 30-31. 
749 Ibid. 30. 
750 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 14. 
751 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, xxxix. 
752 Sebastiano Maffettone, “Political Liberalism: Reasonableness and Democratic Practice,” 555. 
753 Ibid.  
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of individual morality as a whole (then, a thin public morality, or a public morality ‘of narrow 
scope’754), rooted in the moral political criterion of reciprocity, which expresses the relation-
ship of mutual recognition between free equal rational reasonable cooperating fellow citizens, 
and which is specified in a political conception of justice and expressed through public rea-
son. It is not implausible to say that the ideal of public reason is grounded in citizens’ institu-
tional identity since it realises what Scanlon calls their (‘quite strong’) ‘desire to be able to 
justify one’s actions (and institutions) on grounds one takes to be acceptable to others’755 on 
reciprocal bases. This desire can be understood as the outcome of persons’ moral education to 
democratic citizenship.756 If we correlate this point with Rawls’s claim that ‘citizens affirm 
the ideal of public reason […] from within their own reasonable doctrines,’757 then it should 
be clear that the ideal of public reason not only “adheres” to the public identity of citizens, but 
it also reconciles itself (at least ideally) to the content of their broader morality via an over-
lapping consensus. In this way, we are able to understand not only why the ideal of public 
reason is a moral (political) one, but also why Solum can say that ‘an ideal of public reason is 
reflexive in the sense that it applies to its own public justification.’758 In my understanding 
this means that the limits imposed by the ideal of public reason are agreed upon in an over-
lapping consensus (then, justified by each citizen from within her deepest moral, philosophi-
cal, and religious commitments) as a standard that is compelling for citizens’ institutional (or 
public) identity, within which that standard can justify itself drawing on the resources of a 
democratic public political culture (with –among other things− its political conception of the 
person as free and equal, rational and reasonable, society as a fair system of cooperation over 
time, and the fact of reasonable pluralism, see 3.2.b.2). So, Solum affirms:  
                                                        
754 Fevzi Bilgin, Political Liberalism in Muslim Societies, 12. 
755 Thomas M. Scanlon, “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” in The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in Political Philos-
ophy (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 139. Famously, according to Scanlon: ‘[p]eople 
are willing to go to considerable lengths, involving quite heavy sacrifices, in order to avoid admitting the unjustifiability 
of their actions and institutions.’ Ibid. 
756 Ibid. See also John Rawls Political Liberalism, 199: ‘children’s education includes such things as knowledge of their 
constitutional and civic rights [… It] should also prepare them to be fully cooperating members of society and enable 
them to be self-supporting; it should also encourage the political virtues so that they want to honour the fair terms of 
social cooperation in their relations with the rest of society.’ 
757 John Rawls Political Liberalism, 218. 
758 Lawrence B. Solum, “Constructing an Ideal of Public Reason,” 735. 
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‘In the sphere of public political debate, an ideal of public reason must be justi-
fied in accordance with public reason. Because of this constraint, the justification 
of public reason by political liberalism is shallow in the sense that it can only 
draw on common sense and on our public political culture. But even those re-
sources are sufficient for public reason to make the case to each citizen that he or 
she should find the roots of the political ideal of public reason in his or her own 
comprehensive deepest convictions.’759 
Therefore, the ‘political justification’ of the ideal of public reason is ‘historically contin-
gent:’760 it is grounded in the political idea of cooperating free and equal, reasonable and ra-
tional citizens of a democratic society committed on reciprocal basis to providing one another 
public justifications for their political actions, decisions, and institutions. Obviously, then, to 
say ‘historically contingent’ does not mean morally empty. On the contrary, the ideal of pub-
lic reason has a specific political moral content, which in my view is best captured by the idea 
of reciprocity between free and equal citizens cooperating on fair terms. Moreover, it may 
possibly acquire a deeper moral content during the process of full justification within the con-
text of a particular religious or philosophical doctrine: in fact, as I mentioned, such an ideal 
and the limits it imposes for political discussions of fundamental political questions must be 
endorsed in an overlapping consensus. Thus, for example, for the religious doctrine X the ide-
al of public reason may have a certain moral religious relevance that differs from the moral 
religious meaning ascribed to it by the doctrine Y. Furthermore, as I showed in chapter two, 
the method of reasoning from conjecture may have something to say about how the full justi-
fication of this ideal can be achieved from the perspective of a specific doctrine. From the 
evaluative perspective of this study, however, the main focus is on the public political ground 
of such an ideal. 
Allow me sum up. In line with the interpretation of the ideal of public reason offered so 
far, I argue that we should understand legitimacy and reciprocity as two sides of the same 
coin, in terms of their role in providing a moral political ground to the ideal of public reason. 
However, I also think that when Rawls says that legitimacy is ‘based on the criterion of reci-
procity,’ he means that it is the more specifically moral notion of political reciprocity –as it is 
                                                        
759 Ibid. 753. 
760 Ibid. 762. 
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understood in the public political culture of a democratic regime− that characterises the idea 
of political legitimacy in its peculiarly political liberal way. It is the notion of reciprocity as 
‘mutuality of justificatory criteria’761 that configures the liberal principle of political legitima-
cy as it is. Thus, for the moment I would like to establish this point: 
(RR) An account of public reason as an ideal of democratic citizenship is based on the 
(moral) political criterion of reciprocity, which is the moral ideal expressing the relationship 
of mutual recognition between free and equal rational and reasonable cooperating fellow citi-
zens.  
As this formulation of the reciprocity requirement prompts, in a political conception such a 
criterion is a political one. I will return to reciprocity (specifying it as “reciprocity of the rea-
sonable”) in 4.2. As I have shown, for Rawls a commitment to the duty of civility follows 
from here. Thus, from the reciprocity requirement I derive a civility requirement, which is in-
ternally connected to the former. 
(CiR) If one endorses a moral criterion of reciprocity and, consequently, is committed to a 
liberal principle of political legitimacy, she should also abide by the limits imposed by the 
idea of public reason in public political discussions (when the conditions specified in a proper 
account of such an idea are met, see 3.2.b.2 and 3.2.b.3). 
This formulation of CiR is only provisional. I will restate it in the fourth chapter (as CiR*), 
because there I will consider in detail how one can fulfil the duty of civility. 
Rawls works out the ideal of public reason as belonging ‘to a conception of a well-ordered 
constitutional democratic society. The form and content of this reason […] are part of the idea 
of democracy itself.’762 However, this is not to say that public reason is relevant only for a 
perfectly just society. That would not be true with reference to Political Liberalism and it 
would be all the more untrue with reference to “The Idea of Public Reason revisited,” as I will 
explain in chapter five. However, the ideal and the idea of public reason are worked out from 
and for a liberal democratic regime and its public political culture. Elsewhere, he confirms 
that by saying: ‘[p]ublic reason is characteristic of democratic people: it is the reason of its 
                                                        
761 Sebastiano Maffettone, Rawls: An Introduction, 276. 
762 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 440-441. 
  
 European Muslims and Liberal Citizenship 
Ph.D. Thesis successfully discussed on April 21, 2016.  
The total or partial use of the Ph.D. Thesis is subject to copyright restrictions. 
 
  
249  
 Giovanni Vezzani 
 
LUISS-ULB 
citizens, of those sharing the equal status of citizenship’ and ‘as an ideal conception of citi-
zenship for a constitutional democratic regime, it presents how things may be, taking people 
as a just and well-ordered society would encourage them to be.’763 Thus, it is the reason of the 
public: it concerns the political relation between free and equal citizens.764 The subject of 
such a reason is the good of the public: it concerns ‘constitutional essentials and matters of 
basic justice’ (infra).765 Finally, this reason is public in its nature and content,766 since the lat-
ter are specified ‘by a family of reasonable conceptions of political justice reasonably thought 
                                                        
763 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 213. 
764 Ibid. and “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 442. 
765 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 442. 
766 Thus, ‘public reason is public in three ways,’ John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 213 and “The Idea of Public Reason 
Revisited,” 442. 
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to satisfy the criterion of reciprocity.’767 I will concisely return to this aspect in 3.2.b.2. This 
provides to its content a certain degree of openness and adaptability to new political condi-
tions:  
                                                        
767 Ibid. This point apparently marks a difference between the account of public reason in Political Liberalism, where 
the content of public reason was specified by a conception of justice (see 223), and the account developed since 1996 in 
the introduction to the paperback edition and later confirmed in “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” in which the 
content of public reason is specified by a family of political conceptions (see li and 450-451). However, already in Po-
litical Liberalism (225-227) Rawls points out that justice as fairness is but one form of political liberalism. The fact that 
from the beginning he conceived the project of Political Liberalism as dealing with a family of reasonable liberal politi-
cal conceptions of justice rather than with justice as fairness alone is confirmed by Rawls himself in his letter to the edi-
tor (published in the expanded edition of Political Liberalism, 438-439), where he says that ‘[I] mention the idea of jus-
tice as fairness. Many readers were misled into thinking that the book is about this idea, but it is not. Political Liberal-
ism is about a family of reasonable liberal ideas of political justice.’ Thus, in the 1996 introduction to the paperback 
edition and in “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” Rawls simply made more clearly the point that he had already 
made in the original edition. Let me briefly compare the account of how the content of public reason is specified, re-
spectively in Political Liberalism and in “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited.” In justice as fairness, he says in Politi-
cal Liberalism, ‘the guidelines of public reason and the principles of justice have essentially the same grounds. They are 
companion parts of one agreement.’ Ibid. 225-226. However, he immediately adds that ‘political liberalism […] has 
many forms, depending on the substantive principles used and how the guidelines of inquiry are set out.’ Ibid. 226. 
Rawls argues that his political conception of justice (justice as fairness) ‘is but one example of a liberal political con-
ception; its specific content is not definitive of such a view’ (that is, political liberalism per se). Ibid. He also adds that 
the original position is the distinctive device of justice as fairness for defining ‘what principles [of justice] and guide-
lines [of public reason] other citizens […] may reasonably be expected to endorse along with us,’ but he acknowledges 
the fact that ‘[m]any will prefer another criterion.’ Ibid. 226 and 227. What all the forms of political liberalism must 
have in common are the liberal character of their substantive principles of justice and an idea of public reason. This re-
quires that ‘[a]ccepting the idea of public reason and its principle of legitimacy empathically does not mean […] ac-
cepting a particular liberal conception of justice,’ ibid. 226, emphasis added. Yet, a few pages before he maintained 
that the ‘content of public reason is formulated by […] a political conception of justice,’ (223, emphasis added and quo-
tation marks removed). As Rawls notes in his 1998 letter, readers were induced to read this passage as saying that the 
content of public reason is specified by a single conception of justice; plausibly the most reasonable conception, that is, 
according to Rawls’s opinion, justice as fairness. In other words, the reader could have thought that while the project of 
Political Liberalism was open to different liberal conceptions of political justice, the content of public reason –given its 
normative relevance and its central place in Rawls’s new theory− was monopolised by the most reasonable of them. In 
“The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” (450), however, he openly says that the content of public reason is specified by 
the family of liberal political conception as a whole, ‘and not by a single one.’ Thus, he finally makes clear that, instead 
of having several different contents (depending on one’s political conception of justice) for a single common idea of 
public reason, the content of the idea of public reason is jointly specified by all the members of the family of liberal po-
litical conceptions. Accordingly, Rawls now says that political liberalism ‘does not try to fix public reason once and for 
all in the form of one favoured political conception of justice. […] For instance, political liberalism also admits Haber-
mas’s discourse conception of legitimacy […], as well as Catholic views of the common good and solidarity when they 
are expressed in terms of political values. […] The forms of permissible public reason are always several.’ Ibid. 451-
452. These forms, one may add, jointly specify the content of public reason. Conceptually the difference is noteworthy, 
because the main reason for this specification is to make room for different liberal conceptions on the same footing (that 
is, plainly with the same dignity for what concerns the content of public reason), so that public reason becomes more 
open and dynamic. It seems that in this way Rawls averts a possible source of criticism, namely the apparently static 
and “once-for-all” nature of public reason. For this kind of criticism see Jürgen Habermas, “Reconciliation Through the 
Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s Political Liberalism,” The Journal of Philosophy 92, no. 3 (1995), in 
which he argues that in Rawls’s view ‘the act of founding the democratic constitution cannot be repeated under the in-
stitutional conditions of an already constituted just society, and the process of realizing the system of basic rights cannot 
be assured on an ongoing basis. It is not possible for the citizens to experience this process as open and incomplete, as 
the shifting historical circumstances nonetheless demand. They cannot reignite the radical democratic embers of the 
original position in the civic life of their society. […] Because the citizens cannot conceive of the constitution as a pro-
ject, the public use of reason does not actually have the significance of a persistent exercise of political autonomy but 
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‘It is crucial that public reason is not specified by any one political conception 
of justice, certainly not by justice as fairness alone. Rather, its content –the prin-
ciples, ideals, and standards that may be appealed to− are those of a family of rea-
sonable political conceptions of justices and this family changes over time. These 
political conceptions are not of course compatible and they may be revised as a 
result of their debates with one another. Social changes over generations also 
give rise to new groups with different political problems. Views raising new ques-
tions related to ethnicity, gender, and race are obvious examples, and the political 
conceptions that result from these views will debate the current conceptions. The 
content of public reason is not fixed, any more than it is defined by any one rea-
sonable political conception.’ 768  
As James Boettcher puts it, public reason allows for a good degree of flexibility. 
‘The idea of public reason and the liberal principle of legitimacy may aim ide-
ally at agreement. But their principal function is to show us how we can act to-
                                                                                                                                                                                        
merely promotes the nonviolent preservation of political stability,’ 128, emphasis extended. Rawls takes on this argu-
ment in “Reply to Habermas” (see especially 399-403), but for my aims it could be noted that the widening of the 
sources of the content of public reason seems partially to address this criticism and to make public reason more open to 
different or new political conditions. In “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” Rawls says that ‘[t]here are many liber-
alisms and related views, and therefore many forms of public reason specified by a family of reasonable political con-
ceptions. Of these, justice as fairness, whatever its merits, is but one. The limiting feature of these forms is the criterion 
of reciprocity. […] Each of these liberalisms endorses the underlying ideas of citizens as free and equal persons and of 
society as a fair system of cooperation over time. Yet, since these ideas can be interpreted in various ways, we get dif-
ferent formulations of the principles of justice and different contents of public reason. […] Political liberalism, then, 
does not try to fix public reason once and for all in the form of a favoured political conceptions of justice. […] For in-
stance, political liberalism also admits Habermas’s discourse conception of legitimacy (sometimes said to be radically 
democratic rather than liberal) […T]he forms of permissible public reason are always several. Moreover, new varia-
tions may be proposed from time to time […] It is important to be so: otherwise the claims of groups or interests arising 
from social change might be repressed and fail to gain their appropriate political voice,’ 450-452, emphases added. For 
further remarks on these points, see infra. Similarly, Lawrence B. Solum argues that the new statement of public reason 
‘makes it clear that [Rawls] does not conceive of public reason as static or unchanging.’ Lawrence B. Solum, “Novel 
Public Reasons,” 1485. In a recent article, also Jonathan Quong has emphasised that the new formulation of the content 
of public reason as specified by a family of political conceptions may answer Habermas’s criticism. He makes two ar-
guments against Habermas’s claim. The first is related to the inescapable priority of some liberal rights, and the second 
is related to the point I am making in this note about the improvement introduced by Rawls thanks to the enlarged spec-
ification of the content of public reason. In Quong’s words: ‘[t]o some, Rawls’s account of the content of public reason 
[…] wrongly prioritizes philosophically derived liberal principles over the democratic autonomy of actual citizens. I 
believe this objection is misguided. First, certain fundamental liberal rights and principles –for example, freedom of 
speech and freedom of religion− are beyond reasonable dispute, and so incorporating such rights and principles into the 
content of public reason does nothing to unreasonably threaten democratic autonomy […] Second, as Rawls has empha-
sised, the content of public reason is not fixed by one specific conception, but rather it can include any conception of 
justice within a broadly liberal family, and so there is ample scope for each citizen to exercise his or her democratic au-
tonomy by advocating for the conception of justice he or she thinks best.’ Jonathan Quong, “On the Idea of Public Rea-
son,” in A Companion To Rawls, 267. 
768 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, l-li. Emphases added. 
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gether politically in light of ongoing disagreement. Absent the unlikely prospect 
of overlapping consensus on a single political conception of justice, citizens will 
continue to disagree not only about theological issues and questions of first phi-
losophy but also about constitutional essentials, matters of basic justice, and other 
issues of law and policy. Far from being a weakness of Rawls’s view, as some 
have suggested, disagreement about matters of justice is precisely what the main 
ideas of political liberalism, especially the idea of the reasonable, help us to un-
derstand. Adhering to the idea of public reason, citizens attempt to recognize oth-
er claims and arguments, and ultimately one another, as reasonable, while never-
theless disagreeing about what justice entails.’769 
The fact that the content of public reason is specified by a family of reasonable concep-
tions shows that public reason’s focus is more on its moral political nature than on its connec-
tion with a single conception of political justice. I will develop the consequences of these 
considerations in 3.2.b.2. 
Furthermore, in replying to a possible objection, Rawls affirms that it would be an error to 
think that public reason tries to determine in advance the “right” answer to a particular politi-
cal question: in that case it would be too restrictive an ideal.770 He considers the question of 
school prayer as an example.771 One cannot settle in advance this question simply by saying 
that liberal public reason forbids school prayer. Rather, ‘[w]e have to consider all the political 
values that can be invoked to settle this question and on which side the decisive reasons 
fall.’772 Thus, public reason does not settle political questions in advance: public reason is not 
merely a vademecum for the conscientious liberal citizen. Rather, ‘it specifies the public rea-
sons in terms of which such questions are to be politically decided,’773 and requires that citi-
                                                        
769 James W. Boettcher, “What is Reasonableness?” Philosophy and Social Criticism 30, no. 5-6 (2004), 617-618. 
770 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, li and “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 474-478. 
771 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 474-478. 
772 Ibid. 474. Emphasis added. 
773 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, li. 
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zens honour their duty of civility by answering those questions ‘according to their complete 
ordering of political values.’774 
Moreover, Rawls affirms that ‘those who reject constitutional democracy with its criterion 
of reciprocity will of course reject the very idea of public reason’775 and, as I mentioned, he 
adds that ‘the role of the criterion of reciprocity […] is to specify the nature of the political re-
lation in a constitutional democratic regime as one of civic friendship.’776 The question of 
what to do with those who do reject public reason is analysed in the next chapter. What mat-
ters here is that public reason chiefly aims at reconciliation. Rawls emphasises this role of 
public reason mainly in the introduction of the 1996 edition of Political Liberalism and in 
“The Idea of Public Reason Revisited.”777 It may be said that his revised conception of public 
reason is principally concerned with what I shall call “the reconciliation of the reasonable.” 
Effectively, when Rawls discusses the ‘limits of reconciliation by public reason,’ he traces the 
boundaries of the reasonable. He says that public reason can mitigate (‘but cannot eliminate’) 
conflicts that derive from irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines, since ‘even though our 
comprehensive doctrines are irreconcilable and cannot be compromised, nevertheless citizens 
who affirm reasonable doctrines may share reasons of another kind, namely, public reasons 
given in terms of political conceptions of justice.’778 Moreover, a society in which public rea-
son is honoured is able to avoid (or at least importantly to reduce) conflicts deriving from dif-
ferences in social status, class, ethnicity, or gender. The reason is that ‘once we accept the 
principles of justice, or recognize them as at least reasonable […], and know that our political 
and social institutions conform to them, the second kind of conflicts need no longer to arise, 
or arise so forcefully.’779 On the contrary, a third kind of conflicts that derives from the bur-
dens of judgement (supra) cannot be eliminated and ‘limit the extent of possible agree-
                                                        
774 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 479. Emphasis added. 
775 Ibid. 442. 
776 Ibid. 447. 
777 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, lviii and “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 487. 
778 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 487. 
779 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, lviii. 
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ment.’780 This is not surprising. To understand the link that I establish between reconciliation 
through public reason and reasonableness, recall the basic definition of reasonable persons: 
those who are willing to ‘propose fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them’ and, sec-
ond, to ‘recognize the burdens of judgement and to accept their consequences for the use of 
public reason in directing the legitimate exercise of political power.’781 It is natural, then, that 
reconciliation through public reason affects the first two kinds of conflicts but not the third. 
The former both fall within the borders of a reconciliation through public reason, because the 
first kind of conflicts is associated with the second feature of persons’ reasonableness (the 
recognition of the burdens of judgment and of their consequences),while the second with the 
first (the willingness to propose and abide by fair terms of cooperation). On the other hand, 
the elimination of the third kind of conflicts falls outside the moral (political) and practical 
limits of reasonable reconciliation through public reason. Without the oppressive use of state 
power, no agreement could overcome reasonable pluralism. 
The problem is that some authors firmly criticise precisely the possibility of a reasonable 
reconciliation through public reason. For instance, Chantal Mouffe argues that ‘to envisage 
politics as a rational process of negotiation among individuals is to obliterate all the dimen-
sions of power and antagonism –what I propose to call “the political”; it is to miss completely 
its very nature.’782 According to Mouffe, politics is characterised and moved by an ‘antago-
nistic element present in any social relation,’ while ‘every consensus is, by necessity, based 
on acts of exclusion.’783 Political liberalism, based as it is on the idea of an agreement be-
tween reasonable and rational persons and the exclusion of the unreasonable, ‘justifies [politi-
cal] exclusions on the grounds of rationality. As a result, the coercive dimension is denied, 
since those exclusions are presented as if they were the product of “free agreement” resulting 
from rational procedures (veil of ignorance […]) and immune from relations of power.’784 
                                                        
780 Ibid. 
781 Ibid. 54. 
782 Chantal Mouffe, “Political Liberalism: Neutrality and the Political,” Ratio Juris 7, no. 3 (1994), 319. 
783 Ibid. 319-320. 
784 Ibid. 320. 
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The conclusion is that political liberalism is ‘not pluralistic at all,’785 since in ‘politics the 
very distinction between “reasonable” and “unreasonable” is always the drawing of a frontier. 
It has a political character and it is the expression of a particular hegemony.’786 Finally, while 
‘[no] state or political order, even a liberal one, can exist without some form of exclusion, and 
pluralism can never be total,’ she claims that ‘it is very important to acknowledge those forms 
of exclusion for what they are and the violence that they imply, instead of concealing them 
under the guise of rationality.’787 
Mouffe rightly points out a risk of which Rawls himself is aware. As I have already men-
tioned in the first chapter, he says that ‘political philosophy as reconciliation must be invoked 
with care. For political philosophy is always in danger of being used corruptly as a defense of 
an unjust and unworthy status quo.’788 Having said that, I think that we are confronted with 
two different background conceptions of the role of political philosophy. The first starts from 
actual injustices and conflicts and asks how to imagine a social world in which they are elim-
inated or at least significantly reduced. The other starts from the same conflicts and injustices, 
but thinks that the practical task of political philosophy is limited to reveal or disclose them, 
because they cannot be eradicated. The first approach focuses on ideal consensus and is more 
‘critical,’ whilst the second conception is centred on existing conditions, institutions, prefer-
ences, and balance of powers and is more ‘realist.’789 Notice that the first perspective is not 
inconsistent with the second in so far as it recognises the importance of disclosing injustice 
and conflict, but it tries to go beyond it, because it believes that democracy ‘is worth defend-
ing and worth trying to show how the friend-foe fight may move to another level that is more 
symbolic and respectful of others’ and that ‘it is meaningful to exchange sensible arguments 
on political themes, instead of resorting to pure violence.’790 Or, as Bruce Ackerman, an ad-
                                                        
785 Ibid. 322. 
786 Ibid. 321. 
787 Ibid. 322. 
788 See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 4 note 4. 
789 In the first chapter I mentioned the distinction between ‘critical liberalism’ and ‘realist liberalism’ introduced by Se-
bastiano Maffettone in “Liberalismo filosofico contemporaneo,” see in particular 71-80. 
790 Sebastiano Maffettone, Rawls: An Introduction, 245. See also his “Political Liberalism: Reasonableness and Demo-
cratic Practice,” 566-568. 
  
 European Muslims and Liberal Citizenship 
Ph.D. Thesis successfully discussed on April 21, 2016.  
The total or partial use of the Ph.D. Thesis is subject to copyright restrictions. 
 
  
256  
 Giovanni Vezzani 
 
LUISS-ULB 
vocate of a form of political liberalism based on ‘conversational restraint,’ puts it, to the ques-
tion ‘[i]f practical political life seems such an unlikely forum for the dialogic search of moral 
truth, why insist that dialogue is especially central to politics?,’ a political liberal may reply 
that ‘there are other important things to talk about than moral truth: in particular, how people 
who disagree about the moral truth might nonetheless reasonably solve their ongoing problem 
of living together.’791 In its very essence, political liberalism ‘calls upon us to reflect upon the 
pragmatic imperative to talk to strangers as well as soul-mates; and to consider whether, de-
spite the strangers’ strangeness, we might still have something reasonable to say to one anoth-
er about our efforts to coexist on this puzzling planet.’792 Whether we opt for reconciliation or 
for irreconcilable antagonism as the normative horizon of political philosophy is a choice that 
profoundly affects how we understand the domain of the political. This is why, I think, 
Mouffe says that political liberalism ‘is necessarily blind to the existence of “the political”.’ I 
do not think that political liberalism is ‘necessarily blind’ to the existence of conflicts, exclu-
sions, and antagonisms. Certainly, however, it does not make them its ultimate normative 
horizon. 
An early expression of this view oriented toward reconciliation through public reason can 
be traced back to the discussion of the ‘precepts of reasonable discussions’ between reasona-
ble persons in “The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus:” 
‘First, the political discussion aims to reach reasonable agreement, and hence 
so far as possible it should be conducted to serve that aim. We should not readily 
accuse one another of self- or group-interest, prejudice or bias, and of such deeply 
entrenched errors as ideological blindness and delusion. Such accusations arouse 
resentment and hostility, and block the way to reasonable agreement. […] Second, 
when we are reasonable we are prepared to find substantive and even intractable 
disagreements on basic questions. The first general fact [i.e. the fact of reasonable 
pluralism] means that the basic institutions and public culture of a democratic so-
ciety specify a social world within which opposing general beliefs and conflicting 
comprehensive doctrines are likely to flourish and may increase in number. It is 
unreasonable, then, not to recognize the likelihood –indeed the practical certain-
                                                        
791 Bruce Ackerman, “Why Dialogue?” The Journal of Philosophy 86, no. 1 (1989), 8. 
792 Ibid. 22. 
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ty− of irreconcilable reasonable disagreements on matters of the first significance. 
[…] Third, when we are reasonable, we are ready to enter discussion crediting 
others with a certain good faith. We expect deep differences of opinion, and ac-
cept this diversity as the normal state of the public culture of a democratic society. 
To hate this fact is to hate human nature, for it is to hate the many not unreasona-
ble expressions of human nature that develop under free institutions.’793 
Here we can find the same point stated in a slightly different way: we should aim to politi-
cal reconciliation through public reason (first point), while accepting the fact that the burdens 
of judgement limit the possibility of reconciliation. Under free institutions, political reconcili-
ation is the goal of normative theory, mitigated by the awareness of the fact that without op-
pression such reconciliation cannot be total. That is, reconciliation cannot annihilate reasona-
ble disagreement if it has to be achieved in conditions of freedom. However, reconciliation is 
the political normative horizon of a society of reasonable free and equal cooperating citizens. 
Reasonable citizens can reasonably hope for reconciliation through public reason. Thus, an 
important feature of public reason, which derives from a commitment to the criterion of reci-
procity, is that: 
(PR1) To endorse public reason involves engaging in political reconciliation. This en-
gagement is not presented (comprehensively) as “acting for the highest good.” It just entails 
the reasonable acknowledgement that conflicts deriving from irreconcilable comprehensive 
doctrines and from social status, class, ethnicity, or gender may still allow some form of polit-
ical agreement through a public form of reasoning and that they can also be mitigated through 
the latter. 
As I understand them, RR, CiR, and PR1 are the main and reciprocally connected moral 
grounds of the ideal of public reason. However, an account of this ideal is not complete until 
one defines the idea that is structured upon it. Together, they aim to present a unitary concep-
tion of liberal citizenship.794 How can the ideal of public reason be expressed in a structured 
idea? 
                                                        
793 John Rawls, “The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus,” 478-479. 
794 For this reason, the distinction between the ideal and the idea of public reason has been strictly observed –for ex-
planatory purposes− only in this section, and becomes gradually less important as the conception is fully sketched out.  
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3.2.B.2 The Conditions of Public Reason. 
Rawls maintains that the ideal of public justification and deliberation through public rea-
son requires some political institutions to be structured in a working idea. These institutional 
conditions are: ‘public financing of elections,’ ‘fair equality of opportunity especially in edu-
cation and training,’ a ‘decent distribution of income and wealth’ so that all citizens can ‘take 
intelligent and effective advantage of their basic liberties,’ and ‘society as employer of last re-
sort.’795 These institutions are far below the requirements of Rawls’s conception of political 
justice (in particular the third point is obviously not the same as the difference principle), still 
they are ‘essential prerequisites for a basic structure within which the ideal of public reason 
[…] may protect the basic liberties and prevent social and economic inequalities from being 
excessive.’796 These institutions are necessary for the ‘public political deliberation to be pos-
sible and fruitful.’797 In other words, here Rawls is not listing the institutions that are neces-
sary for political justice, but the institutions that are a sine qua non condition for any adequate 
or decent democratic public debate. 
The core of public reason is the idea that political reciprocity and legitimacy (supra) im-
pose limits on fellow citizens in terms of the ‘ways of reasoning and criteria for the kind of 
information relevant for political questions.’798 In discussing fundamental political questions, 
citizens must provide suitable arguments that can serve as public justification for their posi-
tions: they must deliberate ‘within a framework of what [they] sincerely [regard] as the most 
reasonable political conception of justice, a conception that expresses political values that 
others, as free and equal citizens might also reasonably be expected to endorse.’799 As I men-
                                                        
795 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, lvi-lvii. Rawls discusses those institutions when he contrasts his view with liber-
tarianism and says that ‘the latter does not combine liberty and equality in the way liberalism does; it lacks the criterion 
of reciprocity and allows excessive social economic inequalities as judged by that criterion. In this case we do not have 
stability for the right reasons, which is always lacking in a purely formal constitutional regime.’ Then, he provides an 
‘indication of the institutions required for this stability,’ which are the institutions listed above. Ibid. lvi. Then, here 
Rawls connects his criticism against libertarianism to the salience of the moral criterion of reciprocity in ensuring sta-
bility for the right reasons, which, in turn, requires those minimal institutions so that the ideal of public reason can work 
and express the criterion of reciprocity, thus supporting stability for the right reasons. 
796 Ibid. 
797 Ibid. 
798 Ibid. 223. 
799 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 450. 
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tioned in 3.2.b.1, a distinctive element of “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” is the em-
phasis that Rawls puts on the fact that ‘the content of public reason is given by a family of po-
litical conceptions of justice, and not by a single one.’800 While there are many radically dif-
ferent non-public reasons (‘the many reasons of civil society [which] belong to […] the 
“background culture”,’801 supra), the ‘many forms of public reason’802 in order to be ‘permis-
sible’ are all limited by the criterion of reciprocity, because the content of public reason is al-
ways expressed by conceptions of justice which are all both liberal and political. While 
‘standards of rightness and justificatory criteria’ for non-public reasoning ‘derive from the 
subject they treat and the kind of association involved’803 (for instance, they may be correctly 
derived from some religious source), public reasoning ‘proceeds entirely within a political 
conception,’804 and its guidelines, principles, and justificatory criteria derive from a family of 
liberal political conceptions,805 as I underscored above (3.2.b.1). These conceptions have in 
common several features according to Rawls. First, as I have just mentioned, the principle of 
reciprocity is a common limit for all of them.806 Second, since they are liberal political con-
ceptions, they: 1- embed a list of basic rights and liberties, 2- assign a special priority to them, 
and 3- ensure ‘for all citizens adequate all-purpose means to make effective use of their free-
doms.’807 Third, since they are political conceptions, they: 1- apply to the basic structure of 
society, 2- are ‘presented independently from comprehensive doctrines,’ and 3- they are 
worked out from some fundamentals ideas ‘seen as implicit in the public political culture of a 
                                                        
800 Ibid. For additional considerations about this point, see also James W. Boettcher, “Rawls and Gaus on the Idea of 
Public Reason,” in Thinking Fundamentals, ed. David Shikiar, IWM Junior Visiting Fellows Conferences 9 (Vienna: 
IWM, 2000), 10-11. 
801 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 220. 
802 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 450. 
803 Sebastiano Maffettone, Rawls: An Introduction, 276. 
804 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 453. 
805 Ibid. 450. Rawls specifies that ‘I have proposed that one way to identify those political principles and guidelines is to 
show that they would be agreed to in what in Political Liberalism is called the original position. Others will think that 
different ways to identify these principles are more reasonable.’  
806 Ibid. 
807 Ibid. 
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constitutional regime.’808 As Rawls observes, ‘[t]o engage in public reason is to appeal to one 
of these political conceptions –to their ideals and principles, standards and values− when de-
bating fundamental political questions.’809 Then, while the principles of political justice for 
the basic structure of society are characteristic of each of these conceptions, the general prin-
ciples of public reasoning (i.e., the content of public reason) governing the public debate 
about fundamental political questions is what these conceptions have in common, because 
they must fall within the limits of political reciprocity. This point does not contradict what 
Rawls says in Lecture VI of Political Liberalism (224) and in Justice as Fairness: A Restate-
ment (89), namely, that the agreement on principles of public reason is one of the two consti-
tutive parts of a political conception.810 In fact, as I have explained in detail (see the footnote 
about the specification of the content of public reason by a family of reasonable conceptions 
in the previous section), in the 1998 letter to his editor Rawls explicitly affirms that from the 
beginning he thought of Political Liberalism as dealing with ‘a family of reasonable liberal 
ideas of political justice,’ rather than with justice as fairness alone.811 Thus, one may imagine 
that each political conception has distinctive ‘substantive principles of justice for the basic 
structure’ and more or less similar −because liberal and political, limited by reciprocity− gen-
eral principles and guidelines for public reasoning. Thus, while these conceptions of justice 
may disagree about the former (e.g., about whether or not to endorse the original position as a 
device for deriving the principles of justice), they share the basic moral grounds of the latter. 
In other words, while public reason has ‘many forms’ and ‘the forms of permissible public 
reason are always several,’ the content of this idea is jointly specified by a family of concep-
tions of justice which all respect the criterion of reciprocity as ‘the limiting feature of these 
forms’ of public reason.812 Hence, liberal political conceptions “overlap” on the second of the 
two ‘companion parts’ of each of them, that is, on the general principles and guidelines of 
public reason. This supports my interpretation of public reason centred on its moral grounds 
                                                        
808 Ibid. 453. 
809 Ibid.  
810 See also Political Liberalism, 225-226: ‘[i]n justice as fairness, then, the guidelines of public reason and the princi-
ples of justice have essentially the same grounds. They are companion parts of one agreement.’ 
811 See Rawls’s letter to his editor now included in the expanded edition of Political Liberalism, 439. 
812 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 450 and 452. 
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(3.2.b.1). After 1996,813 the idea of public reason becomes more clearly independent from jus-
tice as fairness −even in its political form814− since the notion of a liberal political conception 
itself is now more plainly presented as conceptually freestanding with reference to its original 
matrix in Rawls’s mind, i.e. justice as fairness as the political conception. Note that this is not 
to say that Rawls does not continue to think that justice as fairness is the most reasonable of 
those conceptions of justice.815 However, if justice as fairness is a political conception among 
other political liberal rivals, public reason really represents the pivot of political liberalism as 
(in Sebastiano Maffetone’s words) a liberal ‘meta-theory’ of toleration and legitimacy.816 A 
meta-theory of liberalism obviously makes far less stringent requirements in comparison with 
those made by a theory of justice, because the subject matter of a meta-theory of liberalism is 
political legitimacy, which is a different and in some respect “broader” concept than political 
justice. As James Boettcher correctly notes, ‘justice as fairness is a view about what justice 
is; political liberalism is a view about public reasoning and liberal legitimacy which admits 
justice as fairness as one reasonable political conception of justice among others.’817 As Se-
bastiano Maffettone observes, ‘[l]iberal legitimacy, in Political Liberalism, exceeds justice in 
                                                        
813 As already emphasised, however, the fact that the idea of public reason is independent from any specific conception 
of political justice was already clearly affirmed in the 1993 version of Political Liberalism: ‘accepting the idea of public 
reason […] does not mean accepting a particular conception of justice,’ 226. 
814 See, for instance the presentation of the project of political liberalism: ‘[t]he ambiguity of Theory is now removed 
and justice as fairness is presented from the outset as a political conception of justice’ (Political Liberalism, xvii). Here 
−obviously− I do not discuss whether and how the principles of justice as fairness are affected by the passage from A 
Theory to Political Liberalism. The debate on this point has mainly concerned the ‘survival’ of the second principle 
(and in particular the egalitarian difference principle) in the justificatory structure of Political Liberalism. I just mention 
two positions for illustrative purposes. For the position according to which egalitarianism perishes at the stage of an 
overlapping consensus, see Brian Barry, “John Rawls and the Search for Stability,” in particular 908-914. For the oppo-
site position, see David Estlund, “The Survival of Egalitarian Justice in John Rawls’s Political Liberalism,” The Jour-
nal of Philosophy 4, no. 1 (1996), 70-76. 
815 For a similar position, see Thomas M. Scanlon, “Rawls on Justification,” 162: ‘it may seem that his own doctrine, 
justice as fairness, and his two principles of justice have receded into the background, or perhaps even been replaced. 
The reason for this appearance has to do with the generality, and hence unavoidable abstractness, of the idea of public 
reason itself. The idea is that society should be organized around some reasonable political conception (justice as fair-
ness being only one example, albeit Rawls’s own preferred choice) […].’ This ‘generality and hence unavoidable ab-
stractness’ of the idea of public reason has also been captured in the terms of a liberal ‘meta-theory’ of toleration and 
legitimacy (Sebastiano Maffettone, Rawls: An Introduction, 215 and infra).  
816 See Sebastiano Maffettone, Rawls: An Introduction, 215: ‘[b]asically, in [Political Liberalism], Rawls presents a 
kind of meta-theory of political legitimation, based on liberal tolerance.’ Here, I do not adopt Maffettone’s distinction 
between legitimacy and ‘legitimation.’ For his concept of legitimation, see in particular ibid. 21-24 and 225-228. See 
also his Introduzione a Rawls, 101-103. I am also grateful to Tatiana Alekseeva for having discussed this point with me. 
817 James W. Boettcher, “What is Reasonableness?” 601-602, emphasis added. 
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two opposite ways. On the one hand, it is not sufficient for an act to be just to be also legiti-
mated. On the other hand, there are legitimated laws and regulations that we cannot think of 
as just. Citizens, however, are obliged to respect these legitimated norms even if unjust.’818 I 
now quote a quite long but illuminating passage (from the “Reply to Habermas”), in which 
Rawls alerts us that we should distinguish between matters of legitimacy and matters of jus-
tice:  
‘Suppose we aim to lay out democratic political institutions so that they are le-
gitimate, and so that the political decisions taken and the laws enacted pursuant to 
them are also legitimate. This puts the focus on the idea of legitimacy –and not 
justice. [W]e may think [that] “legitimate” and “just” [are] the same. […] They 
are not. A legitimate king or queen may rule by just and effective government, but 
then they may not; and certainly not necessarily justly even though legitimately. 
Their being legitimate says something about their pedigree: how they came to 
their office. It refers to whether they were the legitimate heir to the throne. […] A 
significant aspect of the idea of legitimacy is that it allows a certain leeway in 
how well sovereigns may rule and how far they may be tolerated. The same holds 
under democratic regimes. […] Laws passed by solid majorities are counted as le-
gitimate, even though many protest and correctly judge them unjust or otherwise 
wrong. Thus legitimacy is a weaker idea than justice and imposes weaker con-
straints on what can be done. It is also institutional, though there is of course an 
essential connection with justice. [… D]emocratic decisions and laws are legiti-
mate, not because they are just but because they are legitimately enacted in ac-
cordance with an accepted legitimate democratic procedure. […] Neither the pro-
cedures nor the laws need be just by a strict standard of justice, even if, what is al-
so true, they cannot be too gravely unjust. […] Legitimacy allows an undeter-
mined range of injustice that justice might not permit.’819 
I believe that Rawls thinks that this effort to open up political liberalism is sustainable in-
sofar as we can rely on some ground that is common to every acceptable liberal political 
view. For this reason, I suspect, he locates the very possibility of an adequate justification in 
                                                        
818 Sebastiano Maffettone “Religion and Liberalism: Public Reason, Public Sphere and Cultural Pluralism,” 9. 
819 John Rawls, “Reply to Habermas,” 427-428. Emphases added. 
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the notion of democratic public political culture.820 The latter is central in Political Liberal-
ism: ‘[s]ince justification is addressed to others, it proceeds from what is, or can be, held in 
common; and so we begin from shared fundamental ideas implicit in the public political cul-
ture, in the hope of developing from them a political conception that can gain free and rea-
soned agreement in judgement’821 in what Rawls calls a ‘general and wide,’ or ‘full,’ ‘reflec-
tive equilibrium.’822 In “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” the connection between the 
notions of public political culture and public reason is perhaps even more emphasised: for ex-
ample, the wide view of public reason is actually discussed in a section entitled “The Wide 
View of Public Political Culture.”823 If in Political Liberalism, as we have seen, Rawls con-
trasted non-public reasons (belonging to the background culture) and public reason (belong-
ing to the public political culture),824 in the later work the coessentiality between public rea-
son and public political culture becomes more explicit, due to the fact that the line of demar-
                                                        
820 The history of this concept in social sciences is a difficult one. I cannot reconstruct it here: I simply adopt Rawls def-
inition (supra and infra). For a recent contribution with a deep and wide reconstructive scope, see Stephen Welch, The 
Theory of Political Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
821 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 101. 
822 See for instance, ibid. 8: ‘a political conception of justice, to be acceptable, must accord with our considered convic-
tions, at all levels of generality, on due reflection.’ Rawls also says that a political conception must pass the test of re-
flective equilibrium, that is, ‘how well the view as a whole articulates our more firm considered convictions of political 
justice, at all levels of generality, after due examination, once all adjustments and revisions that seem compelling have 
been made. A conception of justice that meets this criterion is the conception that, so far as we can now ascertain, is the 
one most reasonable for us.’ Ibid. 28. In “Reply to Habermas,” we read (384, note 16 emphases added): ‘[w]ide reflec-
tive equilibrium […] is the reflective equilibrium reached when [the] citizen has carefully considered alternative con-
ceptions of justice and the force of various arguments for them. […T]he citizen has considered the leading conceptions 
of political justice found in our philosophical tradition […] and has weighed the force of the different philosophical and 
other reasons for them. We suppose this citizen’s general convictions, first principles, and particular judgements are at 
least in line. The reflective equilibrium is wide, given the wide-ranging reflection and possibly many changes of view 
that have preceded it. Wide and not narrow reflective equilibrium (in which we take note of only our own judgments 
[and not also of alternative conceptions of justice]) is plainly the important philosophical concept. […] Think of each 
citizen in [a well-ordered society] as having achieved wide reflective equilibrium. Since citizens recognize that they af-
firm the same public conception of political justice, reflective equilibrium is also general: the same conception is af-
firmed in everyone’s considered judgements. Thus citizens have achieved general and wide, or […] full reflective equi-
librium. In such a society, not only is there a public point of view from which all citizens can adjudicate their claims of 
political justice, but also this point of view is mutually recognized as affirmed by them all in full reflective equilibrium. 
This equilibrium is fully intersubjective: that is, each citizen has taken into account the reasoning and arguments of eve-
ry other citizen.’ See also Sebastiano Maffettone, Rawls: An Introduction, 139-157 (in particular 145-149) and Thomas 
M. Scanlon, “Rawls on Justification,” especially 140-153 and 160. See also Norman Daniels, “Wide Reflective Equilib-
rium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics,” The Journal of Philosophy 76, no. 5 (1979), 256-282. 
823 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 462. 
824 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 220. 
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cation –and the admitted junctions− between the two cultures shapes825 and in turn is shaped 
by826 the configuration of public reason. The notion of public political culture ‘comprises the 
political institutions of a constitutional regime and the public traditions of their interpretation 
[…], as well as historic texts and documents that are common knowledge’827 and represents a 
shared fund of ‘fundamental implicit’ ideas from which the content of a political conceptions 
of justice can arise.828 Rawls extracts from this shared fund three abstract and general ideas in 
particular, which are of cardinal importance for his project, because the family of reasonable 
liberal political conceptions of justice is elaborated by drawing on those ideas. Therefore, it is 
in their terms that ‘political liberalism can be formulated and understood:’829 
1. The fundamental organising idea of society as a fair system of cooperation over 
time; 
2. The companion political conception of the person as free and equal; 
3. The companion conception of a well-ordered society as effectively regulated by a 
political conception of justice; 
Moreover, this culture is characterised by ‘three general facts:’830  
1. The fact of reasonable pluralism; 
2. The fact that only the oppressive use of state power can maintain a shared under-
standing based on one comprehensive doctrine overtime; 
3. The fact that ‘an enduring and secure […] democratic regime must be willingly and 
freely supported by at least a substantial majority of its politically active citizens.’ 
                                                        
825 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 462: ‘the details about how to satisfy the proviso must be 
worked out in practice [… and how] they work out is determined by the nature of the public political culture and calls 
for good sense and understanding.’ 
826 Ibid.: the proviso ‘specifies public political culture as distinct from the background culture.’ 
827 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 13-14. 
828 Ibid. 25 note 27.  
829 Ibid. 43. See also 35. 
830 Ibid. 36-38. 
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Rawls also adds a fourth fact (which underlies the discussion so far):831 
4. The fact that the public political culture represents a shared fund of ‘fundamental 
implicit ideas from which it is possible to work up a political conception of justice 
suitable for a constitutional regime.’ 
The notion of public political culture recurs in different places and occasions. For example, 
in “The Priority of Right and Ideas of Good” (1988), Rawls already said that ‘state’s concern 
with [the education of children] lies in their role as future citizens, and so in such essential 
things as their acquiring the capacity to understand the public culture and to participate in its 
institutions.’832 Moreover, in The Law of Peoples, he writes that there is a right to limit immi-
gration in order ‘to protect a people’s political culture and its constitutional principles.’833 
Some authors have argued that the emphasis on public culture as the common element of a 
democratic regime –along with the requirement of an overlapping consensus of comprehen-
sive views on a conception of political justice− is the expedient that allows Rawls to preserve 
a congruence between justice and good in Political Liberalism.834 This argument is apparently 
supported by Rawls’s considerations about “The Good of Political Society” (seventh section 
of the Lecture V, “Priority of Right and Ideas of Good”).835 The “politicisation” of this con-
                                                        
831 Ibid. 38, note 41. 
832 John Rawls, “The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good,” 465. 
833 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 39 note 48. This is ‘another reason for limiting immigration,’ since few lines be-
fore he pinpointed ‘at least a qualified right to limit immigration’ with reference to the preservation of the capacity of 
peoples’ territory ‘to support them in perpetuity.’ 
834 With reference to the preservation of the congruence between right and good through the idea of an overlapping con-
sensus, Brian Barry says that: ‘in the last chapter of A Theory of Justice, Rawls maintained that the stability of the prin-
ciples of justice could be assured only to the extent that they were “congruent” with widely held conceptions of the 
good. In Political Liberalism, he says that the stability of the principles of justice can be assured only to the extent that 
they are in some way compatible with widely held “comprehensive views.” Apart from the shift in terminology, it is 
clear that in this respect Rawls has not changed his mind about stability’ (“John Rawls and the Search for Stability,” 
890). For a dissenting opinion, see Paul Weithman, Why Polilitical Liberalism?¸ 298-300. Also Maffettone (in a differ-
ent way) maintains something similar when he says that: ‘Rawls’s answer [to the problem of the comprehensiveness of 
the notion of congruence as sketched out in A Theory] is to strive to make the congruence between justice and good rel-
atively independent from his own theory of justice as fairness, to anchor it in the shared public culture of a democracy’ 
(Introduzione a Rawls, 71, my translation). 
835 Here Rawls says that a well-ordered society is a good in two ways. First, for ‘persons individually,’ because: 1) it 
allows the exercise of persons’ moral powers and ‘the exercise of the two moral powers is experienced as good,’ and 
because 2) it secures the ‘social bases of mutual self-respect.’ Secondly, it is a good realised socially, since, ‘establish-
ing and successfully conducting reasonably just […] democratic institutions over a long period of time […] is a great 
social good and appreciated as such.’ Political Liberalism, 202-204. 
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gruence perhaps explains Rawls’s proximity to classical republicanism in this section (in-
fra).836  
In Rawls’s project the notion of public political culture plays a pivotal role because it is 
closely linked with the moral criterion of reciprocity. In fact, if we connect within public po-
litical culture the above-mentioned ideas 1 (fair social cooperation) and 2 (persons as free and 
equal) and the three general facts (the fact reasonable pluralism, the fact of coercion, and the 
fact of democratic support), we can identify the roots of reciprocity as the moral ideal ex-
pressing the relationship between free and equal rational and reasonable citizens cooperating 
on fair terms. As I will explain later (and as I will repeat in 4.2), then, the core of Rawls’s 
conception of public reason is constituted by the triadic relation between public political cul-
ture, reciprocity, and public reason with its proviso. It is clear, then, that public political cul-
ture is the source of “rough” material for the specification of guidelines of public reason 
through the elaboration of political conceptions of justice that are all bound to −and morally-
politically qualified by− the criterion of reciprocity. It is obvious that, during this process, 
those rough materials (implicit ideas and principles) are substantially transformed and revived 
from the moral and political point of view. Yet, the existence of those materials is what makes 
the liberal meta-theory of political liberalism possible. In one sense, this is the realistic side of 
Rawls’s utopia (supra). It is on the basis of democratic public political culture as it is today 
that Rawls can say that his ideal conception ‘describes what is possible and can be.’837 It 
would be difficult, then, to overemphasise the importance of public political culture. In par-
ticular, it serves many crucial (and profoundly intertwined) roles in Rawls’s political theory: 
1. As I have just mentioned, it provides the shared fund of implicit ideas on which the 
political conceptions can be worked out. 
2. Even more importantly, its existence is a necessary precondition for the affirmation 
of the liberal principle of legitimacy. Only a society in which those ideas are shared 
                                                        
836 Ibid. 205-206. On the contrary, he rejects ‘civic humanism’ as a form of Aristotelianism according to which ‘politics 
is […] the privileged locus of the good life,’ because the man is defined as a political animal. In contrast, classic repub-
licanism, according to Rawls, is not comprehensive, since it simply maintains that ‘with a general retreat into private 
life, even the most well-designed institutions will fall into the hands of those who seek to dominate. [… And that] the 
safety of democratic liberties requires the active participation of citizens.’ Thus, with reference to classic republicanism, 
‘justice as fairness as a form of political liberalism has no fundamental opposition [, a]t most there can be certain differ-
ences on matters of institutional design.’ 
837 Ibid. 213, emphasis added. The phrase continues: ‘yet may never be, though no less fundamental for that.’ 
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(to what degree is impossible to say here) can recognise the moral political authori-
ty of such a principle (remember that it says that ‘our exercise of political power is 
fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essen-
tials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse 
in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason’).838 
3. It shapes our conception of reasonableness: it tells us what it means to treat others 
and be treated by others as reasonable persons, as free and equal citizens who share 
the exercise of political power over one another. The two distinctive traits of rea-
sonable citizens are the recognition of the burdens of judgement and their conse-
quences and the willingness to offer and to abide by fair terms of social coopera-
tion, thus recognising their two moral powers as free and equal persons and the fact 
of reasonable pluralism. But this characterisation in political terms of both persons 
and society is possible only thanks to the theoretical elaboration of the shared fund 
of public political culture. 
4. In line with 1, 2, and 3, we can now capture the triadic relation mentioned above by 
saying that the idea of public reason is anchored in public political culture insofar 
as the former is grounded in the criterion of reciprocity, which, in turn, emerges 
from the fundamental organising idea of society as a fair system of cooperation be-
tween free and equal persons (which is part of the democratic public political cul-
ture).  
5. Moreover, as Jonathan Quong has observed, the importance of the notion of demo-
cratic public culture also derives from its connection with the idea of reflective 
equilibrium. Quong notes that ‘Rawls explains that we begin with some of the ideas 
implicit in our public political culture not simply because they are our ideas, [… 
r]ather we do so as part of the process of reflective equilibrium.’839 As Quong 
notes, in Political Liberalism Rawls says that ‘[w]e collect such settled convictions 
as the belief in religious toleration and the rejection of slavery, and try to organize 
the basic ideas and principles implicit in these convictions into a coherent political 
                                                        
838 Ibid. 137. See also xliv, 224. 
839 Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, 155, emphases added.  
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conception of justice. These convictions are provisional fixed points that it seems 
any reasonable conception must account for. We start then, by looking to the public 
culture itself [… and] a political conception of justice, to be acceptable, must ac-
cord with our considered convictions, at all levels of generality, on due reflection, 
or in what I have called elsewhere “reflective equilibrium”.’840 Quong aptly under-
lines, then, that ‘[d]rawing on the ideas implicit in our public culture is therefore 
not a radical departure from the methodology employed in A Theory of Justice, but 
rather a continuation of Rawls’s commitment to the method of reflective equilibri-
um.’841 He calls this ‘the reflective equilibrium explanation of why political liberal-
ism begins with ideas from our public culture.’842 In few words, democratic public 
political culture can be understood not simply as a static and descriptive account of 
the actual basic convictions widely held in a specific society, but as a part of 
Rawls’s justificatory project: ‘[o]ur considered convictions gain justificatory force 
if they fit within a coherent conception of justice, and the conception of justice 
gains justificatory force if it can explain our most important considered convic-
tions.’843 
6. Since this fund is shared, it represents the ground on which the political pro tanto 
justification can be reached and become the focus of an overlapping consensus. In 
Rawls’s theory of justification, public political culture is, in this sense, the ground 
where ‘liberal ideal consensus’ and ‘factual democratic consensus’ can meet and be 
reconciled via a democratic practice backed by a normative conception of liberal 
citizenship.844 On this account, the idea of reasonableness is more on the ideal-
consensus pole of a hypothetical continuum and public reason represents the theo-
retical tool for transferring (in the literal sense of the Latin verb transferre) such a 
normative imprinting to the practice of democratic deliberation, which represents 
                                                        
840 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 8, emphasis added. 
841 Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, 155. 
842 Ibid.  
843 Ibid. 
844 Sebastiano Maffettone, “Political Liberalism: Reasonableness and Democratic Practice,” 572. 
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the factual dimension. At the end of this process of reconciliation, ideal consensus 
on liberal principles and factual agreement (necessary for social stability) are two 
sides of the very same coin (the coin of liberal democracy), and stability for the 
right reasons can occur. Once the coin has been minted, it is difficult to separate its 
two sides. 
Rawls’s conception of public political culture has been criticised on several occasions. For 
example, Thomas McCarthy criticises the ‘observer-centred’ approach of Rawls, contrasted 
with a more ‘participant-centred’ approach à la Habermas.845 In his view, ‘to suppose that the 
stock of shared political ideas and convictions is in some way given, there to be found and 
worked up, or that it could somehow be fixed by theorists, is to hypostatize, or freeze ongoing 
processes of public political communication whose outcomes cannot be settled in advance by 
political theory.’846 If McCarthy calls for a more deliberative democracy with ‘unrestricted 
public reasoning,’847 in order to avoid an excess of rigidity and pre-definition, also George 
Klosko claims that any attempt to pre-define the content of public political culture would be 
mistaken. He maintains that: 
‘The intuitive ideas [of public political culture] are intended to be generally 
subscribed to in ways that principles of justice are not. […] However, because of 
the burdens of judgment, it seems unlikely that adherents of conflicting compre-
hensive views will readily agree that a specific conception of justice is best suited 
to free and equal people who have to live together. Among the many issues over 
which adherents of different views could well disagree are these precise character-
istics of free and equal persons. [… T]here is little reason to believe that liberal 
citizens will agree more readily about them than about other contested moral 
questions.’848 
Klosko then proposes an empirical, evidence-based approach to political liberalism: 
                                                        
845 Thomas McCarthy, “Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism: Rawls and Habermas in Dialogue,” 60-61. 
846 Ibid. 61. 
847 Ibid. 63. 
848 George Klosko, “An Empirical Approach to Political Liberalism,” in Political Liberalism: Variations on a Theme, 
138. 
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‘I believe that careful assessment of empirical evidence is necessary in order to 
develop the most defensible account of [the principles of justice]. If the end is to 
discover principles that people can accept, then a great deal depends on their ex-
isting moral and political views, with which principles must cohere. We must in-
quire into what liberal citizens believe and then craft our principles according-
ly.’849 
And:  
‘[My] alternative, convergence method begins by attempting to find areas of 
agreement between existing comprehensive views. Once such areas have been 
identified, the second stage would attempt to derive principles with the most ro-
bust possible normative content. […] The first stage of the convergence method 
can be represented visually as a Venn diagram, with a highlighted area of agree-
ment –or overlap− between different comprehensive views.’850 
No doubt, here we start with a criticism of Rawls’s notion of public political culture and 
we end up with a quite different version of political liberalism. However, remember that 
Rawls does not say that public political culture is absolutely homogeneous or that it does not 
contain conflicting views. Rather, he tries to ‘find a way of organizing familiar ideas and 
principles into a conception of political justice that expresses these ideas and principles in a 
somewhat different way than before’ and finds this ‘organizing idea within which all ideas 
and principles can be systematically connected and related’ in the ‘idea of society as a fair 
system of social cooperation between free and equal persons viewed as fully cooperating 
members of society over a complete life.’851 Klosko, however, inverts the two stages of 
Rawls’s justificatory strategy: we begin now from something like an overlapping consensus 
between comprehensive views. This contradicts Rawls’s idea that: 
‘To find this political conception we do not look at known comprehensive doc-
trines with the aim of striking a balance or average between them, nor do we at-
tempt to strike a compromise with a sufficient number of those doctrines actually 
                                                        
849 Ibid. 132-133. 
850 Ibid. 139. 
851 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 9. 
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existing in society by tailoring the political conception to fit them. Doing that ap-
peals to the wrong idea of consensus and makes the political conception political 
in the wrong way. Rather, we formulate a freestanding political conception hav-
ing its own intrinsic (moral) political ideal expressed by the criterion of reci-
procity. We hope in this way that reasonable comprehensive doctrines can en-
dorse for the right reasons that political conception and hence be viewed as be-
longing to a reasonable overlapping consensus.’852 
Note that it is difficult to maintain the priority of right (infra) if we revert the order of justi-
fication, giving primacy to the “overlapping consensus.” In this case, the latter would actually 
be more similar to an average between the conceptions of the good. Indeed, this can be a le-
gitimate choice, but, in these terms, it is very different from Rawls’s political liberalism. In 
few words, the point is that: if we want to start from a freestanding conception and if we want 
that such a conception has a moral (political) content, on which −only in a second step− wider 
moral (comprehensive) views may converge, we must necessarily begin from some moral 
(political) ideas that they can share. Fundamental ideas of democratic public political culture 
play this role. Rawls is clearly more concerned with the substance of the problem (that is, 
with ‘uncovering a public basis of justification on questions of political justice’),853 rather 
than with the details of those fundamental ideas. At the end of the day, these ideas consist of 
‘what is, or can be, held in common’854 by people living under democratic institutions over 
generations. I think that if we understand such ideas as something like general constitutional 
supreme principles, they are not particularly troublesome from a theoretical point of view. 
These considerations also reply to McCarthy’s criticism. Since Rawls’s fundamental ideas of 
public political culture are situated at a very high level of generality and abstraction, how 
could one meaningfully hope to ‘expand, contract, shift, challenge, and deconstruct’855 them? 
I doubt that the idea of ‘free and equal persons’ in its basic and most profound meaning could 
be seriously expanded or challenged in a democratic regime. Note that obviously this is not to 
say that the principles worked out by Rawls from these ideas are equally above criticism. I am 
                                                        
852 Ibid. xlv. Emphases added. 
853 Ibid. 100. 
854 Ibid. 
855 Thomas McCarthy, “Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism: Rawls and Habermas in Dialogue,” 61. 
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simply saying that in a liberal democratic regime these ideas per se are abstract enough to be 
comprehensively inoffensive, but, at the same time, they are moral enough to be politically 
relevant. As a general point, it can be argued that ‘those elements of the liberal democratic po-
litical culture are like grounds from which any conception of justice must begin. Without 
those shared starting convictions, it would lack the minimal agreement on the basis of which 
it can be said that political philosophy answers to the same questions even if they are made 
from different viewpoints.’856 Joshua Cohen has also pointed out that a shared public political 
culture is not only a common ground from which we can start to work out a political concep-
tion of justice, but it is also an element that in the long run promotes a convergence on moral 
political views, thus increasing the plausibility of an overlapping consensus. Allow me to 
quote this long but limpid passage: 
‘[W]e need a mechanism –a social or political process that might produce con-
vergence on political values but that does not similarly generate consensus on 
comprehensive moral values. The right place to look for such a mechanism is at 
the level of shared institutions, as they might plausibly play an educative role with 
respect to political ideas, but not with respect to comprehensive moral concep-
tions. […] The underlying idea […] is that people living within institutions and a 
political culture shaped by certain ideas and principles are likely to come to un-
derstand those ideas and principles and to develop some attachment to them. Take 
for example [the political conception of persons as free equal citizens]. This idea 
is manifest in various ways in the practices and traditions of interpretation and 
public discussion associated with citizenship in a democracy: for example equali-
ty before the law, or equal civil and political rights. […] Some will accept politi-
cal equality as following from their more fundamental moral or religious convic-
tions; others will accepts political equality as an important, nonderivative value. 
But what keeps the expectation of general agreement from being hopelessly naïve 
is the plausible thought that citizens who grow up within a reasonably stable de-
mocracy will find this (self-)conception familiar and attractive: the political ideas 
“expressed” in common, public institutions and appealed to in the culture to justi-
fy those institutions will shape citizens’ moral-political education. […] Many 
                                                        
856 Sebastiano Maffettone, Introduzione a Rawls, 73, my translation. 
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views –religious, moral, philosophical− have sufficient internal flexibility or 
openness to make such accommodations possible. But because political values are 
a subset of moral values, we have no reason to expect the accommodations of 
shared political values to produce a more comprehensive agreement that extends 
to moral values generally.’857 
Now the obvious question is whether the plausibility of an overlapping consensus is then 
directly proportional to the strength of the constraints imposed by society’s institutions and 
culture. In this case, an overlapping consensus may seem to be more a matter of social impo-
sition than a matter of free agreement. I think that if we presuppose something like the above-
mentioned institutions that are necessary for any free public debate (supra), we can see this 
process not as an oppressive vicious circle, but as a self-clarification like the one envisaged by 
Rawls through the idea of reflective equilibrium. As Cohen rightly puts it: 
‘Under these conditions, we face strong pressure to regard the acquisition of 
shared ideas as a matter of learning rather than mere inculcation via institutional 
constraint […] Though the political conception of the person does not arise 
through reasoning that proceeds outside an institutional setting, it must successful-
ly withstand pressures arising from the institutionalization of deliberation itself, 
from freedom of expression and association, and from a fair distribution of re-
sources. The attractions of the political conception of the person, then, are as-
sumed to survive criticisms that might be directed against it. If they do survive, 
then how could the mere fact that people would find other views attractive under 
different circumstances provide a reason for rejecting the views that they do 
hold?’ 858 
Therefore, sharing a common political culture and living under the same institutions can 
educate and promote certain political values and common interpretations of fundamental po-
                                                        
857 Joshua Cohen, “A More Democratic Liberalism,” 1530-1533. Emphasis added. For the thesis that ‘democracy [is] a 
tradition, [which] inculcates certain habits of reasoning, certain attitudes toward deference and authority in political dis-
cussion, and love for certain goods and virtues, as well as a disposition to respond to certain types of actions, events, or 
persons with admiration, pity, or horror’ and that ‘the ethical substance [of this tradition] is more a matter of enduring 
attitudes, concerns, dispositions, and patterns of conduct than it is a matter of agreement on a conception of justice in 
Rawls’s sense,’ see Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 3. 
858 Ibid. 1535-1536. Emphasis added. 
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litical ideas without representing a deterministic –oppressive− mechanism of inculcation. 
From all these considerations, I would like to establish the following: 
(PR2) To endorse public reason involves the recognition of belonging to a common demo-
cratic public political culture with its central ‘organizing idea of society as a fair system of so-
cial cooperation between free and equal persons viewed as fully cooperating members of so-
ciety over a complete life.’859 
The central idea of public reason is that ‘political values alone are to settle fundamental 
[political] questions.’860 Clearly, I must specify (1) the scope of what Rawls calls here ‘fun-
damental political questions’ (see 3.2.b.3), and (2) the meaning of the word ‘alone’ (see chap-
ter four). For the moment, let me consider the question of political values. First, Rawls says 
that a liberal political conception:861 
1) Is not procedurally neutral (in the sense of referring to no substantive value at all), 
since it expresses substantives principles of justice which have a moral content, and not 
merely procedural values. 
2) Does not endorse neutrality of aims in the sense that the state should ‘ensure to all citi-
zens equal opportunity to advance any conception of the good’ (emphases added). In-
stead, only ‘permissible conceptions of the good’ (that is, conceptions that respect the 
public principles of justice)862 can be advanced. This is (the ‘particular’) meaning of 
                                                        
859 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 9. 
860 Ibid. 214. 
861 In the following list, quotations are from ibid. 191-194. 
862 Ibid., for instance 190. 
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the priority of right.863 The priority of right is compatible with a different notion of 
neutrality of aims, that is, that the institutions of the basic structure ‘are not intended to 
favour any comprehensive doctrine.’ 
3) Moreover, it is not neutral in its effect or influence: ‘it is surely impossible for the basic 
structure of a just constitutional regime not to have important effects and influences as 
to which comprehensive doctrines endure and gain adherents over time.’  
A political conception of justice, then, expresses moral political principles. It does not fa-
vour any comprehensive doctrine, while it would be implausible to say that it has no ef-
fects on them in the long run. Finally, it puts some restriction on admissible life plans 
made by citizens. In accordance with the previous considerations, Rawls affirms that, 
‘[e]ven though political liberalism seeks common ground and is neutral in aim, it is im-
portant to emphasize that it may still affirm the superiority of certain forms of moral char-
acter and encourage certain moral virtues,’ since ‘ideas of the good may be freely intro-
duced as needed to complement a political conception of justice, so long as they are politi-
cal ideas, that is, so long as they belong to a reasonable political conception of justice for a 
constitutional regime. This allows us to assume that they are shared by citizens and do not 
depend on any particular comprehensive doctrine.’ 864 Recall that for ideas of the good to 
be political, they must a) be ‘shared by citizens regarded as free and equal,’ and b) ‘not 
                                                        
863 Ibid. 209: ‘the priority of right means (in its general meaning) that the ideas of good used must be political ideas, so 
that we need not rely on comprehensive conceptions of the good […] Second, the priority of right means (in its particu-
lar meaning) that the principles of justice set limits to permissible ways of life: the claims that citizens make to pursue 
ends transgressing those limits have no weight. The priority of right gives the principles of justice a strict precedence in 
citizens’ deliberations [about justice] and limits their freedom to advance certain ways of life.’ See also ibid. 174: ‘the 
priority of right means that the principles of justice impose limits on permissible ways of life; and hence the claims citi-
zens make to pursue ends that transgress those limits have no weight. But surely just institutions and the political virtues 
expected of citizens [… must not only permit but also sustain] ways of life fully worthy of citizens’ devoted allegiance. 
A political conception of justice must contain within itself sufficient space, as it were, for such ways of life.’ The priori-
ty of right has been emphasised as an important element of continuity in Rawls’s work: Sebastiano Maffettone, Rawls: 
An Introduction, 216-217. The priority of right –through its characterisation of the two ideas of justice and legitimacy− 
can be seen as a unifying element of Rawls’s work: see Leif Wenar, “The Unity of Rawls’s Work,” in The Legacy of 
John Rawls, eds. Thom Brooks and Fabian Freyenhagen (London and New York: Continuum, 2005), 22-33. Rawls lists 
(Political Liberalism, 176) five political ideas of good: 1) the idea of goodness as rationality, 2) the idea of primary 
goods, 3) the idea of permissible conceptions of the good (‘associated with comprehensive doctrines’), 4) the idea of 
political virtues, 5) the idea of the good of a well-ordered society (for the latter, supra). Those are political ideas of the 
good because: a) they can be ‘shared by citizens regarded as free and equal,’ and b) they ‘do not presuppose any partic-
ular fully (or partially) comprehensive doctrine.’ 
864 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 194. 
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presuppose any particular fully (or partially) comprehensive doctrine.’865 Thus, this means 
–among other things− that to be moral in the political and not in the comprehensive sense, 
they must somehow be grounded in the public political culture that I discussed before. As 
Fred D’Agostino’s analysis points out, values of public reason express a liberal interpreta-
tion of the idea of public justification.866 But how are they specified? Rawls is not always 
clear on this matter. In Political Liberalism they are mainly discussed within justice as 
fairness as a political conception. Rawls claims that justice as fairness expresses two kinds 
of political values, which correspond to the two parts of a political conception (substantive 
principles of justice and principles and criteria for public reasoning): ‘values of justice’ 
(expressed by the principles of justice) and ‘values of public reason’ (‘expressed in the 
guidelines of inquiry and in the steps taken to make such an inquiry free and public, as 
well as informed and reasonable’).867 Thus, he affirms that the ‘content of public reason is 
given by a political conception of justice: this content has two parts: substantive principles 
                                                        
865 Ibid. 176, quoted in the penultimate footnote. 
866 Fred D’Agostino, “Value Pluralism, Public Justification, and Post-Modernism: The Conventional Status of Political 
Critique,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 29, no. 3 (1995), in particular 356-362. D’Agostino argues that there is an un-
solvable tension between different values (which he gathers in two categories: ‘moralistic’ and ‘realistic’ values) that 
characterise the ‘multifaceted’ demands for public justification. Some of those values are in conflict: we cannot realise 
all of them at the same time (e.g. the value of ‘salience’ and the value of ‘independence’ of the justification, see 359). 
He thus maintains that ‘the elements of the very idea of public justification may well be incoherent,’ ibid. Since, accord-
ing to him, there is not a non-conventional overarching principle to rule out such a tension, we can have nothing but a 
mere conventional interpretation of the idea of public justification: ‘[t]he choice of any interpretation of the idea of pub-
lic justification must be made on a purely conventional basis,’ 361. Thus, the choice of a conception of public justifica-
tion cannot be “justified” if not as a matter of how preferences are aggregated: ‘the standards that have actually been 
accepted have a merely conventional claim to superiority with respect to others also based on preferences of the com-
munity’s members. These too could have been validated as socially binding, if the procedure of aggregation had been 
applied in a different, though no more privileged way,’ ibid. 362 To be clear, I fundamentally agree with D’Agostino on 
the idea that we cannot detach the idea of public reason from a specifically liberal interpretation of the values and de-
mands of public justification. In this sense, as I have said, the notion of liberal public political culture plays an im-
portant role in my interpretation of Rawls’s conception of public reason. Having said that, it seems to me that qualifying 
public justification as merely ‘conventional’ radically departs from Rawls’s understanding of public reason. Here I can-
not analyse this important question, but I just underscore that public reason expresses a normative liberal ideal. As 
such, it does have claims to normative superiority in a liberal society: the content of public reason is specified by a fam-
ily of liberal conceptions, which must be justified by means of the device of the original position or some other proce-
dure. Thus, all I will say here is that it seems profoundly inconsistent with Rawls’s view to conceive public reason as a 
mere conventional interpretation of the idea of public justification deriving from an arbitrary procedure of aggregation. 
For a development of D’Agostino’s theses, see his book Free Public Reason: Making It Up As We Go. In particular: 3-
4, 7, and 9-10 for a helpful summary of his basic claims, 30-33 for the ‘dimensions of variation among conceptions of 
public justification,’ chapter four for his analysis of five different conceptions of public justification (depending on their 
interpretation of each of those dimensions), chapter five for the distinction between the above-mentioned ‘realistic’ and 
‘moralistic’ desiderata, chapter six for the claimed incoherence in tracking those desiderata on the relevant dimensions 
and between pairs of desiderata, and chapter seven on the implausibility of constructing an overarching principle to 
overcome the contestability of any conception of public justification. 
867 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, in particular 139, 224, and 253.  
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of justice for the basic structure (the political values of justice) and guidelines of inquiry 
and conceptions of virtue that make public reason possible (the political values of public 
reason).’868 Now, is there any marked change when Rawls makes it clear that ‘the forms of 
permissible public reason are always several’869 and that the content of public reason is 
specified not by a single political conception (justice as fairness) but by a family of politi-
cal conceptions? Apparently not: Rawls does not provide any alternative list of political 
values.870 This is not surprising. The content of public reason is specified by a family of 
liberal political conceptions, and, as I have already explained, the common limiting feature 
of the many forms of public reason is represented by the criterion of reciprocity.871 There-
fore, each citizen is free to reason from the liberal political conception that ‘he or she sin-
cerely regards as the most reasonable political conception of justice,’872 but this does not 
affect the account of political values, because all those political conceptions respect the 
criterion of reciprocity and thus they have the features that are necessary to specify a per-
missible form of public reason, that is, to provide an appropriate rendering of those politi-
cal values. Such conceptions are all able to support the same ideal of public reason, ‘which 
arises from a conception of democratic citizenship in a constitutional democracy.’873 Thus 
they are all able to express those political values which ‘free and equal citizens who exer-
cise ultimate political power as a collective body’874 in a democratic regime would en-
dorse. The crucial thing is that, when they have to appeal to those political values, their 
                                                        
868 Ibid. 253. 
869 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 452. 
870 However, he does provide an illustrative list, just to make the case that public reason ‘proceeds entirely within a po-
litical conception of justice.’ He says: ‘[e]xamples of political values include those mentioned in the preamble to the 
United States Constitution: a more perfect union, justice, domestic tranquillity, the common defense, the general wel-
fare and the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity. These include under them other values: so, for example, 
under justice we also have equal basic liberties, equality of opportunity, ideals concerning the distribution of income 
and taxation, and much else.’ Ibid. 453.  
871 Ibid. 450. 
872 Ibid. 
873 Ibid. 445. 
874 Ibid. 
  
 European Muslims and Liberal Citizenship 
Ph.D. Thesis successfully discussed on April 21, 2016.  
The total or partial use of the Ph.D. Thesis is subject to copyright restrictions. 
 
  
278  
 Giovanni Vezzani 
 
LUISS-ULB 
public reasoning ‘proceeds entirely within a political conception of justice.’875 Obviously, 
Rawls specifies that, while political values ‘are distinct from other values in that they are 
realized in and characterize political institutions,’876 many values may be political but not 
liberal (e.g., the political values of a caste-system-like aristocratic society). Indeed, we are 
concerned only with the political values specified by public reason as expressed by ‘rea-
sonable liberal political conceptions.’877 This is not only to repeat what I have just said, but 
to underline what these conceptions have in common, and, consequently, on which basis 
the political values of public reason can be grounded. Political values can be jointly af-
firmed by different liberal political conceptions because they all fall within the boundaries 
of the criterion of reciprocity. The latter is intimately related to the very nature of liberal 
values and liberties: ‘[t]he criterion of reciprocity is normally violated whenever basic lib-
erties are denied,’ Rawls says.878 He makes some (indeed very general and hardly refuta-
ble) examples of violation of the criterion of reciprocity: ‘denying to some persons reli-
gious liberty, holding others as slaves, imposing a property qualification on the right to 
vote, or denying the right of suffrage to women.’879 Thus, according to Rawls, a list of po-
litical values should include: 1) among values of political justice: ‘values of equal political 
and civil liberty, fair equality of opportunity, the values of economic reciprocity, the social 
bases of mutual respect between citizens,’ 2) among values of public reason: ‘guidelines of 
inquiry [which] make the inquiry free and public’ (the ‘appropriate use of the fundamental 
concepts of judgement, inference, and evidence, but also the virtues of reasonableness and 
fair-mindedness as shown in abiding by the criteria and procedures of commonsense 
knowledge and accepting the methods and conclusions of science when not controversial’) 
along with the political ‘virtues of civility and toleration, of reasonableness and the sense 
of fairness.’880 Rawls offers some examples of the political values affirmed by public rea-
                                                        
875 Ibid. 453. 
876 Ibid.  
877 Ibid. 454. 
878 Ibid. 447. 
879 Ibid. 
880 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, adapted from 139 and 194. See also 224. 
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son and how they should be presented and balanced.881 I will return to some of them in the 
next chapter, together with the question of the ‘containment’ of the unreasonable. Crucially 
for my purposes, Rawls states:  
‘[G]iven the fact of [reasonable] pluralism, what does the work of reconcilia-
tion by free public reason, and thus enables us to avoid reliance on general and 
comprehensive doctrines, is two things: first, identifying the fundamental role of 
political values in expressing the terms of fair cooperation consistent with mutual 
respect between citizens regarded as free and equal; and second, uncovering a suf-
ficiently inclusive concordant fit among political and other values as displayed in 
an overlapping consensus.’882  
This observation is important for two reasons. The first point supports my previous consid-
erations about the fundamental role of reciprocity and its relation to the fundamental ideas 
of public political culture as grounding elements for those political values. The second 
point brings us back to the notion of stability. Both reciprocity and stability are related to 
the concept of political legitimacy. As I mentioned in chapter two, public reason is linked 
with the idea of stability in two ways. First, the ideal of public reason is endorsed via an 
overlapping consensus, then ‘citizens affirm the ideal of public reason, not as a result of 
political compromise, as in a modus vivendi, but from within their own reasonable doc-
trines.’883 Thus, this ideal is stably affirmed in a democratic regime, so that 
‘[u]nderstanding how to conduct oneself as a democratic citizen includes understanding an 
ideal of public reason.’884 Second, the idea of public reason is a source of stability in itself, 
because through it we can establish legitimate institutions via a process of justification 
which is public in aim and content. The reciprocal moral duty of civility is thus met (for 
this point, see chapter four). The following are just a few examples of Rawls’s view: 
‘While no one is expected to put his or her religious or nonreligious doctrine in 
danger, we must each give up forever the hope of changing the constitution so as 
                                                        
881 For instance John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 243 note 32, and “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 455-456. 
882 John Rawls, “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus,” 440. 
883 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 218. 
884 Ibid. 
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to establish our religion’s hegemony, or of qualifying our obligations so as to en-
sure its influence and success. To retain such hopes and aims would be incon-
sistent with the idea of equal basic liberties for all free and equal citizens.’885 
And: 
‘Public reason aims for public justification. We appeal to political conceptions 
of justice, and to ascertainable evidence and facts open to public view, in order to 
reach conclusions about what we think are the most reasonable political institu-
tions and policies. Public justification is not simply valid reasoning, but argument 
addressed to others: it proceeds correctly from premises we accept and think oth-
ers could reasonably accept to conclusions we think they could also reasonably 
accept. This meets the duty of civility […].’886 
As I began to explain in chapter two and in section 3.2.b.1, in my view, stability for the 
right reasons and legitimacy are closely connected: they are both derived starting from the 
mutual presupposition of reciprocity and reasonableness, via a complex justificatory pro-
cess in which ‘factual democratic consensus’ and ‘ideal liberal consensus’887 are reconciled 
and integrated. The initial factual consensus on some core ideas of public political culture 
is ideally worked up as a freestanding conception which is politically justified. Such a po-
litical conception then shifts onto a level in which the tension between the two dimensions 
(factual-ideal) is firstly resolved “one-by-one” (full justification), then “jointly” (via an 
overlapping consensus). In this way, it finally becomes fully public. However, the process 
remains open until a full reflective equilibrium is achieved: in this sense, I think, Rawls 
says that ‘the overall criterion of the reasonable is general and wide reflective equilibri-
um.’888 The two elements at the “beginning” and at the “end” of the justificatory process 
must be brought together, because they both belong and should belong to the same per-
son(s) as citizen(s). Reasonableness and reciprocity meet one another on a more sophisti-
cated level. In the end, we endorse and should endorse legitimate institutions and support 
                                                        
885 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 460. 
886 Ibid. 465. 
887 Sebastiano Maffettone, Rawls: An Introduction, 248. 
888 John Rawls, “Reply to Habermas,” 384. 
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stability for the right reasons. The strength of such support derives precisely from the depth 
of the reconciliation between the factual and the ideal, which, for Rawls, cannot stand in 
perpetual opposition or even separation. This too is political philosophy as reconciliation.  
3.2.B.3 The Structure of the Idea of Public Reason. 
In this final part, I would like to sketch out the more “structural” elements of Rawls’s idea 
of public reason. However, my reconstruction of public reason is not concluded in this chap-
ter. For their crucial importance, I postpone some questions until the next chapter. In particu-
lar I will consider there the ‘wide view” and the proviso, the question of how to treat the un-
reasonable, and some major criticisms against public reason.  
It has been argued that Rawls establishes ‘two –partially overlapping− kinds of grounds for 
the requirements of public reason. The first kind is objective: it depends on the content. […] 
The second kind is subjective: it depends on the persons and roles involved.’889 The first kind 
of grounds concerns the ‘scope’ (the “what”) of public reason –the ‘fundamental political 
questions’ to which it applies− and it will be considered later. Let me start by analysing the 
second kind of grounds (the “who”/“where”/“when” of public reason).890 Rawls clearly points 
out that ‘the idea of public reason does not apply to all political discussions of fundamental 
political questions [infra], but only to discussions of those questions in […] the public politi-
cal forum.’891 Quong calls the public political forum ‘the site of public reason.’892 In fact, 
Rawls distinguishes this kind of forum from the ‘background culture’ (supra), which is ‘the 
culture of civil society’ with ‘its diverse agencies and associations with their internal life.’893 
Thus, Rawls claims that the notion of public political forum (to which public reason applies) 
is different from Habermas’s notion of ‘public sphere,’894 because the latter ‘is much the same 
                                                        
889 Sebastiano Maffettone, Rawls: An Introduction, 275. 
890 Ibid. 
891 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 442-443. 
892 Jonathan Quong, “On the Idea of Public Reason,” 269. 
893 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 442-443.  
894 See for example chapter 8 of Jürgen Habermas’s book Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse 
Theory of Law and Democracy, translated by William Regh (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996). 
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of what [Rawls calls] the background culture [, to which] public reason with its duty of civili-
ty does not apply.’895 On several occasions, Rawls strongly emphasises the non-pertinence of 
public reason outside public political forums. This point has caused some misunderstandings. 
For example, he claims that often ‘those who appear to reject the idea of public reason actual-
ly mean to assert the need for full and open discussion in the background culture. With this 
political liberalism fully agrees.’896 Moreover, he repeats that the limits of public reason ‘do 
not apply to our personal deliberations and reflections about political questions, or to the 
reasoning about them by members of associations such as churches and universities, all of 
which is a vital part of the background culture. Plainly, religious, philosophical, and moral 
considerations of many kinds here properly play a role.’897 Thus, it seems fair to say that 
Rawls fully recognises and values the life and attachments that each person develops outside 
of the public political forum. According to Rawls, the latter is composed of:898 
1 ‘The discourse of judges in their decisions, and especially of the judges of a su-
preme court,’ 
2 ‘The discourse of government officials, especially chief executives and legisla-
tors;’ 
3 ‘The discourse of candidates for public office and their campaign managers 
[sic], especially in their public oratory, party platforms, and political state-
ments;’ 
In all three of these cases (above all in the case of judges),899 the constraints of public rea-
son most obviously and strictly apply. This is so because in conditions of reasonable plural-
ism it would be a blatant violation of the moral political requirement of providing a genuine 
public justification for fundamental political decisions ‘to allow public officials to express 
                                                        
895 John Rawls, “Reply to Habermas,” 382, note 13. See also “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 443-444, note 13. 
For a systematic comparison between Rawls’s public reason and Habermas’s public sphere, see Sebastiano Maffettone 
“Religion and Liberalism: Public Reason, Public Sphere and Cultural Pluralism,” especially 15-20. 
896 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 444. 
897 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 215. Emphases added. 
898 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 443, emphases added; see also Political Liberalism, 216. 
899 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 444. 
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their own deep convictions about the good as the official reasons for state action.’900 Solum 
adds that ‘this requirement does not violate the freedom of conscience or expression of public 
officials. Public office is entered voluntarily, and public officials retain the full freedoms 
when they speak in their capacity as private citizens.’901 However, it seems to me that the de-
cisive argument for Rawls is that the problem of public justification is especially compelling 
for public officials because they come to exercise political power more directly. To put it dif-
ferently, public officials have access to state’s coercive resources more straightforwardly than 
ordinary citizens, so it is particularly important that they present a public justification for their 
most important decisions and actions. But the duty of civility imposes the constraints of pub-
lic reason also upon citizens who are not public officials when they discuss fundamental polit-
ical questions that fall within the scope of public reason (infra). In analysing this case in two 
different passages, on both occasions Rawls emphasises the ideal dimension of public reason: 
in fact, it is especially in this case that the duty of civility is presented as a moral requirement 
rather than as a mere institutional constraint. In Political Liberalism Rawls says: 
‘[T]he ideal of public reason does hold for citizens when they engage in politi-
cal advocacy in the public forum and thus for members of political parties and for 
candidates […] It holds equally for how citizens are to vote in elections when 
constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice are at stake. Thus, the ideal of 
public reason not only governs the public discourse of elections insofar as the is-
sues involve those fundamental questions, but also how citizens are to cast their 
vote on these questions. Otherwise, public discourse runs the risks of being hypo-
critical: citizens talk before one another one way and vote another.’902 
As I have already noted, in “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” he asks: 
‘How though, is the ideal of public reason realized by citizens who are not 
government officials? In a representative government citizens vote for representa-
tive […] and not for particular laws (except […] when they may vote directly on 
referenda questions […]). To answer this question, we say that ideally citizens are 
                                                        
900 Lawrence B. Solum, “Constructing an Ideal of Public Reason,” 753. 
901 Ibid. 
902 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 215, emphasis added. 
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to think themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes, 
supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think 
it most reasonable to enact. When firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens 
to view themselves as ideal legislators, and to repudiate government officials and 
candidates for public office who violate public reason, is one of the political and 
social roots of democracy, and is vital to its enduring strength and vigor. Thus 
citizens fulfil their duty of civility and support the idea of public reason by doing 
what they can to hold government officials to it. This duty […] is an intrinsically 
moral duty.’903 
This long excerpt supports my interpretation of public reason mainly as an ideal expressing 
a moral political standard of discussion and deliberation, rather than as a strictly formal and 
institutional (“protocol-style”) constraint. It seems to me that this interpretation is more true 
to the spirit of Rawls’s revision of the idea of public reason. As Rawls explicitly affirms:  
‘I am concerned only with a well-ordered constitutional democracy […] under-
stood as a deliberative democracy. The definitive idea for deliberative democracy 
is the idea of deliberation itself. When citizens deliberate, they can exchange 
views and debate their supporting reasons concerning public political questions. 
They suppose that their political opinions may be revised by discussion with other 
citizens; and therefore these opinions are not simply a fixed outcome of their ex-
isting private or non-political interests. It is at this point that public reason is cru-
cial, for it characterizes such citizens’ reasoning concerning constitutional essen-
tials and matters of basic justice [infra].’904 
Moreover, the passage quoted above (‘otherwise, public discourse runs the risks of being 
hypocritical: citizens talk before one another one way and vote another’) also points out the 
fact that the notion of sincerity and the ideal of public reason are somehow “co-extensive.” As 
Schwartzman argues: ‘[s]incerity is not an independent requirement that needs to be added to 
                                                        
903 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 445, emphases added. 
904 Ibid. 448. 
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the ideal of public reason […] It is an integral part of any adequate theory of political dis-
course.’905  
Bearing in mind this interpretation of public reason, one must acknowledge that some un-
resolved ambiguities persist in Rawls’s account. However, they do not seem fatal to it. For 
example, as Kent Greenawalt observes:  
‘If decisions by citizens and legislators how to vote are to be determined by 
public reason, just what is the significance of discerning in reflection, or discus-
sion with co-believers, the implications of one’s comprehensive views for particu-
lar political issues? [… T]he way one reflects by oneself and discusses with co-
believers will be deeply affected by a standard of public reasons for appropriate 
decision-making. For example, if we assumed that Supreme Court justices are 
supposed to decide by public reasons, we might be disconcerted to learn that three 
Roman Catholic Supreme Court justices were discussing with each other exactly 
what implications are of Roman Catholicism for a particular constitutional issue. 
Thus, Rawls’s limiting of the requirement of public reasons to voting and public 
advocacy is less significant that one might initially suppose; that requirement 
would infect thought and discussion of relevant issues in all settings.’906 
Now call it the “spill-over effect”907 of public reason: according to Greenawalt’s argument, 
when fundamental political questions are discussed, public reason spills over from its appro-
priate public forum into other settings of citizens’ life. It is difficult to assess the impact of 
such an effect on the normative “soundness” of the ideal of public reason. Just to pose a trivial 
                                                        
905 Micah Schwartzman, “The Sincerity of Public Reason,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 19, no. 4 (2011), 398. 
The author defines sincerity as ‘a form of correspondence between what we believe and what we say we believe,’ ibid. 
384. He defines a ‘principle of sincere public justification’ as follows: ‘A ought to advocate proposal p if, and only if A 
(i) believes that (R1→p), and (ii) publicly asserts R1 as sufficient to justify p,’ (where R1 is a public reason) ibid. 385. He 
defends this account of sincere public justification against two alternative requirements for sincere justification: 1) a 
stronger requirement according to which the citizen must be actually and conclusively motivated by the reasons she 
presents as sufficient to justify p and 2) a weaker requirement according to which the citizen who privately believes she 
has sufficient reasons to support p is not required to disclose those reasons publicly (respectively 387-390 and 390-393). 
906 Kent Greenawalt, “On Public Reason,” Chicago-Kent Law Review 69, no. 3 (1994), 679. 
907 Also Stephen Macedo comes to a similar conclusion when he argues that ‘[l]iberal political virtues and attitudes will 
spill over into other spheres of life.’ See his “Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God 
v. John Rawls?” Ethics 105, no. 3 (1995), 477, emphasis added. See also 496. Notice, however, that here I do not fully 
share Macedo’s confidence (‘will spill over’) about the spill-over effect: I am simply arguing that it may be perhaps de-
sirable from a normative perspective. 
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question (drawn from Greenawalt’s example): were the three Roman Catholic Supreme Court 
justices discussing while drinking a cup of tea in their living-rooms or just before expressing a 
final judgement in the Court? In the first case a public reason liberal would be much less ‘dis-
concerted’ than in the second. More importantly, since Greenawalt is talking about discus-
sions concerning fundamental political questions (infra), after all a partial “spill-over” may 
have positive effects from the perspective of citizens’ learning process about how to treat 
those questions in a spirit of ‘civic friendship’ (to use Rawls’s terminology). It may also be 
both a component and a consequence of what Scanlon calls citizens’ ‘moral education,’ con-
sisting in ‘learning what justifications others are in fact willing to accept, by finding which 
ones you yourself find acceptable as you confront them from a variety of perspectives, and by 
appraising your own and others’ acceptance or rejection of these justifications in the light of 
greater experience.’908 Of course, in those cases in which the spill-over effect occurs, compli-
ance with public reason is not morally required by the duty of civility. Rather, it expresses a 
liberal ‘supererogatory ideal of good citizenship.’909 In this way, we come back to the moral, 
deliberative, and pluralist (rather than merely formalistic and institutional) interpretation of 
public reason that I sketched out in 3.2.b.1. This position is clearly affirmed by Andrew Lister 
in these terms:  
‘The idea that public reason “excludes” certain reasons from consideration can 
make it seem that the principle is an institutional proposal, to the effect there 
ought to be an Office of Public Reason, staffed by a philosopher like Rawls, who 
would be in charge of determining what reasons do and do not count as legitimate 
public reasons […] Yet the idea of public reason is not a legal restriction on what 
citizens can say to one another in public, but a normative restriction on the 
                                                        
908 Thomas M. Scanlon, “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” 139. 
909 Philip L. Quinn, “Political Liberalisms and Their Exclusions of the Religious,” in Religion and Contemporary Lib-
eralism, ed. Paul J. Weithman, 141. For additional considerations on this point, see James W. Boettcher, “Public Rea-
son and Religion,” in The Legacy of John Rawls, eds. Thom Brooks and Fabian Freyenhagen, 141-142.  
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grounds upon which they should act, as citizens, when deciding upon (fundamen-
tal) policies.’910  
Similarly, Thomas Nagel argues that ‘the concept of public reason is not put forward by 
Rawls as a mechanical test for the admissibility of arguments but rather as a characterization 
of what we should be looking for in an admissible ground for the design of basic institu-
tions.’911 I do not explore this issue further. The “spill-over effect” might be real, but it is not 
necessarily a bad thing from the perspective of learning how to provide a public justification 
to political decisions on fundamental questions. 
A further consideration deserves attention in this context. It concerns the salience of the 
question of coercion in defining the ‘site of public reason’ (to use Quong’s expression quoted 
above). Charles Larmore criticises Rawls for not having distinguished between ‘open discus-
sion’ (‘where people argue with one another in the light of the whole truth as they see it’) and 
‘decision making’ (‘where they deliberate as participants in some organ of government about 
which option should be made legally binding’).912 Larmore maintains that an ‘unbridled pub-
lic discussion’ has two positive consequences. First, through it we can ‘gain a firmer appre-
ciation of the value of [a common] standpoint [for political decisions], seeing how without it 
so much would tend to drive us apart.’913 Secondly, unbridled public discussion allows us to 
adopt a critical attitude and to change our mind more easily: we may find some opinions and 
views different from our own more persuasive than we originally thought and, then, we may 
feel ourselves urged to reconsider our own comprehensive views.914 Moreover, according to 
Larmore an interpretation of public reason that frees political discussion from its constraints is 
more faithful to the liberal principle of legitimacy. In fact, as long as the question of political 
                                                        
910 Andrew Lister, “Public Reason and Democracy,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 
11, no. 3 (2008), 281-282. The quotation continues: ‘[t]here is nothing wrong with debating the existence of god in the 
opinion pages of a newspaper. What is wrong is to make a decision about public policy that can be justified only if one 
assumes that god does (or does not) exist (and therefore also to advocate such a policy).’ On the last point, see what fol-
lows about Larmore’s distinction between ‘open discussion’ and ‘decision making.’ 
911 Thomas Nagel, “Rawls and Liberalism,” in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, 76. 
912 Charles Larmore, “Public Reason,” 382. For a similar point, see the continuation of the passage from Andrew Lis-
ter’s article (“Public Reason and Democracy,” 281) quoted above. 
913 Charles Larmore, “Public Reason,” 383. 
914 Ibid. 
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coercion does not arise, political legitimacy does not require that fundamental political issues 
are discussed according to the limits imposed by public reason. Thus, Larmore claims that: 
‘[T]he ideal of public reason, based as it is upon the principle [of legitimacy], 
ought to be understood as governing only the reasoning by which citizens –as vot-
ers, legislators, officials, or judges− take part in political decisions (about funda-
mentals) having force of law. Rightly conceived, it does not thwart the uninhibit-
ed political discussions which are the mark of a vigorous democracy. We can ar-
gue with one another about political issues in the name of our different visions of 
the human good while also recognizing that, when the moment comes for a legally 
binding decision, we must take our bearings from a common point of view.’915 
I agree with Larmore on the fact that Rawls is not always clear about this subject.916 How-
ever, it seems to me that some version of such a distinction is implicit also in Rawls’s account 
of public reason. First, the fact is too often forgotten that along with the notions of ‘public po-
litical culture’ and ‘background culture’ (supra) Rawls concisely presents what he calls ‘non-
public political culture.’917 He says that the latter occupies an intermediate position between 
public political culture and background culture and that it ‘comprises media […] of all kinds: 
newspapers, reviews and magazines, television and radio, and much else [sic].’918 I think that 
plausibly a great part of (although obviously not all)919 open discussions in Larmore’s sense 
take place precisely in non-public political culture. Now, although Rawls is a little laconic on 
this point, public reason clearly does not apply to non-public political culture: in fact, he 
openly says that the ‘idea of public reason does not apply to the background culture with its 
                                                        
915 Ibid. Emphases added. 
916 According to Larmore, Rawls’s approach may be misleading due to his ambiguous use of expressions like ‘public 
political culture’ and ‘public political forum.’ Larmore claims that ‘[t]hough [Rawls] defines these latter terms as refer-
ring to the institutions and traditions in which citizens or their representatives authoritatively settle fundamental ques-
tions of justice, the terms themselves suggest a wider range of political discussion where the rules of public reason do 
not rightfully apply,’ ibid. 384. 
917 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 443-444 note 13. 
918 Ibid. 
919 Indeed, though more controversially, I think one might also include in Larmore’s notion of open discussion properly 
public political discussions, such as parliamentary debates before voting on a law on a fundamental political question, 
which, in a Rawlsian account should be governed by (a wide view of) public reason. See, for instance ibid. 443 and 
444-445. Above all, see Political Liberalism, 216: public reason ‘applies in official forums and so to legislators when 
they speak on the floor of parliament,’ emphasis added. 
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many forms of nonpublic reason nor to media of any kind.’920 This seems to satisfy Larmore’s 
demand of a space for open discussion. Secondly, and more importantly, Rawls says that ‘the 
idea of public reason does not apply to all political discussions of fundamental political ques-
tions, but only to discussions of those questions in [...] the public political forum. This forum 
may be divided into three parts: the discourse of judges […,] the discourse of government of-
ficials […,] and the discourse of candidates for public office’ and he adds that ‘[w]e need this 
three-part division because […] the idea of public reason does not apply in the same way in 
these three cases and elsewhere. In discussing what I call the wide view of public political 
culture, we shall see that the idea of public reason applies more strictly to judges than to oth-
ers, but that the requirements of public justification for that reason are always the same.’921 
What is the rationale for such distinctions? Clearly, the cogency of the requirements of public 
reason is directly proportional to the degree to which the duty of civility is binding on a spe-
cific person or office. The latter, in turn, is directly proportional to the potential impact of that 
person or office in terms of the principle of legitimacy. In line with Larmore’s argument, then, 
we can infer from this that the less a discussion about fundamental political issues is likely to 
trigger an effective exercise of coercive power and, consequently, the less it affects the prin-
ciple of legitimacy, the less its subjection to public reason is compelling. Thus, it seems that 
also on this point Larmore and Rawls to some extent finally agree. Having said this, however, 
I think that Larmore’s distinction between free open discussion and coercive decision should 
be nuanced. Thanks to the enduring practice of public justification among citizens, the moral 
political criterion of reciprocity may leave its mark even on discussions that strictly speaking 
do not fall under the constraints of public reason, as I have explained when I analysed the 
spill-over effect. In this sense, Larmore’s claim that ‘[w]e can argue with one another about 
political issues in the name of our different visions of the human good while also recognizing 
that, when the moment comes for a legally binding decision, we must take our bearings from 
a common point of view’922 presupposes that the boundaries of open political discussion −in 
which the constraints of public reason do not apply properly− are established by the same 
moral political criterion that underpins the idea of public reason itself: namely, the criterion of 
                                                        
920 Ibid. 443-444. Emphasis added. 
921 Ibid. 442-443.  
922 Charles Larmore, “Public Reason,” 383, quoted above. 
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reciprocity (see 4.2). In other words, even in open political discussions citizens who are will-
ing to honour their duty of civility respect the idea that the constraints of public reason be-
come more and more stringent as one get closer to binding decisions and to the effective use 
of coercive political power. But if this is so, then a sharp distinction between open discussions 
and binding decisions is not particularly helpful. Rather, since it seems that discussion and 
decision can be ideally imagined on a continuum, the salience of coercion in determining the 
sphere of application of public reason and the strictness of its requirements is a matter of de-
gree. As I have said, interpreting public reason as an ideal of liberal citizenship better ac-
counts for a conception of public reasoning (whether in the form of ‘open discussion’ or 
aimed at ‘decision making’) grounded in the moral political notions of reciprocity and civic 
friendship. It is in the light of these two notions that the strength of the requirements of public 
reason must be weighed case by case. In conclusion, I believe that Rawls agrees with Larmore 
on the idea that the limits of public reason typically concern binding decisions that call into 
question the coercive power of the state, while they leave ample space for open and uncon-
strained discussions (e.g., within associations and churches, on the media, and so on). Fur-
thermore, partially distancing myself from Larmore, I argue that understanding public reason 
as an ideal of citizenship enables us to soften the distinction between the context of strictly 
binding decisions based on state’s coercive power and the context of free and open discus-
sion. Thus, it seems that the kind of questions discussed (the “what”) is more important than a 
formalistic consideration of the coercive or open nature of the debate.923 However, as I have 
mentioned, such an account of public reason as an ideal of citizenship is closely related to the 
notion of reciprocity that I will present in the next chapter (see 4.2).  
So far I have analysed the “who,” the “when,” and the “where” of public reason. Nonethe-
less, I must now introduce the analysis of the “what.” The persons and roles that I mentioned 
constitute a public political forum in the proper sense when, and only when, they are con-
cerned with the discussion of a particular set of subjects, namely, the subjects to which the re-
quirements of public reason apply. We come then to the scope of public reason. Rawls re-
                                                        
923 This position seems to be endorsed also by Sebastiano Maffettone, who argues that considerations about the kind of 
questions involved are more important than considerations about the effective recourse to the coercive power of the 
state for deciding the cogency of the constraints of public reason in a specific case. See “Religion and Liberalism: Pub-
lic Reason, Public Sphere and Cultural Pluralism,” 9. Thus, according to Maffettone the crucial point concerns the con-
tent (the “what”) of the debate and not its formal nature (i.e., an open discussion or a decision making process involving 
the exercise of the coercive power of the state). To answer the question of “what” falls under public reason we must 
consider the ‘scope’ of the latter. 
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stricts the scope of public reason to ‘constitutional essentials’ and ‘matters of basic justice’ 
(infra). In what follows, I will simply assume Rawls’s view, but it must be noted that such re-
striction of the scope of public reason is not uncontroversial. There is an important debate in 
the related literature concerning two different ways for understanding the scope of public rea-
son. Following Jonathan Quong, the first can be called ‘narrow view,’ which is fundamentally 
in line with Rawls’s view, which affirms that the idea of public reason applies to constitution-
al essentials and matters of basic justice, ‘but need not apply beyond this domain.’924 Notably, 
this view is also endorsed by Scanlon.925 Nonetheless, Quong’s preferred view is what he 
calls ‘broad view,’ which says that public reason ought to apply to ‘all decisions where citi-
zens exercise political power over one another,’926 thus broadening the scope of public reason 
much beyond Rawls’s ‘fundamental political questions.’ A different version of a broad view 
of the scope of public reason can also be found in Gaus’s Justificatory Liberalism. Charging 
Rawls of ‘justificatory populism,’ Gaus holds that: 
‘Because disagreements and conflicts permeate political life, normal politics 
cannot be plausibly construed as a search for consensus. But if public reason is 
understood as essentially consensual, how can normal, everyday politics be ex-
plained? This leads […] to distinguish sharply between constitutional politics and 
normal politics. On this view, constitutional politics is the realm of public reason 
and consensus, everyday politics is simply clash of interest. […] I have dissented: 
A policy cannot justly be imposed on some people on the grounds that it advances 
the interests of others. […] Because of his justificatory populism, however, Rawls 
is unable to provide a clear account as to what normal politics is really about. […] 
Justificatory liberalism identifies [a different] interpretation that explains the dif-
ference between constitutional and normal politics without adopting a dualistic 
theory according to which they are about essentially different matters. Constitu-
                                                        
924 Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, 274. 
925 Thomas M. Scanlon, “Rawls on Justification,” 162-163. Additionally, notice that Quong (Liberalism without Perfec-
tion, 278-281) derives an argument in favour of the narrow view also from Peter de Marneffe’s discussion of citizens’ 
‘basic interests’ (related to a fair distribution of primary goods) that a legitimate constitution must fairly protect [Peter  
de Marneffe, “Liberalism, Liberty and Neutrality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 19, no. 3 (1990), especially 258-260]: 
this argument would support a narrow conception of the scope of public reason because the latter would apply only to 
citizens’ basic interests and would be excluded from the domain of their non-basic interests.  
926 Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, 274. Emphasis added.  
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tional politics concerns what is conclusively justified, and so determines the agen-
da of normal politics. Widespread consensus is to be expected. Normal politics is 
about fundamental matters, but is not a search for consensus; it is the confronta-
tion of undefeated, unvictorious judgements about the demands of basic princi-
ples. […] Normal politics […] is not constituted by a brute clash of incompatible 
moral views; it is a confrontation between inconsistent public justifications.’ 927 
This passage is crucial to understanding the core of the broad view. Namely, that also the 
‘normal (i.e., nonconstitutional) political discourse’928 should be somehow governed by pub-
lic reason. As I have said, I cannot do justice to this discussion here. However, as Quong 
rightly points out, we should not confuse the distinction between the broad and narrow view 
of the scope of public reason with the distinction between the inclusive, wide, and exclusive 
view of public reason. As he maintains, the ‘latter distinction refers to the question of when, 
and under which conditions, comprehensive or non-public reasons can be introduced by citi-
zens when debating issues that are assumed to be within the scope of public reason.’929 Quong 
also adds that ‘[w]hether you adopt the broad or narrow view of public reason’s scope has no 
bearing on whether you accept the inclusive, exclusive, or wide view of public reason.’930 In 
this work I am mainly concerned with the second distinction (i.e., between the inclusive, ex-
clusive, and wide view: see chapter four), since it represents the main dimension on which the 
evaluative task of the third part of this study is plausibly expected to impact. Thus, due to the 
aims of this research, with reference to the first distinction I will simply assume Rawls’s nar-
row view of the scope of public reason. It follows that: 
‘[T]he limits imposed by public reason do not apply to all political questions 
but only to those involving what we may call “constitutional essentials” and ques-
tions of basic justice. This means that political values alone are to settle such fun-
damental questions as: who has the right to vote, or what religions are to be toler-
                                                        
927 Gerald F. Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism, in particular 232-233 (see also 131-136). Emphases added. 
928 Ibid. 231. 
929 Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, 275. Emphasis added. 
930 Ibid. 
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ated, or who is to be assured fair equality of opportunity, or to hold property. 
These and similar questions are the special subject of public reason.’931 
However, let me clarify two points. First, I follow Rawls’s narrow view mainly due to the 
purposes of my research. Since I am concerned with the problem of a liberal evaluation of 
Muslims’ views concerning their civic status in European liberal democracies, it seems rea-
sonable to follow Rawls’s suggestion according to which we should ‘consider first the strong-
est case where the political questions concern the most fundamental matters. If we should not 
honor the limits of pubic reason here, it would seem we need not honor them anywhere’932 
(infra) and that: 
‘[I]f a political conception of justice covers the constitutional essentials and 
matters of basic justice […] it is already of enormous importance even if it has a 
little to say about many economic and social issues that legislative bodies must 
regularly consider. [… S]o long as there is firm agreement on the constitutional 
essentials […] willing political and social cooperation between free and equal cit-
izens can normally be maintained.’933  
Second, none of this is to deny that the distinction between fundamental and non-
fundamental political questions is often very difficult to draw.934 I see no difficulty in recog-
nising that such a distinction must be continuously renegotiated on the basis of changing po-
litical, social, economic, and scientific circumstances.935 
Thus, the answer to the question of the “what” of public reason is that the latter should al-
ways apply when these fundamental questions (constitutional essentials and matters of basic 
justice) are discussed in the appropriate context (that is, a public political forum). In fact, re-
member that: 
                                                        
931 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 214. Emphasis added. 
932 Ibid. 215. 
933 Ibid. 230. 
934 Kent Greenawalt, “On Public Reason,” 685-688. 
935 For a similar position, see James W. Boettcher, “Rawls and Gaus on the Idea of Public Reason,” 10, note 9. 
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‘[I]ts limits do not apply to our personal deliberations and reflections about po-
litical questions, or to the reasoning about them by members of associations such 
as churches and universities [… b]ut the ideal of public reason does hold for citi-
zens when they engage in political advocacy in the public forum […] It holds 
equally for how citizens are to vote in elections when constitutional essentials and 
matters of basic justice are at stake.’936 
As I mentioned in a footnote to the second chapter, Rawls distinguishes between two kinds 
of constitutional essentials:937 
a. First, the ‘fundamental principles that specify the general structure of government and 
the political process: the powers of the legislature, executive and the judiciary; the 
scope of the majority rule.’ Essentials of this kind can be specified differently without 
altering the liberal democratic character of the political regime (Rawls makes the ex-
ample of the difference between presidential and cabinet governments). However, 
Rawls says that ‘once settled, it is vital that the structure of government be changed on-
ly as experience shows it to be required by political justice or the general good, and not 
as prompted by the political advantage of one party or group that may at the moment 
have the upper hand.’ 
b. Second, ‘[e]qual basic rights and liberties of citizenship that legislative majorities are 
to respect: such as the right to vote and to participate in politics, liberty of conscience, 
freedom of thought and association, as well as the protections of the rule of law.’ In 
contrast with essentials of the first kind, essentials of the second kind are more or less 
the same in all democratic regimes. 
With reference to basic matters of justice, Rawls argues that his second principle of justice 
(fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle) is not an essential. In fact, he claims 
that, while some principles of opportunity regulating for instance freedom of movement and 
the free choice of occupation do specify fundamental constitutional rights, his principle of 
‘fair equality of opportunity […] goes beyond that and is not such an essential. Similarly, 
though a social minimum providing for the basic needs of all citizens is also an essential, 
                                                        
936 Ibid. 215. 
937 Ibid. 227-228. 
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what I have called the “difference principle” is more demanding and is not.’938 In general, 
Rawls expects more disagreement about principles dealing with social and economic inequali-
ties than about principles concerning basic rights and liberties. The basic reason for this dis-
tinction is that, according to Rawls, ‘although questions of both kinds are to be discussed in 
terms of political values, we can expect more agreement about whether the principles for the 
basic rights and liberties are realized than about whether the principles for social and econom-
ic justice are realized.’939 Then, he pinpoints four reasons940 for distinguishing constitutionals 
essentials from principles regulating social and economic inequalities and in a passage that I 
have already partially quoted he says that: 
‘These considerations explain why freedom of movement and free choice of 
occupation and a social minimum covering citizens’ basic needs count as constitu-
tional essentials while the principle of fair opportunity and the difference principle 
do not. [… I]f a political conception of justice covers the constitutional essentials 
and matters of basic justice […] it is already of enormous importance even if it 
has little to say about many economic and social issues that legislatives bodies 
must regularly consider. To resolve these more particular and detailed issues it is 
often more reasonable to go beyond the political conception and the values its 
principles express, and to invoke non-political values that such a view does not 
include. But so long as there is firm agreement on the constitutional essentials 
[…] willing political and social cooperation between free and equal citizens can 
normally be maintained.’941 
This point has created many perplexities. Does this concern with the priority of fundamen-
tal constitutional rights and liberties over questions of social and economic justice mean that 
Rawls has abandoned (or at least largely relinquished) his previous egalitarian commitments? 
                                                        
938 Ibid. 228-229. 
939 Ibid. 229-230. 
940 Ibid. 230. See also David Estlund, “The Survival of Egalitarian Justice in John Rawls’s Political Liberalism,” 74. 
941 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 230.  
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In this research I cannot explore this debate further, since it would lead us astray. I limit my-
self to observing the existing disagreement in the literature relevant to this point.942 
Coming back to the question of the narrow/broad view of the scope of public reason, 
Rawls explains his preference for the first option in this way:  
‘Some will ask: why not all questions in regard to which citizens exercise their 
final and coercive political power over one another are subject to public reason? 
Why would it ever be admissible to go outside its range of political values? To 
answer: my aim is to consider first the strongest case where the political questions 
concern the most fundamental matters. If we should not honor the limits of public 
reason here, it would seem we need not honor them anywhere. Should they hold 
here, we can then proceed to other cases. Still, I grant that it is usually highly de-
sirable to settle political questions by invoking the values of public reason. Yet 
this may not always be so.’943 
In this chapter I have emphasised the ideal dimension of public reason (that is, the interpre-
tation of public reason chiefly as an ideal of citizenship in a liberal society of free and equal 
cooperating fellow citizens). I will stress such a dimension in the next chapter as well. Such 
an emphasis allows us to understand why Rawls, after having specified a narrow scope for 
the requirements of public reason, says that, however, a “spill-over” of public reason in dis-
cussions about political issues other than fundamental ones is ‘usually highly desirable’ even 
though not always possible. The presentation of public reason as an ideal of citizenship has 
already helped to explain why at times Rawls seems ambiguous about the boundaries of pub-
lic reason. In particular, I considered Greenawalt’s concerns about what I have called the 
“spill-over” effect in non-public discourses, Larmore’s distinction between ‘open discussion’ 
and binding ‘decision making,’ and Quong’s distinction between the narrow and broad view. 
My main objective was to show that if we consider public reason primarily in its ideal dimen-
sion (based on the moral political criterion of reciprocity, see 4.2), we can better understand 
some of its supposed ambivalences or inconsistencies. Crucially, an account of the ideal of 
public reason also explains why the limits of the latter must be endorsed from within each 
                                                        
942 For two opposite positions, see Brian Barry, “John Rawls and the Search for Stability,” and David Estlund, “The 
Survival of Egalitarian Justice in John Rawls’s Political Liberalism.” 
943 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 215. Emphases added. 
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person’s reasonable comprehensive doctrine. As I mentioned above, Rawls believes that 
‘[c]itizens affirm the ideal of public reason not as a result of political compromise, as in a 
modus vivendi, but from within their own reasonable doctrines.’944 The reason of this remark 
is that the ideal of public reason aims to secure fundamental rights and liberties and to ad-
vance great values, and, indeed, ‘[t]o be able to live with others in terms of mutual respect is a 
significant moral achievement.’945 Thus, in Rawls’s own words: 
‘What has to be shown is either that honoring the limits of public reason by cit-
izens generally is required by certain basic rights and liberties and their corre-
sponding duties, or else that it advances certain great values, or both. Political lib-
eralism relies on the conjecture that the basic rights and duties and values in 
question have sufficient weight so that the limits of public reason are justified by 
the overall assessments of reasonable comprehensive doctrines once those doc-
trines have adapted to the conception of justice itself.’946 
With reference to this point, elsewhere he explains the two grounds on which the project of 
political liberalism relies: 
‘[F]irst, that the values of the political are very great values and not easily 
overridden; and second, that there are many reasonable comprehensive doctrines 
that understand the wider realm of values to be congruent with, or supportive of, 
or else not in conflict with, political values as these are specified by a political 
conception of justice for a democratic regime. These two grounds secure the basis 
of public reason, for they imply that fundamental political questions can be settled 
by an appeal to political values expressed by the political conception endorsed by 
the overlapping consensus. In these circumstances, a balance of reasons as seen 
within each citizen’s comprehensive doctrine, and not a compromise compelled by 
circumstances, is the basis of citizen’s respect for the limits of public reason.’947 
                                                        
944 Ibid. 218. 
945 Micah Schwartzman, “The Completeness of Public Reason,” Politics, Philosophy, and Economics 3, no. 2 (2004), 
211.  
946 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 219. Emphasis added. For the ‘adaptation’ process, see 158-168. 
947 Ibid. 168-169. Emphases added. 
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Thus, it seems that the main ground for affirming such an ideal interpretation of public rea-
son can be persuasively found in the indissoluble connection between the great values that it 
expresses (and which are morally, philosophically or/and religiously endorsed through the 
overlapping consensus) and the fundamental rights and liberties it aims to protect from illegit-
imate exercises of coercive power. It is by reference to those values and that aim that we can 
better understand the normative salience of such an ideal. 
To sum up so far, coming back to the “who”/“where”/“when” and the “what” of public 
reason, let me state that: 
(PR3) To endorse public reason involves being committed to its requirements when dis-
cussing (i) in a public political forum (this is the appropriate site of public reason, in the sense 
that I have specified above) (ii) political questions involving fundamental constitutional rights 
and liberties and chief questions of basic justice (this is the scope of public reason). Though 
not normatively binding, the fact that public reason is honoured in a wider range of cases 
through a “spill-over effect” (e.g., in non-public political discussions –such as discussions in 
churches and associations− or in public discussions about non-fundamental political ques-
tions) expresses a stronger −supererogatory or “more-than-what-is-strictly-required”− sense 
of reciprocity between fellow citizens. 
When the two conditions under (PR3) are present, then, what reasons must be brought in 
public political discussion in order to fulfil the duty of civility? I will postpone the analysis of 
this question and of the wide public reason until the next chapter. However, here some pre-
liminary considerations are in order. One may ask: what is a genuinely public reason accord-
ing to Rawls? As I have mentioned, public reason provides ‘guidelines of inquiry’ and steps 
‘to make such inquiry free and public, as well as informed and reasonable.’948 Rawls states 
that: 
‘[I]n making [public] justifications, we are to appeal only to presently accepted 
general beliefs and forms of reasoning found in common sense, and the methods 
and conclusion of science when these are not controversial. The liberal principle 
of legitimacy makes this the most appropriate, if not the only, way to specify the 
guidelines of public inquiry. […] This means that in discussing constitutional es-
                                                        
948 Ibid. 139. 
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sentials and matters of basic justice we are not to appeal to comprehensive reli-
gious and philosophical doctrines –to what we as individuals or members of asso-
ciations see as the whole truth […] As far as possible, the knowledge and ways of 
reasoning that ground our affirming the principles of justice and their application 
to constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice are to rest on the plain 
truths now widely accepted, or available, to citizens generally. Otherwise, the po-
litical conception would not provide a public basis of justification.’949 
Since it aims at satisfying the liberal principle of legitimacy, public reason requires that we 
offer to our fellow citizens reasons ‘acceptable to them as reasonable and rational’ persons: in 
this way we honour the duty of civility (the moral duty ‘to be able to explain to one another 
on those fundamental questions how the principles and policies [we] advocate and vote for 
can be supported by the political values of public reason’).950 Rawls connects reciprocity, le-
gitimacy, and its conception of “giving a public reason” even more clearly in this crucial pas-
sage: ‘the idea of political legitimacy, based on the criterion of reciprocity says: our exercise 
of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we would offer 
for our political actions –were we to state them as government officials− are sufficient, and 
we also reasonably think that other citizens might also reasonably accept those reasons.’951 I 
will return to reciprocity as the fundamental moral political ground for the fulfilment of the 
duty of civility in chapter four (there I will present a “bifurcate model of the duty of civility” 
articulated on two levels, see 4.2). With reference to Rawls’s previously quoted definition, 
James Boettcher notes that two elements are noteworthy: ‘[f]irstly, […] Rawls acknowledges 
that the exercise of public reason involves offering not simply reasons we believe to be per-
suasive or effective, but ones which we sincerely believe to be good. Second, the principle in-
corporates the idea of reasonableness at two moments, as a moral power of both the author 
and the addressee of reasons.’952 Thus, according to this definition a reason R for justifying 
the action x is public if and only if: 
                                                        
949 Ibid. 224-225. Emphasis added. 
950 Ibid. 217. 
951 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 446-447. Emphases added. 
952 James W. Boettcher, “Rawls and Gaus on the Idea of Public Reason,” 9. 
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1. One sincerely believes that R is a sufficient reason to justify x;  
2. One reasonably thinks that R can be reasonably accepted by others as a reason for 
x. 
So, for Rawls providing a justification in terms of genuinely public reasons means ‘to ap-
peal only to presently accepted general beliefs, and forms of reasoning found in common 
sense, and the methods and conclusions of science when these are not controversial.’ And he 
continues: ‘[t]he liberal principle of legitimacy makes this the most appropriate, if not the on-
ly, way to specify the guidelines of public inquiry.’953 Since here I am considering only 
properly public reasons, I postpone until the next chapter the analysis of the conditions for in-
troducing non-public reasons within the scope of public reason (in this sense, I defined the 
proviso as a “general threshold for public reasoning” in 2.2.b): there, I will present an “exten-
sive interpretation” of the proviso grounded in the bifurcate model of the duty of civility men-
tioned a few lines above. 
Now, I would like to add some observations about the notions of sufficiency and sincerity 
mentioned in the first point above (whilst, with reference to the second point, I will consider 
the question of what we can reasonably think that others can reasonably accept in 4.2 by spec-
ifying the boundaries of the duty of civility and the notion of unreasonableness, both defined 
in the light of –and rooted in− the criterion of reciprocity). Firstly, let me repeat what I said at 
the beginning of chapter two: sufficiency is wanting as a requirement for specifying the ade-
quacy of reasons that must be provided in public justification. I termed “special” the defini-
tion of public justification that qualifies the adequacy of such reasons in terms of their conclu-
siveness. Thus, I interpret Rawls’s sufficiency requirement as a conclusiveness requirement: 
paraphrasing Rawls, in order to have a public justification, we must sincerely believe that the 
reasons we offer for our political actions are conclusive reasons to justify them, and we must 
also reasonably think that other citizens can reasonably accept those reasons. To say that a 
public justification cannot be achieved without conclusive reasons is different from saying 
that in no circumstance can public reason be inconclusive (see the final part of this chapter, 
4.1, and 4.2). As I explained in 3.2.b.1 and I will make clear at the beginning of chapter four, 
public reason is also, but by no means only a justificatory device. Thus, the problem of the 
                                                        
953 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 224. Emphases added. See also ibid. 139.  
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completeness of public reason (that absorbs the question of its conclusiveness, infra), is 
broader and more complex than the mere problem of the adequacy of reasons (in terms of 
their conclusiveness) required for a public justification. Since public reason is not only a justi-
ficatory device, we can assume the justificatory requirement of the conclusiveness of justifi-
catory reasons while at the same time leaving open the question of the completeness of public 
reason itself and its relevance from the viewpoint of public reason as an ideal of citizenship. I 
will say some few words on the completeness of public reason shortly, before analysing it in 
detail in chapter four. However, let me add a concise remark about the question of sincerity, 
on which I will return in chapter four in presenting my interpretation of the proviso. Previous-
ly, I maintained that we can define sincerity as ‘a form of correspondence between what we 
believe and what we say we believe’ (I borrow this definition from Schwartzman).954 Howev-
er, we can understand this formulation in two ways. First, one may understand this definition 
as requiring that there to be a correspondence between, on the one hand, our belief that a pub-
lic reason (or a set of public reasons) is sufficient to justify publicly a political proposal and, 
on the other hand, our public appeal to that public reason as a sufficient public reason to justi-
fy publicly that proposal. In this interpretation, a sincere public justification relies exclusively 
on public reasons. Schwartzman seems to favour this interpretation.955 It specifies a first ac-
count of what he calls ‘an ideal of public sincerity.’956 However, there is another way to speci-
fy an ideal of public sincerity. One could imagine that a citizen is sincere also when she pub-
licly appeals to a non-public reason which she sincerely believes enhances a spirit of political 
reciprocity and civic friendship, that is, a non-public reason fitting with the rationale and the 
moral ground of a properly public reason. Here, there is a correspondence between our believ-
ing that the spirit underlying a non-public reason complies with the ideal of public reason and 
our affirming that non-public reason in public as an adequate ground for justifying publicly 
the political proposal in question. The label ‘ideal of public sincerity’ applies to both interpre-
tations because also the second displays a crucial element of publicity: namely, the fundamen-
tal spirit of political reciprocity that characterises it. Note that I do not deny the first, more 
public, characterisation of the ideal of public sincerity. Simply, in chapter four I will apply the 
                                                        
954 Micah Schwartzman, “The Sincerity of Public Reason,” 384. 
955 Ibid. in particular 384-385. 
956 Ibid. 385. 
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two interpretations of sincerity to two different levels of the duty of civility. The first (fully 
public) interpretation of sincerity applies to the first, consensual stage of the duty of civility. 
The second interpretation of sincerity (which is public in its spirit but not in the particular rea-
sons appealed to) applies to the second, more convergent stage of the duty of civility. I will 
argue that one can comply with a wide view of public reason and its proviso in both ways. As 
I have said, I will return to these points in the next chapter, because this is the core of the bi-
furcate model of the duty of civility that I will present in 4.2. 
Let me concisely consider another issue that I will analyse in the next chapter. As recalled, 
Rawls claims that public reason must be complete: this means that the political values ‘can be 
suitably balanced or combined, or otherwise united […] so that those values alone give a rea-
sonable public answer to all, or to nearly all, questions of justice.’957 He points out that the 
requirement of completeness derives from the fact that: 
‘[U]nless a political conception is complete, it is not an adequate framework of 
thought in the light of which the discussion of fundamental political questions can 
be carried out. What we cannot do in public reason is to proceed directly from our 
comprehensive doctrine, or a part thereof, to one or several political principles 
and values, and the particular institutions they support. Instead, we are required 
first to work to the basic ideas of a complete political conception and from there 
to elaborate its principles and ideals, and to use the arguments they provide. Oth-
erwise public reason allows arguments that are too immediate and fragmen-
tary.’958 
Thus, he maintains that public reason must enable us to form a ‘complete ordering of polit-
ical values,’ on which we can base our justificatory public activity.  
Now, two points must be emphasised. First, the previous remarks could open a deep and 
intense debate about the epistemological status of Rawls’s justificatory project. However, 
here I cannot open the floor to such discussion. The few points considered above and in the 
next chapter are sufficient for my purposes. This is not to say that I underestimate the im-
portance of this kind of debate. In particular, the idea of the completeness of public reason has 
                                                        
957 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 225. Emphasis added. See also “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 454. 
958 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 455. Emphases added. 
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been thoroughly criticised and debated. Traditionally, two forms of incompleteness have been 
distinguished: indeterminacy (when public reason is ‘unable to deliver any clear conclusions 
about a particular question. In these cases, […] public reason “runs out”: its content simply 
proves insufficient to yield an answer to the question posed’) and inconclusiveness (when ‘a 
plurality of different answers might be apparently justified by appeal to public reason, and 
public reason alone cannot clearly tell us which answer is correct or the most reasonable al-
ternative’).959 For example, in Justificatory Liberalism Gerald Gaus famously maintains that 
public justifications are typically inconclusive (they are ‘undefeated but not victorious’)960 
and says that ‘[p]ublic debate is [...] typically inconclusive in this way: the relevant infor-
mation is so great that we are rational to form believes on the basis of what we have access to, 
but other people pick up on other information, coming to different conclusions. Because mat-
ters are so complex, neither side can typically claim victory.’961 Accordingly, he also argues 
that in public justification indeterminacy is much less common than inconclusiveness, since 
‘our standard epistemological situation is an overabundance, not a paucity, of reasons.’962 The 
debate about the incompleteness of public reason is certainly one of the most relevant con-
cerning the idea of public reason.963 In the next chapter, in presenting my interpretation of the 
proviso, I will consider some questions closely related to the issue of completeness of public 
reason. This brings me to the second point. This chapter has dealt mainly with the answer to 
the question “What is public reason?” Nevertheless, as I have repeatedly underlined, we can-
not answer the question “What does it mean to justify through public reason?” until we have 
introduced the idea of a wide view of public reason. To this task, I devote the next chapter. 
                                                        
959 Jonathan Quong, “Public Reason,” page 15 of the printable pdf version of the article. 
960 Gerald F. Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism, 151ff. For the idea of defeat and victory in public justification, see ibid. 
144-150. See also Micah Schwartzman, “The Completeness of Public Reason,” 195. See also chapter four. 
961 Gerald F. Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism, 154. 
962 Ibid. 155. For Gaus’s conception and his proposal to face inconclusiveness (what he calls ‘adjudicative democracy’), 
see also ibid. 179-191, 223ff; see also his Contemporary Theories of Liberalism: Public Reason as a Post-
Enlightenment Project (London and Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2003), in particular 212-218 and (for the ‘liberal um-
pire’) 218-229. See also his definition of a ‘sufficiently credible belief” in “The Rational, the Reasonable and Justifica-
tion,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 3, no. 3 (1995), 252-256 (and 239). 
963 The debate between David Reidy on the one hand, and Andrew Williams and Micah Schwartzman on the other is 
informative in this sense. See David A Reidy, “Rawls’s Wide View of Public Reason: Not Wide Enough,” Res Publica 
6, no. 1 (2000), especially 63-71; Andrew Williams, “The Alleged Incompleteness of Public Reason,” Res Publica 6, 
no. 2 (2000), in particular 205-211; Micah Schwartzman, “The Completeness of Public Reason,” 193-198, 203-208, 
209-214. 
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Chapter Four 
Public Reason and Religion. Reinterpreting 
the Duty of Civility. 
 
 
 
Il faudroit des Dieux pour donner 
des loix aux hommes.  
 
 
In the previous chapter I emphasised what I shall call the “core view” of public reason, 
namely, its moral political interpretation as an ideal of liberal citizenship. Such a perspective–
that I will complete in this chapter− rejects the view that public reason is a mere mechanism 
of homogenisation in a “liberal sauce” of individual preferences. In other words, as I under-
stand it, public reason is neither a silencer nor a simple filter. Rather, I think of it as a moral-
political and procedural force field that is politically centripetal and cohesive, not suppres-
sive.964 Public reason does not require that we all vote in the same way: it is not a unanimity-
generator. It does not require that we all use the same words: it is not a piece of soap to wash 
one’s mouth out with. Rather, it demands that we prefer those reasons, arguments, and words 
that better express the criterion of political reciprocity (see 4.2 below), which is the ultimate 
                                                        
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Il contratto sociale, French parallel text, translated by Maria Garin, with an introduction by 
Tito Magri (Rome and Bari: Laterza, 1997), 56. 
964 My most sincere thanks to Valentina Gentile for having discussed with me this and the following points on so many 
occasions.  
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measure of the health of a liberal democratic regime. In the absence of an absolute political 
power and of a single unified moral-religious view, what ultimately holds a liberal democratic 
regime together is a spirit of civic friendship. This is the third –and often neglected− element 
of the French triad (liberté, egalité, fraternité). One of the deepest intuitions of this study965 is 
that contemporary liberal democracies must reinterpret the ideal principle of fraternity in a 
way that is consistent with their conception of the other two principles of the French triad 
(freedom and equality). A “well-tempered” political regime is a regime that harmonises –as 
far as possible− freedom, fraternity, and equality. According to political liberalism, such har-
monisation must be political. In particular, freedom and fraternity seem at odds because the 
latter involves some kind of unity, while the former is the precondition for what Rawls calls 
the fact of reasonable pluralism (the result of ‘free practical reason within the framework of 
free institutions’).966 Now, the ideal role of public reason is precisely to reconcile these two 
demands by showing that they are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they can consti-
tute the two pillars of a unified political conception of democratic citizenship: a conception 
based on the moral political equality of citizens endowed with the capacity for a sense of jus-
tice and the capacity for a conception of the good who cooperate on fair terms that they pub-
licly endorse and who support their common political institutions over time. In this way, fra-
ternity is politically understood as civic friendship. Moreover, such a political interpretation 
of fraternity is consistent with the political interpretation of equality and freedom. Liberté, 
egalité, fraternité (freedom, equality, and civic friendship) are thus politically reconciled 
within a liberal conception that is stable for the right reasons. As I have just said, the mecha-
nism that brings about such reconciliation and stability for the right reasons is the idea of 
wide public reason (along with the idea of an overlapping consensus, which is not, however, 
the main subject of my research, for the reasons that I explained in chapter two). I will ana-
lyse such an idea in this chapter. Wide public reason strives to ensure that the spirit of reci-
procity that secures civic friendship in a regime of equality is not gained at the expense of lib-
erty. Through wide public reason −and through the overlapping consensus− justificatory con-
sensus and reasonable pluralism are finally politically reconciled and social unity and stability 
are reached for the right reasons (see infra and the second chapter). Since every political con-
ception specifies how to articulate the relations among these three elements in a way con-
                                                        
965 It is merely an intuition since I cannot provide a full argument for this claim in this research. 
966 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 37. 
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sistent with the demands of justice, Rawls emphasises that the content of public reason is 
specified by a family of reasonable political conceptions (supra): thus, there are ‘many forms 
of public reason.’967 Notwithstanding this, he reaffirms that ‘the limiting feature of these 
forms is the criterion of reciprocity.’968 In light of these considerations, my previous claim 
that reciprocity is the ultimate measure of the health of a liberal democracy seems highly 
plausible and in 4.2 I will ground my own conception of wide public reason in a criterion that 
I will call “reciprocity of the reasonable.” 
My interpretation of public reason mainly in terms of a moral political ideal seems in line 
with Rawls’s thinking, as I have said. He resolutely maintains that ‘[t]rying to meet this con-
dition [the criterion of reciprocity] is one of the tasks that this ideal of democratic citizenship 
asks of us. Understanding how to conduct oneself as a democratic citizen includes under-
standing an ideal of public reason,’969 and he reaffirms ‘the central place of the duty of civility 
as an ideal of democracy.’970 More importantly, Rawls says that ‘[a]s an ideal conception of 
citizenship for a constitutional democratic regime, it presents how things might be, taking 
people as a just and well-ordered society would encourage them to be. It describes what is 
possible and can be, yet may never be, though no less fundamental for that.’971  
This brings me to a crucial question that I have already touched on in 1.2.a and in 3.2.b.1 
and that I will consider with greater attention in chapter five, namely the issue of the degree of 
“ideality” required by the ideal of public reason to become normatively salient in a democrat-
ic society. To be more precise, the question is: how just and well-ordered must a society be 
before the ideal of public reason can be advanced as a normative conception of citizenship? In 
chapter five I will argue that the ideal of public reason, while ‘belong[ing] to a conception of 
                                                        
967 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 450. 
968 Ibid. 
969 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 218. 
970 Ibid. 
971 Ibid. 213. For similar considerations on this point and on the duty of civility as a moral and not as a legally enforcea-
ble duty, see also Patrick Neal, “Is Political Liberalism Hostile to Religion?” in Reflections on Rawls: An Assessment of 
his Legacy, ed. Shaun P. Young (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2009), 157. 
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a well-ordered constitutional democracy,’972 is normatively relevant not only in fully just and 
well-ordered societies. 
The first stage of the reconstructive part of my work has already underscored the double 
dimension of public reason. Let me recapitulate this issue here. Building on what I have said 
in the previous chapter, I argue that public reason combines two distinct but complementary 
dimensions. There is a strong and deep connection between, on the one hand, the moral polit-
ical core of public reason as a regulative moral ideal of citizenship which expresses a political 
conception of public morality, and, on the other, its justificatory role as a standard for a civic 
practice of public justification (as I have said, public reason is also –though not exclusively− 
a justificatory device). As Stephen Macedo puts it: 
‘Rawls has discerned more clearly than anyone else that the public ideals and 
principles that constitute a practice of public reasoning in and around democratic 
institutions, when suitably elaborated, are themselves adequate to constitute a 
public morality, without any further philosophical grounding. A public morality –
substantive principles and processes of public justification− can be understood 
from a public point of view as self-supporting.’973 
What Macedo refers to as a ‘practice of public reasoning’ and as ‘processes of public justi-
fication,’ constitute the second dimension that I mentioned, while what he calls ‘substantive 
principles’ of ‘public morality’ refers to the first.  
1) The moral political core of public reason as a regulative moral ideal of citizenship which 
expresses a political conception of public morality is more easily captured if we consider 
that the central insight of Rawls’s conception of public reason is an attempt to resist both 
a comprehensive view of public morality and ‘the Hobbesian invitation to abandon our 
public moral aspirations in favour of scepticism, will, and power.’974 Such a moral politi-
cal core of liberal citizenship is grounded in the idea of democratic social cooperation be-
                                                        
972 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 440. 
973 Stephen Macedo, “In Defense of Liberal Public Reason: Are Slavery and Abortion Hard Cases?” in Natural Law and 
Public Reason, eds. Robert P. George and Christopher Wolfe (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2000), 
21-22. 
974 Ibid. 21. 
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tween free and equal persons in a regime of political reciprocity. While political, this is 
not merely a formal, but a substantive regulative ideal of citizenship. Here the adjective 
“substantive” and the expression “public morality” should be read in terms of a (family 
of) political conception(s) of justice, and not in a comprehensive way. Thus, public rea-
son can be understood as a substantive ideal in the sense that it is grounded in a public 
political morality. Here, with the adjective “political” I mean also that it is a relational, 
historical, and contextual conception of morality, grounded as it is in the cooperation 
among free equals on the basis of reciprocity. I take political reciprocity as the corner-
stone of the public political culture of a constitutional liberal democratic society: in my 
understanding, what makes public political culture liberal in the political sense is the 
moral idea of reciprocity as fair cooperation among free equals who recognise one anoth-
er as such. It is for this reason, I think, that Rawls makes reciprocity the ‘limiting feature’ 
of liberal public reason.975 Reciprocity is, therefore, what characterises such a conception 
of public morality as politically liberal. In few words, when I say that public reason en-
tails a substantive ideal I simply mean that it is grounded in the political and still moral 
idea of political reciprocity. I will come back to reciprocity in 4.2. I understand the no-
tions of a regulative ideal of citizenship and of public morality in strong connection with 
the ideas of publicity, institutional identity, and legitimacy (supra). Thanks to this con-
nection to legitimacy, the substantive dimension of the ideal of citizenship grounded in 
public reason connected with the justificatory project of political liberalism. Note that the 
latter represents the second dimension analysed below: this is not surprising, because, as 
I have mentioned, in public reason its moral political dimension (which is more regula-
tive and ideal) and its role as justificatory device (which is more civic and practical) are 
unified. Quong elegantly expresses a similar position: 
‘At the heart of political liberalism is a commitment to substantive, and not mere-
ly procedural, public justification. The substantive values on which a political jus-
tification rests must be acceptable to all reasonable persons, not simply the proce-
                                                        
975 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 450. 
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dural rules by which the political decision was taken. This is what makes political 
liberalism distinctively liberal, rather than procedural or majoritarian.’976 
He also adds that ‘Rawls’s idea of public reason is not simply a logical implication of the 
commitment to public justification, but rather a substantive position regarding the norma-
tive features of democratic practice.’977 Here we find the two dimensions of public reason 
connected once more. Clearly, in this perspective public reason does not merely specify 
procedural or formal requirements for the civic practice of public justification. Consider, 
for instance, the question of legitimacy. Liberal legitimacy ‘is not […] merely formal. 
For Rawls, in the end what matters are our substantive judgements about justice, which, 
in cases where there is a lack of consistency, are able to provoke a withdrawal of legiti-
macy. […] In such a case the reference is not to the [formal and procedural] pedigree of 
[a specific] norm or policy, but to its substantial content.’978 From this standpoint, the so-
lution of the practical dimension of the problem of stability (see 4.2) is certainly im-
portant, but its place in the theory is not prior to the moral political significance of the 
ideal of public reason.979 Rather, the fact that such an ideal can contribute –together with 
the idea of an overlapping consensus− to solve practically that problem of stability is a 
further argument in favour of its moral and political importance. It is not mere institu-
tional political stability per se, but stability for the right reasons that Rawls wants to pro-
tect.980 As Paul Weithman notes, Rawls ‘explicitly locates the origins of liberalism in the 
aftermath of the wars of religion [and] takes religious toleration as one of liberalism’s de-
fining achievements and famously argues that toleration should be extended to philoso-
                                                        
976 Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, 210. 
977 Ibid. 257. 
978 Sebastiano Maffettone, Introduzione a Rawls, 101-102. My translation. For his defence of the substantive core of 
political liberalism against some more procedural deliberative alternatives see his “Liberalism and Its Critique: Is the 
Therapy Worse than the Disease?” Philosophy and Social Criticism 26, no. 3 (2000), 5-16. His conclusion is that those 
alternatives ‘can successfully transform a sociological account of legitimation in a normative theory of justification if 
and only if [they] smuggle into the concept of legitimation a set of basic liberal assumptions’ and that ‘democratic de-
liberation captures our sense of justice if and only if it coheres with liberal substantive theory.’ Ibid. respectively 11 and 
16. 
979 For an excellent analysis of the normative (and not merely practical) role played in Rawls’s theory by the concepts 
of consensus and stability, see Larry Krasnoff, “Consensus, Stability, and Normativity in Rawls’s Political Liberalism,” 
280-290 and 291-292. 
980 Paul Weithman, “Inclusivism, Stability, and Assurance,” 81-82. See the quotation in one of the following footnotes. 
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phy itself.’981 Nevertheless, his political liberalism (that Weithman calls ‘liberalism of 
reasoned respect’) does ‘not defend constraints on religious political advocacy and activi-
ty primarily because [it] fear[s] civil strife.’ Rather, political liberalism thinks that ‘ob-
serving these constraints is an important part of civic virtue. When citizens honor the re-
quirements of civic virtue, they cooperate with one another on the basis of their common 
reason. This helps to establish a climate of civility, mutual trust and civic friendship in 
which citizens regard one another as reasonable.’982 In other words, it is crucial to under-
stand that –as Weithman points out elsewhere−983 public reason is not simply aimed at 
limiting the potentially disruptive effects of the introduction of religion in politics. Ra-
ther, and much more importantly for Rawls, (a wide view of) public reason is necessary 
for solving the problem of mutual assurance and so for securing not merely institutional 
stability, but stability for the right reasons (see 1.2.a, 4.2, and chapter five).984 Rawls 
himself supports these considerations, when he maintains that ‘[i]n one way we view sta-
bility as a purely practical matter. […] But, as a liberal conception, justice as fairness is 
concerned with stability in a different way. [… W]hat counts is the kind of stability, the 
nature of the forces that secure it.’985 Moreover, when he talks about the spirit of civic 
friendship, Rawls says:  
‘It is sometimes said that the idea of public reason is put forward primarily to 
allay the fear of the instability or fragility of democracy in the practical political 
sense. That objection is incorrect and fails to see that public reason with its crite-
                                                        
981 Paul J. Weithman, “Introduction: Religion and the Liberalism of Reasoned Respect,” 3. 
982 Ibid. 33. 
983 Paul Weithman, “Inclusivism, Stability, and Assurance,” especially 81-84 and 86-90. 
984 ‘The stability with which Rawls is concerned is not institutional stability, but stability of the terms of cooperation. 
And so his argument […] does not turn on the claim that public appeal to religion will or may destabilize social institu-
tions. It turns on the very different claim that if citizens generally violate his guidelines of public reasoning, then the 
terms of cooperation among them may not be affirmed for the right reasons.’ Ibid. 81-82, emphases added. As I have 
anticipated and I will explain in section 4.2 and in chapter five, according to Weithman wide public reason is important 
for Rawls because it solves the problem of mutual assurance: it makes publicly known the fact that citizens are firmly 
committed to the fair terms of social cooperation specified by the conception of political justice, because (as we will 
see) when citizens respect the duty of civility, they may introduce their deepest moral and religious convictions into the 
public political forum while at the same time respecting the limits imposed by public reason. This maximises the stabi-
lising forces operating in the public political forum. 
985 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 142. Emphases added. 
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rion of reciprocity characterizes the political relation with its ideal of democracy 
and bears on the nature of the regime whose stability or fragility we are con-
cerned about. These questions are prior to questions of stability and fragility in 
the practical political sense, though of course no view of democracy can simply 
ignore these practical questions.’986 
In Rawls’s political liberalism the moral political substantive content of public reason 
(including the idea of stability for the right reasons) precedes the practical problem of in-
stitutional stability. This point is worth emphasising and explains why I treat the ideal of 
public reason and the question of stability as connected but distinct and why my main fo-
cus is on the moral political relevance of the first. The second, when conceptually joined 
to the first, shares its moral political significance and becomes stability for the right rea-
sons. In conclusion, political liberalism seems to rest on a political idea of good (an idea 
that is ‘generated and [has its] role within [the political conception itself]’987): the idea of 
the good of a well-ordered society and of the political virtues sustaining it.988 Rawls is 
unambiguous on this point. He even says that ‘a political conception must draw upon var-
ious ideas of the good,’ since ‘the right and the good are complementary.’989 Only in this 
way can a political conception be complete, in the sense that ‘it generates from within it-
self the requisite ideas so that all perform their complementary roles with its frame-
work.’990 These political ideas of the good which complete the political conception lead 
to the view according to which ‘the political values realized by a well-ordered constitu-
tional regime are very great values and not easily overridden and the ideals they express 
                                                        
986 Ibid. xlix, note 24, emphases added. 
987 Ibid. 207, emphasis added. Rawls is aware of the possible problems arising at this stage of his argumentation: he 
openly asks ‘how can political liberalism use ideas of the good at all without making claims about the truth of this or 
that comprehensive doctrine in ways not allowed by political liberalism itself?’ Ibid. 209. His answer is that, as I men-
tioned in the previous chapter, admissible conceptions of the good must be political: they must satisfy the following re-
strictions: a) they ‘are, or can be, shared by citizens regarded as free and equal,’ and b) ‘they do not presuppose any par-
ticular fully (or partially) comprehensive doctrine,’ ibid. 176. In this way, ‘we need not rely on comprehensive concep-
tions of the good but only on ideas tailored to fit within the political conception,’ ibid. 209.  
988 Ibid. 176, 194-195 and 201-206. 
989 Ibid. 175-176. Emphasis added. 
990 Ibid. 207-208. 
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are not lightly abandoned.’991 This is so because ‘these values govern the basic frame-
work of social life –the very groundwork of our existence− and specify the fundamental 
terms of political and social cooperation.’992 Rawls’s hope is that these political ideas of 
the good (precisely because of their being political and not presupposing any specific 
comprehensive doctrine)993 can be harmonised with all the reasonable comprehensive 
views of the good present in society, so that citizens realise the importance of those polit-
ical values and virtues and, by taking part in the overlapping consensus, they come to ‘af-
firm the ideal of public reason […] from within their own reasonable doctrines.’994 The 
actual participation of members of a particular comprehensive doctrine in such a consen-
sus is a matter to be considered case-by-case, and can be investigated by the conjectur-
er.995 However, the hoped for result is theoretically possible, because ‘the true, or the re-
ligiously and metaphysically well-grounded, goes beyond the reasonable.’996 In this way, 
the idea of an overlapping consensus can exploit the conceptual space or gap existing be-
tween the true and the reasonable. However, if congruence between the good and the 
right, the rational and the reasonable is needed, political liberalism –thanks to the idea of 
an overlapping consensus− ‘leaves this step to be taken by citizens individually in line 
with their own comprehensive views.’997 It is then possible to establish a link with the 
provisional conclusions of the previous chapter and say (by using James Boettcher’s 
words) that Rawls thinks of public reason ‘neither as a formula for solving political prob-
lems nor as a vehicle for consensus, but as an idea that can govern the political relations 
among democratic citizens, relations in which they recognize and reassure one another of 
their sincerity and reasonableness.’998 In line with these considerations, in 4.2 I will ex-
                                                        
991 Ibid. 218.  
992 Ibid. 139. Here Rawls quotes John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism, chapter five, par. 25. 
993 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 176 and 209. 
994 Ibid. 218.  
995 See my considerations in chapter two. 
996 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 153. 
997 Ibid. 
998 James W. Boettcher, “Rawls and Gaus on the Idea of Public Reason,” 2. 
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plain why I consider the “criterion of reciprocity of the reasonable” as the foundation of 
the regulative ideal of democratic citizenship expressed by public reason, but also as the 
ground on which public reason can work as a justificatory device. 
2) Hence, in my view, public reason builds its justificatory role as a standard for a civic 
practice of public justification on its own moral political core rooted in reciprocity. As 
Kent Greenawalt999 and Stephen Macedo1000 observe, the central importance of public 
justification in contemporary liberal political theory originates from the fact that the latter 
is mainly concerned with the problem of social and political justice. Greenawalt affirms 
that:  
‘If liberal democracy is seen primarily as a set of institutions for accommodat-
ing conflicting interests and desires, the manner in which people ground their 
claims is not of primary importance; but when the ideal aim of citizens and offi-
cials in their political lives is understood as achieving justice, what considerations 
count as relevant to justice becomes critical.’1001 
Jeremy Waldron aptly captures this point by saying that ‘liberals demand that the social 
order should in principle be capable of explaining itself at the tribunal of each person’s 
understanding.’1002 As I have said, this second dimension (the justificatory civic practice) 
of public reason is connected with the first (its moral political core). Though I outlined 
many features of this standard for the civic practice of public justification in chapter 
three, only in this chapter can I complete its reconstruction by pointing out the relations 
between public reason and non-public reasons. 
 
                                                        
999 Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 5. 
1000 Stephen Macedo, “In Defense of Liberal Public Reason: Are Slavery and Abortion Hard Cases?” 12. 
1001 Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice, 5. I similarly interpret Macedo’s claim that public 
justification is ‘important because liberal justice, properly understood, is a social ideal: the liberal ideal of free self-
government aspires to a polity in which citizens share a sense of justice, a society in which citizens are critical inter-
preters and enforcers of liberal values.’ Stephen Macedo, “In Defense of Liberal Public Reason: Are Slavery and Abor-
tion Hard Cases?” 12. Note, however, that Macedo’s claim is associated with a stronger view of liberal public morality. 
1002 Jeremy Waldron, “Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism,” The Philosophical Quarterly 37, no. 147 (1987), 149. 
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In this chapter, then, I proceed as follows. First, I will present a short overview of Rawls’s 
wide view of public reason (4.1.a). In doing that, I will substantially conclude the analysis of 
Rawls’s conception of public reason. Furthermore, I will also consider some of the most dis-
cussed criticisms of public reason (sometimes both as an ideal and as a justificatory standard), 
(4.1.b). To be sure, in working out my conception of public reason I am mainly concerned 
with preparing the ground for the evaluative analysis of the third part. Thus, my aim here is 
not to consider every single criticism that has been raised against the idea of public reason. 
The latter, no doubt, is one of the most debated topics in contemporary political philosophy 
and its plausibility and/or fairness have been discussed from different perspectives. Some of 
these perspectives have been already discussed in chapter three. In this chapter, however, I 
will specifically address the problem of the relation between public reason and religion. I will 
focus on two different lines of criticism: the first is more epistemic in character, while the 
second is more moral and political.1003 The first line of criticism has to do with the already 
considered (and yet unanswered) claim that in many crucial cases public reason fails to do its 
job because it is incomplete, or because in some cases the conflict between the duty of re-
straint imposed by public reason and other moral duties (often equally based on respect for 
others) may oblige one to recognise that ‘there are reasonable and rational people who find 
themselves with good reasons to go against public reason on the basis of their moral percep-
tions.’1004 The second line of criticism claims that public reason is unfair to religious citizens 
or, even more, that it does deprive the entire citizenry of crucial resources for realising a fuller 
democratic citizenship. I shall call the objections belonging to the first line of criticism “inad-
equacy objections,” since according to them the idea of public reason does not provide an ad-
equate ground to solve all the problems related to public deliberation. Similarly, I shall call 
the second line of criticism “democratic impairment objections.” Again, taking in due consid-
eration the conceptual kernel of this study, I will restrict the analysis to the debate concerning 
how inclusive or exclusive public reason should be with reference to religion. Consequently, I 
will not consider several other objections that could be included among the epistemic or the 
moral political criticisms in a broader sense. For instance, Joseph Raz has moved one of the 
                                                        
1003 I will build on Maffettone’s distinction between ‘epistemic’ and ‘political’ forms of criticisms. See his “Political 
Liberalism: Reasonableness and Democratic Practice,” 566ff. See also his book Rawls: An Introduction, 243-249, 281-
282, 288-289. 
1004 Micah Lott, “Restraint on Reasons and Reasons for Restraint: A Problem for Rawls’s Ideal of Public Reason,” Pa-
cific Philosophial Quarterly 87, no. 1 (2006), 84. 
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most prominent epistemic criticisms to Political Liberalism. More specifically, he criticises 
Rawls for refraining ‘from claiming that his doctrine of justice is true.’1005 According to Raz, 
such ‘epistemic abstinence’ is simply not consistent with the purposes of a philosophical theo-
ry of justice, which cannot do without the truth. In fact, Raz claims that:  
‘To recommend [a particular theory] as a theory of justice for our societies is to 
recommend it as a just theory of justice, that is, as a true, or reasonable, or valid 
theory of justice. If it is argued that what makes it the theory of justice for us is 
that it is built on an overlapping consensus and therefore secures stability and uni-
ty, then consensus-based stability and unity are the values that a theory of justice, 
for our society, is assumed to depend on. Their achievement −that is, the fact that 
endorsing the theory leads to their achievement− makes the theory true, sound, 
valid, and so forth. This at least is what such a theory is committed to. There can 
be no justice without truth.’1006 
I do not go in depth into Raz’s argument here, apart from noting the obvious fact that 
within Rawls’s theory the adjectives that Raz uses in an interchangeable way (‘just,’ ‘rea-
sonable,’ ‘true,’ and ‘valid’) are not equivalent. The fact that they are not equivalent in 
Political Liberalism shows precisely that the latter aspires to separate the true and the 
reasonable. However, this observation is not an argument against Raz’s claim: here I can 
only refer the reader to a more detailed analysis.1007 I simply add that, in my view, Raz’s 
remarks can be conceived as an alternative conception of the foundations and purposes of 
political philosophy, rather than as an attack to the internal coherence of Rawls’s theory. 
If this is so, however, this is not the kind of epistemic criticism that I have in mind in this 
chapter: in other words, it does not belong to the class of inadequacy objections. In the 
same vein, Chantal Mouffe’s views −discussed in chapter three− do not represent the 
                                                        
1005 Joseph Raz, “Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence,” 9. 
1006 Ibid. 15. 
1007 For a three-part reply to Raz, see Sebastiano Maffettone, “Political Liberalism: Reasonableness and Democratic 
Practice,” 570-571: First, ‘while the truth regards the sector of knowledge in general, in PL Rawls discusses, as part of 
the political conception, only those values that regard the basic structure and not the sum total of the values that pertain 
to the person in his or her entirety. Secondly, Rawls’s approach has always assumed an ontological constructivist per-
spective rather than a realist one, and so, rather than talk about the truth of his positions, it might be more appropriate to 
speak of objectivity and general acceptability […] Thirdly, Rawls’s famous and controversial “methods of avoidance” 
can be understood by assuming, together with Rawls, that the philosophical dispute over truth is too ‘intractable’ to be 
included in a theoretical-political argument.’ 
  
 European Muslims and Liberal Citizenship 
Ph.D. Thesis successfully discussed on April 21, 2016.  
The total or partial use of the Ph.D. Thesis is subject to copyright restrictions. 
 
  
317  
 Giovanni Vezzani 
 
LUISS-ULB 
kind of moral political criticism that I have in mind in this chapter, even though they are 
sometimes qualified as a form of political criticism.1008 In other words, Mouffe’s criti-
cism does not belong to the class of the democratic impairment objections. In fact, nei-
ther Raz nor Mouffe criticise how public reason and religion relate to each other within 
Rawls’s political liberalism, because they both provide an alternative to the project of po-
litical liberalism itself. Here, as I have said, I am concerned with a more limited and spe-
cific problem: the relation between public reason and religion, so the two labels “epis-
temic” and “moral political” must be understood as two broad categorisations which try 
to bring together many different –and often conflictual− reactions to Rawls’s conception 
of public reason. These two labels are, I hope, broad enough to facilitate the exposition 
and connoted enough to maintain some internal coherence. In the second section (4.2), I 
will propose my own view of wide public reason, suggesting a reinterpretation of the 
proviso and the duty of civility. At that point, I will be able to reply to some of the major 
objections considered in 4.1. I will also deal with the problem of containment of unrea-
sonable people. I have mentioned this problem several times, but I have always post-
poned its analysis because of its special nature. As I see it, this subject is on the outer 
border of a theory of political liberalism. 
 
4.1 The Wide View of Public Reason and Its Critics. 
 
4.1.A Rawls’s Wide View. 
I have already mentioned (2.2.b) the fact that in the original edition of Political Liberalism, 
in the eighth section of Lecture VI, Rawls contrasted an ‘exclusive view’ and an ‘inclusive 
view’ of public reason. In the first footnote of this section,1009 Rawls maintains that he was in-
itially inclined toward the exclusive view, but that he had been persuaded by Amy Gutmann 
and Lawrence Solum that such a view was excessively restrictive. Interestingly, he says that 
the example that finally convinced him was the case of Martin Luther King Jr. In fact, an ad-
                                                        
1008 Ibid. 567. 
1009 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 247, note 36. 
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vocate of an exclusive view of public reason, who affirms that ‘on fundamental political mat-
ters, reasons given explicitly in terms of comprehensive doctrines are never to be introduced 
into public reason,’1010would reject King’s reliance on religious sources in his struggle against 
racial segregation.1011 In the exclusive account, an appeal to religion would be excluded even 
in the case of the civil rights movement, and this outcome would puzzle any serious liberal 
theorist: if ‘public reason [had] gagged Martin Luther King,’ it could not have been presented 
as an adequate political theory.1012 Thus, Rawls defends an alternative and preferred view1013 
of public reason: the inclusive view. It allows ‘citizens, in certain situations, to present what 
they regard as the basis of political values rooted in their comprehensive doctrine, provided 
they do this in ways that strengthen the ideal of public reason.’1014 In some cases, Rawls says, 
the ideal of public reason is best served by allowing reliance on ones’ religious or philosophi-
cal views (from now on I will refer exclusively to religious comprehensive doctrine, since my 
topic mainly deals with religious views, but on this regard, from a Rawlsian political perspec-
tive, there is no difference between religious, philosophical, and moral comprehensive views). 
According to Rawls, the view of public reason that we opt for must take seriously into con-
sideration the social and historical conditions under which it must work. He affirms that under 
different conditions ‘the ideal must surely be advanced and fulfilled in different ways, some-
times by what may look like the exclusive view, at others by what may look like the inclusive 
view.’1015 He observes that the ‘inclusive view allows for this variation.’1016 Rawls thus ima-
gines three different situations. In the first case, the imagined society is (more or less) well-
ordered. Consequently, political values of public reason are familiar to every citizen, and an 
                                                        
1010 Ibid. 247. Emphasis added. 
1011 Rawls gives some examples of how ‘religious doctrines underlie King’s views and are important in his appeals,’ for 
instance on 250, note 39. 
1012 Leslie C. Griffin, “Good Catholics Should Be Rawlsian Liberals,” 318. 
1013 ‘The inclusive view seems the correct one,’ John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 248. 
1014 Ibid. 247, emphasis added. 
1015 Ibid. 248, emphasis added. 
1016 Ibid. 
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exclusive view represents the straightest way to comply with the ideal of public reason.1017 
Yet, things are much more complex in a society which is only ‘nearly well-ordered.’ When a 
society is only nearly just, it is not always so obvious that ‘everyone accepts, and knows that 
everyone else accepts, the very same principles of justice,’1018 nor that the basic structure of 
such a society effectively satisfies those principles. Citizens may come to doubt each other 
and their commitment to political justice. Rawls makes the example of a dispute about the 
principle of fair equality of opportunity concerning education. It may be the case that a specif-
ic religious group favours public support for church schools, while another group supports 
public financing for public schools only. In a case like this, the two groups may ‘come to 
doubt the sincerity of one another’s allegiance to fundamental political values.’1019 However, 
if they are allowed to present in the public forum the manner in which their religious views do 
affirm those political values, this ‘may help to show that the overlapping consensus is not a 
mere modus vivendi. This knowledge surely strengthens mutual trust and public confidence; 
it can be a vital part of the sociological basis encouraging citizens to honor the ideal of public 
reason.’1020 This situation anticipates in some respects what in “The Idea of Public Reason 
Revisited” becomes the notion of declaration (supra), which, however, is permitted in all cas-
es, not only in cases of dispute in a nearly well-ordered society. The third case analysed by 
Rawls is the one that most clearly shows the need for an inclusive view of public reason. In a 
society that is not well-ordered, there is ‘a profound division about constitutional essen-
tials.’1021 In such cases, some arguments based on religious grounds may be perfectly in line 
with the promotion of the ideal of public reason: examples of this trend are the movement for 
                                                        
1017 ‘Public reason in this well-ordered society may appear to follow the exclusive view. Invoking only political values 
is the obvious and the most direct way for citizens to honor the ideal of public reason and to meet their duty of civility.’ 
Ibid. 
1018 Ibid. 35. 
1019 Ibid. 248. 
1020 Ibid. 249. 
1021 Ibid. 
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the abolition of slavery1022 and the civil rights movement. Rawls specifies that he is analysing 
the question ‘conceptually and not historically,’ and concludes that ‘[i]n this case the non-
public reason of certain Christian churches supported the clear conclusions of public reason. 
[…] The abolitionists and King would not have been unreasonable in [their] conjectured be-
liefs if the political forces they led were among the necessary historical conditions to establish 
political justice, as does indeed seem plausible in their situation.’1023 This is because ‘it may 
happen that for a well-ordered society to come about in which public discussion consists 
mainly in the appeal to political values, prior historical conditions may require that compre-
hensive reasons be invoked to strengthen those values.’1024 Thus, the abolitionists and King 
‘did not go against the ideal of public reason,’1025 because ‘the ideal may be best achieved in 
different ways, in good times by following what at first sight may appear to be the exclusive 
view, in less good times by what may appear to be the inclusive view.’1026 
This account of public reason’s inclusiveness raises an obvious but important question: 
why should citizens of faith be obliged to base their arguments on religious ground only ‘in 
less good times?’ What is the rationale behind this limitation? By the time of his 1996 intro-
duction to the paperback edition of Political Liberalism, Rawls acknowledged that such a re-
striction was not theoretically justified. In presenting the ‘wide view’ of public reason, he 
                                                        
1022 A thorough Rawlsian analysis of the abolitionist movement is provided by David A. J. Richards in “Public Reason 
and Abolitionist Dissent,” Chicago-Kent Law Review 69, no. 3 (1994), 787-842. According to Richards, public reason 
makes possible what I shall call a “decompression of the public space,” which makes room for the free exercise of per-
sons’ moral powers. Public reason is an instrument for social criticism with reference to established political epistemol-
ogies. Whilst at the time dominant religion and science were not opposed to slavery, the abolitionist movement hon-
oured public reason because it focused on public reason’s ‘critical and moral independence in all domains (including 
science and religion) in forging arguments of public reason in opposition to the role that both dominant established sci-
ence and religion played in the defense of slavery and racism.’ Ibid. 835. Richards argues that ‘the religious character of 
abolitionist dissent, to the extent it was religious, was marked by its insistence, remarkable for the standards of its age, 
that religious inquiry (for example, Bible interpretation) be conducted in terms of arguments of public reason not hos-
tage of illegitimately entrenched political epistemologies (including religious epistemologies). In particular, abolitionist 
dissent centrally articulated its arguments of public reason to address all persons, including black Americans and wom-
en in general. […] Public reason both procedurally was the voice of their claims to human rights and afforded the sub-
stantive arguments in terms of which such arguments were made. […] The important feature of arguments of public 
reason […] was not their religious or antireligious character, but their demand that any form of argument (religious or 
irreligious) bearing on respect for basic human rights must, in order to be legitimate, be conducted in terms of public 
reason that could, in principle, be critically addressed to all persons as equal bearers of human rights.’ Ibid. 836-837. 
1023 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 249-251. 
1024 Ibid. 251, note 41. 
1025 Ibid. 251. 
1026 Ibid. 252. 
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now affirms that ‘[t]his is more permissive than Political Liberalism VI:8, which specifies 
certain conditions.’1027 Where previously he said that ‘the Abolitionists’ and King’s doctrines 
were held to belong to public reason because they were invoked in an unjust political society, 
and their conclusions of justice were in accord with the constitutional values of a liberal re-
gime […] and would help to make society more just,’1028 he is now persuaded that there is ‘no 
need for these conditions so far as they go beyond the proviso.’1029 The proviso, he says, ‘se-
cures what is needed.’1030 In this way, public reason and stability for the right reasons are fur-
ther strengthened, since citizens are able to show to one another ‘the roots in our comprehen-
sive doctrines of our allegiance to the political conception.’1031 The crucial element in this 
1996-1997 period is the statement of the proviso. It says that: ‘reasonable comprehensive doc-
trines, religious or nonreligious, may be introduced in public political discussion at any time, 
provided that in due course proper political reasons− and not reasons given solely by compre-
hensive doctrines− are presented that are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive 
doctrines introduced are said to support.’1032 Some considerations are in order. According to 
Rawls: 
1. In contrast with the inclusive view, in the wide view non-public reasons may be in-
troduced at any time, not only when society is moderately or severely unjust. 
2. The ‘proper political reasons’ that must be presented to support the conclusions of 
comprehensive doctrines are drawn not only from justice as fairness, but from any 
reasonable liberal political conception.1033 This point refers to the pluralisation of 
                                                        
1027 Ibid. l, note 25. 
1028 Ibid. l. Emphasis added. 
1029 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
1030 Ibid. 
1031 Ibid. 
1032 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 462. Emphasis added. See also Political Liberalism, xlix-l. 
1033 This is particularly clear in the first formulation of the proviso: ‘provided that in due course public reason, given by 
a reasonable political conception, are presented sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines are intro-
duced to support’ John Rawls, Political Liberalism, xlix-l, emphasis added. 
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the sources and forms of public reason introduced in the second elaboration of pub-
lic reason (supra). 
3.  Those political reasons must be sufficient (i.e., conclusive, supra) to support the 
conclusion previously advocated by means of non-public reasons.  
4. In due course is a vague expression. As Rawls himself asks: ‘when does [the provi-
so] need to be satisfied? On the same day or some later day? Also, on whom does 
the obligation to honor it fall?’1034 He just answers that ‘the details about how to 
satisfy this proviso must be worked out in practice and cannot feasibly be governed 
by a clear family of rules given in advance. How they work out is determined by 
the nature of the public political culture and calls for good sense and understand-
ing.’1035 
5. Rawls specifies a further requirement for meeting the proviso: that it is to be ‘satis-
fied in good faith.’1036 
Now, it is clear that such an account, while fecund, is quite vague and open to various in-
terpretations. In 4.2 I will try to clarify some aspects of such an account by stating my own in-
terpretation of the wide view, which, I believe, is in line with Rawls’s deepest intuitions. 
Here I would only add two short remarks. First, as I stressed in 2.2.b, I understand the pro-
viso as internal to the wide view of public reason, in the sense that it represents a form of pub-
lic reasoning through conditioned non-public reasons. The proviso internalises the non-public 
discourse into public political discourse: to do that it must subject it to a clause of supplemen-
tary guarantee. This characterisation of the proviso seems supported by Rawls when he says 
that ‘the introduction into public political culture of religious and secular doctrines, provided 
the proviso is met, does not change the nature and content of justification in public reason it-
self. This justification is still given in terms of a family of reasonable political conceptions of 
                                                        
1034 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 462. 
1035 Ibid. 462-463. 
1036 Ibid. 462. 
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justice.’1037 For this reason in 2.2.b I argued that the proviso sets the conditions for publicly 
appealing to non-public reasons within the scope of public reason and, as such, it is a general 
threshold for public reasoning. In contrast with that, witnessing and declaration (supra) are 
forms of non-public discourse (respectively, dissenting and confirmative) in accordance with 
public reason, and conjecture is a form of non-public discourse for the sake of public justifica-
tion. Second, when he presents the wide view, Rawls refers once again to the previously men-
tioned examples when discussing his preference for the inclusive view: the case of a highly 
contested policy of public support for church schools, the abolitionist movement, and the civil 
rights movement. He affirms that in the first case ‘it is wise for all sides to introduce their 
comprehensive doctrines […] so as to open the way for them to explain to one another how 
their views do indeed support those basic political values,’1038 and that the Abolitionist and 
King fulfilled the proviso (or they could have fulfilled it, if they were not thinking of them-
selves as fulfilling it), since their doctrines ‘supported basic constitutional values.’1039 The ra-
tionale of the wide view is primarily moral and political: through the wide view, ‘citizens’ al-
legiance to the democratic ideal of public reason is strengthened for the right reasons.’1040 
This passage is of crucial importance. It highlights the connection between the wide view of 
public reason and the solution of the mutual assurance problem (see chapter one, 4.2, and 
chapter five). Thus, the two cases mentioned with reference to a (partially or severely) not 
well-ordered society are now taken to exemplify more generally an understanding of public 
reason which is focused more on both its moral and practical-deliberative dimensions than on 
the conditions of the society in which it must operate (see chapter five). 
 
4.1.B Two Lines of Criticism. 
Rawls’s wide view of public reason has been extensively criticised from different perspec-
tives. In the limited space of this section, it would be impossible to do justice to the broad lit-
                                                        
1037 Ibid. 463. Emphasis added. 
1038 Ibid. 464. 
1039 Ibid. 
1040 Ibid. 463. Emphasis added. 
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erature generated by such a critical endeavour. Here I simply try to prepare the ground for my 
interpretation of the proviso by pinpointing some of the major criticisms that have been di-
rected at public reason and the problems that my reading of the latter could help to resolve. In 
what follows (4.2), I will focus on two of those criticisms in particular: the charges of incom-
pleteness and unfairness. 
First, it is important to note that in “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” Rawls provides 
a range of three possible objections to his account of public reason. A hypothetical critic may 
claim that: 
1. Public reason is too restrictive, because it ‘unreasonably limit[s] the topics and 
considerations available for political argument and debate.’1041 It may be so either 
because (a) public reason ‘mistakenly tries to settle political questions in ad-
vance,’1042 or because (b) ‘it may lead to a stand-off and fail to bring about deci-
sions on disputed issues.’1043 In those cases, it may be more advisable to dismiss 
public reason and adopt an ‘open view with no constraints.’1044 Note that the 
strength of (a) seems much reduced in the interpretation of public reason that I be-
gan to sketch out in chapter three. As I stressed several times, in this reading public 
reason is not static or unchanging, but open to change and dynamic (infra). As 
Lawrence Solum rightly puts it, on this account ‘[w]e can be civil to one another 
and at the same time say something new.’1045 I do not further analyse this objection 
(which Solum calls ‘novelty objection’)1046 here because I will consider it later 
among the “democratic impairment” arguments made for criticising public reason 
and advocating an ideal which is more open to religious arguments (infra). I think 
that my analysis of the proviso will provide sufficient grounds for rejecting this ob-
jection, but I will not openly argue further in that direction. Much more complex is 
                                                        
1041 Ibid. 474. 
1042 Ibid. 
1043 Ibid. 478. 
1044 Ibid. 474. 
1045 Lawrence B. Solum, “Novel Public Reasons,” 1485. 
1046 Ibid. 1460. 
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the objection under (b), which refers to the question of the alleged incompleteness 
of public reason, famously exemplified by the case of abortion.1047 Rawls has al-
ready dealt with this topic in Political Liberalism, by saying that ‘public reason of-
ten allows more than one reasonable answer’1048 to a particular political question 
(inconclusiveness) and that, on the other hand, some may think that ‘it leaves many 
questions without answers’1049 (indeterminacy). Since it is more troublesome, I will 
explain the charge of incompleteness when considering the “inadequacy” criticisms 
against public reason later in this section. Furthermore, I will deal with incomplete-
ness in the final part of section 4.2. 
2. Public reason is too narrow, because actually ‘we should always present what we 
think are true or grounding reasons for our views. [… W]e are bound to express the 
true, or the right, as seen from our comprehensive doctrines.’1050 According to 
Rawls, public reason replaces –for political purposes only− the idea of the true as it 
is conveyed by one’s comprehensive doctrine with the idea of the politically rea-
sonable.1051 Yet, he claims, there is no contradiction between the politically reason-
able and the true as expressed within a reasonable comprehensive doctrine (‘a true 
judgement in a reasonable comprehensive doctrine never conflicts with a reasona-
ble judgment in its related political conception. A reasonable judgement of the po-
litical conception must still be confirmed as true, or right, by the comprehensive 
doctrine’).1052 However, this does not answer concerns about the fairness of pre-
scribing such a distinction between the politically reasonable and the true. There-
fore, it is easy to understand why one of the democratic impairment objections that 
I will consider is based precisely on a fairness argument. 
                                                        
1047 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 243 note 32 and “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 479 note 80. 
1048 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 240. 
1049 Ibid. 244. 
1050 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 481. 
1051 Ibid. 
1052 Ibid. 483. 
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3. Public Reason is unnecessary in a well-ordered democracy, because ‘[i]ts limits 
and constraints are useful primarily when a society is sharply divided […] In the 
political societies of the European democracies and the United States these worries 
[…] are idle.’1053 Rawls’s reply to this objection is that it rests on assumptions that 
are ‘incorrect and sociologically faulty,’ since in well-ordered or almost well-
ordered societies ‘harmony and concord depend on the vitality of the public politi-
cal culture and on citizens’ being devoted to and realizing the ideal of public rea-
son.’1054 Hence, stability for the right reasons cannot be maintained even in well-
ordered societies without relying on general compliance with the ideal of public 
reason: clearly, this has to do with the problem of mutual assurance (see supra, 4.2, 
and 5.2.c). However, this objection is less focused on the point that I would like to 
make here and I leave it aside. On the contrary, in the next chapter I will consider 
the opposite problem, that is, whether the ideal of public reason is normatively 
binding exclusively in well-ordered societies. I can reveal in advance that my an-
swer is negative. 
The objections anticipated by Rawls have been further articulated in recent years in a de-
bate that more directly concerns the inclusion of religious arguments and reasons in public 
political discussions and deliberations. As I have said in the introduction of this chapter, and 
without claiming to be complete, I gather those positions in two main categories. 1055 Rough-
ly, the common inclusivist kernel of these objections is that Rawls’s conception of public rea-
son is too restrictive toward religion, whilst a more adequate and attractive picture makes 
room for religion in public deliberation and discussion. In my reading, then, inclusivism 
might be understood as a broader view bringing together epistemic and moral-political objec-
tions to public reason. Inclusivism can be defined as the position that ‘challenges the common 
political liberal view that religious arguments are prima facie inadmissible in public political 
                                                        
1053 Ibid. 484-485. 
1054 Ibid. 485. 
1055 For an overview of the vast literature concerning the inclusivist criticisms to Rawls’s public reason, see: Kevin Val-
lier and Fred D’Agostino, “Public Justification,” 22-26; Andrew F. March, “Rethinking Religious Reasons in Public 
Justification,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 3 (2013), in particular 523-524; Micah Schwartzman, “The 
Completeness of Public Reason,” 193; Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, 259-260. 
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deliberation over coercive laws.’1056 As I have said, I consider two groups of inclusivist criti-
cisms to Rawls’s public reason. In the following pages, my purpose is to give voice to 
Rawls’s critics: for this reason, I will mainly base the discussion on their own arguments and 
words by quoting them at length. Moreover, even though I will sometimes suggest some pre-
liminary considerations about the most important objections, I will not reply to them here 
(whilst, as mentioned, I will consider some of them in 4.2). Finally, since the objections of the 
first kind are more complex, I decided to say a few more words about them. 
A. The first line of criticism to public reason’s stance toward religion is more epistem-
ic. I call the objections falling in this category “inadequacy objections,” since they 
all claim that public reason does not represent an adequate ground to answer all the 
problems related to public deliberations. Inadequacy objections have two main 
forms:  
A1) Incompleteness objection. The objection, in Michael Perry’s words, 
sounds more or less as follows: ‘a politics –a practice of public justifica-
tion− from which disputed beliefs about human good are excluded […] is 
impossibly restrictive: such a politics is bereft of the normative resources 
required for addressing, much less resolving, the most fundamental politi-
cal-moral issues that engage and divide us. Only a politics in which beliefs 
about the human good, including disputed beliefs, have a central place is 
capable of addressing our most basic political questions.’1057 At the end of 
chapter three, I mentioned the complex problem of the alleged incom-
pleteness of public reason. On that occasion, I also emphasised two kinds 
of incompleteness usually distinguished in the literature: inconclusiveness 
and indeterminacy. Public reason is indeterminate when it is ‘unable to de-
liver any clear conclusions about a particular question. In these cases, […] 
public reason “runs out”: its content simply proves insufficient to yield an 
                                                        
1056 Andrew F. March, “Rethinking Religious Reasons in Public Justification,” 523. 
1057 Michael J. Perry, Love and Power: The Role of Religion and Morality in American Politics (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 29. In this book, Perry proposes a model which he calls ‘ecumenical politics,’ based on a prac-
tice of ‘ecumenical political dialogue,’ in which religious beliefs are central, yet with some qualifications [for instance, 
the ‘attitudes’ of fallibilism and pluralism are crucial to Perry’s ecumenical political dialogue, as well as the ‘virtues’ of 
public intelligibility –to translate as far as possible one’s position into a ‘shared (“mediating”) language’− and public 
accessibility –a non-sectarian and non-authoritarian defence of one’s position) see 99-112]. 
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answer to the question posed.’1058 Public reason is inconclusive when it de-
livers ‘a plurality of different answers’ and ‘public reason alone cannot 
clearly tell us which answer is correct or the most reasonable alterna-
tive.’1059 As I mentioned, Gerald Gaus pinpoints that inconclusiveness is 
much more common than indeterminacy, since ‘our standard epistemolog-
ical situation is an overabundance, not a paucity, of reasons.’1060 Then, ac-
cording to Gaus often public justifications are inconclusive, that is ‘unde-
feated but not victorious.’1061 To be conclusive, a public justification must 
not only be undefeated1062 (that is, not only must it be able to withstand 
‘criticisms that challenge either the validity of its inferential structure or 
the soundness of the reasons that support its conclusions, or both’)1063 but 
also victorious.1064 For that, two other conditions must be met. First, the 
justification must satisfy a publicity condition: since ‘the only accessible 
way to have reasonable confidence that a proposal is publicly justified is to 
put it forward and invite specific challenges from others,’1065 ‘others must 
have the opportunity to examine, clarify, and object to the proposed justi-
fication.’1066 In this way, ‘public scrutiny improves the epistemic quality 
of public justifications.’1067 The second and more burdensome condition 
that public justifications must meet to be not only undefeated but also vic-
torious is that they must ‘demonstrate that it would be unreasonable for 
                                                        
1058 Jonathan Quong, “Public Reason,” 15. 
1059 Ibid. 
1060 Gerald F. Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism, 155. 
1061 Ibid. 151. 
1062 Gaus explains what it means for a justification to be undefeated in ibid. 144-147. 
1063 Micah Schwartzman, “The Completeness of Public Reason,” 195. 
1064 Gaus analyses two conditions for a public justification to be victorious in Justificatory Liberalism, 147-151. 
1065 Ibid. 148. 
1066 Micah Schwartzman, “The Completeness of Public Reason,” 195. 
1067 Ibid.  
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anyone to disagree with the justification that [one] has offered for her posi-
tion.’1068 In few words, Gaus argues (and Schwartzman agrees with him on 
this point)1069 that in public justifications –where state coercion concerning 
fundamental questions is at stake− the relevant epistemic standard is ‘be-
ing beyond a reasonable doubt.’1070 However, sometimes (often) public 
reasons are not able to meet that ‘higher burden of proof,’ and political 
disagreement persists. Thus, critics argue that if the idea of public reason 
cannot provide an answer that is ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ (that is if 
public reason is inconclusive), we should revise our standards of public 
justification. This is even truer in case of indeterminacy. To see the differ-
ence between the two cases, let me refer to Schwartzman’s analysis of in-
conclusiveness. Public reason is inconclusive if ‘it fails to generate con-
vergence among reasonable people on a single political outcome.’1071 To 
understand this point, suppose that ‘A supports policy P1, and B supports 
P2, and that both A and B justify their positions on the basis of what they 
sincerely believe are reasonable balances of political values (R1 and R2, 
respectively). Thus, A offers the justification R1→P1, and B offers 
R2→P2. Now if P1 and P2 are mutually exclusive, and if neither A nor B 
can prove to the other that his or her position is the most reasonable, then 
they have reached an impasse within the limits of public reason. Each of 
them believes that public reason provides a determinate conclusion, but 
they are unable to reach agreement on a specific political outcome.’1072 
Consider, for instance the case of abortion. Rawls has argued that, for try-
ing to solve such an intricate issue, we should balance three political val-
ues: ‘the due respect for human life,’ ‘the ordered reproduction of political 
                                                        
1068 Ibid. 
1069 Ibid. 
1070 Gerald F. Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism, 150. 
1071 Micah Schwartzman, “The Completeness of Public Reason,” 194. 
1072 Ibid. 
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society over time,’ and ‘the equality of women.’1073 Rawls think that on 
‘any reasonable balance of these three values,’ the political value of wom-
en’s equality is overriding and from this he concludes that ‘any reasonable 
balance of these values will give a woman a duly qualified right to decide 
whether or not to end her pregnancy during the first trimester.’1074 But why 
should the political value of equality of women be overriding? A political 
liberal may equally claim that the respect of human life is the overriding 
political value and she may consistently conclude that abortion should be 
forbidden.1075 On which bases does Rawls argue that ‘any comprehensive 
doctrine that leads to a balance of political values excluding that duly qual-
ified right [to abortion] in the first trimester is […] unreasonable?’1076 As 
Macedo frames the problem, ‘[t]he abortion question is so vexing, in a 
sense, precisely because there are weighty reasons on both sides, and it is 
easy to see how reasonable people can come down on either side.’1077 
However, inconclusiveness easily turns into indeterminacy, as Philip 
Quinn’s analysis shows1078 and as Schwartzman observes: ‘[w]hat ap-
peared only a moment ago to be a failure of public convergence may actu-
ally turn out to be a case of indeterminacy.’1079 Schwartzman says that 
public reason is indeterminate ‘if it fails to provide a sufficient reason for 
                                                        
1073 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 243, note 32. 
1074 Ibid. 
1075 For a similar argument, see Philip L. Quinn, “Political Liberalisms and Their Exclusions of the Religious,” 150. He 
notes that ‘[s]ome who agree with Rawls about the values at stake will claim that the value of respect for human life is 
overriding and argue that a fetal right to life is required to give substance and force to that value. There is a conflict of 
intuitions about how two great values are to be balanced in a hard case.’ 
1076 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 243, note 32. 
1077 Stephen Macedo, “In Defense of Liberal Public Reason: Are Slavery and Abortion Hard Cases?” 29. Macedo con-
cludes that ‘[a]bortion is a matter of basic, principled disagreement that calls […] for a recognition of the reasonable-
ness of both sides of the issue, and for moderation or magnanimity and for principled compromise.’ Ibid. 33. 
1078 Philip L. Quinn, “Political Liberalisms and Their Exclusions of the Religious,” 150. Infra. 
1079 Micah Schwartzman, “The Completeness of Public Reason,” 196. 
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selecting between two (or more) responses to some issue.’1080 The claim 
here is not that there are several possible reasonable balances of political 
values, but that public reason alone cannot provide any grounds for solv-
ing the problem:1081 alone, public reason does not have the necessary re-
sources for this task. For example, for deciding the question of abortion, 
the internal resources of public reason are not sufficient, because they are 
not able to settle the prior question to the status of the foetus, on which all 
the issue seems to rest. As Kent Greenawalt rightly points out, the ‘abor-
tion issue is so intractable because of the sharp divergence over the moral 
status of the foetus. Those who think […] that at the moment after concep-
tion a foetus, or more precisely at this early stage a zygote, has moral 
rights as full as those of a newborn baby tend to take a very different view 
of the morality of abortion from those who think a foetus is only potential 
life and that moral rights arise only at birth or at some later point in 
time.’1082 Since both sides of the controversy cannot appeal to their com-
prehensive doctrines, Philp Quinn claims that to honour public reason they 
‘must accept the discipline of restricting their appeals to generally accept-
ed common sense beliefs and uncontroversial science. However, common 
sense is divided on or simply perplexed by the question of abortion and 
probably will remain so, and uncontroversial science is and is likely al-
ways to be silent on the question of whether the early foetus is a person 
and so should be protected by a strong right to life.’1083 He then concludes 
that ‘there appear to be two ways of describing the situation. One could 
                                                        
1080 Ibid. Emphasis added.  
1081 ‘To see the difference between indeterminacy and inconclusiveness, consider again A’s claim that R1→P1 is an in-
conclusive justification for a right to abortion. Her argument does not provide decisive grounds for supporting a right to 
abortion, but it does have the status of a determinate, undefeated public justification. Now it might be objected that P1 
cannot be established based on public reason alone. When asked to provide an argument for the way in which she has 
ordered the political values of respect for human life and the equality of women (R1), A may have no further public rea-
son(s) to support her position. If her argument cannot be defended by anything other than an appeal to her comprehen-
sive view, then it would seem that public reason has not in fact provided her with a basis on which to determine the is-
sue. Furthermore, if the same holds true for B, who opposes a right to abortion, then neither A nor B has a public reason 
for the manner in which they have ordered the relevant political values.’ Ibid. 
1082 Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice, 121. 
1083 Philip L. Quinn, “Political Liberalisms and Their Exclusions of the Religious,” 150. Emphasis added. 
  
 European Muslims and Liberal Citizenship 
Ph.D. Thesis successfully discussed on April 21, 2016.  
The total or partial use of the Ph.D. Thesis is subject to copyright restrictions. 
 
  
332  
 Giovanni Vezzani 
 
LUISS-ULB 
say that public reason in this case yields no reasonable balance of the val-
ues of respect of human life and equality of women because its resources 
are too weak to determine any reasonable balance. Or one could say that 
public reason permits two reasonable balances of those values because its 
resources are too weak to single out just one reasonable balance. In any 
case, public reason […] is incomplete.’1084 Thus, critics argue that in those 
cases in which public reason fails to produce an agreement on a reasonable 
balance of political values (cases of inconclusiveness) or cannot provide 
by itself sufficient reasons to settle a fundamental political question (cases 
of indeterminacy), citizens should be free to introduce in public political 
debate their comprehensive doctrines in order to eliminate the impasse. 
For instance, Kent Greenawalt maintains that the duty to base public polit-
ical discussion exclusively on publicly accessible reasons and shared 
premises is binding if and only if such public reasons and premises provide 
a single and clear answer to the question discussed (that is, if public reason 
is both conclusive and determinate). On issues such as abortion, citizens 
cannot take a position without relying on controversial assumptions and 
intuitions (e.g., why should the balance of political values in which the 
equality of women is overriding be preferred to a balance in which the 
value of protection of life is prioritised?) or on their comprehensive doc-
trines (e.g., in order to solve the problem of the moral status of the foetus). 
When public reason does not provide a single and clear answer or cannot 
provide sufficient grounds for deciding, it is necessary (and fairer)1085 that 
citizens rely on their comprehensive doctrines to “complete” public reason 
and arrive at some definite conclusions: ‘[i]f people must rely on evalua-
tions that are not based on commonly accessible reasons to arrive at posi-
                                                        
1084 Ibid. 
1085 Greenawalt’s argument seems to be grounded in both epistemic considerations and concerns about fairness, see Re-
ligious Convictions and Political Choice, for instance 144 and 152-155. On page 155 Greenawalt says: ‘To demand that 
many devout Catholics, Protestants, and Jews pluck out their religious convictions is to ask them how they would think 
about a critical moral problem if they started from scratch, disregarding what they presently take as basic premises of 
moral thought. Asking that people perform this exercise is not only unrealistic in the sense of impossible; the implicit 
demand that people try to compartmentalize beliefs that constitute some kind of unity in their approach to life is posi-
tively objectionable.’ 
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tions regarding [questions such as animal rights and abortion …], the reli-
gious believer has an argument that he should be able to rely on his reli-
giously informed view of humankind’s place in the world [or the moral 
status of the foetus …]; if commonly shared moral perspectives and forms 
of reason provide no evidently correct perspective, it is hard to understand 
why a liberal democrat should eschew his deeply held religious premises 
in favor of some alternative assumptions that also lie beyond public rea-
sons and can yield a starting point.’1086 
A2) Civility-as-a-duty-that-can-be-derogated objection. A second form of 
the inadequacy line of criticism is grounded in the idea that the ideal of 
public reason is often ‘unable to provide people with good reasons for ex-
ercising restraint with respect to their non-public reasons.’1087 In particu-
lar, by making the example of two hypothetical individuals (Dr. X and 
Pastor Lopez),1088 Micah Lott argues that on several occasions persons 
who are fully rational and reasonable and who do recognise the duty of ci-
vility as morally grounded in mutual respect have good and powerful rea-
sons to break the restraint requirement imposed by the duty of civility. In 
fact, there are cases in which we may come to the conclusion that the duty 
of civility is weaker than other moral duties equally grounded in respect 
for persons. Lott maintains that ‘[i]t is acceptable to be uncivil in cases 
where something more important than civility is at stake and when one 
                                                        
1086 Ibid. 112-113. Note, however, that Greenawalt also maintains that when it is possible to come to a single answer 
through public reason alone, a liberal citizen should rely on it: ‘[i]f publicly accessible reasons decisively answer a 
question of fact or value, or limit the range of plausible answers, the good liberal citizen does not rely on particular reli-
gious premises to urge a political result that is at odds with the answer or range of answers that the publicly accessible 
reasons indicate to be sound.’ Ibid. 207.  
1087 Micah Lott in “Restraint on Reasons and Reasons for Restraint,” 75. 
1088 Both Dr. X and Pastor Lopez must break the duty of civility (which otherwise they recognise and abide by) because 
the only way in which they can honour (a higher form of) the duty of respect for other persons is by recurring to non-
public reasons. Dr. X supports a law protecting chimpanzees from being killed, based on pioneering (and highly contro-
versial) scientific evidence proving that chimps possess language skills and moral capacities similar to human beings. 
Pastor Lopez advocates the prohibition of abortion, based on the religion-based belief that full human personality exists 
since conception. Dr. X and Pastor Lopez are ‘good Rawlsians’ who face a dilemma: on the one hand, they have ‘a very 
serious obligation to do what [they] can to protect the lives of thousands of innocent children [and chimps]. On the oth-
er hand, however, the only way [they] can do this is by going against public reason and thereby failing in [their] duty of 
civility.’ Ibid. 80. 
  
 European Muslims and Liberal Citizenship 
Ph.D. Thesis successfully discussed on April 21, 2016.  
The total or partial use of the Ph.D. Thesis is subject to copyright restrictions. 
 
  
334  
 Giovanni Vezzani 
 
LUISS-ULB 
must be uncivil in order to act for that more important thing. [… I]f people 
perceive their duties to be in conflict with one another, then it is right for 
them to choose the more important duty at the expense of the lesser duty, 
or at least they cannot be faulted for doing so.’1089 The conclusion is that 
we should refrain from blaming those who are unable to fulfil the duty of 
civility because they try to abide by what they perceive as their higher or-
der duty. What is more, in the examples that Lott provides, those who 
break the duty of civility do so precisely because they are willing to hon-
our the very moral foundation of the duty of civility itself: respect for other 
persons. In fact, Dr. X and Pastor Lopez think that on same particular oc-
casions respecting the duty of civility is not the adequate way for honour-
ing the moral requirement of respect for others. In this sense, ‘public rea-
son is not the only way in which persons […] can demonstrate respect for 
their fellow citizens as free and equal.’1090 Lott affirms that this problem 
‘shows that liberal political conceptions do not exhaust the reasonable an-
swers that can be given to questions of constitutional essentials and basic 
justice. […W]e can imagine people who are committed to a liberal politi-
cal conception and who value public reason, and yet who also have views 
which give them good reason to go against public reason. [… P]ublic rea-
son [does] not provide the only reasonable views on these matters. This 
opens the door to the possibility that people will have rational and reason-
able views that cannot be articulated in public reason, and this makes pos-
sible the dilemmas faced by people such as Dr. X and Pastor Lopez.’1091 
According to Lott, even Rawls’s wide view of public reason is unable to 
solve the problem, because Dr. X and Pastor Lopez would have good rea-
sons for offering non-public reasons ‘even if they don’t know if they can 
                                                        
1089 Ibid. 81. Emphasis added. 
1090 Ibid. 87. Lott adds that ‘from the point of view of Dr. X and Pastor Lopez, the duties which conflict with public rea-
son are also expressions of respect for persons. […] Thus, the decision about whether or not to exercise restraint is a 
question about what kind of respect takes precedence,’ ibid. 88, emphasis added. 
1091 Ibid. 84. The original emphases in this passage have been modified. 
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fulfil the proviso, and even if they don’t ever fulfil the proviso.’1092 Even 
though Dr. X and Pastor Lopez may be generally willing to satisfy the 
proviso because they are committed to the ideal of public reason, the duty 
of civility is not always an overarching moral duty. 
B. The second line of criticism is more moral and political. The central idea is that 
public reason provides a poor ideal of democratic citizenship: under the ideal pub-
lic reason, democratic citizenship is impaired. There are three “democratic impair-
ment objections”: 
B1) Fairness and integrity objection.1093 The first moral and political ob-
jection against the idea of public reason is that it is unfair to (and too bur-
densome for) religious citizens. Moreover, it is said that ‘the Rawlsian idea 
asks the religious citizen to “split” himself in a way that does, or can do, 
damage to the moral and or religious integrity of the person.’1094 Kent 
Greenawalt presents a line of argument in this direction.1095 Philip Quinn, 
after having rejected Audi’s two principles of ‘secular rationale’ and ‘secu-
lar motivation,’1096 and before dealing with the above-mentioned problem 
of the alleged incompleteness of public reason, concisely raises the ques-
tion of its unfairness. He notes that public reason may unfairly exclude 
some reasonable citizens, because, ‘even if one agrees with Rawls that the 
hope for [an] overlapping consensus on a liberal conception is not utopian, 
one should be willing to acknowledge that no such consensus exists in our 
society here and now. Hence those whose reasonable comprehensive doc-
trines do not at present support any liberal conception of justice will find it 
                                                        
1092 Ibid. 91. 
1093 Here, for brevity, I consider together two objections that are usually treated separately. 
1094 Patrick Neal, “Is Political Liberalism Hostile to Religion?” 159 (see also 164-169). 
1095 Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice, for instance 144 and 152-155, supra. 
1096 See Robert Audi, Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 86-
100; “The Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of Citizenship,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 18, no. 3 
(1989), 278-285; “The State, the Church, and the Citizen,” in Religion and Contemporary Liberalism, 55-56; and “Lib-
eral Democracy and the Place of Religion in Politics,” in Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convic-
tions in Political Debate, 25-33. 
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natural to object that they have no sufficient reason to honor the limits of 
public reason or to affirm the duty of civility.’1097 Similarly, Patrick Neal 
submits that ‘Rawls’s account of liberalism misunderstands the perspec-
tive of the religious citizen and consequently treats it unfairly.’1098 The 
reason is that Rawls’s view of public reason would be unable to resolve 
what Neal calls ‘the issue of authority.’1099 The latter is based on the idea 
that a ‘conscientious citizen with prior [religious] loyalties will assess pub-
lic reason and the question of whether or not to practice it against the 
standard set by those prior loyalties. His commitment to public reason and 
the state of which it is part will thus be a necessarily qualified one.’1100 
Neal contends that ‘[t]he hard truth about claims of conscience […] is that 
they are fundamentally unjustifiable from the point of view of the legiti-
mate state, for they claim a legitimacy that is other than that of the 
state.’1101 If the problem is entirely understood in terms of obedience to 
two irreconcilable authorities, establishing two different and equally bind-
ing orders of legitimacy, then it is plausible to conclude (as Neal does) that 
it is not fair to qualify as unreasonable those citizens who choose to obey 
the authority of religion rather than public reason. Those citizens are not 
unreasonable, because, in a situation of opposing and irreconcilable orders 
of authority, citizens ‘are left with a disagreement about how best to speci-
fy the demands of justice. [But this] is quite a different thing from a disa-
greement between those who support justice and those who are selfish 
scoundrels.’1102 Disagreements about which of the two authorities best 
specifies the requirements and principles of justice are not unreasonable, 
                                                        
1097 Philip L. Quinn, “Political Liberalisms and Their Exclusions of the Religious,” 148.  
1098 Patrick Neal, “Political Liberalism, Public Reason, and the Citizen of Faith,” in Natural Law and Public Reason, 
172. 
1099 Ibid. 173 and 174. 
1100 Patrick Neal, “Is Political Liberalism Hostile to Religion?” 173. 
1101 Ibid. 174. 
1102 Patrick Neal, “Political Liberalism, Public Reason, and the Citizen of Faith,” 178. 
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according to Neal. At the end of the day, he says, Rawls has built ‘an ac-
count of political justice (political liberalism) which by definition is not in-
compatible with the comprehensive moral theory of liberalism (presuma-
bly the comprehensive Kantian liberalism of A Theory of Justice). Assum-
ing such congruence, there can be no rupture between politics and morali-
ty.’1103 This is perfectly normal according to Neal: nobody would defend 
political principles that contradict one’s own comprehensive view. The 
idea is simple: being a Kantian, Rawls would have built a conception of 
justice which is not openly Kantian, but which is not inconsistent with 
Kantian liberalism. If this is true, Rawls’s political liberalism is just one 
among other and equally legitimate accounts of political justice, including 
conceptions derived from comprehensive views other than Kantian liberal-
ism. Political liberalism ‘cannot be equated with justice itself,’1104 because 
it would have been designed to fit with Rawls’s deepest moral (Kantian) 
convictions: thus, by definition it cannot contradict Rawls’s comprehen-
sive liberal view. But if this is so, it would be unfair to deny citizens of 
faith the same right to seek congruence between their comprehensive 
views and an account political justice: in determining the requirements of 
justice, they must be free to follow the authority of their religion, because 
for Neal there is reasonable disagreement about the demands of justice and 
about whether or not they include the Rawlsian notion of public reason. In 
this perspective, public reason treats religious believers unfairly because it 
presents itself as the unique reasonable ground for establishing the order of 
the politically legitimate, but, in so doing, it actually dissimulates its con-
gruence with comprehensive liberalism. Thus, public reason is ultimately 
unfair because it claims to be the sole political reason for the public of rea-
sonable citizens, but as a matter of fact ‘[r]easonable people of good will 
disagree about what justice requires of us,’1105 and religious citizens are 
                                                        
1103 Ibid. 191. 
1104 Ibid. 193. 
1105 Ibid. 179. 
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not unreasonable if they ‘believe, upon the basis of reflection, that political 
liberalism is not the best specification of the value of justice.’1106 I will not 
openly address this objection. However, notice that much of its plausibility 
derives from the clause mentioned above: “if the problem is entirely un-
derstood in terms of obedience to two irreconcilable authorities, establish-
ing two different and equally binding orders of legitimacy.” But Rawls’s 
basic intuition is precisely that reasonable persons agree on the fact that, in 
spite of (1) their reasonable disagreement about matters of religion, phi-
losophy, and so on, (2) they are able to live together within the same order 
of legitimacy (namely, the political legitimacy expressed by a democratic 
constitution) thanks to a common form of reasoning specifying justificato-
ry standard and a shared ideal of political life (namely, a political ideal of 
citizenship). Neal accepts and emphasises the idea of reasonableness under 
(1), that is the fact of reasonable pluralism, but he underrates or overlooks 
the idea of reasonableness entailed by (2), that is fair social cooperation 
under the same politically legitimate institutions. However, since for 
Rawls the idea of reasonableness is specified by both (1) and (2) [remem-
ber Rawls’s definition: reasonable persons both accept the burdens of 
judgement which fall under (1) and are willing to offer and abide by the 
fair terms of social cooperation which fall under (2)], it seems to me that 
Neal and Rawls are not referring to the same notion of reasonableness. 
Thus, the cogency of Neal’s argument seems at least very questionable. If 
we are reasonable in the Rawlsian sense, we cannot accept the idea that, 
when discussing the fundamentals of our constitution, we can substitute to 
our liking political loyalty to the democratic constitutional order with our 
particular religious loyalties. If we do that, we are not reasonable in the 
Rawlsian sense. Then, Neal cannot say that political liberalism is unfair 
                                                        
1106 Ibid. 
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according to its own internal standards.1107 Nor is a critical objection 
against political liberalism the fact that –according to Neal− there is a con-
sistency between comprehensive and political liberalism. This is not, per 
se, a fatal criticism against Rawls’s theory. In fact, political liberalism is 
freestanding from a theoretical and political point of view, and even if 
Rawls worked out political liberalism from within his own comprehensive 
view, this would not be sufficient to prove its unfairness to other compre-
hensive views, as long as they are able to support the political conception 
through an overlapping consensus. One could say that in political liberal-
ism there is a sort of “justificatory outsourcing” with reference to full justi-
fication. It is no longer the job of the political philosopher to vindicate the 
congruence of the right and the good, of the reasonable and the rational, as 
in chapter nine of A Theory of Justice. Rather, each citizen must vindicate 
such congruence within her own comprehensive view. What the political 
                                                        
1107 However, these remarks do not exhaust the range of possible criticisms related to the alleged arbitrariness and un-
fairness of Rawls’s public reason. See for instance Paul F. Campos [“Secular Fundamentalism,” Columbia Law Review 
94, no. 6 (1994), 1814-1827], who argues that the idea of public reason is not only unfair, but also deeply arbitrary and 
authoritarian: he claims that ‘for Rawls “reason” and “reasonable” fill the lexical space that in many other discourses 
would be filled by “God” or “the scriptures,” or “moral insight.” […] That is, “reason” functions as the master concept 
that transcends the enumeration of particular reasons: invoking “reason” becomes equivalent to giving reasons’ (1820-
1821), and that ‘the authoritative (and authoritarian) voice of a public reason that speaks ex cathedra [eliminates] the 
possibility of true conceptual incommensurability and its discursive offspring, interminable moral disagreement. […I]n 
this triumphalist incarnation liberalism can begin to resemble the very dogmatic systems that it once rebelled against’ 
(1825). Similarly, Miriam Galston [“Rawlsian Dualism and the Autonomy of Political Thought,” Columbia Law Review 
94, no. 6 (1994), 1842-1859] argues that Rawls’s political liberalism is not autonomous from his comprehensive view. 
That is, Rawls’s ‘dualism’ that distinguishes between political principles and comprehensive views would in fact reflect 
his particular comprehensive view about the relations between politics and comprehensive doctrines in general. In this 
way, Rawls would unfairly exclude those who hold a different (but in principle equally good) comprehensive view 
about those relations. As Galston puts it, contrary to Rawls’s dualist view (as rooted in his comprehensive beliefs) ‘a 
person’s comprehensive view could contain the belief that political life and institutions should be constructed in a way 
that mirrors, and thus reinforces, his or her theological philosophical, or moral beliefs’ (1851). Galston argues that it 
would be unfair to exclude as unreasonable those persons, because ‘Rawls rejects comprehensive views that presuppose 
single conception of the human good, but himself presupposes a single conception of the relationship between politics 
and the human good’ (1856). The conclusion would be that ‘Rawls unwittingly does injustice to a wide range of signifi-
cant comprehensive views and is thus himself guilty of the kind of coercive, exclusionary use of power that he seeks to 
avoid’ (1858). Likewise, Michael Sandel argues that Rawls cannot assert the priority of political values without refer-
ring to some controversial moral, philosophical, or religious doctrine. He makes the example of abortion and affirms 
that ‘[g]iven the intense disagreement over the moral permissibility of abortion, the case for seeking a political solution 
that brackets the contending moral and religious issues –that is neutral with respect to them− would seem especially 
strong. But whether it is reasonable to bracket, for political purposes, the comprehensive moral and religious doctrines 
at stake largely depends on which of those doctrines is true. If the doctrine of the Catholic Church is true, if human life 
in the relevant moral sense does begin at conception, then bracketing the moral-theological question of when human life 
begins is far less reasonable than it would be on rival moral and religious assumptions. The more confident we are that 
foetuses are, in the relevant moral sense, different from babies, the more confident we can be in affirming a political 
conception of justice that sets aside the controversy about the moral status of foetuses.’ Liberalism and the Limits of 
Justice, second edition (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 197-198, emphases added. 
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philosopher must do, however, is to explain how an overlapping consensus 
is possible and how this consensus is sufficient for the justificatory pur-
poses of the theory.1108 And this is what Rawls does. Let me focus on two 
other versions of this objection. Cristopher Eberle maintains that ‘an obli-
gation to pursue public justification doesn’t imply an obligation to exercise 
restraint.’1109 His central thesis is that citizens have an obligation to pursue 
public justification, but not to refrain from supporting their favoured coer-
cive laws if they are unable to provide such justification.1110 In his words: 
‘so long as a religious citizen sincerely and conscientiously attempts to ar-
ticulate a rationale for his favoured coercive policies that will be convinc-
ing for his compatriots, then he has thereby discharged his obligation to re-
spect them, even if his attempts end in failure.’1111 Then, the duty of civili-
ty merely consists of an ‘ideal of conscientious engagement’1112 that fixes 
some ‘constraints on the reasons [a citizen] employs in political decision 
making and advocacy,’1113 rather than on a restraint requirement. There-
                                                        
1108 For this part, I build on Larry Krasnoff “Consensus, Stability, and Normativity in Rawls’s Political Liberalism,” 
285. Krasnoff says that in A Theory of Justice ‘the problem of stability was addressed by an appeal to a minimal, in-
strumental sense of rationality (assumed to be common to all richer conceptions of rationality) and to certain minimal 
psychological assumptions (most prominently the Aristotelian Principle, assumed to hold of anyone endowed with ra-
tional capacities). In the terms of his later work, it was as if Rawls had searched the various comprehensive doctrines 
for a lowest common denominator of rationality; he then attempted to use this lowest common denominator to prove 
that the reasonable was rational on every comprehensive doctrine. But the guiding thought of the later work, and espe-
cially of the idea of the reasonable, is that this sort of procedure is both unwieldy and unnecessary. It is unwieldy be-
cause it would involve us in an elaborate survey of comprehensive doctrines to determine if our minimal conception of 
rationality was common to them all; and it is unnecessary because the particular comprehensive doctrines, themselves 
exercises of reasons, are perfectly capable of affirming the reasonable in their own terms. So long as these various pri-
vate exercises of reason converge on the same public notion of the reasonable, there is no reason for the normative the-
ory itself to secure the stability of a political conception of justice.’ Emphases added. This is the substance of what I call 
justificatory outsourcing. 
1109 Cristopher J. Eberle, Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics, 70. 
1110 Eberle formulates his thesis in the following terms: ‘a citizen has an obligation sincerely and conscientiously to pur-
sue a widely convincing secular rationale for her favoured coercive laws, but she doesn’t have an obligation to withhold 
support from a coercive law for which she lacks a widely convincing secular rationale.’ Ibid. 10. Emphases modified.  
1111 Ibid. 82. Emphasis added. 
1112 Ibid. 104-108. 
1113 Ibid. 104. Just to give an example of such constraints, according to the ideal of conscientious engagement a citizen 
must ‘pursue public justification for her favoured coercive policies,’ and ‘listen to her compatriots’ evaluation of her 
reasons for her favored coercive policies with the intention of learning from them’ (ibid. 105). 
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fore, what Eberle refuses in justificatory liberalism is not the ‘principle of 
pursuit,’ but the ‘doctrine of restraint:’1114 according to him, then, once the 
ideal of conscientious engagement has been satisfied, a citizen is free to 
support her favourite coercive laws even if she only has religious reasons 
for supporting them.1115 What matters here is that Eberle justifies his re-
fusal of the doctrine of restraint by arguing (among other things) that re-
straint is unduly burdensome for religious citizens and seriously endangers 
their moral integrity.1116 However, the most adamantine formulation of this 
line of criticism is given by Nicholas Wolterstorff. I quote him at length. 
‘(1) It belongs to the religious convictions of a good many religious people 
in our society that they ought to base their decisions concerning fundamen-
tal issues of justice on their religious convictions. They do not view it as 
an option whether or not to do so. It is their conviction that they ought to 
strive for wholeness, integrity, integration, in their lives: that they ought to 
allow the Word of God, the teachings of the Torah, the command and ex-
ample of Jesus, or whatever, to shape their existence as a whole, including, 
then, their social and political existence. Their religion is not, for them, 
about something other than their social and political existence; it is also 
about their social and political existence. Accordingly, to require of them 
that they do not base their decisions and discussions concerning political 
issues on their religion is to infringe, inequitably, on the free exercise of 
their religion. […] (2) The second inequity is a kind of unfairness that per-
                                                        
1114 Ibid. 68-71. 
1115 Note that a not too different perspective is also advocated by Jürgen Habermas within what he defines the ‘public 
square:’ see his “Religion in the Public Square,” European Journal of Philosophy 14, no. 1 (2006), 1-25. According to 
Habermas, a doctrine of restraint (in terms of a ‘translation’ in secular terms) is valid only within public institutions, but 
not within the ‘informal public sphere.’ In fact, Habermas contends that ‘[r]eligious citizens can well recognize the “in-
stitutional translation proviso” without having to split their identity into a public and a private part the moment they par-
ticipate in public discourses. They should therefore be allowed to express and justify their convictions in a religious 
language if they cannot find secular “translations” for them.’ Ibid. 10. 
1116 Cristopher J. Eberle, Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics, for instance 113 and 183. On page 183 Eberle affirms 
that ‘many citizens don’t regard their religious commitments as a set of preferences on the order of a taste for schnapps 
or a desire to live in the suburbs. Rather, they regard themselves as bound to obey a set of overriding and totalizing ob-
ligations imposed on them by the Creator. They regard their failure to discharge those obligations as anathema. If we 
impose on those citizens the expectation that they ought to privatize their religious commitments, we thereby impose on 
them the expectation that they be willing to violate their fundamental commitments.’ Emphases added. 
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tains more to practice than theory. Much if not most of the time we will be 
able to spot religious reasons from a mile away: references to God, to Je-
sus Christ, to the Torah, to the Christian Bible, to the Koran, are unmistak-
ably religious. Typically, however, comprehensive secular perspectives 
will go undetected. How am I to tell whether the utilitarianism or the na-
tionalism of the person who argues his case along utilitarian or nationalist 
lines is or is not part of his comprehensive perspective?’ 1117 Public reason, 
then, would severely endanger the capacity of religious people for achiev-
ing an integrated existence and the fulfilment of their view of the truth (1), 
and it would be unfair because it would disallow religious comprehensive 
views much more easily than non-religious comprehensive perspectives 
(2).  
B2) Novelty1118 or conservatism1119 objection. This objection, as formulat-
ed by Jeremy Waldron, points to the rigidity (or conservatism) and lack of 
novelty that public reason is said to introduce in public political discus-
sions, because of its requirement that citizens rely on reasons that are pub-
lic in the sense of being accepted by all. Rawls says that, according to pub-
lic reason, ‘in making [public] justifications we have to appeal only to 
presently accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning found in com-
mon sense, and the methods and conclusions of science when these are not 
controversial.’1120 Thus, Waldron claims that ‘[w]hat this conception 
seems to rule out is the novel or disconcerting move in political argumen-
tation: the premise that no one has ever thought of before, but which, once 
stated, sounds plausible or interesting. Rawls’s conception seems to as-
sume an inherent limit in the human capacity for imagination and creativi-
                                                        
1117 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues,” 105. I added the nu-
meration. See also his “Why We Should Reject What Liberalism Tells Us about Speaking and Acting in Public for Re-
ligious Reasons,” in Religion and Contemporary Liberalism, for instance 177. 
1118 This label has been used by Lawrence B. Solum, “Novel Public Reasons,” 1460. See infra. 
1119 This alternative label for the objection has been used by Chad Flanders, “The Mutability of Public Reason,” Ratio 
Juris 25, no. 2 (2012), 182. See infra. 
1120 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 224. 
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ty in politics, implying as it does that something counts as a legitimate 
move in public reasoning only to the extent that it latches onto existing 
premises that everybody already shares.’1121 If true, public reason would 
entail a serious risk for a political society: citizens would lose not only an 
important opportunity to become acquainted to the comprehensive views 
of their fellow citizens, but also the opportunity that their own views ‘may 
be improved, in [their] subtlety and depth, by the exposure to a religion or 
a metaphysics that [they are] initially inclined to reject.’1122 The risk is a 
poor and conservative flattening of political discussion. Waldron expresses 
this worry very clearly: ‘I mean to draw attention to an experience we all 
have had at one time or another, of having argued with someone whose 
world view was quite at odds with our own, and of having come away 
thinking, “I’m sure he’s wrong, and I can’t follow much of it, but, still, it 
makes you think…” The prospect of losing that sort of effect in public 
discourse is, frankly, frightening −terrifying, even, if we are to imagine it 
being replaced by a form of “deliberation” that, in the name of “fairness” 
or “reasonableness” (or worse still, “balance”) consists of bland appeals to 
harmless nostrums that are accepted without question on all sides. That is 
to imagine open-ended public debate reduced to the formal trivia of Amer-
ican television networks.’1123 
B3) Citizenship resources impoverishment (or democratic depletion) ob-
jection. Some authors have emphasised the contribution of religious per-
spectives to the quality of liberal citizenship. According to this view, the 
idea of limiting the role that such perspectives play in the public life of our 
societies would be counterproductive if not self-defeating. For instance, 
David Hollenbach contends that ‘[f]or a society to try to exclude such vi-
sions of the good life from public simply because they are identified with 
religion would be to impoverish itself both intellectually and cultural-
                                                        
1121 Waldron, Jeremy. “Religious Contributions in Public Deliberation.” San Diego Law Review 30, no. 4 (1993), 838. 
1122 Ibid. 842. 
1123 Ibid. 
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ly.’1124 Similarly, John Coleman shows the participatory and transforma-
tive civic potential that becomes available to citizens when they are free to 
draw on the moral resources of their religious traditions: in his words, 
‘deprivatizing religion’ means ‘revitalising citizenship’.1125 He joins José 
Casanova, who maintains that ‘religious normative traditions should have 
the same rights as any other normative tradition to enter the public sphere 
as long as they play by the rules of open public debate. Indeed, it is when 
other nonreligious normative traditions have failed, abandoned the public 
sphere, or abdicated their public role that religious normative traditions are 
likely to step in to fill the public vacuum. One after another, all the modern 
public institutions which at first tended to exercise some of the public 
functions traditionally performed by religious institutions abandoned their 
public normative roles: academic philosophy, the specialized social sci-
ences, the universities, the press, politicians, intellectuals. Under such cir-
cumstances one cannot but welcome the return of religion to the naked 
public square.’1126 In the same vein, Paul Weithman argues that ‘churches 
make valuable contributions to American liberal democracy. [… S]ince 
some citizens have realistically available opportunities to participate in 
politics only because their engagement has been facilitated by a religious 
organization […, t]o maintain that citizens should not engage in political 
action solely for religious reasons is to require these citizens to withdraw 
from democratic politics […] To maintain that churches should not be en-
gaged in politics is, in effect, to require that they not facilitate the realized 
citizenship of large numbers of Americans.’1127 
                                                        
1124 David Hollenbach, S.J., “Politically Active Churches: Some Empirical Prolegomena to a Normative Approach,” 
305. 
1125 John A. Coleman, S.J., “Deprivatizing Religion and Revitalizing Citizenship,” in Religion and Contemporary Lib-
eralism, 264-290. 
1126 José Casanova, Public Religion in the Modern World (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 205. Casa-
nova quotes John Richard Neuhaus’s expression ‘the naked public square.’ See his The Naked Public Square: Religion 
and Democracy in America, second edition with a new preface (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1986). 
1127 Paul J. Weithman, Religion and the Obligations of Citizenship, 65. 
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For their preeminent importance and urgency, in the next section I will focus on the first 
objection of each group. That is, with reference to criticisms concerning the alleged inadequa-
cy of public reason, I will consider the incompleteness objection, while, with reference to the 
supposed impairment of democratic citizenship that it would provoke, I will consider the fair-
ness objection. 
Once again, my purpose here is not to offer a full defence of public reason with regard to 
those criticisms: a separate work would barely be sufficient to that task. Clearly, only a fully-
fledged reply to all those criticisms could establish public reason as a normative standard on 
an unquestionably solid ground. Unfortunately, I cannot provide such an argument here. 
However, concerning (a2), I find persuasive James Boettcher’s reply to Micah Lott,1128 and, 
                                                        
1128 James W. Boettcher, “The Moral Status of Public Reason,” 168-171. Boettcher claims that Lott’s argument against 
the restraint requirement fails to show that there is no moral fault when we withdraw from the duty of restraint and in-
stead give priority to different interpretations of the moral duty to respect other persons which conflict with the duty of 
civility expressed by public reason. Even when we are pursuing the value of respect, Boettcher affirms that we are mor-
ally wrong if we do not fulfil the duty of civility, because ‘[r]espect is not simply a political value that needs to be max-
imized up to a certain threshold. Nor is its significance reducible to favourable political consequences such as additional 
trust or civic friendship. Respect is also a normative principle according to which we should properly recognize the 
moral standing and authority of our fellow citizens as entitled to good reasons for our exercise of power over them on 
fundamental political questions.’ Ibid. 169. Thus, the duty of civility is a particularly strong duty, which is not so easily 
overridden. If, nonetheless, we argue (as Lott does) that there are other ways in which we can respect our fellow citi-
zens, one can reply (as Boettcher does) that different forms of respect are not directed to citizens qua citizens, since on-
ly ‘requirements of public reason are internally connected to respect for the rights of others. Public reason should gov-
ern the very process through which citizens together work through their disagreement about how an abstract system of 
basic rights unfolds and takes shape in law and policy.’ Ibid. 170, emphasis added. [Of course, there is another, less 
principled argument, against Lott’s claims: if we say that in disrespecting someone we are respecting her in some other 
(unspecified) way, we are implicitly justifying ‘any single rights violation or other form of disrespect, such as racial in-
sensitivity or prejudice, by observing that the offending citizen respects his or her compatriots in a host of other ways,’ 
ibid.]. In conclusion, ‘citizens usually have good reason to exercise restraint in the circumstances where the idea of pub-
lic reason applies. Thus their failure to do so usually warrants moral criticism.’ Ibid. However, Boettcher recognises 
that Lott rightly emphasises the fact that one’s failure to comply with the duty of civility and its restraint requirement ‘is 
more understandable when citizens are motivated by what they take to be compelling moral grounds, like the duty to 
protect the innocent from harm.’ Ibid. Thus, it would be perfectly conceivable that other citizens ‘may sometimes decide 
to tolerate [these failures] by withholding strong moral criticism or condemnation of their compatriots.’ Ibid. 171. 
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concerning (b2), the replies of Lawrence Solum and Chad Flanders to Jeremy Waldron.1129 
Furthermore, luckily such an unquestionable a priori foundation of public reason is by no 
                                                        
1129 Lawrence B. Solum, “Novel Public Reasons.” To simplify Solum’s articulated reply to Waldron (see ibid. 1476ff), 
his most important argument against Waldron’s thesis is that public reason does not requires previous universal ac-
ceptance of the justificatory reasons, but their availability. Thus the ‘criterion for public reason is not universal prior 
acceptance. Rather, public reasons are those that could be widely shared by those who considered them, and these can 
be as novel as one likes.’ Ibid. 1477. Moreover, unanimity is not required: we aim neither for actual universal ac-
ceptance, nor for universal availability. What is required is wide availability. What matters is availability eventually 
leading to ‘wide agreement among reasonable persons.’ Ibid. 1476 and 1477-1478. This obviously allows new reasons 
and premises which are not already universally shared. What matters is that such reasons and premises could be shared 
(that is, they are available) to reasonable persons. Chad Flanders (“The Mutability of Public Reason,” 186-188) con-
tends that Solum’s reply to the novelty objection is unsatisfactory. He claims that Solum’s availability criterion ‘risks 
not only expanding the content of public reasons, but also eliminating any restrictions on it.’ Ibid. 186. If we say (as So-
lum does) that we should admit any reason ‘that could be widely shared by those who consider’ it, we risk being 
obliged to admit reasons derived from comprehensive doctrines. In fact, ‘those who argue that they should be able to 
assert premises based on their comprehensive doctrines will make precisely the same claim: they will say that although 
their arguments are not currently accepted, they may one day be, and so they remain available.’ Ibid. For example, even 
if others do not accept my religious arguments today, why should it be in principle excluded that they can come to ac-
cept them one day, when those arguments are considered as they deserve? Maybe others will convert to my religion in 
the future. If so, those arguments remains available today (because they could be accepted) and they must be admitted 
in public political debate. Thus, Flanders argues that to be coherent with the restraint of public reason, we must interpret 
availability in a more limited way. Instead of saying that those reasons and arguments that ‘could be accepted if consid-
ered’ are available, one could say that only those reasons and arguments that are ‘accepted but not known to be accept-
ed’ are available, ibid. 188 (after all, in Political Liberalism Rawls refers to ‘presently accepted general beliefs and 
forms of reasoning found in common sense, and the method and conclusions of science when these are not controver-
sial,’ 224). Thus, in a more modest sense, available reasons would consist in those ‘beliefs which are available to us as 
premises in our reasoning because they are obvious or not at all controversial’ (Chad Flanders, “The Mutability of Pub-
lic Reason,” 187). But if this is so, the problem of novel reasons is unsolved, because we cannot introduce in public po-
litical debate properly new arguments. According to Flanders, the introduction of the proviso also represents an unsatis-
factory answer to the objection from conservatism: if we present a new reason from our comprehensive doctrine, in or-
der to satisfy the proviso we must also present a properly public reason (i.e., a reason available in the previous sense) to 
support it. Then ‘the putatively novel reason was not all that “novel.” One was simply phrasing in a different way a 
claim that could easily have been made in terms of public reason alone. Asserting one’s comprehensive justification 
might have an expressive function, but it would not be doing any real justificatory work.’ Ibid. 190. Therefore, Flanders 
suggests looking for the solution of this problem in the historical and mutable nature of public reason itself. Not only 
does public reason change over time, so that ‘[w]hat may not yet be legitimate as a public reason now […] may be legit-
imate in the future –should our ideal of public reason be made actual’ (ibid. 196), but also ‘changes in background cul-
ture eventually lead to changes in public reason itself’ (ibid. 203). Thus ‘the reasons available to the “public” at any 
time will be constantly in flux.’ Ibid. For this reason, he claims that we should not draw a stark line between public rea-
son and background culture. Flanders’s conclusion is that ‘public reason can change and has changed through shifts in 
what is widely accepted by the public at large. These shifts happen not through public reason itself, but through some-
times slow and sometimes sudden alterations in the background culture.’ Ibid. 204. Now I do think that both Solum and 
Flanders’s arguments present interesting elements for building a criticism of the novelty objection (something that I do 
not attempt to do here). Flanders rightly points out that public reason is dynamic and open to changes and that the back-
ground culture is a vital incubator for those changes. I will consider a similar point concerning the changing nature of 
public reason in discussing the charge of inconclusiveness. However, I think that Flanders exaggerates the inadequacy 
of both Solum’s reply and of the proviso to solve the problem of conservatism. First, in the next section I will show that 
in my interpretation of the proviso the introduction of (novel) comprehensive reasons may do a ‘real justificatory work,’ 
provided that the fundamental criterion of reciprocity (as the deepest foundation of the duty of civility) is not violated. 
Second, a sympathetic reading of Solum’s article cannot miss the moral significance that he confers to the notion of 
availability. As mentioned, he maintains that ‘the criterion for public reason is availability to the public at large’ (“Nov-
el Public Reasons,” 1463), but after a while he also stresses the relevance of the criterion of reciprocity by saying that 
‘[w]hile the duty of civility requires citizens to offer public reasons, it does not itself require abstention from the disclo-
sure of nonpublic reasons that play a foundational or supporting role in either political deliberation or public political 
debate. Moreover, the giving of nonpublic reasons, which –while not shared− are the foundations of public reasons –
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means necessary. I do think that if I am able to show that my account of public reason seri-
ously undermines the plausibility and power of the two most troubling objections to public 
reason, then the appeal of that account is greatly strengthened. An account of public reason 
can gain credibility “on the field,” that is, thanks to its capacity to work effectively, while at 
the same time showing that, with regard to the unsettled questions, the burden of proof falls 
on its critics. 
 
4.2 A Reinterpretation of the Proviso (and a Reply to Critics). 
 
In this section, I present my interpretation of the wide view of public reason. I try to com-
bine and make consistent two positions usually thought to be in contrast; namely, a strong 
commitment to the moral foundation of public reason (what I will call the “reciprocity of the 
reasonable,” infra) and a more inclusive stance toward the role of religious convictions in pol-
itics.  
In 2.2.b, I defined the proviso as a “general threshold for public reasoning.” In this section, 
that basic intuition will become clearer. The idea that a more appropriate interpretation of the 
proviso can specify an ultimate bottom line is crucial for my purposes: the proviso defines a 
threshold (or minimal standard) for the evaluation carried out in this research. In fact, one 
may argue that the proviso establishes a threshold of liberal toleration. As I will explain over 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
which are shared− may foster mutual civility and tolerance. I may see that you and I agree about fundamental public 
values but disagree about the moral foundations of those values. Despite my unwillingness to accept them as true, I may 
nevertheless come to see your fundamental views as reasonable’ [ibid. 1466]. If we link Solum’s presentation of availa-
ble reasons as those reasons ‘that could be widely shared by those who considered them’ with his above-mentioned 
considerations about reciprocity, we could say that he endorses neither the ‘too expansive’ nor the too ‘modest’ concep-
tion of availability which Flanders pinpoints. To be fair, Flanders underscores the fact that Solum’s availability re-
sponse is connected to Rawls’s criterion of reciprocity (“The Mutability of Public Reason,” 188). But he says that pre-
cisely for this reason availability is not able to solve the dilemma (as mentioned, either availability would give too 
much space to comprehensive doctrines because people who assert them are deeply persuaded that others, on due con-
sideration, could accept them or availability would confine public reasoning to arguments and reasons that are so un-
controversial that most people already accept them or would accept them if they knew them). On the contrary, I think 
that we could use (and my interpretation of the proviso does use) the criterion of reciprocity as a moral political thresh-
old in order to identify those reasons that, while not shared, do not violate political reciprocity and thus are “available” 
to others in a very general but still morally meaningful way. My understanding of the proviso does not require availabil-
ity in the sense of providing a straightforward public reason. However, it does still require some connection between 
non-public reasons and public reason. I will explore this issue in detail in the next section. I conclude this long excursus 
by emphasising that, if I am right on these points, Flanders emphasis on the mutability of public reason (not only for its 
internal dynamics, but also for the relevance of the background culture), a certain interpretation of Solum’s argument 
from availability, and the proviso are not conflicting answers to the objection from conservativism. 
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the course of the following pages, such a threshold can be found in the criterion of reciprocity, 
which expresses the moral-political core of public reason worked out from the public political 
culture of a constitutional democracy. For the sake of clarity, remember how Rawls formu-
lates the triadic relation that ties together public political culture, reciprocity, and public rea-
son with its proviso (for the explanation of such a relation, see 3.2.b.2):  
‘The ideal [of public reason] is that citizens are to conduct their public political 
discussions of constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice within the 
framework of what each sincerely regards as a reasonable political conception of 
justice, a conception that expresses political values that others as free and equal 
also might reasonably be expected to endorse. Thus each of us must have princi-
ples and guidelines to which we appeal in such a way that the criterion of reci-
procity is satisfied.’1130 
Remember that to express those political values we must ‘start by looking to the public po-
litical culture itself as a shared fund of implicitly recognized basic ideas and principles.’1131 
To put it concisely, I understand this triadic relation between public political culture, reciproc-
ity, and public reason as the foundation of Rawls’s liberal meta-theory of toleration and legit-
imacy. Reciprocity is the moral core of such meta-theory, and the proviso –as its minimal 
threshold− embodies its most salient requirements. To break this relation means rejecting the 
liberal account of toleration and legitimacy: then, we fall in a difficult case of severe non-
compliance with the duty of civility. However, I cannot deal with such cases until I have spec-
ified that duty in some depth. This is my purpose in what follows. 
Following Paul Weithman, a fundamental insight of this section is that the wide view of 
public reason is a crucial element for stability for the right reasons to materialise and that the 
proviso1132 is the mechanism through which the mutual assurance problem can be solved. The 
                                                        
1130 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, xlviii-xlix. Emphases added. 
1131 Ibid. 8. 
1132 Recall: ‘reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, may be introduced in public political dis-
cussion at any time, provided that in due course proper political reasons –and not reasons given solely by comprehen-
sive doctrines− are presented that are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to 
support.’ John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 462, emphasis added. 
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mutual assurance problem is connected to a ‘generalised prisoner’s dilemma’1133 that Rawls 
has to face in his account of stability for the right reasons. Remember that stability for the 
right reasons is not mere institutional stability, as we have seen. Rather, it is the moral kind of 
stability that characterises a society in which fair terms of social cooperation are freely af-
firmed by all (or a substantial number of) citizens. Why is it so difficult to reach this kind of 
stability according to Weithman? And why did it lead Rawls to adopt the wide view of public 
reason and its proviso? I try to reconstruct Weithman’s complex argument in few words. Hav-
ing shown that the conception of justice is politically (pro tanto) justified, Rawls is confront-
ed by the fact that:  
‘[I]n addition to having a sense of justice, each citizen has a conception of her 
own good. That each citizen has such a conception opens the possibility that she 
will think honoring the terms of cooperation […] is not good for her. Thus [1] 
terms that are collectively rational might not be individually rational. And so the 
rational thing for each individual to do may be to defect from terms of coopera-
tion. And [2] if each thinks others will defect, then each will think it rational to 
defect preemptively, so that society is not regulated by terms of cooperation.’1134 
Therefore, to avert the threat of instability Rawls must: (1) solve the problem of defection 
by showing that it is in the interest of each individual to cooperate on fair terms (i.e., Rawls 
must solve the generalised prisoner’s dilemma) and (2) make publicly known the fact that the 
problem of defection has been solved, so that the problem of preemptive defection can also be 
averted. This latter is the core of the problem of mutual assurance: nobody will be tempted to 
defect preemptively on the sole condition that everybody knows (or thinks) that nobody will 
defect. Thus, this knowledge must be public. Here I focus exclusively on how Rawls answers 
to this double challenge to stability in Political Liberalism (I do not consider the account of 
the question of stability in A Theory of Justice).1135 Rawls solves the problem of defection (1) 
                                                        
1133 See in particular John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 269-270/237-238, 336/295-296, and 577/505. On page 577/505 
we read: ‘[t]he hazards of the generalized prisoner’s dilemma are removed by the match between the right and the 
good.’ This remarks anticipates the role played by the idea of an overlapping consensus in Political Liberalism (infra). 
1134 Paul Weithman, “Inclusivism, Stability, and Assurance,” 83. Numbers added. 
1135 A detailed analysis of the differences between A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism on the issue of stability 
can be found in Paul Weithman’s book Why Political Liberalism? Other bibliographic references about this point are 
mentioned in a previous footnote in section 3.2.a. 
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by showing that the political conception can be the focus of an overlapping consensus in 
which each person can find a form of congruence between her conception of the good and the 
political conception (i.e., in the overlapping consensus each person fully justifies the concep-
tion of justice). In this way, Rawls tries to demonstrate that cooperation rather than defection 
is in the interest of each individual. However, ‘the individual rationality of compliance is not 
enough. If preemptive defection is to be avoided, the fact that each citizen recognizes the indi-
vidual rationality of compliance must itself be a matter of public knowledge. In sum, each 
must have some assurance that others accept the terms of cooperation and will not defect.’1136 
In fact, the overlapping consensus alone is not enough to solve the problem of stability for the 
right reasons, because we can rationally accept to view the terms of social cooperation as 
binding us only insofar as we know that others do (and will continue to do) the same. If we 
are not sure about others’ commitment to the fair terms of social cooperation, then we may 
come to think that preemptive defection is our best reply to others’ strategic choices. 
‘[W]hen an overlapping consensus obtains, each person’s payoff table has the 
following structure: the payoffs are such that it is rational for a person to honor 
the terms of cooperation and treat the political conception of justice as authorita-
tive only when she has the assurance that all others, or a sufficient number of oth-
ers, also adhere to the terms and treat the conception as authoritative.’1137 
How to solve the assurance problem then? The basic idea is that at least on some occasions 
we need the assurance of others’ allegiance to the terms of social cooperation specified by the 
liberal political conception (our ‘common point of view’),1138 and that assurance is provided 
by relying on common shared (i.e., public) reasons.1139 Does this mean that we should always 
base political discussion exclusively on public reasons? In other words, does this mean that 
we should adopt an exclusive view of public reason? The answer is no. As we have seen in 
4.1.a, in some circumstances (for instance in the case of public support for church schools 
                                                        
1136 Paul Weithman, “Inclusivism, Stability, and Assurance,” 83. Emphases added. 
1137 Ibid. 85-86. Emphasis added. 
1138 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 5/4. 
1139 ‘What citizens know about one another’s commitment to the authority of a conception of justice depends, in part, 
upon what concepts and methods of reasoning they actually use when they argue about basic political questions. That, I 
believe, is why Rawls introduces guidelines of public reason –to provide a solution to the assurance problem.’ Paul 
Weithman, “Inclusivism, Stability, and Assurance,” 86. 
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mentioned above) stability for the right reasons may be actually best served by disclosing the 
deep roots of one’s commitment to the social order established by the political conception of 
justice: in this way each citizen can come to know that all other citizens are part of an over-
lapping consensus. In doing so citizens strengthen, rather than undermine, civic friendship 
and stability. The idea is simple: if you introduce in public political discussion of fundamental 
political questions your religious (or philosophical or moral) reasons in a spirit of compliance 
with the ideal of public reason (infra), ‘I may see that you and I agree about fundamental pub-
lic values but disagree about the moral foundations of those values. Despite my unwillingness 
to accept them as true, I may nevertheless come to see your fundamental views as reasona-
ble.’1140 This in turn strengthens civic friendship and mutual confidence. This is why Rawls 
rejects the exclusive view of public reason in favour of the inclusive view and, later, why he 
shifts from the inclusive to the wide view of public reason (see 4.1.a for the explanation of 
such a shift).1141 In this way, he allows the widest possible space for the positive convergent 
contribution of religious voices (in terms of disclosing one’s deep allegiance to the ‘common 
point of view’ via an overlapping consensus), while at the same time keeping intact a com-
mon mechanism for mutual assurance. To employ an admittedly inelegant metaphor, the latter 
works like a pressure cooker safety valve: as I will explain, the proviso brings some degree of 
flexibility that permits the correct balance between convergence of non-public reasons and 
consensus on properly public reasons to be found each time (or at least on the majority of oc-
casions), as is necessary to solve the problem of stability for the right reasons. In effect, the 
expression ‘in due course’1142 is (intentionally?) ambiguous and opens the door to different 
readings. For instance, Paul Weithman interprets the proviso in these terms:  
‘Rawls allows ordinary citizens to rely on their comprehensive doctrines with-
out adducing public reasons in support of their positions, so long as their doing so 
does not lead others to doubt that they acknowledge the authority of the public 
conception of justice. If doubts never arise, then the proviso is never triggered 
[…] Only if doubts arise, and others need assurance of their allegiance, must citi-
                                                        
1140 Lawrence B. Solum, “Novel Public Reasons,” 1466. 
1141 For Weithman’s explanation of why and how Rawls refuses the (at first glance attractive) exclusive view in favour 
of the inclusive and –later− the wide view, see “Inclusivism, Stability, and Assurance,” 86-88. 
1142 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 462. 
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zens provide assurance by actually adopting and reasoning from the “unified per-
spective” the public conception of justice provides.’1143 
Elsewhere, he maintains that: 
‘[T]he motivation for the proviso is not the conviction that religion destabilizes 
society or that it leads to civil strife. It is the fact that a person’s reliance on reli-
gious argument can lead her interlocutors to doubt whether she acknowledges the 
political authority of justice as fairness. Rawls could have required citizens to as-
sure one another of their commitments by requiring them to comply with more re-
strictive guidelines of public reason than those associated with the wide view. He 
could, for instance, have argued that citizens must preempt others’ doubts about 
their acceptance of the political conception. In that case, he might have replaced 
the phrase “in due course” in the proviso with the phrase “at the same time.” In-
stead, the proviso requires citizens to adopt and deliberate in their “common point 
of view” only when they have good reason to think assurance is actually needed. 
In defending it, Rawls advocates what is, by construction, the weakest and least 
restrictive guideline sufficient to solve the mutual assurance problem [emphasis 
added].’1144 
Thus, for Weithman the wide view solves the problem of mutual assurance because it 
makes room for religious reasons and turns their introduction in public political discussion in-
to a source of stability (citizens may say to each other: “Oh, now I can see what your deep 
conviction about our reciprocal political standing is!”), while at the same time it sets up a 
shared mechanism (the proviso) for giving one another assurance of one’s allegiance to (a 
member of the family of) the political conception(s) of justice when needed. As Weithman 
observes, this also seems to explain Rawls’s caveat: ‘details about how to satisfy this proviso 
must be worked out in practice and cannot feasibly be governed by a clear family of rules 
                                                        
1143 Paul Weithman, “Inclusivism, Stability, and Assurance,” 88-89. Emphases added. See also Why Political Liberal-
ism?, 330-331. 
1144 Paul Weithman, Why Political Liberalism?, 331. 
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given in advance. How they work out is determined by the nature of the public political cul-
ture and calls for good sense and understanding.’1145 
I fundamentally agree with Weithman on the fact that the wide view of public reason is re-
quired to solve the assurance problem and so to secure stability for the right reasons. I also 
agree with him (and with Rawls) that public reason can work effectively in that direction only 
if it is understood widely and its proviso is interpreted as the ‘least restrictive guideline suffi-
cient to solve the mutual assurance problem.’1146 Indeed, Rawls rejects the exclusive view 
and, later, the inclusive view precisely because they are not always the best options for solv-
ing the assurance problem and securing stability for the right reasons. I call my interpretation 
of the proviso “extensive”, since it does not always require a direct and strict link between the 
non-public reasons appealed to in public debate and a public reason. However, as I will ex-
plain presently, I think that the best way to work out that extensive interpretation of the provi-
so is to reconsider the duty of civility and its foundations. This brings us back to what I have 
said before: depending on the circumstances, stability for the right reasons may require a flex-
ible balance of consensual shared public reasons and of convergent non-public reasons. In ef-
fect, Weithman’s interpretation of the proviso also seems to be based on a similar considera-
tion: the proviso is the “safety” mechanism which is triggered ‘only if doubts arise’ about 
one’s allegiance to the public conception. Only in those cases should a consensual view based 
on public reasons prevail. In other cases, when doubts do not arise, a convergence of non-
public reasons in the justification of political decisions, policies, and laws on fundamental po-
litical questions is enough for securing stability for the right reasons. Moreover, sometimes 
such convergence may be even better in terms of stability than the search for a consensus ex-
clusively on properly public reasons, as the example of public funding to religious schools 
shows. However, as Weithman acknowledges, it is difficult −maybe too difficult− to know in 
advance ‘what counts as an expression of doubt.’ 1147 Most importantly, if we never appeal to 
public reasons, it is very likely that doubts about our allegiance to the public conception of 
justice will arise and become more and more numerous, so that, in the end, we are left with 
the only viable option: to appeal to properly public reasons in order to satisfy the proviso and 
                                                        
1145 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 462-463. 
1146 Paul Weithman, Why Political Liberalism?, 331, quoted above. 
1147 Paul Weithman, “Inclusivism, Stability, and Assurance,” 89. 
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solve the mutual assurance problem. I am not suggesting that this result is an undesirable one. 
Simply, my claim is that perhaps taking others’ doubts as the critical threshold for triggering 
the proviso is not the best strategy to fully understand the significance of the proviso itself. 
Indeed, it is not implausible to imagine a paradoxical situation in which, as we are increasing-
ly more confident (for whatever reason) that the others do not doubt our allegiance to the pub-
lic conception of justice, and –consequently− as we offer less and less genuine public reasons, 
with the passing of time it becomes more and more likely that the others will come to doubt 
our allegiance. The more the problem of mutual assurance is attenuated, the more it becomes 
intense and acute. Maybe it would be wiser to clarify from the beginning a different way in 
which the proviso may be fulfilled. In my understanding, the respect of the duty of civility 
(and not simply others’ doubts) is the cornerstone for evaluating the satisfaction of the provi-
so. In fact, my account of the proviso differs from Weithman’s conception more in its presen-
tation than in its practical functioning. However, my presentation of the proviso is aimed at 
avoiding the circularity of ending up with having to present public reasons in any case in or-
der to solve the mutual assurance problem. I think that Weithman’s account of the proviso 
shares this goal. However, I believe that it is not clear on this point, because, as I have just 
explained, one might read Weithman’s proviso as implying this kind of circularity: you do not 
have to offer public reasons if other citizens have no doubts about your willingness to main-
tain your sense of justice and abide by fair terms of social cooperation, but the more you ap-
peal to non-public reasons, the more others are likely to doubt, therefore you have to appeal 
to public reasons finally. On the contrary, the “bifurcate model” of the duty of civility pre-
sented here (infra) determines from the very beginning the criterion for dispelling others’ 
doubts about one’s allegiance to the public conception of justice: the criterion of “reciprocity 
of the reasonable” (infra). In doing so, it shows that, as long as that criterion is satisfied, we 
do not have to appeal to public reasons in order to solve the mutual assurance problem be-
cause doubts about our loyalty should not arise. In this way, the risk of circularity is averted. 
I propose then a bifurcate model for the duty of civility, that is, a two-level conception of 
that duty. I assume that a direct appeal to public reasons is the most straightforward way to 
assure one’s allegiance to the public conception of political justice and to show respect for 
other fellow citizens as free equals reciprocally engaged in social cooperation based on fair 
terms publicly endorsed. Thus, I call the direct appeal to public reasons the “first level duty of 
civility.” It is evident, then, that my interpretation of the wide view starts with a consensual 
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premise. However, it does not stop there. The main idea is that if it is not possible to success-
fully use the consensual mode of public reasoning by directly appealing to shared political 
values and methods of reasoning (‘presently accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning 
found in common sense, and the method and conclusions of science when these are not con-
troversial’),1148 it is nonetheless possible to climb down one level toward some degree of con-
vergence, taking advantage of the flexibility introduced by Rawls’s proviso. The bottom line, 
however, is represented by the criterion of political reciprocity (as mentioned, I will call it 
reciprocity of the reasonable), understood as a qualified form of respect: that is, as the respect 
which free and equal persons owe each other as fellow citizens cooperating on fair terms. I 
will return to this conception of reciprocity in the following pages. Here, I must be clear on 
one point: at the end, also at the second level there must be some connection with a properly 
public reason. However, this connection may be quite indirect. First, if the connection of a 
non-public reason with a public reason is clear enough to everyone else, one does not need to 
mention explicitly that public reason. Here, I come close to Weithman’s interpretation of the 
proviso. Second, the connection may be not with a public reason, but with the spirit of politi-
cal reciprocity and civic friendship that represents the rationale and the deep moral grounding 
of any public reason as such. Thus, with reference to the second level of the duty of civility, I 
have in mind two particular ways for satisfying the proviso. Let me summarise my two-level 
model as follows: 
A. First level of the duty of civility: one appeals to public reasons alone as justificatory 
reasons. The justificatory pool is composed exclusively of genuine public reasons. 
In supporting a law or policy, in the end ideally all have the same conclusive public 
reasons (in a strong consensual view)1149 or different −but always public and thus 
shareable even though not shared− conclusive reasons (in a weak consensual 
view1150 or public-convergence view). Thus, citizen X satisfies the duty of civility 
                                                        
1148 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 224. 
1149 Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, 264. 
1150 Ibid. Quong endorses a weak consensus view (ibid. 273). Here, with reference to the consensual level of the duty of 
civility (A), I do not analyse the differences between a strong consensual view and a weak consensual (or public-
convergent) view. However, since the weak consensual view is more flexible but at the same time it is still consensual 
(it says that we may hold different public reasons), it seems that the weak consensual model represents a reasonable in-
terpretation of the first level of the duty of civility. Also Rawls seems to endorse this model (ibid.). 
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of the first level if she supports the law L by appealing exclusively to a public rea-
son R. 
B. Second level of the duty of civility. (For simplicity in the following lines I will talk 
exclusively of religious non-public reasons, but the same reasoning applies to com-
prehensive views that are not religious). I argue that a citizen of faith who wants to 
introduce a religious reason in public political discussion of fundamental political 
questions –that is, within the scope of public reason as defined in chapter three− 
can fulfil the proviso in one of these two ways: 
B1) The citizen of faith satisfies the proviso if her religious reason supports 
(or is supported by) a public reason. As I will explain, in this way she clearly 
and unambiguously supports the criterion of reciprocity. This possibility re-
flects Rawls’s formulation of the proviso (‘provided that in due course proper 
political reasons […] are presented that are sufficient to support whatever the 
comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to support’).1151 As I have said, 
building on Weithman’s interpretation of the proviso, I do think that, if the 
connection between the non-public reason and a public reason or a political 
value is clear enough in the eyes of other fellow citizens, there is no evident 
reason to exclude the former from the justificatory pool of the relevant justifi-
catory reasons just because the person who appeals to that non-public reason 
does not present the related public reason contextually and/or explicitly. In 
other words, if the supportive relation between the non-public reason at hand 
and a public reason is strong and evident enough in the eyes of other liberal 
citizens, that non-public reason must be counted as relevant for public justifi-
cation also if the person who appeals to it does not also directly appeal to the 
public reason related to that non-public reason. Otherwise, one could not un-
derstand Rawls’s annotation that ‘whether [or not] the Abolitionists and King 
thought of themselves as fulfilling the purpose of the proviso […], they could 
have,’1152 because in any case they ‘supported basic constitutional values,’1153 
                                                        
1151 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 462. 
1152 Ibid. 464, note 54. Emphases added. 
  
 European Muslims and Liberal Citizenship 
Ph.D. Thesis successfully discussed on April 21, 2016.  
The total or partial use of the Ph.D. Thesis is subject to copyright restrictions. 
 
  
357  
 Giovanni Vezzani 
 
LUISS-ULB 
even when those values were not explicitly invoked. For instance, imagine a 
citizen of faith who supports a law according to which the state must subsi-
dise the construction of new multifaith or separate prayer rooms in hospitals 
when the already existing religious facilities are markedly mono-
confessional. Imagine that in supporting such a law the citizen appeals to a re-
ligion-based duty of respect for others’ religious choices, for instance, a duty 
based on the argument that God calls to believe freely and without compul-
sion, so people of different faiths must be free to worship their own God. 
Clearly, this does not amount to a relativistic view: from the perspective of 
the citizen of faith, there is only one true religion and she probably whole-
heartedly hopes that, one day, citizens of other faiths will finally come to 
know the true God (i.e., her God). It is precisely because she has that reli-
gious rationale (i.e., that acceptance of the true religion must be based on sin-
cere and spontaneous belief, because religious belonging without religious 
sentiment would amount to nothing but hypocrisy or mere habit) that she ac-
cepts that others may worship their Gods. This religious reason is not only 
consistent with, but also supportive of a public reason that upholds the law 
mentioned above on the basis of freedom of worship and the responsibility of 
the state to provide the minimal conditions necessary for the equal exercise of 
that freedom. Without any doubt, whether or not that supportive relation is 
made explicit by the citizen of faith, other citizens will be able to recognise it 
on reflection. This is so because reciprocity is affirmed by both kinds of rea-
sons: the religious reason expresses a comprehensive understanding of reci-
procity (equal freedom for all God’s creatures to know and exalt their Creator 
on the basis of sincere conviction), whilst the public reason expresses a polit-
ical understanding of reciprocity (equal freedom of worship for all citizens as 
a public political value). The crucial point is that the religious understanding 
of reciprocity overlaps with –supports− the political understanding of reci-
procity: politically what matters is that the former permits the endorsement of 
freedom of worship as affirmed by the latter. Formally, citizen X satisfies the 
second level duty of civility if she advocates L by invoking the non-public 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
1153 Ibid. 464. 
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reason P which (explicitly or implicitly but recognisably) supports a public 
reason R. To be sure, the phrases “implicitly but recognisably” and “clear 
enough in the eyes of other fellow citizens” are admittedly vague. How can 
we know that a non-public reason that we are presenting to our fellow citi-
zens can be clearly recognised as supportive of a public reason or a political 
value? I cannot consider this important issue and its epistemic implications 
here. Seemingly, we run into the same difficulties raised by Weithman’s con-
ception of the proviso focused on others’ doubts about our allegiance to the 
political conception of justice: it is difficult to foresee in advance ‘what 
counts as an expression of doubt,’1154 likewise it is difficult to know in ad-
vance whether a non-public reason is “clearly” linked to a public reason in 
the eyes of other fellow citizens. However, as I have mentioned, I do believe 
that the approach presented in this research has an important advantage in 
comparison with Weithman’s view. Here I anchor the fulfilment of the provi-
so to the satisfaction of the duty of civility and I consider reciprocity (what I 
will call the criterion of reciprocity of the reasonable, infra) as the moral-
political foundation of that duty and as the crucial threshold for the proviso. 
Shifting the focus from others’ doubts to the criterion of reciprocity of the 
reasonable and citizens’ respect of the duty of civility allows the proviso to be 
interpreted in a more straightforward and less circular way. Here I am inter-
ested in the moral-political side of the issue and I believe that this reading is 
close to the core of Rawls’s presentation of the wide view. In particular, the 
example of King reveals Rawls’s faith in citizens’ capability to recognise the 
supportive connections between public and non-public reasons, even when 
such connections are only implicit. Obviously, such a capability requires a 
moral political effort. For this reason, he appeals to citizens’ practical wis-
dom, good sense, and understanding.1155 This point simply shows that it is not 
always a simple, unproblematic, and spontaneous matter to know how to 
comply with public reason: as I have said, there is no “vademecum” for liber-
al citizenship. Contrary to what some of the criticisms that I have considered 
                                                        
1154 Paul Weithman, “Inclusivism, Stability, and Assurance,” 89. 
1155 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 462-463. 
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above seem to imply, public reason entails much more debate, discussion, and 
critical reflexion than is usually thought.  
B2) However, there is a more indirect way in which the proviso can be satis-
fied. Imagine that the citizen of faith mentioned above is now supporting the 
same law (L) for state funding of new prayer rooms in hospitals, but based on 
a different religious reason: say, that even in matters of faith ‘God does not 
love those who overstep the limits,’1156 and that denying religious comfort to 
dying people is surely an excess. Now, this religious reason is reasonable for 
political purposes. There is no refusal of political reciprocity (the citizen in-
volved may think that it is not a good thing for dying people to find comfort 
in a false God, but she finally allows them the freedom to choose for them-
selves). Still, that religious reason is not directly connected with the public 
reason mentioned above, namely, freedom of worship (which, for the sake of 
simplicity, I assume to be the only relevant public reason at hand). Her reli-
gious reason is neither in conflict with nor directly supportive of freedom of 
worship: instead, it is independent from that public reason. Indeed, between 
God’s prohibition of overstepping the limits in affirming one’s own faith and 
freedom of worship (at least as we usually understand it) there may be a link, 
but certainly not a direct one as in the previous case. However, the effects of 
invoking this religious reason are perfectly reasonable, since it advocates for 
a law which affirms the freedom and equality of citizens in realising their 
moral powers. The problem is that citizens’ freedom and equality are not pre-
sent in the reason invoked itself: the latter is not a public reason. Nor is the 
reason invoked directly linked to a public reason: in fact, in contrast to the 
case analysed in the previous point (B1), the reason appealed to is independ-
ent from what is, by assumption, the only relevant public reason at hand. Still, 
the affirmation of citizens’ freedom and equality (indirectly) results from the 
fact that the religious citizen has appealed to that non-public reason. Can we 
count that non-public reason (call it P2) in the justificatory pool and consider 
it as consistent with the proviso? Now, we may imagine different possibili-
                                                        
1156 Qur’an, 2:191. 
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ties. First, we may find that citizen X also presents a public reason R (i.e., X 
affirms both the non-public reason P2 and the public reason R referring to 
freedom of worship, which is by assumption the only available public rea-
son). This case would collapse in the first class analysed under letter A, be-
cause in this scenario what matters in terms of public justification is that there 
is a straightforward public reason R, even though the two reasons R and P2 
are presented in parallel. Second, we may imagine that citizen X also endors-
es another religious reason (P) which –explicitly or implicitly but beyond any 
reasonable doubt− supports a public reason (R). This case would collapse in 
the second class analysed under letter B1, where the non-public reason P 
supports the public reason R. Also in this case P2 would have no bearing on 
its own in the public justification of L, because all the justificatory work 
would be done by the supportive relation between P and R. In the first two 
cases, then, P2 is simply neglected as a justificatory reason and it remains in 
the background: it has no specific role to play in the public justification of L 
because it is possible to bypass it by resorting to a properly public reason or 
to a non-public reason that supports (or is supported by) a properly public 
reason. There is however, a third scenario. X may invoke exclusively P2, 
which is −by construction− independent from the only relevant properly pub-
lic reason R. Should we reject P2 −which, after all, brings about results which 
are consistent with political reciprocity and which may strengthen civic 
friendship− just because it is not directly supported by any public reason? My 
answer is negative, but it is also contingent upon a crucial assumption. The 
assumption is that those positive effects in terms of affirmation of the spirit of 
reciprocity are not merely fortuitous. Instead, they must represent the ground 
on which citizen X presents her religious reason (which, in the case under 
scrutiny, is her only justificatory reason). That is, if she appeals to this reli-
gious reason out of a sincere disposition to enhance political reciprocity and 
civic friendship,1157 her religious reason P2 meets the requirements for satis-
fying the proviso. As I will explain, in this situation by appealing to P2 the 
                                                        
1157 Remember that she could also affirm civic friendship and political reciprocity out of her religious conviction, be-
cause the political conception is a module which is the focus of an overlapping consensus. 
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religious citizen does meet the threshold that I call “the reciprocity of the rea-
sonable.” This is not always the case. Imagine again that the same citizen 
supports the same law only on the basis of a religious reason. However, now 
the religious reason is different from the previous one: the religious reason for 
supporting L is now that leaving unbelievers to pass away praying to their 
false God is the surest way for their souls to be condemned in the afterlife, 
and this is a good thing from the perspective of advancing the creational pro-
ject of the true God. Obviously, even if the legal results are the same (assum-
ing that the law L is approved), and the state subsidises new separate prayer 
rooms, the spirit in which that non-public reason is presented is contrary to 
civic friendship: it is not reasonable to propose such reason with the goal of 
others’ damnation in mind. This is not because political liberalism is con-
cerned with souls’ salvation or damnation (it is not), but because in this case 
the political decision would be justified in light of considerations that are in-
strumental to our contempt for people with religious views different from our 
own: realistically, from this position we could not participate in an overlap-
ping consensus on a political conception of justice that is based on citizens’ 
equality and freedom. The fact that on this specific issue (the law on prayer 
rooms) coercive political power is not used to suppress but to promote politi-
cal freedom and equality would be merely fortuitous from a moral and politi-
cal point of view. If our goal is to use political power against citizens who 
hold different but reasonable comprehensive views simply because they hold 
these views, we are not promoting but denying political freedom and equality: 
next time we could be tempted, for instance, to use the state’s apparatus to 
wipe out citizens believing in a different God or in no God (see below the 
analysis of the notion of unreasonableness). Then, the previous assumption 
about the spirit in which non-public reasons are appealed to is of crucial im-
portance for including (or excluding) a religious reason in (from) the justifi-
catory pool. However, coming back to the first case imagined under B2, let 
me explain why I think that if a citizen presents a non-public reason in a spirit 
that enhances civic friendship we should not neglect it. How can we recog-
nise such a spirit of reciprocity and civic friendship in those cases? In few 
words, the basic idea is that while such a non-public reason is not public in 
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character, it is nonetheless “public enough,”1158 and other reasonable citizens 
are able to recognise this fact. To show how this can happen, recall my char-
acterisation of intelligibility in chapter two. There, I argued that “when politi-
cally reasonable persons publicly discuss fundamental political questions, 
their arguments should be at least intelligible to other politically reasonable 
persons.” In the example that we are considering now, we can recognise not 
only the reasonableness of the religious reason P2 from a political perspec-
tive, but also the reasonableness of the grounds on which it is advanced (from 
here the importance of the assumption just mentioned). One could say that the 
politically reasonable is intelligible to politically reasonable citizens. Political 
reasonableness –as described in previous chapters− is a feature that mediates 
the intelligibility of non-public reasons between politically reasonable per-
sons, at least with reference to some limited features of such reasons, namely, 
limited to their ability to embed and communicate the spirit of political reci-
procity. In other words, even if a reason is not shared between you and me (as 
it is often the case with religious reasons), since we are both politically rea-
sonable citizens in public discussion of fundamental political questions you 
are able to discern if I am advancing that reason in a spirit of political reci-
procity. Whether or not a non-public reason is invoked in a spirit of reciproci-
ty and civic friendship is a political and moral fact that is intelligible to other 
reasonable persons. Since reciprocity is tightly connected with reasonableness 
and reasonableness is something that reasonable persons have in common by 
definition, reasonableness mediates between reasonable persons and makes 
their non-public arguments somehow (and to some political degree only) in-
telligible to other reasonable persons, at least as far as political reciprocity is 
concerned. Reasonableness entails a commitment to reciprocity (infra). Thus, 
in public political discussions reasonable persons cannot consistently appeal 
to non-public reasons that violate or contradict that very spirit of reciprocity 
and civic friendship. Intelligibility thus means that other reasonable people 
are able to recognise the spirit of reciprocity and civic friendship that should 
                                                        
1158 “Public enough” here simply means “sufficiently public.” I am not completely satisfied with this expression, but I 
cannot find any better alternative for the moment.  
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always characterise public reasoning: whether public or non-public reasons 
are invoked, public discourse should be grounded in political reciprocity. As 
one can see, here I defend only a very narrow understanding of intelligibility, 
restricted to the domain of the political and to political notions such as reci-
procity, reasonableness, and civility. In my reading of the proviso, this latter 
is satisfied whenever other reasonable citizens are able to detect that spirit of 
reciprocity and civic friendship in one’s appealing to non-public reasons. It is 
true that one may appeal to a notion of reciprocity or friendship that is broad-
er and deeper than political reciprocity or friendship (for instance, fraternity 
among God’s creatures, that is, a comprehensive notion of reciprocity or 
friendship). However, this does not contradict political reciprocity or friend-
ship which, in Rawls’s terms, are moral elements of a ‘module’ that must be 
endorsed via an overlapping consensus. One does not have to endorse some-
one else’s non-public reasons in their comprehensive content to appreciate −if 
present− the spirit of political reciprocity underlying their being brought to 
the public forum. Obviously, this spirit of reciprocity is not sufficient for a 
reason to be victorious in justifying a law or policy, but it can be understood 
as the minimal necessary condition for a reason to be brought in public politi-
cal discussion in a way consistent with the proviso. I think that a non-public 
reason that embodies a sincere and consistent commitment to reciprocity sat-
isfies the proviso because it relies on moral grounds ‘that each citizen might 
reasonably endorse as consistent with their freedom and equality.’1159 Thus, 
non-public reasons of this kind are adequately morally-politically grounded to 
be reabsorbed within the ideal of public reason. Moreover, if reasonable citi-
zens are able to detect that spirit of reciprocal political commitment even in 
one’s non-public reasons, then they can feel assured of the willingness to be 
loyal to the ‘common point of view’ (the political conception of justice) and 
the authority of public reason. The problem of mutual assurance is thus also 
solved in this “extensive” interpretation of the wide view: this reading of the 
                                                        
1159 Daniel A. Dombrowski, Rawls and Religion: The Case for Political Liberalism (Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press, 2001), 116.  
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proviso ‘secures what is needed’1160 (a second and linked reason for affirming 
that the wide view solves the assurance problem is provided in chapter five). 
If this spirit of reciprocity and civic friendship is sincere, then the fact that 
one does not provide proper public reasons is not a demonstration of a will-
ingness to back out of (or defect from) the ‘common point of view’ represent-
ed by the political conception. Rather, this fact is related either to one’s inca-
pacity (for whatever reason) to find a proper public reason at all, or to the 
conviction that one’s religious reason supports the spirit of reciprocity and 
civic friendship better than any public reason at hand (that is, available at the 
moment to a particular citizen) could otherwise do. I introduce now two im-
portant remarks. First, note that, however, a reasonable citizen as such is and 
remains committed to the need for providing a public justification (supra). 
Therefore, she acknowledges that, if proper public reasons are available and 
they adequately support civic friendship and reciprocity, she should directly 
appeal to those properly public reasons as the most straightforward way to 
achieve a public justification and honour the duty of civility. Second, this is 
not to say that a religious citizen should be motivated only by public consid-
erations: she may appeal to a non-public reason because she genuinely values 
this reason in itself (that is, out of religious conviction for its own sake). 
However, since she is reasonable and accepts the burdens of judgement and 
their consequences, she is also committed to the ideal of public justification, 
as I have just mentioned. Thus, she may present that religious reason, but she 
should also strive for satisfying the duty of civility as specified by A, B1, or 
B2. From these remarks it follows that −if requested− a citizen should be 
willing to go back up to level B1 and to present public reasons that support 
her non-public reason, or at least (if she is not able to detect any supportive 
public reason) to make it explicit that she introduced that religious reason (al-
so) to advance political reciprocity and civic friendship. Only in this way can 
the problem of mutual assurance be solved. Since it corresponds to the re-
spect of political reciprocity, the threshold for satisfying the proviso is low 
enough to admit many religious contributions that may manifest our deep 
                                                        
1160 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, l. 
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commitment to the conception of justice on which the overlapping consensus 
is reached and, in so doing, they may strengthen civic friendship and stability 
for the right reasons. At the same time, however, in virtue of the same spirit 
of political reciprocity, reasonable citizens accept the fact that it may be nec-
essary to go back up to a higher level of the duty of civility (A or B1) when 
doubts arise1161 about the ability of a religious reason brought to the public 
political forum to fulfil the proviso and respect the threshold pinpointed by 
the criterion of reciprocity of the reasonable (infra). If we are sincerely and 
consistently willing to honour the duty of civility, we must accept the fact 
that sometimes this safety mechanism is the only way for providing mutual 
assurance. When this is the case is an issue devolved to the practical wisdom 
of citizens themselves. 
I now briefly come back to the question of sincerity, which I mentioned at the end of chap-
ter three. On that occasion, I maintained that we can understand the ‘ideal of public sinceri-
ty’1162 in two complementary ways (for more details, see above). The first is properly public 
and focuses on our sincere belief that a public reason to which we appeal is sufficient to justi-
fy a proposal publicly. This first understanding of the ideal of public sincerity refers to the 
first level of the duty of civility as I constructed it. On the other hand, the second understand-
ing of such an ideal focuses on our sincere belief that a non-public reason to which we appeal 
as an adequate ground to publicly justify a proposal complies with the spirit of reciprocity and 
civic friendship expressed by an ideal of public reason. This second understanding refers to 
the second level of the duty of civility. Now, it may seem that my interpretation of the proviso 
puts too much stress on the notion of sincerity. If we say that the proviso is satisfied just be-
cause the non-public reasons one appeals to are sincerely grounded in a spirit of reciprocity 
and civic friendship, it may seem that we are naively and dangerously relying (or simply rely-
ing too much) on other citizens’ commitment to fair social cooperation. However, I do not 
think that this claim is correct. This point only goes to show that social cooperation previous-
                                                        
1161 It is indisputable that on this point there is a remarkable proximity to Weithman’s model. As I said at the beginning, 
my interest here is more in understanding how we should present the duty of civility than in developing a radically dif-
ferent view: in fact, I believe that Weithman’s insights about how the wide view of public reason works toward solving 
the mutual assurance problems are fundamentally correct and I build on them. 
1162 Micah Schwartzman, “The Sincerity of Public Reason,” 385. 
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ly requires a certain degree of mutual trust, which it further develops. As long as mutual trust 
is not betrayed and doubts do not arise, there is no reason to ask for further assurance or be 
suspicious toward non-public reasons, as Weithaman rightly points out. Moreover, this point 
shows that liberal toleration is not grounded in scepticism or fear toward religion in general 
(and perhaps some religions in particular). These remarks also reply to many criticisms ana-
lysed in previous sections: the interpretation of the proviso developed in this research recog-
nises the potential contributions in terms of civic friendship, political participation, and reci-
procity coming from religious organisations and individuals. The introduction of religious 
reasons in public political discussion is not seen per se as an incendiary attack against social 
unity. On the contrary, as Rawls emphasises, religious doctrines (and reasons drawn from 
these doctrines) are of capital importance to stability for the right reasons, for the only form of 
social unity consistent with the fact of reasonable pluralism ‘is given by a stable overlapping 
consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines.’1163 One’s participation in the overlapping 
consensus is best shown by her willingness to present in public political discussion non-public 
reasons that support public reasons (B1) or which are in line with the spirit underpinning the 
ideal of public reason itself (B2). Thus, political liberalism lays the foundations of liberal tol-
eration on solid moral political grounds: the reciprocal recognition between free and equal, 
reasonable and rational citizens (infra). I then argue that what really matters in order to sus-
tain a just liberal society is not a consensus on a set of public reasons. If a −strong or 
weak1164− consensual view holds, all the better in terms of social cohesion. But from a politi-
cal viewpoint this is not necessary. Instead, what really matters is sharing the moral core of 
liberal democracy: political reciprocity between free equals who recognise one another as 
such and cooperate on fair terms. Then, all citizens ask each other to make public what they 
sincerely believe is the best ground for enhancing political reciprocity and civic friendship. If 
that ground is represented by a religious reason, it should be admitted in public political dis-
cussion even if it is not directly supported by genuine public reasons. Clearly, then, sincerity 
                                                        
1163 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 43. 
1164 See point A above. 
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is a crucial premise of any account of public reason and of a wide interpretation of public rea-
son in particular.1165 
To sum up, according to my model of wide public reason we begin from a consensual view 
of public reason. According to the first level of the duty of civility (A), reasonable citizens try 
first to find reasons that are most likely to be endorsed by other reasonable citizens, i.e. public 
reasons. However, this is not the end of the story. Rather, reasonable citizens can comply with 
their duty of civility at a second −but no less important− level by presenting non-public rea-
sons which support public reasons (B1), or which are advanced in line with the spirit of reci-
procity and civic friendship underpinning the ideal of public reason (B2). (As I have men-
tioned several times, in the following pages I will specify reciprocity as “reciprocity of the 
reasonable,” but for the moment I simply talk of reciprocity for brevity: as I use them here, 
the two expressions are interchangeable). The rationale is to combine a civically strong and 
cohesive understanding of public reason with a more inclusive and “religion-friendly” con-
ception of the latter by refining our understanding of the duty of civility. This is, I think, the 
most extensive interpretation of the wide view compatible with a robust commitment to pub-
lic reason as regulative ideal of democratic citizenship. The first level of the duty of civility is 
the most pressing and strict, but it is also negotiable: to be a good Rawlsian citizen it is not 
necessary to satisfy it. The second level is broader and looser, but it is not negotiable: if we 
fail to comply with it, we fail on an important dimension of our being citizens of a liberal 
democratic society. That is, we fail to comply with the criterion of reciprocity understood as a 
(moral) thesis about the moral political equality of citizens endowed with the two moral pow-
ers (a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of the good)1166 and coop-
erating in society on fair terms. As should be clear, here we come back to the regulative polit-
ical substantive (and not merely formal) dimension of public reason analysed at the beginning 
of this chapter. If one radically denies this thesis, she infringes the moral criterion of political 
reciprocity in a way that is not consistent with any serious declination of the duty of civility. 
                                                        
1165 As I said, I agree with Schwartzman when he argues that ‘[s]incerity is not an independent requirement that needs 
to be added to the ideal of public reason […] It is an integral part of any adequate theory of political discourse.’ Micah 
Schwartzman, “The Sincerity of Public Reason,” 398, emphasis added. 
1166 Recall that, according to Rawls, ‘[s]ince we start within the tradition of democratic thought, we […] think of citi-
zens as free and equal persons. The basic idea is that in virtue of their two moral powers (a capacity for a sense of jus-
tice and for a conception of the good) […] persons are free. Their having these powers to the requisite minimum degree 
to be fully cooperating members of society makes persons equal.’ John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 18-19. 
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Thus, she can be qualified as politically unreasonable, with the consequences that it entails 
(infra). For this reason, I understand the issue of containment (infra) as the outer border of a 
political liberal theory of toleration. In other words, I understand containment as a response to 
the unreasonableness involved in the negation of the criterion of reciprocity itself and in a 
systematic failure to comply with the second level of the duty of civility. In such cases, there 
is an infringement of others’ moral –not legal− rights (i.e., rights to equal respect and consid-
eration as a free and equal citizens),1167 a rejection of the liberal principle of legitimacy and, 
ultimately, of the ideal of public reason itself. Thus, in my view only systematic violations of 
the duty of civility and a more or less intentional rejection of the moral political criterion of 
reciprocity must be politically contained (see below). This kind of unreasonableness is in-
compatible with good liberal democratic citizenship: as Macedo puts it, ‘[r]easonableness and 
cooperativeness or reciprocity are, obviously, closely bound up here: public reasonableness 
depends on citizens being willing to deliberate about the fair terms of social cooperation if 
others will likewise do so.’1168 (Note that this does not imply that a person who is unreasona-
ble in this way does not have access to equal legal rights on the same footing with other –
reasonable− citizens, infra). On the other hand, single (and possibly minor) instances in which 
one fails to respect the duty of civility of the second level may not be enough to determine 
that that person is unreasonable tout court, at least not in a –politically speaking− conclusive 
way. Such a failure could have several causes, some frankly venial, even though the implica-
tions may be serious. For example, in Lott’s example Dr. X is simply unable to find a way to 
both protect chimps and to honour the requirements of public reason, to which he is otherwise 
committed.1169 Indeed, cases of “sporadic” unreasonableness are less threatening from a po-
litical perspective. However, since in such cases the obligations of good citizenship specified 
                                                        
1167 For the purposes of my research, I simply assume that in a liberal democracy (as expressed in its public culture) 
every person is understood as possessing those moral rights. Note, however, that the duty of civility being a moral duty 
and not a legal duty (John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 217 and 253), its violation does not involve a violation of others’ 
legal rights (Robert Audi, Religious Commitment and Secular Reason, 85). Nor, however, is it just a supererogatory 
ideal unable to impose moral requirements. Rather, the ‘moral status of public reason’ infers that such an ideal imposes 
binding moral requirements (James W. Boettcher, “The Moral Status of Public Reason,” in particular 159-160). 
1168 Stephen Macedo, “In Defense of Liberal Public Reason: Are Slavery and Abortion Hard Cases?” 24. 
1169 As I mentioned above, in cases like this, we should admit that one’s failure to comply with the duty of civility ‘is 
more understandable when citizens are motivated by what they take to be compelling moral grounds, like the duty to 
protect the innocent from harm.’ Thus, other citizens ‘may sometimes decide to tolerate [these failures] by withholding 
strong moral criticism or condemnation of their compatriots.’ James W. Boettcher, “The Moral Status of Public Rea-
son,” 170-171. 
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by the moral-political duty of civility are also violated, they are subject to social moral criti-
cism.1170 The reason for this distinction is rather simple: there is an obvious difference be-
tween being morally criticised for not honouring a moral requirement and being politically 
contained. The reader could wonder what counts as “sporadic and minor” and what counts as 
“systematic and intentional” forms of unreasonableness. The answer is necessarily vague: it 
depends. Like the reader, I am not fully comfortable with this answer and I will return to the 
sources of unreasonableness in public justification and to the question of containment in a 
moment. However, the distinction between “sporadic” and “systematic” forms of political un-
reasonableness is inescapably loose and mutable because, as Rawls aptly points out, the wide 
view of public reason is bound to citizens’ ‘good sense and understanding.’1171 Apart from the 
main points considered here, there is no way to anticipate in theory what only citizens’ judg-
ment can settle in practice. 
Yet, if one does not respect the first, highly consensual, level of the duty of civility, while 
she complies with the second level, she does not infringe others’ moral rights (i.e., the right to 
equal respect and consideration as free and equal citizens). In this case, civility is not violated 
at all, because by satisfying the proviso a citizen shows her commitment to the criterion of 
reciprocity, the liberal principle legitimacy, and the idea of public reason: such a citizen is po-
litically reasonable, and she wants to be recognised as such. As Boettcher rightly observes, 
‘[i]n attempting to satisfy the proviso, citizens are guided by their disposition to be reasona-
ble and their desire to be recognized by others as reasonable […] The aspiration to be recog-
nized as reasonable motivates citizens to reason and act in a manner that reassures others of 
their good faith effort to offer public reasons for their political choices.’1172 In this sense, I 
fully agree with the claim that we can ‘understand the idea of public reason as a vehicle for 
allowing citizens to see one another as reasonable, even when they are fully aware of what 
seem to be irreconcilable differences between them.’1173 The desire to be reciprocally recog-
nised as reasonable is manifested in the satisfaction of the duty of civility, at least at its sec-
                                                        
1170 Robert Audi, Religious Commitment and Secular Reason, 85. James W. Boettcher, “The Moral Status of Public 
Reason,” 159-160. 
1171 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 463. 
1172 James W. Boettcher, “Public Reason and Religion,” 129-130. Emphases added. See also ibid. 145. 
1173 James W. Boettcher, “Rawls and Gaus on the Idea of Public Reason,” 17. Emphasis added. 
  
 European Muslims and Liberal Citizenship 
Ph.D. Thesis successfully discussed on April 21, 2016.  
The total or partial use of the Ph.D. Thesis is subject to copyright restrictions. 
 
  
370  
 Giovanni Vezzani 
 
LUISS-ULB 
ond level. For these reasons, therefore, I argue that the core of the duty of civility is grounded 
in what I call the “reciprocity of the reasonable.” Before explaining its content, let me de-
scribe its role in defining the frontiers and limits of the duty of civility. 
The criterion of reciprocity of the reasonable serves as a critical threshold for recognising 
when the second and most fundamental level of the duty of civility is violated. For this rea-
son, I have defined my interpretation of the proviso as extensive: its bottom line (and its most 
essential criterion) coincides with the respect of the criterion of reciprocity of the reasonable. 
According to B2, it is not enough that a non-public reason contradicts a single public reason 
for it to be rejected as unreasonable. In fact, non-public reasons that satisfy the proviso must 
be counted as justificatory reasons and, as such, can play a role in supporting or opposing a 
specific political position. In this case, they must be weighed against all the other public and 
non-public reasons in the justificatory pool. When we try to justify publicly a law or a policy, 
a public reason can go against another public reason. Likewise, a non-public reason that satis-
fies the proviso can go against a public reason (or another non-public reason that satisfies the 
proviso). Clearly, for instance, there is no inconsistency in saying that a non-public reason P 
can satisfy the proviso under B1 or B2 even if it counts against a law L which is supported by 
a public reason R. This is not different from the case in which two properly public reasons 
(say, R1 and R2) count respectively in favour and against L. Instead, to be disqualified from 
public justification as unreasonable, a reason must deny or contradict (be at odds with) the 
criterion of reciprocity itself. What does this mean? In few words, it means that those reasons 
that deny citizens’ freedom and equality cannot be counted as reasonable, because they deny 
the moral grounds of the ideal of public reason. The reciprocity of the reasonable thus speci-
fies a criterion for distinguishing reasonable from unreasonable non-public reasons. A non-
public reason may deny the criterion of reciprocity in two ways (alternatively, one could say 
that there are two sources for unreasonableness):1174 
U1) The refusal of citizens’ freedom and equality may be embedded within the content 
of a non-public argument. For instance, imagine that we support a law that discrimi-
nates against the members of a particular religious group because our sacred texts de-
scribe them as inferior and perverted. If we present such a description in public as an 
                                                        
1174 Interestingly, Paul Weithman has independently come to outline a similar distinction: see Religion and the Obliga-
tions of Citizenship, 83. 
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argument for supporting that discriminatory law, we fail to show political respect for 
others as free and equal citizens. In this case, unreasonableness is subsumed within the 
very content of the non-public reason and the latter cannot count as a reasonable justi-
ficatory reason. 
U2) Furthermore, the refusal of the criterion of reciprocity may be implied not in the 
content of a non-public reason, but in the willingness to coerce others only on grounds 
that they could reasonably reject. In that case, there is unreasonable enforcement upon 
others. Suppose that someone is supporting pro-life positions on abortion based on an 
argument drawn from her comprehensive view according to which human life is sa-
cred and should be protected from its beginning. Leaving aside the vexing question of 
the moral status of the foetus, I cannot see how one can exclude such a religion-based 
reason (“human life is sacred and should be protected from its beginning”) as unrea-
sonable per se. Its content is not unreasonable, because it does not deny political reci-
procity between free and equal citizens. Therefore, a religious citizen may generally 
present that religion-based reason in public discussions about fundamental political 
questions (for instance, in a discussion about the death penalty) and try to satisfy the 
proviso as specified by B1 or B2: I do not think that it would be difficult to show that 
such a religion-based reason could be presented in a way consistent with the spirit of 
reciprocity and civic friendship requested by B2. However, the citizen who refers to 
this non-public reason cannot reasonably expect that other reasonable citizens would 
accept the criminalisation of abortion in the first trimester and, say, the prosecution of 
women who have an abortion in that period exclusively on the basis of this religion-
based reason (even though, once again, the content of the reason “human life is sacred 
and should be protected from its beginning” is not politically unreasonable in itself, 
because it does not deny citizens’ freedom and equality). This expectation would be 
unreasonable because citizens reasonably disagree precisely on the moral status of the 
foetus: while they may generally agree on the protection of human life, they reasona-
bly disagree about the exact moment in which human life begins. Thus, it would be 
unreasonable to claim that, in the absence of a supportive public reason, the question 
of abortion can be politically decided exclusively on religious grounds. Now, it could 
seem that B2 leads precisely to this outcome: according to B2, in effect, a non-public 
reason can be included in the justificatory pool without being supported by a specific 
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public reason. It would follow, then, that we can appeal to that non-public reason (the 
protection of human life as sacred from the beginning) as an adequate reason to justify 
political coercion, even if other citizens can reasonably reject part of its non-public 
content, that is, even if reasonable disagreement does persist about whether a zygote is 
a human being. However, if one wants to fulfil the duty of civility as I specified it, she 
should acknowledge that B2 would rule out the hypothesis of basing political coercion 
exclusively on reasons that citizens can reasonably reject. In fact, it should be recalled 
that the case analysed in B2 was premised on a different and very specific sort of ac-
ceptability. Namely, I said that B2 is satisfied only if other reasonable citizens can 
recognise a spirit of political reciprocity and civic friendship underlying the appeal to 
a specific non-public reason. The sine qua non condition for satisfying the proviso at 
level B2 is that the non-public reason in question must be invoked in a way that is con-
sistent with the affirmation of other citizens’ political freedom and equality. Yet if one 
thinks that, lacking any public ground, political coercion should be grounded exclu-
sively on her comprehensive view, what lacks is precisely that spirit: on the contrary, 
what prevails is the willingness to impose on the others one’s own comprehensive 
view and in so doing one denies citizens’ freedom and equality. What other reasonable 
citizens cannot be reasonably expected to endorse is not only the non-public content of 
that non-public reason (the qualification of the zygote, the embryo, and, later, the foe-
tus, as a human being whose life is sacred and should be protected), but also the politi-
cal spirit on the basis of which that non-public reason is brought to the public forum. 
While the comprehensive content about the moral status of the foetus would have re-
mained an object of reasonable dispute in any case, if the political spirit underlying 
the public presentation of the non-public reason at hand (“human life is sacred and 
should be protected from its beginning”) had been consistent with the criterion of po-
litical reciprocity, at least other reasonable citizens would have been assured about 
one’s allegiance to the moral grounds of the ideal of public reason. Nothing similar 
occurs in the case considered now, because there is no sign of respect for the criterion 
of reciprocity in basing political coercion exclusively on (otherwise reasonable) non-
public grounds. It is simply an unreasonable attitude because it denies other citizens’ 
freedom and equality and treats them as passive subjects of one’s will. To sum up, to 
say that “human life is sacred and should be protected” is certainly not unreasonable in 
itself, because this affirmation does not reject citizens’ freedom and equality: it may 
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satisfy the proviso under B1 or B2, even though disagreement on the “sacred” nature 
of human life would probably persist. On the other hand, to take sides over the moral 
status of the foetus is not unreasonable as long as taking a side does not mean coerc-
ing other citizens on the basis of one’s own comprehensive doctrine. Otherwise, a 
question of reasonable disagreement becomes a matter of unreasonable political en-
forcement. Thus, to impose a non-public reason (no matter how reasonable its content) 
as the sole basis for public justification in extremely disputed cases such as abortion is 
never politically reasonable and this possibility is ruled out by B2. However, since 
with reference to the issue of abortion it is also very difficult to find genuine public 
reasons to fulfil the duty of civility as specified by A and B1, maybe the best we can 
hope for politically is a provisional reasonable solution that satisfies the criterion of 
reciprocity. I will return to this point at the end of the chapter when I discuss the in-
completeness objection (see 2a). 
In other words, to be counted in the justificatory pool, a non-public reason must avoid both 
kinds of unreasonableness. That is, it must be reasonable both in its content and in the spirit in 
which it is offered to the public. Since they neglect citizens’ freedom and equality, actually 
both cases of unreasonableness are clearly connected in one important respect: they ultimately 
deny the need for a justification of coercion that does not stifle reasonable pluralism. Bearing 
in mind that one of the two features of reasonable persons is the acceptance of the burdens of 
judgment and their consequences (supra and infra), those who systematically appeal to unrea-
sonable reasons (as specified under U1 and U2) cannot be defined as reasonable persons, be-
cause the reasons they present are not consistent with the persistence of the fact of reasonable 
pluralism. One can even imagine a test for knowing whether a non-public reason violates po-
litical reciprocity. One could say that a non-public reason infringes political reciprocity if oth-
er reasonable citizens’ acceptance of that reason would require −due to the content of that rea-
son (U1), or to the willingness to impose that reason independently from the fact that others 
cannot be reasonably expected to accept it as the sole ground for being politically coerced 
(U2)− their forced conversion1175 to the non-public view from which that reason stems. In-
deed, if one politically discriminates a group on the basis of her sacred text or religious tradi-
                                                        
1175 For the unreasonableness involved in the idea of forced conversion from the perspective of political liberalism, see 
Daniel A. Dombrowski, Rawls and Religion: The Case for Political Liberalism, 10, 19, 21, and 34. For a similar point, 
see also Leslie C. Griffin, “Fundamentalism from the Perspective of Liberal Tolerance,” Cardozo Law Review 24, no. 4 
(2003), 1635-1636. 
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tion, the members of this group would have to change (convert) their minds in order to accept 
this political discrimination based on reasons that they do not share and the content of which 
clearly violates political reciprocity. The same kind of reasoning applies with reference to U2: 
in this case, it is not a matter of content. In fact, the content of the reason presented in public 
may be politically reasonable in itself, as in the case of the belief that human life is sacred and 
should be protected. Rather, the problem is the willingness to impose coercive measures on 
others on grounds that they could reasonably reject. Maybe other citizens acknowledge that a 
particular non-public reason is not politically unreasonable per se. However, it seems unlikely 
that they would accept to be coerced on the basis of this reason alone, imposed on them as the 
sole and ultimate ground for political justification. In both cases (U1 and U2), the idea behind 
the forced conversion test is that one cannot reasonably expect that other citizens accept polit-
ical coercion based exclusively on non-public grounds that are at odds with political reci-
procity, unless they share those non-public grounds. Others’ acceptance is thus premised on 
their belief in −or on their “conversion” to− those non-public grounds. From here the admit-
tedly not particularly felicitous expression “forced conversion.” To force other citizens to 
convert to one’s own comprehensive view in order to accept the exercise of political power 
simply means denying their freedom and equality. After having explained the content of the 
criterion that I called reciprocity of the reasonable, I will come back to the notion of unrea-
sonableness and analyse how reciprocity helps to exclude unreasonableness without sacrific-
ing reasonable but illiberal (here “illiberal” simply means “non-liberal”) preferences. 
Let me now explain in greater detail what I mean when I use the expression reciprocity of 
the reasonable. As I have already said on several occasions, in my understanding the criterion 
of political reciprocity expresses the core of the moral political ideal of free and equal ra-
tional and reasonable citizens cooperating on fair terms.1176 Rawls says that reciprocity is re-
lated to social cooperation: ‘all who are engaged in cooperation and who do their part as the 
rules and procedure require, are to benefit in an appropriate way as assessed by a suitable 
benchmark of comparison.’1177 This benchmark is expressed by the fair terms of social coop-
                                                        
1176 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 446: ‘[t]he criterion of reciprocity requires that when those 
terms are proposed as the most reasonable terms of fair cooperation, those proposing them must also think it at least 
reasonable for others to accept them, as free and equal citizens, and not as dominated or manipulated, or under the pres-
sure of an inferior political or social position.’ 
1177 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 16. 
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eration specified by a conception of political justice. Moreover, Rawls maintains that reci-
procity ‘lies between the idea of impartiality, which is altruistic (being moved by the general 
good), and the idea of mutual advantage understood as everyone’s being advantaged with re-
spect to each person’s present or expected future situation as things are.’1178 Thus, reciprocity 
does not simply mean being committed to the general good, nor simply being committed to an 
idea of mutual advantage. Rather, it is the result of these two commitments taken together 
within a view that is unified by a (moral) political commitment to persons’ freedom and 
equality as rooted in their two moral powers.1179 Rawls efficaciously captures the essence of 
political reciprocity in these terms: ‘reciprocity is a relation between citizens in a well-ordered 
society expressed by its public political conception of justice.’1180 Crucially, he connects rea-
sonableness and reciprocity in the following way: ‘Reasonable persons […] are not moved by 
the general good as such but desire for its own sake a social world in which they, as free and 
equal, can cooperate with others on terms all can accept. They insist that reciprocity should 
hold within that world so that each benefits along with others.’1181 How can we move, howev-
er, from reasonableness to reciprocity? I try to reconstruct a plausible explanation for this 
move.1182 Rawls quotes Sibley’s 1953 article “The Rational Versus the Reasonable” as one of 
the two main sources for his notion of the reasonable.1183 In that article, Sibley characterises 
the reasonable in a moral sense that ‘implies a willingness to consider our actions from a 
common standpoint and in light of the interests of others.’1184 Thus, reasonableness is con-
nected with the idea of entering in a relation of reciprocity with others. This, in turn, is related 
to the idea of public justification: as I have previously mentioned, Sibley observes that as a 
reasonable person I am committed to the idea that ‘I must justify my conduct in terms of some 
                                                        
1178 Ibid. 16-17. 
1179 As mentioned a few pages previous: ‘[t]he basic idea is that in virtue of their two moral powers (a capacity for a 
sense of justice and for a conception of the good) […], persons are free. Their having these powers to the requisite min-
imum degree to be fully cooperating members of society makes persons equal,’ ibid. 19. 
1180 Ibid. 17. 
1181 Ibid. 50, emphases added. 
1182 Here I build on James W. Boettcher, “What is Reasonableness?” 
1183 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 48-49, note 1. The other source is Kant. 
1184 James W. Boettcher, “What is Reasonableness?” 603. For this characterisation of the reasonable, see W. M. Sibley, 
“The Rational Versus the Reasonable,” 554-555. 
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principle capable of being appealed to by all parties concerned, some principle from which we 
can reason in common.’ 1185 This is because ‘[t]o be reasonable here is to see the matter […] 
from the other person’s point of view, to discover how each will be affected by the possible 
alternative actions; and, moreover, not merely to “see” this (for any merely prudent person 
would do as much) but also to be prepared to be disinterestedly influenced, in reaching a deci-
sion, by the estimate of these possible results.’1186 Thus, one can agree with Miriam Galston 
in saying that ‘the reasonable has a strong social connotation:’1187 as reasonable persons we 
want to recognise other reasonable persons and to be recognised as such by them. Recognition 
must be built on reciprocal grounds. I have already mentioned the opinion according to which 
‘[i]n attempting to satisfy the proviso, citizens are guided by their disposition to be reasonable 
and their desire to be recognized by others as reasonable.’1188 Thus, reasonableness entails a 
reciprocal recognition as beings worthy of moral consideration and concern. Therefore, rea-
sonableness intrinsically entails some form of reciprocity. More specifically, political reason-
ableness refers to the moral political interest and consideration that citizens reciprocally man-
ifest. It is this kind of reciprocity between reasonable citizens that explains why they: 1) are 
willing to propose and accept fair terms of social cooperation; 2) recognise one another as 
free and equal; 3) are willing to recognise the legitimacy of their common social institutions 
despite their disagreement about truth. If this is correct, then reasonable citizens’ reciprocal 
political recognition entails a recognition of reasonable citizens’ political autonomy: that is, 
‘the legal independence and assured political integrity of citizens and their sharing with other 
citizens equally in the exercise of political power .’1189 In my view, such a notion of political 
autonomy expresses the political liberal interpretation of the ideal of democratic self-ruling: 
                                                        
1185 W. M. Sibley, “The Rational Versus the Reasonable,” 557. 
1186 Ibid. 
1187 Miriam Galston, “Rawlsian Dualism and the Autonomy of Political Thought,” 1846. 
1188 James W. Boettcher, “Public Reason and Religion,” 129-130. 
1189 For the sake of completeness, notice that Rawls says that the value of autonomy ‘may take at least two forms. One 
is political autonomy, the legal independence and assured political integrity of citizens and their sharing with other citi-
zens equally in the exercise of political power. The other form is moral autonomy expressed in a certain mode of life 
and reflection that critically examines our deepest ends and ideals, as in Mill’s ideal of individuality, or by following as 
best one can Kant’s doctrine of autonomy. While autonomy as a moral value has had an important place in the history 
of democratic thought, it fails to satisfy the criterion of reciprocity required of reasonable political principles and cannot 
be part of a political conception of justice. Many citizens of faith reject moral autonomy as part of their way of life.’ 
John Rawls, Political Liberalism, xlii-xliii. Emphases added. 
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the latter is grounded in citizens’ freedom and equality as rooted in their two moral powers. 
Accordingly, from this definition of citizens’ reciprocal political recognition and political au-
tonomy we can also derive both: 1) the commitment of reasonable citizens to the priority of 
basic rights and liberties and to the freestandingness of their public institutional identity (see 
chapter three), and 2) their participation on the same footing in the democratic practice of 
public justification of the exercise of political power. Overall, this perspective describes what 
I call the reciprocity of the reasonable. I can summarise these points in the following way: 
 
Figure 7 Reciprocity of the reasonable. 
 
Reasonableness: moral capacity and 'willingness to 
consider our actions from a common standpoint and in light 
of the interests of others' (Boettcher, "What is 
Reasonableness," 603.)
It entails a recognition of the self and the other as beings 
equally worthy of moral concern. 
Idea of reciprocal recognition. Political reasonableness 
involves citizens' reciprocal political recognition as free 
equals.
Mutual recognition of citizens' political autonomy ('the 
legal independence and assured political integrity of citizens 
and their sharing with other citizens equally in the exercise 
of political power,' John Rawls, Political Liberalism xlii) as
political interpretation of the ideal of democratic self-ruling: 
it expresses a recognition of citizens' moral political equality.
Mutual recognition of the priority of basic rights and liberties 
and of the freestandingness of citizens' public-institutional 
identity
and
Participation in the democratic practice of public justification of 
the exercise of political power.
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I have already underlined the fact that most cases of non-compliance with the duty of civil-
ity can be tackled by mere social criticism. One may simply not realise that the content of a 
specific non-public reason not only lacks the support of a public reason, but also denies the 
criterion of reciprocity itself (thus, that the presentation of that non-public reason falls under 
U1). Alternatively, one may hold a non-public reason which is reasonable in its content, but 
that −she thinks− should be imposed upon other citizens “only this time” (as she promises to 
herself) because the issue at stake is far too important from her comprehensive perspective. 
This second case is much more complex than the previous one. However, I assume that, de-
spite the undeniable deficit of reasonableness in both these cases, social criticism can be 
strong enough to absorb and neutralise their negative effects on social trust and civic friend-
ship. However, social criticism alone can be insufficient when unreasonableness is more than 
just sporadic or accidental. When unreasonableness threatens to jeopardise stability for the 
right reasons (remember that, as Weithman observes, Rawls is not concerned with mere insti-
tutional or political stability) of a just society, Rawls proposes to ‘contain’ it. Unfortunately, 
he is quite laconic on this point: he barely mentions it. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls says that 
intolerant people’s ‘freedom should be restricted only when the tolerant sincerely and with 
reason believe that their own security and that of the institution of liberty are in danger. The 
tolerant should curb the intolerant only in this case. The leading principle is to establish a just 
constitution with the liberties of equal citizenship’1190 (I return to the last point presently). 
Famously, in Political Liberalism he devotes just a short but well-known footnote to this sub-
ject: ‘[t]hat there are doctrines that reject one or more democratic freedoms is itself a perma-
nent fact of life, or seems so. This gives us the practical task of containing them –like war and 
disease− so that they do not overturn political justice.’1191 Apart from that, as I have said in 
the third chapter, Rawls seems aware that a stable and just democratic society inevitably fa-
vours certain doctrines over others: but this fact ‘would not appear unfair […], for social in-
fluences favoring some doctrines over others cannot be avoided by any view of political jus-
tice. No society can include within itself all forms of life.’1192 In returning to the containment 
of the unreasonable in “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” Rawls unequivocally connects 
                                                        
1190 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 220/193. 
1191 Ibid. 64, note 19, emphases added. 
1192 Ibid. 197. Emphasis added. 
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unreasonableness to the rejection of the criterion of reciprocity and of the ideal of public rea-
son. This seems in line with my interpretation of the proviso and the duty of civility, in par-
ticular under B2: 
‘Those who reject constitutional democracy with its criterion of reciprocity 
will of course reject the very idea of public reason. For them the political relation 
may be that of friend or foe, to those of a particular religious or secular communi-
ty to those who are not; or it may be relentless struggle to win the world for the 
whole truth. Political liberalism does not engage those who think this way. The 
zeal to embody the whole truth in politics is incompatible with an idea of public 
reason that belongs with democratic citizenship.’1193 
Remember that I adopt Rawls’s specification of the reasonable person: someone who ac-
cepts the burdens of judgement and their consequences and who is willing to propose and 
abide by fair terms of social cooperation with other free and equal citizens. Without claiming 
that the following few lines may represent a complete theory of how to deal with unreasona-
ble citizens, for the purposes of my justificatory evaluative political theory I must nonetheless 
develop some considerations here, while deeper analyses can be found elsewhere.1194 I divide 
the discussion in two parts: 
1. First, in the literature there is a wide debate concerning whether –and above all to what 
extent− we should exclude unreasonable citizens from the ‘constituency of public justi-
fication.’1195 This option seems plausible if we bear in mind that ‘democracy aims at the 
public justification of political power, it necessarily ignores claims or arguments that 
are not suitably public, [… such as] appeals to religious truth or claims to racial, gender 
                                                        
1193 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 442. Emphases added. 
1194 Among the most influential recent contributions to this topic see: Marilyn Friedman, “John Rawls and the Political 
Coercion of Unreasonable People,” in The Idea of a Political Liberalism: Essays on Rawls, ed. Victoria Davion and 
Clark Wolf (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 16-33; Erin Kelly and Lionel McPherson, “On Tolerating the 
Unreasonable,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 9, no. 1 (2001), 38-55; Jonathan Quong, “The Rights of Unreason-
able Citizens,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 12, no. 3 (2004), 314-335, but see also chapter ten of his book Lib-
eralism without Perfection; Vicente Medina, “Militant Intolerant People: A Challenge to John Rawls’s Political Liberal-
ism,” Political Studies 58, no. 3 (2010), 556-571. 
1195 Jonathan Quong, “The Rights of Unreasonable Citizens,” 316. 
  
 European Muslims and Liberal Citizenship 
Ph.D. Thesis successfully discussed on April 21, 2016.  
The total or partial use of the Ph.D. Thesis is subject to copyright restrictions. 
 
  
380  
 Giovanni Vezzani 
 
LUISS-ULB 
or ethnic superiority.’1196 Rawls endorses this position in the passage quoted above: un-
reasonable persons must be excluded from the constituency of public justification (in 
Rawls’s words, ‘political liberalism does not engage those who think this way’). In 
passing, I could add two remarks. First, referring back to what I said in the second chap-
ter, one may observe that while justificatory comparative political theory tries to evalu-
ate the reasonableness of a particular comprehensive doctrine and its capacity to enter 
into an overlapping consensus, justificatory evaluative political theory is more con-
cerned with excluding particular instances of systematic unreasonableness from the 
constituency of public justification. Second, for the discussion that I am considering 
now, it is important to introduce the distinction made by Kelly and McPherson between 
political and philosophical reasonableness.1197 In few words, according to them, while 
political reasonableness refers to one’s willingness to propose and accept fair terms of 
social cooperation (that is, a moral political disposition to act in a certain way), philo-
sophical reasonableness refers to one’s acceptance of the burdens of judgement and 
their consequences.1198 According to Kelly and McPherson, one could be politically 
reasonable (that is, willing to act on the basis of fair terms of social cooperation) and 
philosophically unreasonable (e.g., she could be a racist). The two authors claim that 
public justification should include all politically reasonable citizens, whether or not 
their philosophical views are reasonable (but only ‘just as long as their philosophical 
unreasonableness does not spill over into political unreasonableness’).1199 However, as 
Jonathan Quong points out, actually it is difficult that such a spill-over from philosophi-
cal to political unreasonableness does not materialise. In fact, Quong criticises Kelly 
and McPherson’s characterisation of the burdens of judgement (whose rejection gener-
ates philosophical unreasonableness) merely in epistemological terms.1200 Quong con-
vincingly argues that Rawls kept the two elements of the reasonable (the willingness to 
                                                        
1196 Ibid. 315. 
1197 Erin Kelly and Lionel McPherson, “On Tolerating the Unreasonable,” 39ff. That distinction has been endorsed also 
by Maffettone (see his “Political Liberalism: Reasonableness and Democratic Practice,” 562). 
1198 Erin Kelly and Lionel McPherson, “On Tolerating the Unreasonable,” 39-44. 
1199 Ibid. 40, emphasis added. 
1200 Jonathan Quong, “The Rights of Unreasonable Citizens,” 319-321. 
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propose and abide by fair terms and the acceptance of the burdens of judgment) tightly 
connected because otherwise any serious moral understanding of public justification 
would be impossible. Without accepting the burdens of judgement and their conse-
quences (i.e., without accepting the fact of reasonable pluralism), nothing more than a 
modus vivendi would be possible: citizens would be ready to overturn the system of so-
cial cooperation if they could. Quong is right when he says that ‘[a]ccepting the bur-
dens of judgement is […] the only way to motivate a moral account of public justifica-
tion.’1201 The burdens of judgment are thus ‘a necessary component of reasonableness if 
that concept is to do the moral work required of it.’1202 Indeed, the burdens of judgment 
have an epistemological dimension, but they are needed primarily to provide a moral 
motivation to the reasonable and, in the end, they are absorbed by the moral political 
nature of this concept. One could say that the acceptance of the burdens of judgment 
and of reasonable pluralism is the motivational component of a broader moral political 
concept (the concept of the reasonable), which has a practical dimension too (i.e., pro-
posing and abiding by fair terms of cooperation). Note that this characterisation of the 
reasonable is consistent with my account of the duty of civility. It is precisely because 
reasonable persons recognise the fact of reasonable pluralism and are committed to the 
ideal of public justification that they must rely on the spirit of reciprocity and civic 
friendship mentioned above as the minimum necessary for the proviso to be satisfied 
under B2. Thus philosophical reasonableness defined in terms of acceptance of the fact 
of reasonable pluralism collapses into political reasonableness and together they repre-
sent the two components of the same moral political concept. Having said that, howev-
er, notice that this does not mean that reasonable illiberal (i.e., non-liberal) views are 
excluded from public justification. Although we cannot include philosophically unrea-
sonable but politically reasonable positions because such a distinction seems to rest on a 
misunderstanding of the concept of reasonableness itself, we can nonetheless consist-
ently include illiberal religious or philosophical views that are politically reasonable (in 
the full sense of accepting the burdens of judgments and of being willing to accept and 
propose fair terms of cooperation). In few words, reasonableness is a political category, 
while in this context the fact of being liberal or illiberal is a philosophical (in a thick, 
                                                        
1201 Ibid. 320-321.emphases added. 
1202 Ibid. 321. 
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deep, and broad –i.e., comprehensive− sense) question.1203 Politically speaking, what is 
important is one’s reasonableness, not the fact that one is liberal or illiberal from a 
philosophical perspective. Remember that the ‘only comprehensive doctrines that run 
afoul of public reason are those that cannot support a reasonable balance of political 
values.’1204 Thus, obviously, according to political liberalism comprehensive doctrines 
can be reasonable without being liberal (in this thick−deep and broad− sense): reasona-
ble yet illiberal persons and doctrines are compatible with political liberalism, while 
they are incompatible with comprehensive liberalism.1205 Taken together, these two el-
ements of reasonableness as a moral political concept (that is, the burdens of judgement 
as an epistemological concept providing moral motivation to reasonable citizens and the 
willingness to propose and abide by fair terms of social cooperation shaping reasonable 
citizens’ practical political reasoning) show that Rawls’s notion of toleration is not 
based on scepticism. Rather, it is based on moral grounds, to which the burdens of 
judgment belong. One could say that the deepest foundation of the concept of the rea-
sonable is a political commitment to two forms of respect: a) the respect toward our fel-
                                                        
1203 For instance, Leslie C. Griffin argues that ‘theological fundamentalists’ may be politically reasonable: see “Funda-
mentalism from the Perspective of Liberal Tolerance,” 1635-1636. One’s comprehensive view may be either liberal or 
illiberal (i.e., non-liberal), what matters is one’s political reasonableness, as Rawls clearly explains in “The Idea of Pub-
lic Reason Revisited” (488, emphasis added): ‘[t]he idea of the politically reasonable is sufficient unto itself for the 
purposes of public reason when basic political questions are at stake. Of course, [some] fundamentalist religious doc-
trines […] will reject the ideas of public reason and deliberative democracy. They will say that democracy leads to a 
culture contrary to their religion […] They assert that the religiously true, or the philosophically true, overrides the po-
litically reasonable. We simply say that such a doctrine is politically unreasonable. Within political liberalism nothing 
more need be said.’ 
1204 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 243. 
1205 For this reason I think that the following claim by Marilyn Friedman is grounded in error. She says that those who 
do not accept the burdens of judgment and are not willing to propose and accept fair terms are ‘not merely unreasona-
ble; more specifically, they are also illiberal’(“John Rawls and the Political Coercion of Unreasonable People,” 28). 
This seems to mean –correctly− that unreasonableness entails inconsistency with political liberalism. This is surely 
true: remember Rawls’s quotation above: ‘political liberalism does not engage those who think this way’ (“The Idea of 
Public Reason Revisited,” 442). The problem is that immediately after she simply equates the adjectives “illiberal” and 
“unreasonable.” Thus, in her view, political liberalism would disqualify all illiberal views as unreasonable. But this is 
simply not true. Only unreasonable illiberal views are disqualified from public justification. But saying this presupposes 
a clear distinction between the opposition reasonable/unreasonable (which concerns political liberalism) and the opposi-
tion liberal/illiberal (which concerns comprehensive liberalism). For these reasons, one can reject Friedman’s most 
caustic charges [‘Rawls’s legitimation pool for political liberalism is defined precisely in such a way as to exclude those 
whose prior (illiberal) commitments would lead them to reject political liberalism,’ “John Rawls and the Political Coer-
cion of Unreasonable People,” 28; ‘Rawls’s approach is therefore similar in one respect to the very viewpoints that he 
regards as unreasonable, namely, it seeks to justify the use of coercive (liberal) power over some of the individuals who 
reject its tenets. From their points of view, it is Rawls who appears […] to be unreasonable,’ 30]. 
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low citizens, and b) the respect toward our reasonable (even though sometimes illiberal) 
comprehensive doctrines.1206 
2. I turn now to the second part of the argument: the problem of how to treat unreasonable 
citizens. It is not possible to analyse this issue in every single detail here. I would like to 
consider it in a subsequent study because it may represent the part of a theory of public 
reason citizenship with the most direct effects on reality. Here I just try to clarify some 
fundamentals. Rawls suggests that we should contain unreasonable doctrines when they 
directly threaten the stability of a just society, but he does not explain how.1207 First, 
note that containment can be defined as ‘any policy whose primary intention is to un-
dermine or restrict the spread of ideas that reject the fundamental tenets of liberal de-
mocracy, that is (1) that political society should be a fair system of cooperation for mu-
tual benefit, (2) that citizens are free and equal, and (3) the fact of reasonable plural-
ism.’1208 Some contend that Rawls’s notion of the containment is too “soft,” running the 
risk of endangering the constitutional regime of a democratic society irreparably.1209 I 
follow again Quong in framing the problem, because rather than focusing exclusively 
on the (crucial) question of preserving stability for the right reasons, Quong also asks 
what kinds of rights can be invoked when one claims that the rights of unreasonable cit-
izens are to be limited. For instance, can unreasonable citizens invoke a right to freedom 
of speech? Quong maintains that we should distinguish between two different kinds of 
rights claims. First, unreasonable citizens can claim ‘the same basic liberal rights and 
entitlements as other citizens.’1210 Second, one may think that they can also claim a 
‘right to be unreasonable.’1211 According to Quong, while there is no point for a politi-
cal liberal committed to a political conception of citizens as free and equal to deny equal 
                                                        
1206 I am grateful to Valentina Gentile for having brought this point to my attention during her LUISS Ph.D. course “Re-
ligion and Politics” on January 2015. 
1207 For recent interpretations of Rawls’s containment, see: Vicente Medina, “Militant Intolerant People: A Challenge to 
John Rawls’s Political Liberalism,” 558-569 and Jonathan Quong, “The Rights of Unreasonable Citizens,” 323-330.  
1208 Jonathan Quong, “The Rights of Unreasonable Citizens,” 323. 
1209 Vicente Medina, “Militant Intolerant People: A Challenge to John Rawls’s Political Liberalism,” in particular 566 
and 569. 
1210 Jonathan Quong, “The Rights of Unreasonable Citizens,” 314. 
1211 Ibid. 330. 
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basic rights and liberties to unreasonable citizens, the latter cannot consistently invoke a 
right to be unreasonable. This is because any right must be inscribed in a system of 
rights, which is supported by an ‘overall moral ideal which the system of rights is meant 
to uphold.’1212 In a liberal society, such an ideal is the ideal of social cooperation on fair 
terms between free equals. Quong’s central idea is that any activity which is ‘motivated 
by, or aimed at, the rejection of fair cooperation between free and equal citizens’1213 is 
not protected by any right at all, because such a right would be inconsistent with the 
whole system of rights to which it is supposed to belong. Thus, ‘there is no right to be 
unreasonable,’1214 because ‘[r]ights are only intended to permit or protect choices made 
within a limited domain, and that domain is set by the boundaries of political justice. 
[…T]he alternatives open to you in exercising your rights are always constrained by the 
general principles of justice derived from the ideal of persons as free and equal.’1215 
Thus, in few words, Quong’s position is that a Rawlsian liberal should acknowledge 
that reasonable and unreasonable citizens are equally entitled to the same basic civil and 
political rights and liberties, but, since ‘only permissible conceptions (those that respect 
the principles of justice) can be pursued,’1216 unreasonable citizens have no right to ad-
vance their unreasonable conceptions of the good, because such a right could not exist 
within a democratic system of rights. Thus, when their basic rights (as the right to the 
freedom of expression) are used to promote unreasonable conceptions of the good 
which threaten other citizens’ equal rights or the stability for the right reasons of a just 
society, the liberal state can legitimately ‘infringe the rights of unreasonable citizens, 
even if they are generally to be accorded the same rights as everyone else.’1217 After all, 
as Rawls also affirms, in a liberal democracy the ‘priority of right gives the principles of 
justice a strict precedence in citizens’ deliberations and limits their freedom to advance 
                                                        
1212 Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, 308. 
1213 Ibid. 
1214 Jonathan Quong, “The Rights of Unreasonable Citizens,” 331, emphasis added. 
1215 Ibid. 331. 
1216 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 193.  
1217 Jonathan Quong, “The Rights of Unreasonable Citizens,” 314. 
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certain ways of life.’1218 Obviously, not all the rights and liberties of unreasonable citi-
zens can be infringed, but only those that become instrumental to the promotion of 
views that deny other citizens’ freedom and equality (e.g., it would be unreasonable 
from the part of public authorities to infringe the right to a fair trial and, even more, the 
right to bodily integrity of some citizens in order to avoid preemptively that those citi-
zens promote their unreasonable views. Clearly, it is difficult to draw a line in the hard-
est moral cases, where unreasonableness is possibly coupled with the likely or potential 
recourse to violence, as the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario shows.1219 However, I do not need 
to address such complications here). What makes Quong’s position theoretically appeal-
ing is that according to his view unreasonable people are kept within political liberal-
ism. They are not excluded, since they enjoy equal liberal rights and liberties. It also 
makes clear that containment is mainly a moral device that aims at softening the impact 
of unreasonable views on stability for the right reasons of a publicly justified system of 
cooperation. It does not concern –at least not primarily− legal limitations of unreasona-
ble citizens’ civil and political rights and liberties, in so far as this does not jeopardise 
stability for the right reasons (here the problem is not merely to contain a security threat 
but to safeguard the political moral stability of fair social cooperation) of the system 
that protects those equal rights and liberties. I am aware that many important questions 
remain open, but I must stop here: my point was simply to provide a –provisional− ac-
count of how to treat unreasonable citizens, because such an account is required by any 
theory of public reason. What I have said is just enough for the aims of my research.  
At this point, I can come back to the reciprocity requirement (RR) and the civility require-
ment (CiR) enunciated in 3.2.b.1. There I defined them in the following terms: 
(RR) An account of public reason as an ideal of democratic citizenship is based on the 
(moral) political criterion of reciprocity. 
                                                        
1218 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 209. 
1219 The case of the ticking bomb raises problematic questions about whether ‘the torture of a terrorist suspect to find 
the location of a bomb set to explode is justified as the lesser evil.’ For an analysis of this issue and the correlated de-
bate, see for instance Maureen Ramsay, “Can the Torture of Terrorist Suspects Be Justified?” in Secret Intelligence: A 
Reader, eds. Christopher Andrew, Richard J. Aldrich, and Wesley K. Wark (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 
411-429 (the quotation in this footnote is from page 411). 
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(CiR) If one endorses a moral criterion of reciprocity and, consequently, is committed to a 
liberal principle of legitimacy, she should also abide by the limits imposed by the idea of pub-
lic reason in public political discussions. 
In chapter three I also outlined three dimensions (PR1, PR2, and PR3) of what I called the 
consistency requirement (CR). Finally, in this chapter I have defined more accurately the cri-
terion of reciprocity in terms of what I have called reciprocity of the reasonable. Thus, RR 
should be read in the light of the criterion of reciprocity of the reasonable, which consists of 
the reciprocal recognition between reasonable free and equal fellow citizens cooperating on 
fair terms and who possess both a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity for a concep-
tion of the good. 
The reader is now able to see how the civility requirement (CiR) is grounded in the reci-
procity requirement (RR), which refers to the spirit of reciprocity and civic friendship that 
specifies a critical threshold for satisfying the proviso and the duty of civility. I can then re-
state CiR in the light of the extensive interpretation of the proviso and the bifurcate (two-
level) model of the duty of civility developed in this chapter, so that evaluative political theo-
ry can answer the question “how do citizens honour public reason?” The civility requirement 
now is formulated as follow: 
(CiR*): One abides by the ideal of public reason if in her effort to publicly justify a politi-
cal position in public political discussion she appeals to: (A) properly public reasons, (B1) 
non-public reasons supported by public reasons, or (B2) non-public reasons which embody a 
sincere and consistent commitment to the spirit of reciprocity underpinning the ideal of public 
reason (the fact that this commitment must be sincere and consistent means that those non-
public reasons cannot be unreasonable in the sense specified by U1 and U2). 
As announced in section 4.1.b, in concluding this chapter I would like to present a reply to 
two major objections raised against Rawls’s conception of public reason. I do believe that the 
reinterpretation of the proviso that I offered here can answer many of the criticisms analysed 
above. Some of them have just been addressed implicitly. For instance, with reference to the 
democratic depletion objection, in discussing the question of sincerity I argued that my under-
standing of the proviso is more suitable for taking into consideration contributions to political 
reciprocity and civic friendship made on religious terms. Interpreted in this way, it would be 
difficult to say that public reason deprives liberal societies of (religious) resources that are es-
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sential for their democratic and civic life. B (and B2 in particular) is an extensive enough in-
terpretation of the proviso to dispel such worries. However, here I wish to concisely address 
the two major criticisms considered in 4.1.b: the incompleteness objection (that is, the thorni-
est among the inadequacy objections) and the integrity and fairness objection (that is, the 
most difficult among the democratic impairment objections). I do not attempt to offer a com-
plete response to those objections: this is not the aim of this study. However, since the credi-
bility of public reason as a theoretical tool for answering the questions that I am considering 
in this research is inversely proportional to the strength of such objections, here I try to show 
that, when confronted with my model of wide public reason, those objections are far less con-
vincing than one might think. Having said that, however, I emphasise once more that I am not 
claiming that the following is enough to defeat those criticisms conclusively. 
(1) With reference to the fairness and integrity objection, let me firstly ask: is there some-
thing unfair in requiring that any reason (public or non-public) which one appeals to in public 
political discussion is at least grounded in a spirit of reciprocity and civic friendship and that 
it cannot reject (neither in its content nor in the manner in which it is invoked, enforced, or 
imposed upon others) the ideal of fair social cooperation between free equals? As we have 
seen, moral integrity is very important to Rawls, and he made a great effort to reconcile the 
public and non-public dimensions of citizens’ moral identity: the idea of an overlapping con-
sensus aims precisely at such reconciliation. Every citizen is demanded to make a similar rec-
onciliatory effort, in terms of being able to participate in the overlapping consensus. One can 
observe that such a requirement equally concerns both religious and non-religious citizens. In 
this sense, it does not seem to be unfair to the latter. However, political liberalism is not con-
cerned with preserving the moral integrity of those who deny other citizens’ freedom and 
equality. Unreasonable people reject political reciprocity and, consequently, their moral integ-
rity cannot have special claims on reasonable citizens. If one is concerned with the protection 
of an unreasonable moral integrity, the political liberal ‘can only say “grow up!”.’1220 How-
ever, this is obviously not the kind of moral integrity that we are usually concerned with when 
we discuss the fairness and integrity objection. Instead, the question is whether or not public 
reason protects reasonable citizens’ moral integrity. Indeed, a strict doctrine of restraint may 
have the splitting effect pinpointed by Wolterstorff (supra), with the possible result of pre-
                                                        
1220 Stephen Macedo, “In Defense of Liberal Public Reason: Are Slavery and Abortion Hard Cases?” 35. 
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venting religious citizens from living an integrated life. However, my interpretation of the 
proviso is not based on strict restraint and reasonable religious citizens’ moral integrity is not 
endangered. Clearly, to say that ‘[i]t belongs to the religious convictions of a good many reli-
gious people in our society that they ought to base their decisions concerning fundamental is-
sues of justice on their religious convictions’1221 is not a manifestation of unreasonableness, 
provided that those convictions do not entail a rejection of political reciprocity between free 
and equal citizens. The wide view of public reason not only makes room for the contribution 
of religious convictions on human flourishing in what Rawls calls the background culture (a 
space that political liberalism recognises and protects, but in which it does not directly enter), 
but also highly values religious contributions which strengthen civic friendship and stability 
for the right reasons, not only due to the notion of the proviso as general threshold for public 
reasoning, but also thanks to declaration as confirmative non-public reasoning (for these defi-
nitions, see chapter two). This is also a further sense in which the extensive interpretation of 
the proviso treats both religious and non-religious citizens fairly: religious and secular contri-
butions that foster a public political life consistent with the criterion of reciprocity of the rea-
sonable are equally welcomed. Public reason does not require a tragic, stark, and irreconcila-
ble division of the morality of reasonable citizens in two parts for the purpose of public justi-
fication. In fact, the overlapping consensus and the wide view of public reason permit a rec-
onciliation between the public and the non-public dimensions of citizens’ moral identity. 
From the perspective of public reason, preserving a sincere commitment to the moral (politi-
cal) core of public justification (i.e., to the criterion of reciprocity) ‘secures what is need-
ed.’1222  
(2) With reference to the incompleteness objection, following Gaus, it should be firstly 
noted that indeterminacy is less common than inconclusiveness.1223 Cases in which public 
reason is completely silent about an essential political question are much fewer than cases in 
which public reason can provide more than one reasonable answer. To be sure, the most obvi-
ous example of public reason’s indeterminacy is the question of the moral status of the foetus: 
                                                        
1221 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues,” 105. Original empha-
ses removed. 
1222 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, l. 
1223 Gerald F. Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism, 155. 
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public reason alone is not able to answer this question. However, even in those rare cases, we 
may have different possible strategies for coping with indeterminacy. For instance, 
Schwartzman lists five strategies to face incompleteness in general, even though some of 
them −like reliance on democratic procedures− are meaningful and effective only in cases of 
inconclusiveness. Those strategies are the following: postponing the decision, taking ad-
vantage of others’ capacity to point out a genuine public reason, trying to ‘economize disa-
greements by narrowing as much as possible [the] major points of contention’ and to ‘negoti-
ate a principled compromise,’ or relying on democratic or even random procedures.1224  
Even when public reason is incomplete, a liberal democracy is, by its very nature, commit-
ted to a principle of ‘presumption in favour of liberty.’1225 Gerald Gaus talks of a ‘political 
liberty principle’ stating that: ‘(1) A citizen is under no standing obligation to justify her ac-
tions to the state. (2) All use of force or coercion by the state against the persons of its citizens 
requires justification; in the absence of such justification, such force or coercion by the state is 
unjust.’1226 Rawls endorses this presumption by stressing the priority of basic liberties1227 and 
by requiring public justification for the exercise of political power. For instance, when Rawls 
explains the ‘full publicity condition:’ he affirms that ‘if the basic structure relies on coercive 
sanctions, however rarely and scrupulously applied, the grounds of its institutions should 
stand up to public scrutiny.’1228 Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy is premised on similar 
assumptions: ‘political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in ac-
cordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to 
endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational.’1229 
What does this presumption in favour of liberty entail? First, public reason should be ground-
                                                        
1224 Micah Schwartzman (“The Completeness of Public Reason,” 209-214) call them, respectively, intrapersonal delega-
tion, deference to others, moral accommodation, democratic procedures, and arbitrary decision procedures. 
1225 Gerald F. Gaus, “Coercion, Ownership, and the Redistributive State,” 238, expression italicised. See also Kevin 
Vallier Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Separation, 30-31.  
1226 Gerald F. Gaus, “Coercion, Ownership, and the Redistributive State,” 239. 
1227 Rawls defines a liberal conception as a conception that specifies ‘certain rights, liberties and opportunities,’ deter-
mines ‘a special priority for these freedoms,’ and takes ‘measures assuring all citizens […] adequate all-purpose means 
to make intelligent and effective use of their liberties.’ Political Liberalism, xlvi. 
1228 Ibid. 68. 
1229 Ibid. 217. 
  
 European Muslims and Liberal Citizenship 
Ph.D. Thesis successfully discussed on April 21, 2016.  
The total or partial use of the Ph.D. Thesis is subject to copyright restrictions. 
 
  
390  
 Giovanni Vezzani 
 
LUISS-ULB 
ed in this presumption in favour of liberty in the two following ways. On the one hand, in the 
negative sense that such a presumption excludes certain non-public reasons as inadequate for 
the public justification of the exercise of coercive political power: namely, it rules out those 
non-public reasons that do not respect one of the two levels of the bifurcate model of duty of 
civility. On the other hand, in the positive sense that the presumption in favour of liberty im-
plies that public reason should be open to (and include in pubic political discussion) the wid-
est range of public and non-public reasons compatible with a sincere and consistent commit-
ment to treating others as cooperating free and equal citizens. This means −among other 
things− that in principle only non-public reasons that are inconsistent with the spirit of reci-
procity should be excluded from the public political forum. Let me consider this point in 
greater detail. It seems plausible to maintain that this presumption in favour of liberty allows 
that in the hardest cases, when it is not possible to find a clear answer in terms of public rea-
sons alone, we may appeal to non-public reasons in a sincere spirit of reciprocity and civic 
friendship as specified above. That is, even when we cannot find enough resources within 
public reason alone, we can nonetheless remain committed to the ideal of public reason by 
advancing only reasons (e.g., inconclusive public reasons or non-public reasons) that are 
consistent with the spirit of reciprocity on which the ideal of public reason is grounded. This 
entails avoiding non-public reasons that are unreasonable in one of the two ways mentioned 
above. Obviously, however, in some cases (abortion evidently being one of them) disagree-
ment stems precisely from divergences in what reasonably seems to be the best way for en-
hancing reciprocity. For the most part, both pro-life and pro-choice advocates are not unrea-
sonable with reference to the content of the reasons that they bring to the fore. How to solve 
the impasse? Clearly, in any democratic regime, any political decision should be the outcome 
of a convergence of the majority of votes on a reasonable balance of political values.1230 And 
while disagreements may persist about how to balance political values on a specific issue, cit-
izens should nonetheless abide by political decisions that are legitimate (even if for some of 
them they such decisions may be unjust, supra) because they have been voted by a democratic 
majority committed to a liberal political conception of justice. Citizens may even ‘bear wit-
ness’ (see chapter two) to the comprehensive grounds for their opposition to legitimate politi-
                                                        
1230 Ibid. for instance 243. 
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cal decisions.1231 Now the problem is that, while in cases of inconclusiveness there may be a 
plurality of determinate reasonable balances of political values and so reasonable disagree-
ment about alternative (but equally legitimate) outcomes is likely to persist (infra), when pub-
lic reason is indeterminate no determinate reasonable balance of political values is actually 
available on the basis of public reason alone. And, as I have just said, appealing to one’s 
commitment to the criterion of political reciprocity does not seem to be sufficient by itself to 
settle the issue: finally the question at hand must be politically decided. How to do so? 
(2A) It is not true that in conditions of absolute uncertainty (indeterminacy) public reason 
is completely silent about how we should behave.1232 While in these cases public reason alone 
is not able to provide any particular answer about the subject discussed, it still reminds us that 
we are free and equal cooperating fellow citizens and that we have a reciprocal duty of civility 
to honour. This is no small thing. Accordingly, one possible solution would be the following. 
Since the ideal of public reason to which we are committed is unable to provide any determi-
nate public ground for a reasonable solution, then justifications of the kind A and B1 are pre-
cluded. Moreover, if our commitment to political reciprocity is really genuine and sincere, 
then we should acknowledge that we cannot consistently hold such a commitment to political 
reciprocity while at the same time attempting to coerce other free and equal persons exclu-
sively on the basis of a non-public reason that they can reasonably reject. This would be a 
form of unreasonableness of the second kind (U2). Thus, if we are sincerely committed to po-
litical reciprocity, in cases in which public reason is indeterminate and a public justification 
for coercion cannot be provided, we should acknowledge that the only alternative compatible 
with the criterion of reciprocity between free and equal persons is to go back to the presump-
tion in favour of liberty: reasonable persons –by the very fact of being reasonable− refuse to 
coerce other reasonable persons on grounds they cannot be reasonably expected to en-
                                                        
1231 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 466, note 57. 
1232 Pace Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice, 148-149. 
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dorse.1233 To be clear, this is an admittedly provisional solution: lacking any determinate pub-
lic ground to adopt a more specific policy, we can do nothing but treating others equally as 
free and equal persons. Moreover, reasonableness must go both ways: the harder the case, the 
more divisive the issue, the more the compromise and practical wisdom must be pondered.1234 
As a critic has rightly emphasised, ‘reasonableness is surely a matter of degree.’1235 Indeed, 
reasonable disagreement will persist. However, public reason does not aim to produce agree-
ment on ultimate truths. Rather, it tries to contain disagreement within a reasonable common 
perspective. For example, I have already said that public reason cannot answer the question of 
the personhood of the foetus. Thus, public reason seems to be indeterminate about the ques-
tion of abortion. It is said that neither a right to nor a ban of abortion can be justified on the 
basis of public reason alone. Nonetheless, whether or not to criminalise abortion is an im-
portant political issue that a democratic state must inevitably decide upon. According to crit-
ics, public reason is unable to settle the question precisely because it is indeterminate. How-
ever, according to the argument developed here, a qualified right to abortion (for instance dur-
ing the first trimester) seems to be the only reasonable option compatible with a presumption 
in favour of liberty in the absence of any public justification for coercing women not to have 
an abortion. In other words, an absolute ban of abortion would be unreasonable because it 
would coerce women without providing any public ground for such a coercion (as discussed 
under U2, see above). This solution seems reasonable because it leaves pro-life supporters 
free to decide not to have an abortion. Indeed, they may complain that in this way they are 
obliged to live in a society that, according to their views, allows something like infanticide. 
This is a very serious complaint and it should be carefully taken into account. But lacking any 
public justification for coercion, political liberals should grant priority to individual liberty. 
However, the great advantage of public reason is that it allows disagreement to endure and 
                                                        
1233 For instance, with reference to abortion Dombrowski remarks that ‘[i]f one could prohibit abortion without violating 
the rights of the pregnant woman who wants an abortion, then Rawls would see the “pro-life” position as politically rea-
sonable. But this seems impossible. By way of contrast, it is at least possible, and perhaps likely, that permitting first 
trimester abortions does not violate the rights of any person.’ Daniel A. Dombrowski, Rawls and Religion: The Case for 
Political Liberalism, 127. See also Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 480: abortion’s opponents ‘need not 
themselves exercise the right to abortion. They can recognize the right as belonging to legitimate law enacted in ac-
cordance with legitimate political institutions and public reason, and therefore not resist it with force. Forceful re-
sistance is unreasonable: it would mean attempting to impose by force their own comprehensive doctrine that a majori-
ty of other citizens who follow public reason, not unreasonably, do not accept.’ Emphasis added. 
1234 See Stephen Macedo, “In Defense of Liberal Public Reason: Are Slavery and Abortion Hard Cases?” 
1235 Marilyn Friedman, “John Rawls and the Political Coercion of Unreasonable People,” 19. 
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develop within a shared perspective, that is, within wide public reason itself. Thus, pro-life 
supporters may continue to advocate publicly against abortion, also by presenting their reli-
gion-based arguments in accordance with B2 (i.e., without presenting also public reasons that 
support those religion-based arguments), for instance the claim that “human life is sacred and 
should be protected from its beginning” mentioned above. The important thing is that other 
citizens are not coerced exclusively on the basis of reasons that they could reasonably reject. 
Even when public reason is indeterminate, discussion can continue without degenerating into 
open social conflict, and individual freedom is politically protected by a justificatory pre-
sumption in favour of liberty. As I have said, compromise and political wisdom are needed. 
So one could imagine that norms regulating abortion may evolve taking into account new are-
as of “overlapping consensus,” for instance restricting or broadening the possibility to have an 
abortion; a choice that normally nobody makes light-heartedly. But such new areas of consen-
sus can emerge only thanks to a shared discursive framework which includes disagreement 
without annihilating it, but limiting its most radical disruptive effects. The moral ground of 
this perspective, I argued, is a consistent commitment to a spirit of political reciprocity be-
tween free and equal cooperating citizens. 
(2B) Fortunately, however, ‘our standard epistemological situation is an overabundance, 
not a paucity, of reasons.’1236 Should we abandon public reason because of its (quite frequent) 
inconclusiveness? The answer is no. As I have said before, in a democratic society many dif-
ferent determinate and reasonable balances of political values can be considered as legitimate 
outcome of public political discussion and decision. The choice between equally reasonable 
balances is made by appealing to the majority principle. In effect, Rawls argues that: 
‘[D]isputed questions, such as that of abortion, may lead to a stand-off between 
different political conceptions, and citizens must simply vote on the question. In-
deed, this is the normal case: unanimity of views is not to be expected. Reasona-
ble political conceptions of justice do not always lead to the same conclusion, nor 
do citizens holding the same conception always agree on particular issues. Yet the 
outcome of the vote is to be seen as reasonable provided all citizens of a reasona-
bly just constitutional regime sincerely vote in accordance with the idea of public 
                                                        
1236 Gerald F. Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism, 155. 
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reason. This does not mean the outcome is true or correct, but it is for the moment 
reasonable, and binding on citizens by the majority principle.’1237 
Even more clearly, Rawls stresses not only the idea of reasonableness but also the idea of 
legitimacy by saying that: 
‘[T]he outcome of the vote […] is to be seen as legitimate provided all gov-
ernment officials, supported by other reasonable citizens, of a just constitutional 
regime sincerely vote in accordance with the idea of public reason. This does not 
mean that the outcome is true or correct, but that it is reasonable and legitimate 
law, binding on citizens by the majority principle.’1238 
To simplify, the binding character of a political decision rests on its legitimacy, and the lat-
ter depends on its being a reasonable alternative (possibly among other reasonable alterna-
tives) which has been approved by the majority sincerely voting in accordance with the idea 
of public reason. This seems to reinforce the idea that what really matters is a sincere com-
mitment to the moral political ground of public reason. Only such a commitment somehow 
qualifies the majority rule. Indeed, Rawls maintains that ‘when, on a constitutional essential 
or matter of basic justice, all appropriate government officials act from and follow public rea-
son, and when all reasonable citizens think of themselves ideally as if they were legislators 
following public reason, the legal enactment expressing the opinion of the majority is legiti-
mate law.’1239 In few words, even when public reason is inconclusive citizens are able to rec-
ognise a political decision as legitimate and binding because it is a reasonable outcome voted 
by the majority in accordance with public reason.1240 Therefore, inconclusiveness is not 
                                                        
1237 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, liii-liv. Emphases added. 
1238 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 479-480. Emphases added. 
1239 Ibid. 446, emphases added. 
1240 See Rawls’s remarks about opposition to abortion quoted above. 
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enough to urge citizens to relinquish the idea of public reason.1241 As Rawls points out, public 
reason is important also when it is inconclusive, because it explains why citizens can disagree 
on a political decision while at the same time they accept it as a legitimate law, and, as such, 
as a law that is binding on them. Rawls argues that  
‘[P]olitical liberalism does not hold that the ideal of public reason should al-
ways lead to a general agreement of views, nor is it a fault that it does not. Citi-
zens learn and profit from debate and argument and when their arguments follow 
public reason, they instruct society’s political culture and deepen their under-
standing of one another even when agreement cannot be reached.’1242 
In line with these remarks, it might be said that when public reason is inconclusive, it is all 
the more crucial to remain committed to the ideal of public reason itself. Inconclusiveness 
backed by a commitment to the moral political ideal of public reason may permit the reab-
sorption of otherwise disruptive disagreements, while leaving the door open to the emersion 
of a more shared reasonable perspective.1243 It even favours the emersion of such a perspec-
tive, because it makes a debate possible which (pace Habermas) is not pre-determined but 
which is grounded in a shared moral commitment to political reciprocity. If I am correct about 
this, it is not difficult to see that public reason is dynamic. It can move from a condition of 
stable and almost “universal” agreement about the most reasonable alternative, to phases of 
inconclusiveness and contestation, to a new consensus and so on. In its dynamism, public rea-
son draws not only from its internal resources, but also from the resources coming from the 
background culture. Moreover, some elements of what is generally considered public may be-
                                                        
1241 As Quong puts it (“On the Idea of Public Reason,” 267-268), ‘even if the content of public reason is too abstract to 
provide a single determinate answer to any important political question we might face, this does not mean that public 
reason fails to be suitably complete. So long as the content of public reason alone provides enough normative material 
to arrive at one or more reasonable answers, this degree of completeness is all citizens require in order to be able to es-
chew non-public reasoning over essential matters.’ Although Quong’s view of public reason is more consensual than 
the view that I advocate, I agree with him on the fact that showing that public reason is sometimes inconclusive is not 
enough for urging citizens to abandon it. However, to be clear, I underline (I hope superfluously) that I also agree with 
him that a mere reliance on non-public reasons (that is reliance on non-public reasons without a commitment to the ide-
al of public reason analysed above) on fundamental political questions would be unreasonable and inconsistent with the 
duty of civility: no legitimate law (at least in the liberal sense) could be supported by exclusively non-public reasons, 
that is without at least a sincere commitment to political reciprocity and civic friendship: supra for my account of how 
the proviso can be satisfied. 
1242 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 480-481, emphases added. 
1243 For a similar idea, see Michael J. Perry, Love and Power, 95. 
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come non-public at a certain moment and vice versa.1244 For instance, think to the progressive 
formation of the contemporary consensus about the notion of political equality regardless of 
one’s census, race, and gender. A posteriori we may certainly say that many of the views that 
in the past denied an equal status of citizenship to certain groups (poor people, black people, 
women…) were clearly unreasonable. But it could be that in the past they were part of a kind 
of “public reason” very different from contemporary liberal democratic public reason, which 
was progressively questioned and contested, also thanks to the contributions coming from re-
ligious perspectives. The emersion of a more democratic common standpoint may be the re-
sult of sources, forces, and struggles external to current public reason.1245 In fact, as Boettcher 
perceptively observes, for opening up these possibilities of renewal and greater inclusion po-
litical liberalism ‘seems to require its reasonable citizens to maintain multiple interpretations 
of basic political values.’1246 Therefore, some degree of inconclusiveness may even be a posi-
tive asset for the ideal of public reason in terms of its capacity to evolve over time and to in-
clude new social groups and political issues. Elsewhere, Boettcher maintains that ‘public rea-
son does not present a populist conception of public justification that would require a citizen 
to adopt and present those arguments that would in fact be endorsed by all other citizens. Ra-
ther, the idea of public reason instructs each citizen to seek agreement by identifying first-
person political justifications that satisfy the criterion of reciprocity.’1247 Pace Gaus (supra), 
then, Rawls’s public reason is not a “vox populi, vox dei” consensual mechanism that pre-
scribes a single answer to every question. Rather, public reason is permeated by debate: it re-
absorbs disagreement within a shared frame without annihilating it. For this reason, public 
reason can stand on its foot even when it is inconclusive. This is not a flaw in the theory. Ra-
ther, this is a crucial dimension of political liberalism as a liberal meta-theory of political le-
gitimacy and toleration.  
                                                        
1244 See Chad Flanders, “The Mutability of Public Reason,” 199-201. 
1245 See again Chad Flanders, “The Mutability of Public Reason,” 192-196 and for fuller accounts of these struggles see 
in their entirety the contributions by David A. J. Richards “Public Reason and Abolitionist Dissent,” and Judith Shklar, 
“American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion,” Tanner Lectures on Human Values, University of Utah (May 1-2, 
1989), available at URL = http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/s/shklar90.pdf.  
1246 James W. Boettcher, “What is Reasonableness?” 616. 
1247 James W. Boettcher, “Public Reason and Religion,” 127. 
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In conclusion, Rawls does not aim at solving reasonable disagreement once and for all. Ra-
ther he aims at including it within a common shared moral and political frame, so that it does 
not endanger stability for the right reasons. On the contrary, as we have seen, the fact that cit-
izens are committed to the ideal of public reason while they disagree not only about their 
comprehensive views, but also about the most reasonable balance of political values may 
strengthen stability for the right reasons. As Rawls says, ‘political liberalism does not hold 
that the ideal of public reason should always lead to a general agreement of views […] Citi-
zens learn and profit from debate and argument, and when their arguments follow public rea-
son, they instruct society’s political culture and deepen their understanding of one another 
even when agreement cannot be reached.’1248 This means, as it has been emphasised, that 
‘while public reason may not be able to lay down necessary and sufficient conditions to solve 
a case, it can contribute to a better atmosphere between citizens of a liberal democratic poli-
ty. And with this better atmosphere, one can suppose also that political deliberation becomes 
less difficult.’1249 To recapitulate what I have just explained, the cases in which public reason 
is indeterminate will endure. However, they do not defeat the ideal of public reason, because 
they are quite rare (the most important hard cases with reference to indeterminacy are eutha-
nasia and abortion) and, above all, because citizens can protract the discussion without tearing 
each other apart by abiding by the norms of the wide view of public reason analysed above. 
The problem, however, is that, in any case, in the end a political decision must be made. How 
to do so? The idea proposed above is that when it is impossible to provide a public justifica-
tion because public reason is indeterminate, a political liberal should rely on a presumption in 
favour of liberty, while at the same time public reason allows reasonable disagreements to 
freely develop within its structure, which morally shapes continued discussion. Even in the 
more frequent cases of inconclusiveness, public reason is not defeated. First, as I mentioned, it 
may be that a consensus on a single balance of political values gradually emerges thanks to 
the interplay between public political culture and background culture, because public reason 
makes it possible for the extended discussion about disagreeing views to remain within limits 
compatible with the existence of a society which is stable for the right reasons. Second, a 
commitment to public reason explains why one can believe that a political decision is not the 
most reasonable or just one while at the same time believing that it is politically legitimate. 
                                                        
1248 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 480-481. 
1249 Sebastiano Maffettone, Rawls: An Introduction, 288, emphasis added. 
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This is so not only because such a decision has been adopted following democratic proce-
dures and the majority rule, but also because it is compatible with and expresses citizens’ sta-
tus as free and equal, since its justification ultimately relies on a commitment to the ideal of 
public reason and political reciprocity as its moral political foundation. 
Let me conclude by specifying a crucial point. The fact that public reason can reabsorb and 
include reasonable disagreement (without flattening or annihilating it) within public reason it-
self as a shared frame explains why I think that a conception of citizenship grounded in public 
reason can resolve the problem that I outlined in the first chapter. There, I said that the chal-
lenge of a broadened and deepened reasonable pluralism connected with the long-lasting and 
irreversible presence of Islam in European societies can be taken on only by providing a 
shared discursive platform. In chapter five, I will show why public reason may represent such 
a platform and how it can solve the articulated theoretical problem that I am considering in 
this study. 
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Chapter Five 
Reconciliation through Public Reason:  
Justificatory Evaluative Political Theory 
between Modelling and Application.  
 
To assume that any culture is in-
herently illiberal, and incapable of 
reform, is ethnocentric and ahis-
torical. Moreover, the liberality of 
a culture is a matter of degree. All 
cultures have illiberal strands, just 
as few cultures are entirely repres-
sive of individual liberty. Indeed, it 
is quite misleading to talk of “lib-
eral” and “illiberal” cultures, as 
if the world was divided into com-
pletely liberal societies on the one 
hand, and completely illiberal ones 
on the other. The task of liberal re-
form remains incomplete in every 
society […]. 
 
In the last two chapters, I developed the reconstructive part of my study. In this chapter, I 
will bridge the reconstructive and the evaluative tasks, while the next will be entirely devoted 
to the evaluative analysis. 
 
                                                        
 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, 94. 
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5.1 Modelling Public Reason Citizenship. 
 
In this section, I try to summarise my justificatory evaluative model of public reason citi-
zenship. It is based on what in 2.3 I defined as the three political liberal evaluative require-
ments (RR, CR, CiR). Figure 6 in chapter two illustrates their connections and how to proceed 
in the liberal evaluation that I suggest undertaking. I specified the content of those three eval-
uative requirements in chapters three and four. Thus, I spelled out PR1, PR2, and PR3 as 
structuring components of CR. Moreover, I have restated CiR in terms of CiR*. Now let me 
recapitulate this model in order to facilitate its application in the evaluative part of this study 
(6.2, 6.3, and 6.4). Here I just summarise the main points: I do not present a full-fledged ar-
gument for each requirement and its specifications, since such arguments have already been 
developed in chapters two, three, and four. 
(RR) In chapters one and two, I formulated the reciprocity requirement as involving the 
“acknowledgment of the need for a public justification in public discussions about fundamen-
tal political questions.” I said that, according to political liberalism, citizens should be able to 
say whether other fellow citizens (Muslims and non-Muslims) recognise the necessity for a 
public justification of the conception of citizenship, the fundamental policies, laws, and insti-
tutions. In 3.2.b.1, I presented the content of RR by emphasising its connection with the crite-
rion of reciprocity. I said that “an account of public reason as an ideal of democratic citizen-
ship is based on the (moral) political criterion of reciprocity, which is the moral ideal express-
ing the relationship of mutual recognition between free and equal rational and reasonable co-
operating fellow citizens.” In 4.2 I also specified this understanding of reciprocity as “reci-
procity of the reasonable.” Thus, in this study the recognition of the necessity for a public jus-
tification in public discussion and deliberation about fundamental political questions is ex-
pressed in (and can be evaluated through the lens of) the recognition of the criterion of reci-
procity of the reasonable, which consists in the reciprocal recognition between reasonable 
free and equal cooperating citizens who possess a capacity for a sense of justice and a capac-
ity for a conception of the good. Accordingly, the political liberal evaluation that I develop 
with reference to RR in 6.2 consists of asking: does the European Muslim perspective in 
question affirm the criterion of reciprocity of the reasonable? 
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(CR) In the first chapter, I argued that for the evaluation that I have in mind it is important 
to know whether other fellow citizens take part in public justification in a way that is con-
sistent with the idea of public reason. As I explained in 2.3, this means evaluating the con-
sistency between the conception of public reasoning that members of a particular comprehen-
sive doctrine uphold as fully justified and the conception of public reason politically (or pro 
tanto) justified by the meta-theoretical perspective of political liberalism. For this reason, I 
call this requirement “consistency requirement.” In chapter three, I presented three dimen-
sions of CR: PR1, PR2, and PR3 (see 3.2.b.1, 3.2.b.2, and 3.2.b.3). They specify the features 
of a liberal political conception of public reason and represent the dimensions in respect of 
which I conduct the evaluation of consistency. PR1 maintains that “to endorse public reason 
involves engaging in political reconciliation.” PR2 affirms that “to endorse public reason in-
volves the recognition of belonging to a common democratic public political culture with its 
central ‘organizing idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation between free and 
equal persons viewed as fully cooperating members of society over a complete life’.” Finally, 
PR3 holds that “to endorse public reason involves being committed to its requirements when 
discussing (i) in a public political forum (ii) political questions involving fundamental consti-
tutional rights and liberties and chief questions of basic justice. Though not normatively bind-
ing, its being honoured in a wider range of cases expresses a stronger sense of reciprocity be-
tween fellow citizens.” Note that my interpretation of the qualifications under PR3 (that is, 
the concept of public political forum and the kind of questions that fall under the requirements 
of public reason) is analysed and developed in detail in chapter three. However, in 6.3 I con-
sider whether the conception of public reasoning presented as a European Muslim approach to 
the issue of citizenship in Western Europe is consistent with PR1, PR2, and PR3. Thus, with 
reference to CR the political liberal evaluation that I apply in 6.3 consists of asking: does the 
European Muslim perspective in question present an account of public reasoning which is 
consistent with the features of public reason as expressed by PR1, PR2, and PR3? 
(CiR) As I have explained, the civility requirement concerns whether and how public rea-
son is concretely honoured in public discussions of fundamental political questions, for one 
discharges her duty of civility by honouring public reason. In 3.2.b.1, I formulated CiR in 
these terms: “if one endorses a moral criterion of reciprocity and, consequently, is committed 
to a liberal principle of legitimacy, she should also abide by the limits imposed by the idea of 
public reason in public political discussions.” Then, in 4.2, after having clarified my interpre-
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tation of the proviso that divides the duty of civility in two levels, I reformulated CiR as 
CiR*, so that it becomes possible to answer the question of how and when citizens honour 
public reason. CiR* says that “one abides by the ideal of public reason if in her effort to pub-
licly justify a political position in public political discussion she appeals to: (A) properly pub-
lic reasons, (B1) non-public reasons supported by public reasons, or (B2) non-public reasons 
which embody a sincere and consistent commitment to the spirit of reciprocity underpinning 
the ideal of public reason (the fact that this commitment must be sincere and consistent means 
that those non-public reasons cannot be unreasonable in the sense specified by U1 and U2).” 
Consequently, the political liberal evaluation concerning CiR* developed in 6.4 addresses the 
question: does the European Muslim perspective in question really honour the duty of civility 
(by appealing to properly public reasons, non-public reasons supported by public reasons, or 
non-public reasons that reflect a sincere and consistent commitment to the spirit of reciproci-
ty)? 
In Table 2, I summarise my justificatory evaluative model of public reason citizenship 
based on the three political liberal evaluative requirements. In chapter six, I apply the evalua-
tive questions as reported in the last column on the right in the table.  
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Table 2 The Justificatory Evaluative Model of Public Reason Citizenship. 
 
Evaluative 
requirements 
 
Main ques-
tion 
 
Specification 
 
Content 
 
Evaluative  
question 
 
Reciprocity 
Requirement 
(RR) 
Do citizens 
recognise the 
necessity for a 
public justifi-
cation? 
 
Criterion of 
reciprocity of 
the reasonable 
It is based on the criterion 
asserting the moral political 
ideal that expresses the rela-
tionship of mutual recognition 
between free and equal ra-
tional and reasonable cooper-
ating fellow citizens. 
Does the European 
Muslim perspective 
in question affirm the 
criterion of reci-
procity of the rea-
sonable? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consistency 
Requirement 
(CR) 
 
 
Do citizens 
consistently 
participate in 
the process of 
public justifi-
cation from 
the perspec-
tive of public 
reason? (Al-
ternatively: is 
their concep-
tion of public 
reasoning 
consistent 
with the idea 
of public rea-
son?) 
 
PR1 
To endorse public reason in-
volves engaging in political 
reconciliation. 
 
 
 
Does the European 
Muslim perspective 
in question present 
an account of public 
reasoning which is 
consistent with the 
features of public 
reason as expressed 
by PR1, PR2, and 
PR3? 
 
 
PR2 
To endorse public reason in-
volves the recognition of be-
longing to a common demo-
cratic public political culture 
with its idea of society as a 
fair system of social coopera-
tion between free and equal 
persons. 
 
 
 
PR3 
 
To endorse public reason in-
volves being committed to its 
requirements when discussing 
(i) in a public political forum 
(ii) political questions involv-
ing fundamental constitution-
al rights and liberties and 
chief questions of basic jus-
tice.  
 
 
 
 
 
Civility  
Requirement 
(CiR) 
 
 
 
Is public rea-
son concretely 
honoured in 
public discus-
sions of fun-
damental po-
litical ques-
tions? 
 
 
 
 
 
CiR* 
One abides by the ideal of 
public reason if in her effort 
to publicly justify a political 
position in public political 
discussions she appeals to: 
(A) properly public reasons, 
(B1) non-public reasons sup-
ported by public reasons, or 
(B2) non-public reasons 
which embody a sincere and 
consistent commitment to the 
spirit of reciprocity underpin-
ning the ideal of public rea-
son. The fact that this com-
mitment must be sincere and 
consistent means that those 
non-public reasons cannot be 
unreasonable in the sense 
specified by U1 and U2. 
 
Does the European 
Muslim perspective 
in question honour 
the duty of civility in 
practice (by appeal-
ing to properly pub-
lic reasons, non-
public reasons sup-
ported by public rea-
sons, or non-public 
reasons that reflects 
a sincere and con-
sistent commitment to 
the spirit of reciproc-
ity)? 
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So far, I have explained the justificatory evaluative model of public reason citizenship: in 
chapter two, I presented the evaluative approach, while, in chapters three and four, I recon-
structed the arguments underlying the three evaluative requirements, their foundations, and 
their qualifications. However, I must still demonstrate that a conception of citizenship 
grounded in public reason is not only desirable, but also possible given the actual conditions 
of Western European democratic societies (5.2.a). Moreover, with reference to the problem 
that I outlined in 1.2, I must explain why public reason citizenship is also preferable if com-
pared with competing conceptions which are close to it (5.2.b), by showing that it is able to 
solve the above mentioned problem more effectively (5.2.c). If this can be done, at the end of 
5.2 I will have conclusively demonstrated that public reason as normative conception of citi-
zenship for contemporary Western Europe is desirable, possible, and more suitable than its 
alternatives: therefore it not only could but should be adopted as the ideal conception of citi-
zenship for European societies. In other words, my aim here is to show that public reason citi-
zenship stands out as a realistically utopian project of political reconciliation. 
 
5.2 Public Reason Citizenship: An Appealing Normative Model for Con-
temporary Europe. 
 
5.2.A Between Ideal and Non-Ideal: Application of the Model to Contemporary Eu-
ropean Societies.  
Rawls regards a closed society ‘as self-contained and as having no relations with other so-
cieties. Its members enter it only by birth and leave only by death.’1250 Rawls, as I have said, 
is fully conscious that this is a ‘considerable abstraction,’ but he thinks that such an abstrac-
tion is ‘justified only because it enables us to focus on certain main questions free from dis-
tracting details.’1251 Moreover, his theorising about public reason is on quite an abstract and 
idealised level. In fact, he openly says that ‘the idea of public reason […] belongs to a con-
                                                        
1250 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 12. 
1251 Ibid. 
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ception of a well-ordered constitutional democratic society.’1252 Now, with reference to the 
connection between Rawls’s theoretical strategy and the problem I am considering in this 
study, an essential question that must be answered is the following: why does this research 
not consider one or more European society or societies (for instance, France, Germany, Italy, 
or the UK) as they actually are? I claim that public reason is a viable and appealing normative 
ideal for these societies. Yet, I also pointed out that existing European societies are not fully 
just and well-ordered societies, so, apparently, the ideal of public reason −which belongs to a 
conception of a well-ordered and fully just society− could not apply to those societies. In oth-
er words, now I must face the difficult question of if and under what conditions the ideal of 
public reason can work in non-ideal conditions. In his article in the 2014 Blackwell Compan-
ion to Rawls, Jonathan Quong rightly asks: ‘[i]f Rawls’s conception of public reason is only 
intended for an ideally just and well-ordered society, how should citizens behave in our im-
perfect and nonideal world?’1253 Quong does not answer this question, but he underscores the 
fact that ‘[t]his is a hugely important question that has received insufficient attention.’1254 
In this section, I try to answer Quong’s question. To do that, let me start by calling to the 
memory a point I have raised in 1.2.a, 3.2.b.1 and in the introduction to chapter four. There, I 
have maintained that both: (1) the ideal of public reason belongs to a conception of a well-
ordered society; and that (2) the ideal of public reason is normatively relevant for those socie-
ties which are not fully just and well-ordered. Is there any inconsistency between these two 
claims? No, I think there is not. As Paul Weithman perceptively observes,1255 when Rawls 
says that the ideal of public reason ‘belongs to a conception of a well-ordered constitutional 
democracy’ and that ‘[t]he form and content of this reason […] are part of the idea of democ-
racy itself,’1256 he wants to say that no well-ordered society is possible without honouring this 
ideal. The fact that compliance with the ideal of public reason is a condition for stability of a 
                                                        
1252 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 440. Emphasis added. 
1253 Jonathan Quong, “On the Idea of Public Reason,” 270. 
1254 Ibid. 
1255 Paul J. Weithman, Religion and the Obligations of Citizenship, 182-183. 
1256 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 440-441. 
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fair system of social cooperation1257 is repeated several times in Political Liberalism.1258 
Whilst Rawls himself states that the three conditions that he mentions for a society to be a fair 
and stable system of cooperation (namely, the fact that the basic structure of society is regu-
lated by a political conception of justice, the existence of an overlapping consensus, and com-
pliance with public reason) are sufficient and not necessary conditions,1259 it should be noted 
that he immediately adds that ‘the three conditions express an ideal case.’1260 Stability for the 
right reasons of an ideally well-ordered society cannot occur without an overlapping consen-
sus and the idea of public reason. On the contrary, an overlapping consensus is not necessary 
for other forms of stability and social unity, as a ‘constitutional consensus,’ that is, ‘a less 
deep consensus on the principles and rules of a workable political constitution [which] may 
be sufficient for less demanding purposes and far easier to obtain,’1261 because in such con-
sensus constitutional democratic principles ‘are accepted simply as principles and not as 
grounded in certain ideas of society and person of a political conception, much less in a 
shared public conception. And so the consensus is not deep.’1262 So, I fundamentally agree 
with Weithman when he says that –at least in “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” Rawls 
seems to claim that ‘no society is well-ordered unless its citizens and public officials perfectly 
comply with the requirements of public reason.’1263 As Chad Flanders puts it, ‘[t]he ideal of 
public reason is part of ideal theory, after all.’1264  
                                                        
1257 Note that these conditions are different from the characteristic features of a well-ordered society. As mentioned in 
the previous chapters, the latter are the following: ‘everyone accepts, and knows that everyone else accepts, the very 
same principles of justice,’ ‘its basic structure[…] is publicly known […] to satisfy these principles,’ ‘citizens have a 
normally effective sense of justice.’ John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 35. 
1258 Ibid. xlvii-xlviii and 44. 
1259 Ibid. 44, note 46. See also 149. 
1260 Ibid. 44, note 46. 
1261 Ibid. 149. See also 158-168. 
1262 Ibid. 158. 
1263 Paul J. Weithman, Religion and the Obligations of Citizenship, 183. 
1264 Chad Flanders, “The Mutability of Public Reason,” 195. 
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However, it seems plausible to say –as Weithman suggests1265− that the idea of a well-
ordered society plays a more and more a diminished role in Rawls’s theory from A Theory of 
Justice to Political Liberalism and –even more so− to “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 
because now Rawls’s attention is not primarily focused on showing that a well-ordered socie-
ty is possible. Rather, he wants to show how an overlapping consensus is possible.1266 Then, 
he increasingly emphasises the two conditions leading to a well-ordered society (the idea of 
an overlapping consensus and the idea of public reason), while he leaves in the background of 
the theory a single unified definition of a well-ordered society. In few words, he seems to be 
less concerned with the ideal dimension of his theory than with the mechanisms and processes 
that his theory shapes and sustains and which eventually lead to ideal results. These remarks 
are in line with what I said in chapter three, where the overall project of Political Liberalism 
(with “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”) was presented as a liberal meta-theory of tolera-
tion and legitimacy.1267 This process is exemplified in the shift of emphasis from the defini-
tion of a well-ordered society as one in which ‘everyone accepts, and knows that everyone 
else accepts, the very same principles of justice,’1268 to the idea that the content of public rea-
son is specified by a family of reasonable political conceptions and that ‘there are many forms 
of public reason.’1269 Political liberalism does not prescribes a single set of ultimate principles 
of political justice: it does not have to show that the principles of justice as fairness are true or 
the most reasonable ones (even though they may be the true or the most reasonable principles 
of justice, but it is not necessary that political liberalism −as a meta-theory of toleration and 
legitimacy− takes sides on this question). It is not the aim of Rawls’s political liberalism to 
say once and for all which conception of justice should regulate the basic structure of society. 
What counts is that society’s basic structure is regulated by some reasonable liberal political 
conception of justice and by the ideal of public reason, whose content is specified by a family 
                                                        
1265 Paul J. Weithman, Religion and the Obligations of Citizenship. 198. 
1266 Recall the fundamental question of Political Liberalism (4): ‘how is it possible for there to exist over time a just and 
stable society of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and 
moral doctrines?’ 
1267 For this, see supra and Sebastiano Maffettone, Rawls: An Introduction, 215 (Maffettone says: ‘[b]asically, in [Polit-
ical Liberalism], Rawls presents a kind of meta-theory of political legitimation, based on liberal tolerance’). 
1268 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 35. Emphasis added. 
1269 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 450. 
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of such conceptions. Rawls also says that ‘the idea of public reason is not a view of specific 
political institutions, but a view about how they are to be argued for and justified,’1270 thus 
suggesting that the question of compliance with public reason does not exhaust the question 
of well-ordered institutions (a matter that only a single and complete conception of justice can 
settle). Finally, the idea that the ideal dimension of a well-ordered society –while fundamental 
for the normative and regulative purposes of the (meta)theory− is not the main analytical fo-
cus of his political liberalism is captured by the fact that he begins from the public political 
culture of existing democracies. Therefore, the intuition is that here and now (that is, in the 
public culture of our actual and not well-ordered societies) one can find the fundamental ideas 
from which one can begin the elaboration of a normative theory (saying how we should be-
have toward the ideal). Thus, we have two parallel processes the main ideas of which are not 
alien to the original edition of Political Liberalism (see 3.2.b.1), but which are much more ev-
ident in “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited:” (1) an increased emphasis on the conditions 
leading to a well-ordered society rather than on the definition of what a well-ordered society 
looks like and (2) an increased emphasis on the plurality of sources characterising one of 
those two conditions, namely, the idea of public reason (note that the concept of an overlap-
ping consensus is in itself a plural concept).  
In line with the previous remarks, Weithman underscores another point, which is crucial to 
my purposes here. After having noted that, in a plausible reading of Rawls, ‘no society is 
well-ordered unless its citizens and public officials perfectly comply with the requirements of 
public reason,’ he adds that ‘[t]his does not imply that the duty of civility and the proviso are 
binding only in well-ordered society or that they do not bind in actual ones.’1271 It would be a 
mistake to think that the ideal of public reason, while being a defining feature of an ideal con-
ception of liberal democracy, has no normative grip in non-ideal conditions. There are three 
strong arguments for the opposite view. (A) First, we should bear in mind what I have just 
said, namely, that plausibly in Political Liberalism and “The Idea of Public Reason Revisit-
ed,” Rawls’s main concern is with the implications of his liberal meta-theory of toleration and 
legitimacy, rather than with the features of an ideally defined well-ordered society. (B) Sec-
ond, the very characterisation of Rawls’s normative project –including public reason− as real-
                                                        
1270 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, lii note 28. 
1271 Paul J. Weithman, Religion and the Obligations of Citizenship, 183. 
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istically utopian (supra),1272 that is, as a project which ‘presents how things might be [… ,] 
what is possible and can be,’1273 once –if ever− actual people in “flesh and blood” live their 
political lives as citizens in accordance with a normative political conception of justice and its 
sustaining normative ideal of public reason. (C) Third [and consistently with (b)], the fact that 
in Political Liberalism Rawls provides examples of public reason’s normative grip even in 
societies which are not well-ordered (see chapter four for the cases presented in the inclusive 
view), while in the following revised account he says that it ‘secures what is needed,’1274 
clearly meaning that this revised account is able to cover the cases covered by the original one 
(and other cases in addition, supra, chapter four), including non-ideal cases.1275 Therefore, 
from (a), (b), and (c) one may conclude that the ideal of public reason clearly aspires to have a 
normative power also in not fully just and well-ordered societies. Prima facie, then, the fact 
that actual European societies are not well-ordered in the ideal sense is not an obstacle to the 
recognition of public reason as an ideal of democratic citizenship specifying a normative 
standard for a civic practice of public justification even in those societies. We can behave in 
accordance with the ideal of public reason and consider it as the regulative ideal guiding our 
public political action, even though we do not live in fully just societies. 
Is there, however, a bottom line under which this ideal has no normative force? To be sure, 
it would be difficult to see how the ideal of public reason as the one I have sketched out could 
express binding normative requirements with reference to individuals who live under severely 
unjust institutions. Then, we must be able to say what is the relevant threshold of liberal “de-
cency” for the ideal of public reason to carry some ‘normative weight.’1276 I find very plausi-
ble James Boettcher’s claim that ‘the idea of public reason gives rise to prima facie obliga-
tions even in liberal democratic societies that are not fully well-ordered, provided that certain 
background institutional conditions are satisfied.’1277 Which are those background institu-
                                                        
1272 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, in particular 5-9 and 11-23.  
1273 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 213. 
1274 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, l. 
1275 For this point, I borrow from Weithman, Religion and the Obligations of Citizenship, 183-184. 
1276 I borrow this expression from James W. Boettcher, “The Moral Status of Public Reason,” 156. 
1277 Ibid. 158. 
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tional conditions according to Boettcher? He argues that, (1) first, requirements of public rea-
son ‘are prima facie obligations for a moral agent C only if C is a citizen of a liberal demo-
cratic society,’ and that, (2) second, ‘such a society should at least provide basic constitutional 
protections and minimally functioning liberal democratic institutions for those who would be 
obligated [, … since] it is hard to see how a person acquires or maintains role-mediated dem-
ocratic obligations while at the same time being utterly and unjustly excluded or disenfran-
chised from the relevant institutions.’1278 All this seems perfectly reasonable, but two remarks 
are in order. Note that the first condition explain why this study focuses only on the political 
relation of citizenship (at the beginning of this study, I have defined it as “the political rela-
tion specifying the mutual rights and obligations of persons who share that relation in a liberal 
democratic society”), because democratic citizenship is the only relevant relation from the 
standpoint of public reason’s normative scope, even in a not fully well-ordered society. Fur-
thermore, the second condition stated by Boettcher is admittedly vague: the requirement that 
society must pass ‘some threshold of protection and democratic functioning that allows for 
[every citizen’s] meaningful participation’1279 crucially depends on the definition of such a 
threshold. Now, Rawls seems to agree with Boettcher that once a certain threshold is reached 
(what I call the decency threshold), and once decent conditions for political debate and deci-
sion are guaranteed, then even in a not well-ordered society public reason steps forward as a 
normative ideal that promotes ( in a future-oriented perspective) justice and the well-ordering 
of the basic structure. However, I find it somewhat odd that Boettcher does not realise that a 
useful specification of the threshold is provided by Rawls himself. In 3.2.b.2 I have already 
pointed out that Rawls specifies those conditions in these terms:  
1. ‘Public financing of elections and ways of assuring the availability of public infor-
mation on matters of policy;’ 
2. ‘A certain fair equality of opportunity, especially in education and training;’ 
3. ‘A decent distribution of income and wealth meeting the third condition of liberal-
ism: all citizens must be assured the all-purpose means necessary for them to take 
intelligent and effective advantage of their basic freedoms;’ 
                                                        
1278 Ibid. 174-175. 
1279 Ibid. 175. 
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4. ‘Society as employer of last resort through general or local government, or other 
social and economic policies;’ 
5. ‘Basic health care assured for all citizens.’1280 
Those conditions, Rawls says, do not fully realise his principles of justice: then, a society 
which embodies these institutions and nothing more is not a fully well-ordered society. Still, 
he openly maintains that those conditions are ‘essential prerequisites for a basic structure 
within which the ideal of public reason […] may protect the basic liberties and prevent social 
and economic inequalities from being excessive.’1281 Clearly, then, when those condition are 
fulfilled, public reason can work. Thus, it can ‘carry some normative weight’ even in a not 
fully well-ordered society in which those conditions are present. 
Crucially for my aims, I think that, if common sense is sufficient to be persuaded that ex-
isting European liberal democracies are not well-ordered societies in the Rawlsian sense, so 
we need no further evidence to acknowledge the fact that nonetheless European societies pass 
the decency threshold test specified by Rawls. Then, public reason can work as a normative 
ideal even in the existing (and not fully well-ordered) European societies. Even though Euro-
pean societies are certainly not fully well-ordered, it would be hard to maintain that they are 
not decent in the sense specified above. Probably, it would be reasonable to conclude that 
those societies are nearly well-ordered, but we do not need to speculate too much about these 
matters and introduce such complications. Here, it is enough to demonstrate that public reason 
can lay normative claims even in societies that are not well-ordered but at least decent, that is, 
in societies which provide those minimal conditions that allow public reason to work. In few 
words, for the considerations I made above, I argue that public reason as a regulative moral 
ideal of democratic citizenship (see chapters three and four) is available also in non-ideal 
conditions. That is, public reason can perform its regulative role also in societies which are 
not well-ordered, provided that they satisfy the minimal conditions that I mentioned above.1282 
                                                        
1280 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, lvi-lvii. 
1281 Ibid. lvii. Emphases added. 
1282 I wish to express my most sincere gratitude to Leif Wenar for having discussed this point with me. 
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It is of crucial importance to note that the previous considerations are just intended to rec-
ognise: a) that even under less-than-ideal conditions public reason ‘carries some normative 
weight,’ and b) the minimal conditions (or decency threshold) for (a) to be true. However, this 
does not automatically mean that public reason should be the normative ideal for European 
not well-ordered societies. So far, I have just argued that public reason could be considered as 
a binding moral political ideal of citizenship in existing European societies. To go one step 
further and argue that such an ideal should be considered as binding, we need to analyse some 
alternative conceptions and demonstrate that public reason works better than these alterna-
tives. This is precisely what I will do in the remaining part of the chapter. 
Summing up, the normative deployment of public reason as an ideal conception of citizen-
ship does not require a fully well-ordered society: crucially for my aims, it is possible to abide 
by this normative ideal under the conditions that characterise contemporary European socie-
ties. To be clear, it would be interesting and fully reasonable to consider the following two 
questions: 
1) The degree to which each existing national case approaches and possibly influences the 
ideal conception of a well-ordered society. Taking into account such a question would 
allow the political theorist to draw some conclusions on the actual degree of cogency 
of the ideal of public reason in any particular European country (e.g., in Italy, France, 
Germany, or in the UK). 
2) The plausibility of shifting the conception of society’s basic structure from the national 
level to the level of the European Union. Assume –as Rawls does− that the basic struc-
ture is constituted of ‘a society’s main political, social, and economic institutions, and 
how they fit together into one unified system of social cooperation from one generation 
to the next,’1283 and assume –as Rawls does− that this structure is the specific subject 
of a political conception of justice because ‘the institutions of the basic structure have 
deep and long-term social effects and in fundamental ways shape citizens’ character 
and aims, the kinds of persons they are and aspire to be.’1284 Then, taking into consid-
eration the far reaching effects of the process of integration among the European Un-
                                                        
1283 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 11. 
1284 Ibid. 68. 
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ion’s member states, it would be perfectly reasonable to conclude that a political con-
ception of justice should be concerned at least with those effects of the EU’s basic 
structure which impact more directly on EU’s citizens’ life plans. While I cannot pre-
sent a full argument for that here, it would seem that the political bond of citizenship 
and the problem of the legitimacy of the exercise of coercive political power have –at 
least partially− acquired a regional dimension. For instance, consider the election of the 
EU Parliament, or the binding effects of EU regulations. Consequently, it is plausible 
to think that our conception of public reason could also be affected by (and perhaps 
should reflect) this shift. However, in this research I cannot say to what extent –if any− 
the idea of public reason should be revised in order to make room for this process of in-
tegration. 
Since I cannot analyse these issues here, I am determined to explore them in subsequent 
research, which may represent a follow-up to this study. 
In this section, I have demonstrated that public reason citizenship is a possible normative 
conception of citizenship for contemporary Western European societies as they currently are. 
Yet, how does this conception work in comparison with its alternatives? Is it in a better or 
worse position to solve the problem that I described in 1.2? 
 
5.2.B Marianne Wandering Around: Islam in Europe From a Republican Perspec-
tive. 
In 1.1.a.1, I said that today a multicultural model of citizenship seems inadequate or at 
least problematic in the specific case of Muslims with an immigrant background in Western 
Europe. Crucially, this fact is acknowledged by one of the most prominent liberal multicultur-
al theorists: Will Kymlicka. As already mentioned, after having listed several conditions 
which represent the necessary background for the implementation of his ‘ideal of multicultur-
alism-as-citizenization,’1285 Kymlicka maintains that: 
                                                        
1285 Will Kymlicka, “Multiculturalism: Success, Failure, and the Future,” 21-24. 
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‘The situation with respect to immigrant groups is more complex. The same 
factors that push for multiculturalism in relation to historic minorities have also 
generated a willingness to contemplate multiculturalism for immigrant groups. 
[…] However, MCPs [multiculturalism policies] for immigrants have run into dif-
ficulties where the situation is perceived as high-risk. Where immigrants are seen 
as predominantly unauthorized, as potential carriers of illiberal practices or 
movements, and/or as net burdens on the welfare state, then multiculturalism pos-
es perceived risks to both prudential self-interest and moral principles, and this 
perception can override the forces that support multiculturalism.’1286 
Thus, as I said in 1.1.a.1, it seems that perceptions do matter. Firstly, as we have seen, in 
contemporary Western Europe Muslims with an immigrant background fit the negative repre-
sentation described by Kymlicka. Then, according to Kymlicka himself, it is unlikely that 
multicultural policies and institutions meet widespread support in Western European socie-
ties. Unlike in Canada, in Europe it is difficult to conceive that ‘multiculturalism serves as a 
source of shared national identity and pride for native-born citizens and immigrants alike.’1287 
As a consequence, Kymlicka (rightly) fears that ‘in the absence of multiculturalism, national 
identity is more likely to lead to intolerance and xenophobia.’1288 In other words, Kymlicka’s 
considerations show the importance and urgency of solving the mutual assurance problem in 
Western Europe with reference to Muslim citizens’ loyalty to fair terms of social cooperation. 
Accordingly, in 1.2 I argued that a new kind of common identity is needed, and in 5.2.c I will 
show that my model of public reason citizenship can provide such an identity. Unfortunately, 
liberal multiculturalism cannot work in this direction with reference to Muslim citizens in 
Western Europe, because, as Kymlicka seems to acknowledge, in this specific case liberal 
multiculturalism cannot benefit from those (external) conditions that would trigger its (inter-
nal) stabilising forces. In a situation of general distrust like this, liberal multiculturalism in it-
self does not provide mechanisms through which citizens publicly assure one another that 
they will honour fair terms of social cooperation and that they will not defect. Then, the mu-
tual assurance problem is still open. Secondly, negative perceptions are frequently associated 
                                                        
1286 Ibid. 24. Emphasis added. 
1287 Ibid. 11. 
1288 Ibid. 11-12. 
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with very real phenomena of exclusion, discrimination, and alienation. Therefore, in 1.2 I ar-
gued that the only way to empower European Muslims on a basis of reciprocity is to provide 
them with adequate instruments of social critique, so that they can expose and denounce actu-
al discriminations and exclusions and have their voices heard. In 5.2.c I will explain why I 
think that public reason can equip citizens (Muslims and non-Muslims alike) with those in-
struments.1289 
As I mentioned in 1.1.a.1, I do not provide real philosophical objections against liberal 
multiculturalism in general. The reason for this is that I am not interested in confuting it as a 
philosophical view. I neither need nor desire to provide such a philosophical argument. In 
other words, I find Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism (the only version of multiculturalism I 
consider in this research) philosophically reasonable on the whole. Nonetheless, when one 
specifically considers the case of European Muslims (that is, when one restricts the scope of 
her analysis both contextually to contemporary Europe and subjectively to the situation of 
Muslims with an immigrant background), it does seem that the favourable conditions presup-
posed by liberal multiculturalism are not there, as Kymlicka himself points out. However, if 
political philosophy aspires to be realistically utopian, it should take seriously into considera-
tion the actual conditions in which it must work. I think that public reason citizenship is better 
equipped than Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism to solve the impasse that ostensibly char-
acterises the relationship between contemporary Western European societies and their Muslim 
citizens. This is because public reason citizenship is able to provide what, under these specific 
circumstances, Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism seems to many people (Kymlicka includ-
ed) unable to provide: namely, a shared common political identity and instruments of social 
critique. As I will show in 5.2.c, public reason can fulfil this role because it equips citizens 
with that identity and those instruments within a framework of reconciliation in which rea-
sonable disagreement is absorbed within an agreed discursive arena without being annihilated 
or nullified. Thus, it solves the mutual assurance problem that liberal multiculturalism leaves 
open. If solving such a problem is of crucial importance for explaining society’s stability (for 
the right reasons, and not merely as a modus vivendi or a Hobbesian stability imposed by the 
                                                        
1289 Note that a similar view –requiring both a new shared common identity and empowering instruments− is expressed 
in Aristide R. Zolberg and Long Litt Woon, “Why Islam is Like Spanish: Cultural Incorporation in Europe and the 
United States,” 18, where they say that the ‘question facing Muslim immigrants and their children in not only how they 
can overcome such practical problems but also how they can develop a sense of belonging and being comfortable’ (em-
phases added). On the same page, they also quote a similar position developed in Zianuddin Sardar, “Introduction,” in 
Muslim Minorities in the West, ed. Syed Z. Abedin and Zianuddin Sardar (London: Grey Seal, 1995), 15. 
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sovereign1290), and if the capacity for securing social stability is a an essential feature for as-
sessing the value of political theories, then, the fact that liberal multiculturalism does not 
solve the mutual assurance problem with reference to Muslims’ citizenship in contemporary 
Europe suggests that liberal multiculturalism is not an adequate framework for theorising 
Muslims’ citizenship in Europe, no matter how valuable it is in other contexts. 
Until now, I have discussed an important philosophical “alternative” to my model of ideal 
citizenship for contemporary Western European societies: (liberal) multiculturalism. Howev-
er, in this section, I would like to analyse a second possible alternative to the idea of public 
reason that I developed so far. 
Cécile Laborde has presented a republican account of citizenship for European Muslims in 
her book Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy.1291 Be-
cause of the thoroughness and elegance of her work, critical republicanism represents an im-
portant alternative to the idea of public reason I adopt here. However, it seems to me that her 
theses do not contradict the basic tenets of public reason. Nonetheless, since she openly 
adopts a (revised) republican position concerning citizenship, one might legitimately ask what 
are the main differences between her positions and the idea I embrace here. Second, one may 
ask which of the two positions is best equipped for dealing with the issue at stake. For this 
reason, let me summarise the main points of her book.  
The starting point of Laborde’s analysis is the law of 15 March, 2004, banning the wearing 
of the hijab (the Muslim headscarf).1292 While the law also bans Jewish yarmulkes and osten-
                                                        
1290 For Hobbesian ‘imposed’ stability as opposed to Rawlsian stability (that is, ‘inherent stability’ in A Theory of Jus-
tice and ‘stability for the right reasons’ in Political Liberalism), see Paul Weithman, Why Political Liberalism?, in par-
ticular 5-6, 44-45, 50-51, 56, 176. Hobbes’s idea is that ‘terms of cooperation could be stabilized only by the institution 
of a sovereign who was known effectively to enforce severe penalties for defection’ (Paul Weithman, Why Political 
Liberalism?, 176). Thus, in a Hobbesian account stabilising forces come from outside the system, while, as we have 
seen, in a Rawlsian account stability is secured by forces which are internal to it (thanks to the notion of ‘congruence’ in 
A Theory of Justice and the idea of an ‘overlapping consensus’ in Political Liberalism). For all these questions, here I 
can only refer the reader to Paul Weithman’s outstanding book Why Political Liberalism?  
1291 Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy. 
1292 Following Laborde, here I do not make any distinction between different kinds of veiling (hijab, chador, khimar, 
niqab, and burqa). For a detailed account of differences between these forms of veiling, of the Qur’anic foundations for 
the practice of veiling, and of (some of) the underlying personal motivations for its use in contemporary societies, see 
Renata Pepicelli, Il velo nell’Islam: storia, politica, estetica, 20-22, 25-41, 65-138. 
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tatious Christian crosses,1293 public debate was overwhelmingly centred on Muslim head-
scarves. The reason for that was the existence of a highly politicised controversy concerning 
the wearing of Muslim headscarves in public schools dating back to 1989.1294 However, the 
law did not extinguish the debate. Why did the wearing of the hijab provoke ‘a sense of dif-
fused threat to French national identity’?1295 According to Laborde, ‘the wearing of hijab to 
school was highly controversial because it challenged three dimensions of the republican ideal 
of laïcité (secularism) at once.’1296 In other words, the hijab was (is) perceived as a threat to 
the ideal sustaining the republican “French being”. What are those three dimensions of 
laïcité? First of all, Laborde denies that laïcité simply means state’s abstention and neutrality 
toward religion. This term –she claims− captures a far more specific and characterised con-
cept: it ‘encompasses a comprehensive theory of republican citizenship’ and this latter is ar-
ticulated in the French revolutionary triad: liberté, egalité, and fraternité.1297 That is, freedom, 
equality and fraternity. Only equality expresses the idea of secularism or religious neutrali-
ty.1298 Taken together, liberty, equality and fraternity define the ideal of republican citizenship 
in its entirety. However, different versions of republicanism might be identified depending on 
the way in which they depict those three pillars of republican citizenship. According to La-
borde, the public issue of hijab emerged fundamentally because its introduction in public 
schools contrasted with the official doctrine of French republicanism. French ‘official repub-
licanism’1299 banned the hijab from public schools because the latter represented a refusal of 
                                                        
1293 According to this law, ‘in primary and secondary public schools, the wearing of signs or clothes through which pu-
pils ostensibly express a religious allegiance is forbidden.’ Quoted in: Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism, 7 and 
52. 
1294 For the reconstruction of those events, see Riva Kastoryano, “French Secularism and Islam: France’s Headscarf Af-
fair,” in Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship, eds. Tariq Modood, Anna Triandafyllidou, Ricard Zapata-Barrero 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 57-60. See also Joan Wallach Scott’s contribution, The Politics of Veil, in 
particular chapter one. 
1295 Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism, 7. 
1296 Ibid. 
1297 Ibid. 7-8. 
1298 Ibid. 8. 
1299 For an initial account of ‘official republicanism’, see Cécile Laborde, “Secular Philosophy and Muslim Headscarves 
in Schools.” 
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its ideal of citizenship. So, official republicans were naturally led to struggle against this chal-
lenge. Nonetheless, Laborde argues, another version of republicanism is possible, and this 
version might be compatible with students’ wearing the hijab in public schools. She calls this 
version ‘critical republicanism.’ 
Critical republicanism is mainly conceived as an alternative to both ‘radical multicultural-
ism’ on the one hand, and ‘official’ republican citizenship: 
‘[N]either the radical multicultural rhetoric of the recognition of difference as 
an alternative to the ideal of civic inclusion nor the liberal and republican uncon-
scious idealization of status quo arrangements in actual Western societies have 
helped reduce the “citizenship deficit” of members of minorities. Both, in fact, 
have underestimated the appeal of the republican ideal of inclusive citizenship, 
when this is critically understood and applied […] by interrogating the complex 
relationships between ideal and practical norms on the one hand, and the ends and 
means of progressive reforms on the other.’1300 
Thus, critical republicanism aspires to overtake those positions. First, multicultural theory 
of citizenship is inadequate according to Laborde. In her understanding, ‘radical, post-
colonial, post-national, and post-secular forms of multiculturalism’ fundamentally do not pre-
sent a theory of common citizenship.1301 As for Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism,1302 criti-
cal republicanism shares some of its concerns, but important differences endure:1303 
‘[W]hile multiculturalists advocate the public recognition of specific groups, 
[…] critical republicans do not single out any predefined and fixed group as the 
object of their concerns. They claim, rather, that citizens who find themselves as-
sociated with these groups have different citizenship entitlements which address 
different types of disadvantage. [… Q]ua members of racialized underclass, such 
citizens would benefit from genuinely colour-blind socio-economic integration; 
                                                        
1300 Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism, 20. 
1301 Ibid. 
1302 See above. 
1303 For this, see Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism, 20-21. 
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qua Muslims, they need a revised theory of the inclusive secular state; […] and 
qua “minorities within minorities” (e.g. women), they need the robust promotion 
of their ability to resist multifaceted domination. Critical republicans, then, pursue 
no single strategy of ethno-cultural (or religious) recognition; and are more likely 
to advocate the de-ethnicization and disestablishment of dominant cultures and 
identities […] as the best strategy for the civic incorporation of minorities mem-
bers.’1304 
Thus, critical republicanism does not aim at the recognition of single unified identities 
(such as “Muslim,” “Sikh,” and so on); nor does it try to work out a theory of citizenship that 
takes into consideration a single dimension of citizens’ identities, namely, the dimension as-
sumed as problematic or as the main source of disadvantage. Laborde thinks that, contrary to 
multiculturalism, critical republicanism assumes that ‘culture is not the problem, and it is not 
the solution.’1305 Rather, it tackles disadvantage in its multifaceted dimensions (economic, so-
cial, sexual, political, and so on) and it questions and works on society’s dominant culture and 
identity(ies) in order to achieve this goal. 
As I said before, Laborde rejects official republicanism too. Her main objection against 
this view is that it uncritically derives practical principles from substantive ideals, making 
complete abstraction from real (i.e., non-ideal) conditions.1306 In other words, official republi-
cans impose on Muslim women an idealised image of the French citizen. They demand that 
Muslims interiorise the ideal of laïcité, but actually France is not (and cannot be) as ideally 
secular as official republicans pretend (or desire) it to be. The result, thus, is that official re-
publicans’ state neutrality is, in fact, a ‘status quo neutrality,’ that is, ‘a theoretical position 
which unreflectively takes some background institution or distributive pattern for granted and, 
as a result, fails to provide an impartial baseline from which current claims about unjust 
treatment, misrecognition, oppression, and the like can be normatively assessed.’1307 Laborde 
                                                        
1304 Ibid. 21-22. 
1305 Anthony Appiah, “The Multiculturalist Misunderstanding,” New York Review of Books 44, no. 15 (October 9, 
1997), 36. Quoted in Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism, 21. 
1306 Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism, 12 and 82-83. 
1307 Ibid. 13. 
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contrasts official republicanism’s status quo neutrality with critical republican context-
sensitiveness in the following way: 
‘Critical republicans, contra official republicans, believe that the optimal com-
pliance of citizens with republican principles cannot legitimately be required un-
der conditions where those principles are only imperfectly realized and upheld by 
state institutions. To put it in Rawlsian terms: in non-ideal conditions, where the 
basic structure is not fully just, citizens may have (inter alia) a duty to strive to 
bring about just institutions, but they are not (non-reciprocally) required to abide 
by ideal principles of justice. To put it in perhaps more apposite republican idiom: 
when institutions are corrupt, citizens cannot be expected to be fully virtuous. […] 
The critical republican view […] suggests that it is institutions, instead of citizens, 
that should be “republicanized” as a matter of priority. And when demands are 
made on minority citizens, they should be made on a reciprocal basis, rather than 
in isolation from the existing structure of legal and customary rights and entitle-
ments.’1308 
In the official republican separatist view, state institutions should not, for instance, fund 
Muslim cemeteries. The problem with such an abstract and uncritical interpretation of repub-
licanism, Laborde argues, is that it legitimises the status quo and imposes unreasonable bur-
dens on members of minorities. The reason is that the vast majority of cemeteries ‘are run fol-
lowing customary, unreflected pre-Christian or Christian norms: for example burial plots tra-
ditionally face east. [Hence, European cemeteries are] unsuited for Muslim burials, where the 
dead must imperatively be lying on their side and have their face turned towards Mecca 
(south-east).’1309 This is just an example of how a strict conception of neutrality as separation 
ends up with disproportionate, non-reciprocal, and non-impartial demands on minorities, due 
to a non-neutral status quo. Fairness requires that, before formulating demands on minorities 
or rejecting their claims, status quo is scrutinised and critically assessed: 
‘[O]fficial republicans would have to admit that the current regime of state-
church relations in France exhibits anomalies which are troubling from the per-
                                                        
1308 Ibid. 13-14. 
1309 Ibid. 96. 
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spective of the French state’s proclaimed commitment to neutralist separation. 
Failing that, the demand that Muslims abide by principles of laïcité as neutrality 
when, under status quo arrangements, laïcité is only imperfectly realized, cannot 
plausibly be construed as a fair demand.’1310  
Obviously, her “critical” form of republicanism is largely built by means of compari-
son/opposition with “official” republicanism.1311 I cannot examine in detail the principles of 
official republicanism here. In Table 3, I make a comparison between the tenets of the two 
views. Like official republicanism, critical republicanism is a theory of citizenship based on 
the link between liberty, equality, and fraternity: ‘on the republican view, I am free when I am 
recognized by others as enjoying a status that resiliently protects me against arbitrary interfer-
ence and guarantees my equal status as a citizen living in community with others.’1312 Protec-
tion against arbitrary interference, equal citizenship, and membership in the community coin-
cide with, respectively, liberty, equality, and fraternity. Hence, critical republicanism claims 
to be a republican conception of citizenship.1313 However, as I have previously emphasised, it 
differs from official republicanism in its interpretation of those ideals: ‘critical republicanism 
articulates a progressive, social-democratic, and inclusive version of republicanism.’1314 How 
does this new interpretation express the republican ideal of citizenship? In what follows, I 
briefly analyse the main features of Laborde’s theoretical position. 
                                                        
1310 Ibid. 83. 
1311 And with a third version of republicanism, that she calls ‘tolerant republicanism.’ The author devotes chapters 3, 6, 
and 9 of her book to this view. Here it will be enough to consider the official and the critical forms of republicanism.  
1312 Ibid. 11. 
1313 ‘I shall defend the validity of ideal republican principles such as secular impartiality, civic integration, and liberty as 
non-domination.’ Ibid. 13. 
1314 Ibid. 
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Table 3 Enunciation of the three pillars of republican citizenship according to the two versions of republicanism 
(Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism). For official republicanism: chapters 2, 5, 8; for critical republicanism: chap-
ters 4, 7, 10. See also chapter 1 and conclusions. 
  
Official Republicanism Critical Republicanism 
Egalité 
Laïcité as neutrality (Neutralist republicans†) 
Separation/abstention; laïcité as a separation doctrine and as a doctrine of con-
science (pp. 33-48). Analogy: liberal ideal of equality as state neutrality (p. 32), 
similar to egalitarian, difference-blind liberalism (p. 40). Criticism: excessive 
abstraction from real conditions for its principles to be applicable: status quo neu-
trality (pp. 12-13 and 82-83). 
Secularism as impartiality 
Institutional doctrine (p. 87) of secu-
larism as non-dominating impartiality 
(p. 89), that is, separation with two 
provisos (basic free exercise and con-
textual parity, p. 88). 
Liberté 
Autonomy (Laïciste republicans) 
Laïcité as democratic state’s emancipatory power: it makes it possible to liberate 
individuals from the oppression of ‘private institutions such as the family and 
religious institutions’ (p. 102). Analogy: liberal ideal of individual autonomy as a 
worthy form of life, similar to liberal perfectionism (p. 102). Criticism: a) the 
‘liberty-based case against headscarves in schools’ (p.124) fails to respect the 
agency of women; b) it is based on a neo-orientalist interpretation of Islam; c) it is 
self-defeating because it might ‘exacerbate the defensive assertion of patriarchal 
norms and practices’ (pp. 149-150). 
Non-domination 
Non-domination as a right to voice (capac-
ity for contestation, pp. 152, 155, 160); 
interest in minimal autonomy (pp. 153, 
155, 168). 
Fraternité 
Community (National republicans) 
Laïcité as a civic religion (p. 182): anti-ethnic theory of the nation (p. 174) and 
‘national culture as civic bond’ (pp. 176-178) = national republicanism; model of 
assimilation: no ethnic difference is relevant (pp. 174, 184-185, 188-189, 192). 
Criticism: ‘the politics of republican solidarity are oppressive of difference’ be-
cause: a) ‘the application of difference-blind policies in conditions of widespread 
racial discrimination only contributes to the legitimization of ethnicized social 
relationships’ and b) ‘republican conception of nationality as shared common 
culture is inherently exclusive: it downplays the ethnic-like, particularist compo-
nents of French culture and underestimates the moral costs of assimilations’ (p. 
229). 
Trans-ethnic integration 
‘Struggles for recognition […] are best 
interpreted as struggles for voice’ and 
against domination (pp. 237-238). Critical 
patriotism (pp. 247-249): de-ethnicization 
of existing ‘modes of national identifica-
tion’ and mainstreaming of Muslim identi-
ties. 
 
                                                        
†In my understanding, Laborde internally classifies official republicans depending on the degree of comprehensiveness 
of their conception of laïcité: laïciste republicans are less neutralist (that is, they hold a more comprehensive view) than 
neutralist republicans (because the former promote the ‘exercise of rational autonomy’, that is, a ‘comprehensive con-
ception of … education’), but they are more neutralist (that is, they hold a less comprehensive view) than national re-
publicans. In fact, national republicans endorse the most comprehensive version of official republicanism: they ‘insist 
that democratic principles and values must be rooted in a particular culture to have the required motivational force. 
Thus, civic education must be patriotic in a “thicker” cultural sense than neutralists believe. Contra laïciste, national 
republicans argue that education should promote, not so much the dubious virtues of a-social individuality and unfet-
tered choice, as the more civic-minded virtues of self-restraint, responsibility, solidarity, and the ability to abide by 
common rules. Thus, civic education must, of necessity, find the right balance between individuality and sociability, 
criticism and compliance, self-assertion and self-restraint’. See ibid. 181-182. 
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Egalité: In Laborde’s critical interpretation of the republican theory of citizenship, equality 
stands for secularism, and secularism stands for ‘non dominating impartiality.’1315 Critical re-
publicans’ impartiality is different from official republicans’ abstentionist neutrality. The 
former might be conceived as something similar to a “separation rightly understood.” In fact, 
while official republican laïcité as neutrality is also a ‘doctrine of conscience’ that ‘prescribes 
norms of conduct for religious organizations, in terms of their internal “laïcization”, and for 
individual citizens, in terms of religious restraint in the public sphere,’1316 critical republican 
secularism preserves the idea of separation, but it critically reinterprets its rationale. Such a 
rationale connects institutional separation, freedom of conscience, toleration, and equality:  
‘[S]ecularism is primarily an institutional doctrine of separation, prescribing 
the extent to which state institutions, and the public sphere more generally, must 
remain secular so that citizens can freely follow their conscience. A tough institu-
tional doctrine of separation is therefore the condition for a tolerant doctrine of 
conscience. [… T]he republican secularism aims to show equal respect to all reli-
gious and non-religious citizens by guarding against majoritarian infringements 
on freedom of conscience. [...] Thus, it constructs the public sphere fairly expan-
sively, as a space where citizens can meet as citizens.’1317 
Bearing this (republican) rationale for secularism clearly in mind, Laborde restates the re-
publican doctrine of separation as follows: ‘the state should not support religion, unless such 
abstention (i) unreasonably burdens the exercise of basic religious freedoms or (ii) legitimizes 
status quo entitlements which unduly disadvantage minority religious groups.’1318 The author 
calls (i) the ‘basic freedom exercise proviso,’ and (ii) the ‘contextual parity proviso.’ The 
general provision is one of separation and abstention: the state should not intervene in reli-
gious affairs. Nonetheless, this provision is tempered by the two conditions. (I) requires that, 
for the state to be fair and inclusive, it must intervene when religious citizens would be unrea-
                                                        
1315 Ibid. 89. 
1316 Ibid. 44. 
1317 Ibid. 87. 
1318 Ibid. 88. 
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sonably burdened and deprived of their basic rights by state’s abstention (e.g., the state should 
provide religious spaces and services in enclosed public institutions like prisons, for otherwise 
the exercise of prisoners’ basic rights of free religious exercise would be compromised). 
Moreover, (ii) requires that demands on minorities must be fair: they must be context-
sensitive and avoid legitimising status quo while unreasonably burdening minorities (like in 
the above-mentioned example of cemeteries). Thanks to these two provisos republican equali-
ty is no more understood as neutrality, but as impartiality. 
Liberté:1319 Drawing on Philip Pettit’s work1320, Laborde defines liberty as non-
domination. Republican freedom as non-domination is claimed to be more demanding than 
the liberal idea of freedom as non-interference.1321 In fact, ‘freedom as non-interference 
makes the absence of interference sufficient for freedom; in contrast, freedom as non-
domination requires the absence of a capacity on the part of anyone else … to interfere arbi-
trarily in another person’s life or affairs.’1322 In comparison with freedom as non-interference, 
two clarifications are in order. First, freedom as non-domination is more stringent since it de-
nies the mere capacity for or possibility of interference (what Pettit calls ‘the easier-to-lose-
freedom-effect’). Second, putting the emphasis on the discretion of the interference (“to inter-
fere arbitrarily”) means that an interference that would be considered as a constraint on free-
dom from the standpoint of freedom as non-interference, could be acceptable from the point 
of view of freedom as non-domination because of its non-arbitrariness (what Pettit calls ‘the 
harder-to-lose-freedom-effect’):  
‘Under freedom as non-interference, a regime of law, being necessarily coer-
cive, systematically compromises people’s freedom […] Under the second con-
ception, however, subjection to the law need not represent a loss of liberty for an-
yone who lives under it, provided –and of course it is a big proviso– that the mak-
                                                        
1319 I am grateful to Daniele Santoro for our instructive discussions about the republican ideal of freedom in spring 
2013, when I was writing an unpublished paper (titled “Civic and Epistemic Virtues”). For this part of the section, I am 
indebted to him and I draw on some considerations that I developed in that paper. 
1320 See Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government and “The Republican Ideal of Freedom,” 
223-243. 
1321 For this conception of liberal freedom, see, among others, Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in The Liberty 
Reader, in particular 34-43. 
1322 Philip Pettit, “The Republican Ideal of Freedom,” 224. 
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ing, interpretation and implementation of the law are not arbitrary: provided that 
the legal coercion involved is constrained to track the interests and ideas of those 
affected. The proviso […] is that the legal regime represents a fair rule of law.’1323 
Here, we can see the influence of the venerable (Aristotelian) republican ideal of ruling 
and being ruled:1324 to be subject to a regime of law is not per se a loss of freedom, if we can 
consider ourselves at the same time as makers of and subject to the law. Here I cannot exam-
ine in details the differences between Pettit’s idea of non-domination and Laborde’s concep-
tion of it; such an analysis would not be necessary for my aims.1325 In order to briefly recapit-
ulate Laborde’s account of non-domination, let me firstly consider what the author calls 
‘Muslim women’s double domination.’1326 This latter consists of an inter-groups and intra-
group domination: while inter-groups domination is provoked by an ‘arbitrary state’ problem 
(that is, state’s imposition of liberal reforms upon groups ‘which perceive themselves to be 
victims of the state’s illiberal and ethnocentric past’), intra-group domination is provoked by 
an ‘internal minority’ problem (that is, the result of the ‘negative impact that multicultural ac-
commodation or toleration can have on the most vulnerable members of the groups that bene-
fit from it, in particular women’).1327 To put it simply, in the hijab affair, Muslim women risk 
to be dominated twice: first, by the État laïque that bans the veiling and, in so doing, denies 
the agency of those women who use the hijab as a sign of emancipation; and/or, second, by 
‘sexist norms’ and practices within their own cultural environment.1328 Between those Scylla 
and Charybdis, the idea of non-domination offers a third solution. Laborde (in harmony with 
                                                        
1323 Ibid. 227. 
1324 For the influence of this ideal on the evolution of citizenship theory, see, among others, David Burchell, “Ancient 
Citizenship and its Inheritors,” in Handbook of Citizenship Studies, eds. Engin F. Isin and Bryan S. Turner (London and 
Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2002), 89, and Rogers M. Smith, “Modern Citizenship,” in Handbook of Citizenship Stud-
ies, 106. See, notably, J. G. A. Pocock, “The Ideal of Citizenship since Classical Times,” in Theorizing Citizenship, ed. 
Ronald Beiner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 30-33. 
1325 However, as I will explain in a while, it should be noticed that Laborde’s notion of non-domination seems to be 
“wider” than Pettit’s one. See Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism, 16-19 and 151-157. For instance, we read: ‘Pet-
tit’s account […] concerns itself too narrowly, with domination as a subjectively experienced harm, thus neglecting 
phenomena of restrictive socialization and the development of adaptive preferences under oppressive conditions, 
whereby individuals prima facie consent to living under relations of domination.’ Ibid. 152. 
1326 Ibid. 151. 
1327 Ibid.  
1328 Ibid. 152. 
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Pettit’s definition) defines domination as a ‘capacity for arbitrary interference.’1329 The inter-
ference is arbitrary, according to Pettit, if it does not ‘track the interests and ideas of the per-
son suffering the interference.’1330 So far, so republican (in Pettit’s terms). Differences arise –
and the critical republican ideal of non-domination is specified– when we consider interfer-
ences which the victims have consented to. Are these cases of domination? Laborde distin-
guishes two forms of dominated consent, depending on the circumstances in which it is ex-
pressed. First, there are situations in which we are aware that someone else could exercise 
power over us and that this power does not track our interests, but we consent to it. For exam-
ple, think of the case of workers forced to accept patently iniquitous contracts.1331 Laborde 
and Pettit agree on qualifying this situation as a case of domination. The ‘consent to a form of 
interference is not a sufficient guard against arbitrariness’ Pettit says.1332 This is a “weak” 
form of dominated consent for Laborde, because of the awareness of the victims: they know 
they are subject to their employer’s domination. There is, however, a “stronger” form of dom-
inated consent, Laborde argues.1333 This second form of dominated consent occurs when the 
victim of the interference is not aware of it and domination is not perceived. If we enlarge the 
notion of non-domination in this way, we might be able to employ this idea to tackle those 
cases in which wearing the hijab is an imposition with dominating effects, whether or not the 
imposition is perceived (for instance, due to family or social pressure, even when one does 
not consciously experience the latter as a form of arbitrary interference with her freedom). In 
those cases, Laborde asserts, the interference is dominating not because it dismisses the inter-
ests of the victims (like in the example of workers), but because it denies them. Victims are 
simply unable to perceive what their interests are. In framing domination in this way, Laborde 
aims to disclose ‘phenomena of unjust ([…] arbitrary) preference formation or “backroom 
manipulation”,’1334 by showing that in some cases ‘domination can be partly consented to, by 
                                                        
1329 Ibid. 153. Pettit says: ‘one agent dominates another if and only if they have a certain power over that other, in par-
ticular a power of interference on an arbitrary basis,’ see Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 52. 
1330 Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 55 and Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism, 153. 
1331 See Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism, 153. 
1332 Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 62. 
1333 Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism, 153. 
1334 Ibid. 154. 
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being invisible to its victims.’1335 But what are those basic interests then? What is the relevant 
interest that domination denies? Laborde answers that domination violates our basic interest 
in a form of ‘minimal autonomy.’1336 Few considerations are in order. For an interference to 
be qualified as arbitrary and, then, as dominating, it must involve a systematic and intentional 
denial (or a dismissal) of a capacity we consider essential: minimal autonomy. According to 
the author, education should actively promote autonomy-promoting capacities.1337 However, 
Laborde openly states that ‘the good life is not one of full autonomy and self-determination, 
but rather one in which autonomy-related skills can (but do not have to) be used by individu-
als to face the most pernicious forms of domination.’1338 Hence, what matters is not a perfec-
tionist ideal of full-autonomy, but a capacity for minimal autonomy enabling individuals to 
resist domination.1339 Minimal autonomy entails a capacity for contestation or ‘voice.’1340 A 
non-dominated human being is one who is not silenced, who is able to contest the power ex-
ercised over her or him, to ask a justification for any interference so that the latter can be 
qualified as non-arbitrary.1341 This “sufficientarian,” non-perfectionist, and instrumental ap-
proach to autonomy allows Laborde to avoid the problem of the coherence and compatibility 
between autonomy and religion. In so far as individuals have a minimum capability for au-
tonomy, they are not dominated. They do not need to value full autonomy, but just to be au-
tonomous enough to have a voice “on their own”, to be free from domination.1342  
                                                        
1335 Ibid. 
1336 Ibid. 153. 
1337 Ibid. 152. 
1338 Ibid. 
1339 Importantly, Laborde emphasises that ‘we do not have a (basic and universal) interest in pursuing a life of autono-
mous assertion, but we do have a (basic and universal) interest in combating ethical servility.’ Ibid. 156. 
1340 ‘What matters is that individuals have minimum discursive control or “voice” – that they can contest the power that 
is exercised over them.’ Ibid. 152. For Pettit’s account of contestation, see Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 183-205. 
1341 Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism, 155. 
1342 ‘Nothing about non-domination requires that individuals break free from their religious or communal attachments; 
nor does the ideal imply that the good life is a life of autonomy. The autonomy critical republicans value is more akin to 
a basic capability: a skill which, up to a threshold (minimum discursive control), is essential to the good life, but which, 
above the threshold, individuals do not have to develop further, let alone to exercise fully. Conceived as a minimum ca-
pability, autonomy is not understood as an intrinsic but as an instrumental, yet primary, good. It is an essential ingredi-
ent to living a successful life – a life that is good for oneself – but it is not necessarily a part of that success.’ Ibid. 155. 
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Fraternité: Official republicans, Laborde contends, hold that civic solidarity involves an 
‘anti-ethnic theory of the nation’1343 and assume ‘national culture as civic bond.’1344 Laborde 
underscores the link between national culture and membership in the civic community, be-
cause in this view, at the end, citizenship is perceived as a matter of cultural (and not merely 
political) membership. ‘By the Third Republic, French nationality had come to acquire a sub-
stantive content, in terms of socialization into a common national culture.’1345 Critical repub-
licanism cannot agree without demur. Firstly, the conception of official republicans is mis-
leading, because ‘it confuses the denial of the moral relevance of ethnicity with the denial of 
its social existence, and as a result inadvertently deprives itself of the means to tackle discrim-
inatory practices.’1346 Secondly, this conception is exclusive, since it uncritically includes the 
‘ethnic-like, particularist components of French culture’ in its definition of ‘nationality as 
shared common culture,’ and the resulting demand of integration seems to be excessively 
burdensome.1347 In contrast with this idea of integration, Laborde develops her own model of 
national community. While she recognises the attractiveness of the republican ideal of ‘an in-
clusive and impartial sphere within which all resident individuals, regardless of their particu-
lar origins and identities, can be included as equal citizens,’1348 she judges that existing strate-
gies to achieve this goal are wrong. As we have seen, the mistake concerns the misrecognition 
of the actual (non-neutral) conditions in which the ideal of neutrality is implemented sic and 
simpliciter.  
‘[A]ll “civic” nations are rooted in a particular “ethnic” experience. As a result, 
civic competences and virtues have historically been associated with the traits of 
dominant groups (white, male, middle class, Christian, Parisian, and so forth) […] 
The difficulty is that the historical ethnicization of the public sphere […] still 
                                                        
1343 Ibid. 174. 
1344 Ibid. 176-178. 
1345 Ibid. 176. 
1346 Ibid. 229. 
1347 Ibid.  
1348 Ibid. 232-233. 
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weighs heavily on the present, and creates often intangible obstacles to the fair in-
corporation of minorities.’1349 
Critical republicans think that political claims of cultural recognition arise when culture 
represents an additional level of subjection, that is, when cultural ‘misrecognition […] is ex-
perienced as an “insult added to injury”: when, that is, it compounds and exacerbates existing 
socio-economic exclusion and relegation.’1350 Consequently, Muslims’ demands for cultural 
recognition and even defiant social behaviours should be read in this light: as a response to an 
intricate and multifaceted social disdain experienced by Muslims, ‘not exclusively or neces-
sarily qua religious believers, but qua presumed members of a marginalized working class 
and racial (post-colonial) underclass.’1351 It should be clear, then, that the key-concept is al-
ways domination: struggles for recognition are, ultimately, ‘struggles against domination’ of 
different and usually interrelated forms.1352 To conclude, Laborde calls for a ‘critical (or civ-
ic) patriotism’1353 that critically tries both to “de-ethnicize” existing French identity and to 
mainstream ‘immigrant and Muslims identities’, that is, ‘[to present and perceive them] as 
normal (if plural) ways of being French.’1354 This last remark is particularly relevant: the crit-
ical task is one of pluralisation of a monistic and falsely neutral civic identity, in order to 
achieve a non-dominant conception of civic belonging and national identification.1355 
In conclusion, critical republicanism vindicates the republican triad (egalité, liberté, and 
fraternité), though its interpretation of this triad makes it compatible with the wearing of hijab 
in public schools, because this latter does not contradict any of those republican pillars when 
                                                        
1349 Ibid. 233. 
1350 Ibid. 236-237. 
1351 Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism, 237. 
1352 Ibid. 238. 
1353 She openly draws on Habermas’s notion of ‘constitutional patriotism’ (ibid. 247). With reference to the scope of my 
research, it may be useful to mention Habermas’s “Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the future of 
Europe,” in Theorizing Citizenship, 263-264, 271, and 274-279. 
1354 Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism, 248. Here, we may read a further criticism of affirmative politics of recog-
nition: ‘Mainstreaming is about removing symbolic obstacles to equal citizenship; it does not so much involve a posi-
tive validation of Muslim identities as it requires the transformation of dominant perceptions of shared identity. In this 
sense, it appeals more to a negative ideal of non-domination than to a positive ideal of recognition.’ 
1355 For more details on critical patriotism, see ibid. 244-253. 
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“rightly understood”. Thus, not only is the republican ideal acceptable to Muslims, but it 
should also be attractive to them: 
‘Secularism, properly understood, does not require pupils to remove signs of 
religious allegiance; female emancipation is not assisted by the prohibition of re-
ligious symbols; and civic solidarity depends not on cultural conformism but on 
social equality and the politics of participatory inclusion. Yet republican ideas 
[…] are undeniably appealing and […] should be attractive to members of reli-
gious minorities. Republicanism is at bottom an ideal of progressive, egalitarian, 
and social-democratic citizenship, which points to a society where all citizens en-
joy basic but robust civic standing, in the form of political voice, minimum per-
sonal autonomy, material capabilities, equal opportunities, and intersubjective 
mutual recognition as equals.’1356 
At this point, it should be clear why I consider critical republicanism as an interesting al-
ternative framework for discussing the issue of citizenship of European Muslims. First, criti-
cal republicanism is developed and presented as a complete theory of citizenship. Second, it is 
openly developed and presented as a theory that aims at offering fair terms of citizenship to 
Muslims. In the rest of this section, I analyse the question of whether this option is more in-
teresting than the Rawlsian idea of public reason, as I previously did with reference to liberal 
multiculturalism. 
Having expressed the republican conception emerging from Laborde’s model, now I con-
sider some possible objections to it. The first and most obvious argument would consist of 
emphasising that critical republicanism seems deeply rooted in French (republican) heritage 
and that this historical connection is so indissoluble that it is unlikely to spread (and adapt) to 
different European contexts. Although this consideration does not mean that such diffusion is 
impossible, a critic may doubt that such a republican conception would generally be norma-
tively attractive to different realities in Europe.1357 However, to be effective, this argument 
would require an accurate and thorough assessment of the different national models of citi-
                                                        
1356 Ibid. 254. 
1357 For instance, one may wonder how to make such normative model more or less consistent with multicultural poli-
cies implemented in different degree in different European countries: see, among others, the comparative study by Na-
sar Meer and Tariq Modood, “The Multicultural States We’re In.”  
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zenship historically developed and adopted all around Europe. Be that as it may, I am not 
concerned with this kind of analysis. Having adopted a more abstract, normative, and ideal 
standpoint, I will restrict my arguments to normative ones. Let me consider, then, why public 
reason is normatively more attractive than critical republicanism. 
I take into account two different kinds of arguments. First, under (a) I will scrutinise La-
borde’s objections to Rawls. If it can be demonstrated that these objections do not hit the 
mark and that Rawls’s conception of public reason is stronger than the arguments used 
against it, then there would exist a prima facie reason to endorse it or, at least, not to reject it. 
Second, under (b) (divided in b1 and b2) I will consider the strength of the two theories re-
spectively: which of the two theories is more suitable for answering my main research ques-
tion (Q)? In doing this I will focus my attention on Laborde’s account of secular impartiality, 
the egalitarian pillar of her critical republican view. 
(A) I begin from Laborde’s criticism of Rawls’s public reason. First of all, Laborde charges 
Rawls with an excess of ‘liberal neutralis[m].’1358 While she acknowledges that Rawls does 
not claim that a set of ‘action-guiding principles’ directly originate from his ideal theory,1359 
nonetheless, she argues, his view of the relationships between religion and public reason is 
not suitable. Contrary to Rawls’s view, she continues, critical republicanism aspires to estab-
                                                        
1358 Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism, 86. 
1359 Ibid. 83. Rawls’s conception of the relation between ideal theory (and the related concept of strict compliance) and 
non-ideal theory (and the related concept of partial compliance) is presented in A Theory of Justice. I briefly summarise 
(by necessity, not exhaustively) the main concepts. Ideal theory considers the conception of justice and its principles 
from the perspective of a well-ordered society: ‘for the most part, I examine the principles of justice that would regulate 
a well-ordered society. Everyone is presumed to act justly and to do his part in upholding just institutions’ (8/7-8). Ideal 
theory requires strict compliance with principles of justice, so that the society is just. Strict compliance is one of the 
stipulations in the original position: ‘the principles of justice are chosen on the supposition that they will be generally 
complied with’ (245/215). And ‘the persons in the original position assume that the principles they acknowledge […] 
will be strictly complied with and followed by everyone’ (351/308-309). On the contrary, in non-ideal conditions, prin-
ciples of justice are not perfectly followed and compliance is only partial. So, partial compliance theory ‘studies the 
principles that govern how we are to deal with injustice’ (8/8). Samuel Freeman gives the following account of ideal vs. 
non-ideal theory: ideal theory consists of ‘Rawls’s assumption of the ideal conditions of a perfectly just, or “well-
ordered”, society, in which everyone accepts and complies with principles of justice. The problem of Theory is to dis-
cover the principles of justice most suitable for these ideal conditions of “strict compliance” with principles of justice. 
Once principles for ideal circumstances are derived, questions of partial compliance in non-ideal theory can be ad-
dressed. These include a theory of punishment, the doctrine of just war, civil disobedience, revolution, preferential 
treatment, assistance to burdened societies and many other questions about how to deal with and remedy injustice or 
departures from the ideal.’ See Samuel Freeman, Rawls, 472. In Political Liberalism, Rawls presents ideal theory as a 
‘necessary complement’ to non-ideal theory: the former directs the desire for change in the latter (285). See also 281-
285. For a helpful overview of the ongoing debate about the opposition between ideal and non-ideal theory, see the arti-
cle by Laura Valentini, “Ideal Vs. Non-ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map,” Philosophy Compass 7, no. 9 (2012), 654-
664. 
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lish a theory of citizenship able to reduce the (real, non-ideal) ‘citizenship deficit of members 
of minorities.’1360 According to Laborde, political liberalism would not be adequately 
equipped to carry out such a task, because it detaches religion and politics too dramatically. 
People do have the right to use religious reasons (or, in Rawlsian terms, reasons derived from 
their reasonable comprehensive doctrines, whether they be religious or non-religious) in pub-
lic political discussions. Nevertheless, according to Laborde, religion should not override 
shared or common (or, more appropriately, public) reason when fundamental questions are at 
stake and, above all, where state institutions are concerned. Thus, critical republicanism 
grants a limited role to religion in public debates and specifies its own version of the con-
straints of public reason. Critical republicanism’s specificity would consist of: 
‘[S]uggest[ing] that [,] while it is natural and acceptable for citizens to enter 
politics out of religious conviction, and to introduce religious arguments in broad 
public debate, it is not acceptable for the constitution to be theologically inspired, 
or for public officials to justify public decisions by reference to religious views; in 
both cases, “common grounds” principles should be appealed to. Generally, criti-
cal republicans tend to be fairly tolerant of the religious expression of ordinary 
citizens, but they adopt a less tolerant stance towards display of religious alle-
giance or support by state institutions.’1361 
One can read in this passage –and in the provision limiting the role of religion in public fo-
rums– two central tenets of the republican tradition: first, the fear of the potentially divisive 
power of religions and, second, the faith in neutrality (better, in Laborde’s words, “impartiali-
ty,” that is, not to taking sides, being super partes) of state institutions. I can now take into 
consideration the question of whether Laborde’s criticism of Rawls and her characterisation 
of the specificity of critical republicanism are strong enough to be conclusive. Let me divide 
Laborde’s previous formulation of the critical republican interpretation of the constraints of 
public reason into the following normative claims: 
(I) It is natural and acceptable for citizens to enter politics out of religious conviction; 
(II) It is natural and acceptable to introduce religious arguments in public debate; 
                                                        
1360 Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism, 20. 
1361 Ibid. 86. 
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(III) It is not acceptable for the constitution to be theologically inspired; 
(IV) It is not acceptable for public officials to justify public decisions by reference to re-
ligious views; 
Laborde seemingly acknowledges that Rawls would agree with her critical republicanism 
on points (iii) and (iv).1362 Indeed, this interpretation would be correct. With reference to (iii), 
as I explained in chapter three, Rawls also believes that constitutional essentials should be de-
cided through the use of public reason.1363 For constitutional essentials are ‘fundamental polit-
ical questions’, along with ‘questions of basic justice’, and the constraints of public reason 
apply to them (and only to them).1364 One could even observe that Rawls’s idea of public rea-
son seems to be more (and not less) open to religion than Laborde’s critical republicanism, 
since the constraints of Rawlsian public reason apply only to constitutional essentials. While 
these latter refer exclusively to the most relevant and fundamental political issues (especially 
basic rights and liberties), the ‘theological inspiration’ of the constitution evoked by Laborde 
seems to concern a much broader and disputable set of questions, without any real impact on 
citizens’ fundamental rights and liberties (even including, for example, possible references to 
God in the preamble or in the general principles of the constitution). After all, many contem-
porary democratic constitutions refer to values that one could see as rooted (openly or tacitly) 
in religious views, and this fact is not seen as particularly problematic. The agreement be-
tween Rawls and Laborde is also solid with regard to point (iv), especially in light of Rawls’s 
reference to the idea of political legitimacy. In chapters three and four, I analysed in detail the 
subjects to (and the circumstances under) which constraints of public reason apply. I have al-
so specified my interpretation of the proviso (4.2), which allows the introduction of non-
public reasons in public political discussions of fundamental political questions in so far as 
they do not violate the criterion that I called reciprocity of the reasonable. I do not come back 
to these aspects here. However, in general terms one can say that Rawls agrees with Laborde 
                                                        
1362 Ibid. 
1363 See chapter three and John Rawls, Political Liberalism, for example xix, xlviii, li, liii, liv, 214-215, 217, 224-225, 
227-230, 235, 241, 252, and “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 460.  
1364 ‘[T]he limits imposed by public reason do not apply to all political questions but only to those involving what we 
may call “constitutional essentials” and questions of basic justice … This means that political values alone are to settle 
such fundamental political questions as: who has the right to vote, or what religions are to be tolerated, or who is to be 
assured fair equality of opportunity, or to hold property.’ John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 214. 
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on (iv): public decisions to be legitimate must be based on public reasons that each citizen 
may reasonably be expected not only to understand, but also to endorse. So far, so good: La-
borde and Rawls agree on points (iii) and (iv). On the contrary, Laborde apparently maintains 
that Rawls would disagree with her on points (i) and (ii).1365 However, such an interpretation 
would rest on a misinterpretation of Rawls’s view. In fact, as for (i), the reasons for entering 
politics are neither constitutional essentials nor questions of basic justice. Therefore, public 
reason does not apply to one’s motivation to enter politics. A citizen can enter politics for 
whatever ‘social reason’ (e.g., belonging to a church which values active engagement in 
earthly affairs in order to change them) or ‘domestic reason’ (e.g., being the child of a politi-
cian).1366 The problem is not why (in foro interno) one enters politics, but how one discusses 
fundamental political questions in public political forums. Therefore, the views of Rawls and 
Laborde do not differ with reference to (i). As for (ii), as I have explained in depth, endorsing 
Rawls’s wide view of public reason does not mean excluding religious arguments from public 
political forums (see 4.1.a and 4.2). From the perspective of Rawls’s political liberalism, sat-
isfying the proviso (see the two levels of the duty of civility specified in 4.2) is the necessary 
and sufficient condition for making the introduction of non-public reasons in public political 
discussion acceptable. Thus, for instance, one can legitimately argue in favour of or against a 
law concerning a fundamental political question drawing on his or her reasonable comprehen-
sive doctrine (religious, philosophical, or moral), if and only if the proviso is ‘satisfied in 
good faith.’1367 Most important of all, Rawls overtly recognises that, through this qualified in-
troduction of religious reasons, the ideal of public reason is strengthened1368 and that, there-
fore, this introduction can be based on a ‘positive ground’, rather than on a ‘defensive ground, 
as if [the intrusion of religious arguments] into public discussion were inevitable in any 
case’1369, that is, as if it were a necessary evil. 
                                                        
1365 Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism, 86. 
1366 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 220. 
1367 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 462. 
1368 John Rawls Political Liberalism, 247-252, and “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 463. 
1369 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 464. 
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Therefore, Laborde’s critique of the Rawlsian account of public reason does not hit its tar-
get. If compared with Rawls’s idea of public reason, critical republicanism says nothing dif-
ferent about (i) and (ii), nor about (iii) and (iv). Of course, I am not saying that critical repub-
licanism and political liberalism are identical. Quite the contrary, in the previous section I 
tried to do justice to critical republicanism by presenting it in its own specificity. Rather, my 
intention was simply to demonstrate that the points Laborde appeals to in order to prove the 
superiority of her theoretical model are not the exclusive jurisdiction of the latter.  
(B) I can now analyse in greater detail the problems that critical republicanism potentially 
raises. I consider two main questions. (B1) I would like to start from the following statement 
by Laborde that I have already quoted: ‘the demand that Muslims abide by principles of 
laïcité as neutrality when, under status quo arrangements, laïcité is only imperfectly realized, 
cannot plausibly be construed as a fair demand.’1370 Does this remark imply that, if the status 
quo were really neutral, then Muslims could be fairly demanded to abide by principles of 
laïcité as neutrality? In ideal conditions, would laïcité as neutrality be the reference point for 
any republican theorist (critical or official)? Laborde ostensibly holds that we cannot persist 
in our official republican demands and we need critical republicanism just because these ideal 
conditions are not present.1371 Indeed, she clearly states that she ‘interpret[s] republican re-
flection as rooted in non-ideal theory and political praxis, concerned not so much with ideal 
theories of justice as with the correction of actual relationships of power and domination.’1372 
Of course, her theory has a normative core: the ideal of citizenship as non-domination,1373 and 
she then employs this ‘normative yardstick of evaluation’1374 for tackling real injustices to-
ward religious minorities (in our case, Muslims), that is, in the framework of non-ideal theo-
ry. Even if critical republicanism is not primarily concerned with ideal theory, non-
domination is still its normative ideal (in non-ideal conditions). But, then, one might ask 
whether or not laïcité as neutrality would be part of republican ideal theory, that is, if neutrali-
                                                        
1370 Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism, 83. 
1371 Ibid. mainly 12-15, 23, 82-83, 85-86, 87-88, 254-257. 
1372 Ibid. 23. 
1373 On this point, see in particular ibid. 16, 155, 156. 
1374 Ibid. 156. 
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ty would be desirable in ideal conditions. If the answer is positive, then critical republicanism 
and its revision of laïcité look like the self-reflective republican reply to the acknowledgment 
that laïcité as neutrality regrettably cannot be obtained, and that in non-ideal conditions other 
principles and ideals are required for the sake of freedom and fairness. In this case, secularism 
as impartiality seems to be a more realistic (realist) and fairer revision of laïcité as neutrality, 
once it has been adjusted to non-ideal conditions. Indeed, this seems to be the correct interpre-
tation. Laborde unequivocally affirms that her ‘basic objection to official republicanism […] 
concerns not so much its substantive ideals as its strategy for reform. Too often official re-
publicanism functions as an uncritical ideology which both legitimizes the status quo by ide-
alizing it and imposes unreasonable burdens of compliance on challengers, outsiders, and mi-
norities.’1375 This is the core of Laborde’s thesis. She does not radically criticise official re-
publicanism as comprehensive ideal. Rather, she criticises its decontextualised application to 
real (non-ideal) conditions, which ends up by legitimising an unfair status quo. However, if I 
am right about this point, then one might raise the following question: if the purpose is to 
achieve integration, freedom, and equality for minority groups through a critical theory of cit-
izenship, is it a successful strategy to suggest implicitly that, ideally, laïcité as neutrality 
would be preferable and that critical republican principles are just imposed by circumstances? 
To be sure, clearly this is a possible theoretical option. However, it is quite problematic and 
internal tensions would probably persist. I believe that Laborde’s revision of republican prin-
ciples is much deeper than that. I think it stems from her attempt to adjust them to what Rawls 
calls ‘the fact of reasonable pluralism.’1376 This attempt compels her to shift the focus onto 
the issue of inclusion in non-ideal conditions, although she does not completely dismiss tradi-
tional (or official) republican ideals. Therefore, my impression is that the resulting equilibri-
um between ‘official’ and ‘critical’, or between ideal theory and principles adjusted to non-
ideal conditions, is not always fixed and stable. This is the point: one can see republicans fac-
ing the choice between assimilating Muslims to their traditional ideal of citizenship, or revis-
                                                        
1375 Ibid. 15, emphasis added. See also 83 (‘[t]he problem with official republican neutrality is not that it is an impracti-
cal “ideal theory” […] It is, rather, that while (in contrast to Rawlsian ideal theory) it claims to be a set of directly ap-
plicable, or at least action-guiding, principles, it nonetheless (in contrast to Rawlsian non-ideal theory) completely ab-
stracts from the concrete conditions to which they are supposed to apply’) and 233 (‘the substantive ideals pursued by 
official republicans are persuasive and attractive. However, the strategic principles they defend are problematic’). 
1376 This intuition is confirmed by her most recent works, see for instance her “Justificatory Secularism.” 
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ing the latter.1377 Laborde follows the second strategy. However, she defines the ideal critical 
republican citizen in non-ideal terms: the republican citizen forced to live in a non-ideal re-
public and to revise her ideals and principles in order to adjust them to real conditions. If it is 
true that critical republicanism ‘offers its own version of the three ideals of laïcité: equality as 
secular impartiality, liberty as non-domination, and fraternity as trans-ethnic integration’1378, 
the overall impression is that such ideals are presented as “adaptive” ideals, whilst in the ideal 
republic strict and full compliance would be consistent with an official republican interpreta-
tion of laïcité. Consequently, one could ask: if laïcité as neutrality were perfectly realised un-
der status quo arrangements, then would official republican ideals hold and would Muslims 
be compelled to abide by them? In conclusion, we could say in wordplay, official laïcité as 
neutrality looks like the “ideal ideal”, whereas critical laïcité as secular impartiality looks like 
the “non-ideal ideal.” Which takes priority? Laborde’s answer could plausibly be the follow-
ing: critical ideals are the only possibility given actual conditions of domination and, even if 
the critical ideals are presented in opposition to the official ones, at the end they are norma-
tively autonomous. Still, from a normative perspective the question is open: one may think 
that Laborde’s good republican citizen is forced to be critical because she lives under non-
ideal conditions; still she is nostalgic toward her strongest republican principles and ideals. 
She has to be a critical republican because −in this world as it exists− she cannot be an offi-
cial republican. Then, a normative tension persists and Laborde should solve it more clearly. 
Moreover, this would not be a very optimistic account of citizenship in Europe. As it takes se-
riously the existing negative conditions of discrimination and exclusion, critical republican-
ism as a realistic utopia is realistic, but it is not very utopian, for it has little hope of changing 
them in the best possible way. Note that the above-mentioned tension is not extant if one fol-
lows the interpretation of public reason that I developed earlier. Laborde is right when she 
maintains that ‘[o]ne problem with much of republican (and liberal) normative theory is that 
its proposals are designed to apply to ideal well-ordered societies, but they are also offered as 
                                                        
1377 Pocock perceptively latches onto a similar point with reference to feminist theories. See J. G. A. Pocock, “The Ideal 
of Citizenship since Classical Times,” 31-33. He says: ‘[a]t an early point in the exposition of the problem, one can see 
that [feminist theorists] face a choice between citizenship as a condition to which women should have access, and sub-
verting or deconstructing the ideal itself as a device constructed in order to exclude them.’ Ibid. 31.  
1378 Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism, 9. 
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practical proposals designed to guide reform in the real world.’1379 Nonetheless, the Rawlsian 
perspective I defend does not claim that ideal theory can be directly transposed in non-ideal 
conditions while completely abstracting from them. Laborde is aware of this.1380 I do not ar-
gue that existing European societies (which are not well-ordered) should be immediately re-
formed in the light of the specific “contents” (principles, institutions, laws, and policies) of a 
Rawlsian well-ordered society. Rather, I argue that in existing societies the ideal of public 
reason can also provide regulative guidance about how to conceive liberal citizenship from 
both a procedural and a politically substantive point of view. In 3.2.b.1, I mentioned that 
‘Rawls’s public reason does not concern a determinate object, but rather the limits of the pub-
lic debate when fundamental questions are at stake within a liberal-democratic society.’1381 In 
the previous section (5.2.a), I presented Rawls’s public reason as an ideal conception of citi-
zenship that also retains its regulative role in non-ideal conditions. In this case, the regulative 
ideal is always the same: the requirements of public reason take into account the circumstanc-
es under which we live (for example, they are reflected in my two-level formulation of the 
proviso), but once stated it keeps its fundamental traits both in ideal and non-ideal conditions 
(provided that the minimal conditions specified above are present). This allowed me to say 
that public reason represents a viable normative option even in existing European societies. 
On the contrary, the tension I have just underscored concerns two different ways of conceptu-
alising the republican regulative ideal (as neutrality/separation or as non-dominating impar-
tiality), and the difficulty in assessing which of them a good republican citizen should cherish 
the most. The tension in Laborde’s theory originates from this duality. 
(B2) The last point brings me to a closely related question. Why ought Muslims to be nor-
matively committed to the critical republican ideal of citizenship? Why should they endorse it 
and, accordingly, support social cooperation within the basic structure in which ‘the funda-
mental political relation of citizenship’1382 can arise and flourish? These questions deal with 
two fundamental aspects of our issue: the reasons that Muslims have to adopt a political con-
                                                        
1379 Ibid. 12. 
1380 See the excerpt quoted above from page 83: ‘while (in contrast to Rawlsian ideal theory) [official republicanism] 
claims to be a set of directly applicable, or at least action-guiding, principles, it nonetheless (in contrast to Rawlsian 
non-ideal theory) completely abstracts from the concrete conditions to which they are supposed to apply.’ 
1381 Sebastiano Maffettone, Rawls: An Introduction, 274. 
1382 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, xliii. 
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ception of citizenship and, accordingly, the stability of the society supported by this shared 
conception. In fact, if the goal is to achieve, in Rawlsian terms, a well-ordered society, then 
one must take into consideration the question of stability for the right reasons. Therefore, we 
should ask: what kind of reasons must Muslims have to endorse secular impartiality as a nor-
mative principle of a critical republican political conception of citizenship? Are those reasons 
of the “right” kind? That is, are they strong enough for Muslims to be morally committed to 
the stability of European societies? As I mentioned, to answer these questions I focus on the 
first egalitarian pillar of Laborde’s critical republicanism: the interpretation of secularism as 
impartiality. Now, Laborde contends that ‘the great majority of Muslims […] should welcome 
a critical republican approach to secularism.’1383 She argues that this is true for three reasons: 
‘First, critical republicans endorse secularism as the best guarantee of equal 
citizenship. Many Muslim demands are demands of access to the equal status of 
citizenship: they are not demands for exorbitant, special rights. Yet, second, criti-
cal republican equality is not the formal equality of official republicans or of lib-
eral egalitarians like Barry; nor does it necessarily mandate state abstention from 
intervention in religious affairs. Critical republicans recognize that a secular state 
respects equal citizenship only if it does not dominate its religious citizens. Thus, 
a critical republican state would ensure that Muslims […] are able to follow the 
basic tenets of their religion: it is the commitment to what I called basic free exer-
cise. Third, […] critical republicanism rejects status quo neutrality and normative-
ly scrutinizes existing church-state arrangements. Its commitment to what I called 
contextual parity follows from the thought that the status quo can dominate mem-
bers of minority religions, and it prescribes how to treat religious minorities fairly 
in formally secular, but historically Christian-dominated, societies.’1384  
However, one could plausibly argue that these are not reasons a Muslim should agree to 
qua Muslim. At best, from the point of view of a Muslim qua Muslim, such reasons could 
justify a strategic or context-based acceptance of critical republican impartiality. First, “just” 
because Muslims are not treated as equal citizens –and, consequently, because their primary 
                                                        
1383 Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism, 97. Remember that critical secularism ‘upholds the secular character of the 
public sphere unless doing so infringes a basic religious free-exercise right […] or entrenches exorbitant majoritarian 
historical privileges.’ Ibid. 89. 
1384 Ibid. 97. 
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concern is equality– they should accept impartiality. Second, “just” because Muslims may 
need state intervention for exercising their basic religious rights (for example concerning the 
availability of places of worship) they should strive for a ‘basic free exercise proviso’. Third-
ly, “just” because the status quo is not neutral –and, consequently, because Muslims should be 
compensated for this contextual disadvantage– they should agree on a ‘contextual parity pro-
viso.’ What kind of reasons are these? In justifying Muslims’ acceptance or endorsement of 
critical republicanism (or of whatever other political conception of citizenship), I think one 
should start by pinpointing three possibilities. (a) Muslims are somehow able to make refer-
ence to reasons within their own religious doctrine (Islam): that is, they can endorse it from a 
Muslim perspective. Alternatively, (b) Muslims’ endorsement or acceptance is shaped as a 
mere modus vivendi: that is, they accept it only provisionally, but they do not morally endorse 
it. Or, finally, (c) Muslim citizens’ religious conviction is simply overlooked: they endorse 
the political conception qua citizens tout court (in Laborde’s case, as impartial republican cit-
izens). To be sure, in the first and in the third cases there is real endorsement, either qua Mus-
lims or qua impartial citizens. On the contrary, in the second case, there is only temporary and 
opportunistic acceptance, but there is not moral support. It seems to me that the arguments 
presented by Laborde in order to justify Muslim citizens’ acceptance or endorsement of secu-
lar impartiality lie somewhere between (b) and (c). Muslim citizens do not endorse it as Mus-
lims (a). Rather, they should accept (‘welcome’) it because they actually need it (b), or they 
should endorse it because they are already critical secularists (c).1385 Whilst many of the mo-
tivations presented above seem to fall under (b), in my opinion it is the idea of moral en-
dorsement of critical secularism under (c) that really underlies Laborde’s argument and re-
flects the republican ideal of the nation as the community of citizens qua citizens (fraternité). 
Hence, analysing the kind of reasons that Laborde provides for Muslims to support the princi-
ple of critical secularism, one might conclude that consensus on this principle may be stable 
only on the assumption that citizens will politically justify and endorse it as impartial republi-
can citizens (c), otherwise it may be accepted as a mere modus vivendi (b) but it would not be 
genuinely stable. This is so because justifications of the first kind (a) (that is, justifications 
                                                        
1385 The last point (c) is a little tautological: critical secularism should be endorsed by Muslim citizens because of their 
being secular citizens. To demonstrate the widespread acceptance of critical secularism among Muslims in Europe, La-
borde quotes the study carried out by Jytte Klausen in her The Islamic Challenge: ‘[m]any [Muslim] secularists prefer 
the strict separation of church and state and, if this was already the established rule, their first preference is that the state 
provides no assistance to religion. But given that state neutrality is generally not an option, the secularists want equity.’ 
Ibid. 89. Laborde adds that ‘[w]here my critical republicanism differs [from this conception of secularism] is in its be-
lief that neutrality at times can and should be an option.’ Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism, 97. 
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produced starting from within one’s comprehensive doctrine) are not considered in Laborde’s 
theory. Indeed, stability achieved under (c) is moral, but, unfortunately, it can be obtained on-
ly at great cost: namely, the sacrifice of religious, philosophical, and moral pluralism. Un-
doubtedly, in a society ‘marked by a diversity of opposing and irreconcilable religious, philo-
sophical, and moral doctrines,’1386 not everyone is willing to endorse a conception based only 
on a purely and exclusively political justification.1387 A Muslim could aspire not only to share 
a common political conception of citizenship with her fellow citizens, but also to have some 
persuasive Islamic reasons to do so. Understandably, without such reasons she could be reluc-
tant to ratify the political conception, or, at least, her support would probably be uncertain and 
vacillating. In order to avoid this, we should somehow combine (c) and (a).1388 As I have ex-
plained in chapter two, Rawls’s idea of an overlapping consensus explicitly links political jus-
tification [which can be subsumed under (c)] and full justification (a), providing a moral 
ground to a conception of public reason that can draw on public political culture for its own 
moral content, that is the reciprocal respect for the freedom and equality of cooperating fellow 
citizens. Laborde, however, overlooks such an important question: how to secure moral en-
dorsement (then, different from mere acceptance as a modus vivendi) of her conception of cit-
izenship on the part of those Muslims who would like to achieve it as Muslims? To put it dif-
ferently, is a consensus on a conception of citizenship also rooted within Islam possible? To 
conclude, I argue that, by leaving these questions unanswered, Laborde’s account of citizen-
ship is significantly weakened. An important element is missing in her theory; an element 
whose main purpose is the reconciliation between pluralism on the one hand, and consensus 
and stability on the other. As I have just said, Rawls’s public reason seems to be better 
                                                        
1386 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 3-4. 
1387 This point is summarised by Freeman with reference to the difference between A Theory of Justice and Political 
Liberalism concerning the problem of stability: ‘[in Theory s]tability was prefaced on the argument that reasonable per-
sons would find it rational to affirm their sense of justice as supremely regulative in order to realize their capacities for 
agency and therewith their status as autonomous moral agents. But given the fact of reasonable pluralism, many people 
will not want to affirm their status as autonomous moral agents even in a society where justice as fairness is generally 
accepted. Thus the stability problem remains: How is it possible that reasonable and rational citizens find it not just rea-
sonable to agree upon justice as fairness (or any other liberal conception of justice), but also find it rational to endorse 
this conception of justice as supremely regulative of their pursuit of their good?’ Samuel Freeman, Rawls, 366, italics in 
the original. We could ask a similar question with reference to critical secularism: how can Muslims as reasonable and 
rational citizens find it both reasonable (qua citizens) and rational (qua Muslims) to endorse a political conception of 
citizenship including the principle of critical secularism? About the distinction between rational and reasonable, see 
above. 
1388 Or, in Rawlsian terms, political pro tanto justification and full justification. 
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equipped for this task. To put it simply, the idea of an overlapping consensus provides the 
deepest level of moral commitment, so that the endorsement of the political conception can be 
anchored in one’s religious or philosophical views (what I have called the “justificatory out-
sourcing” with reference to full justification). Hence, in Rawls’s view Muslims can and 
should endorse the political conception qua Muslims, that is, from within their Islamic per-
spective (a). This is the idea of full justification (see chapter two). As I mentioned in chapter 
four, however, such a non-public endorsement must be expressed in public, so that the mutual 
assurance problem is also solved (see chapter four).1389 This can be done by publicly honour-
ing the idea of wide public reason. Taken together, the idea of an overlapping consensus and 
the idea of public reason make stability for the right reasons possible.1390 In other words, the 
fact that an overlapping consensus is reached means that Muslims can embrace the political 
conception qua Muslims (a). Simultaneously, the fact that they respect public reason shows 
that they are willing to endorse it qua (political liberal) citizens. This point qualifies endorse-
ment under (c) in a politically liberal way. Hence, in a Rawlsian perspective (a) and (c) are 
not only reconciled, but (a) supports and deepens (c). In other words, the overlapping consen-
sus allows the move from the political pro tanto justification to the public justification. Citi-
zens support the political conception as political liberal citizens, that is, they recognise it as 
politically justified and at the same time as justified from within their own comprehensive 
doctrine. On the contrary, critical republicanism does not seem so greatly concerned with an 
endorsement similar to (a), while it is perfectly apt and ready to provide a republican version 
of a (c)-kind of endorsement. Yet, one may then legitimately doubt that Laborde’s critical re-
publicanism is able to assure stability for the right reasons. This is a crucial question, because 
a normative theory of citizenship for contemporary Western European societies must prove 
able of reconciling religious pluralism with the aspiration of social stability. However, if we 
take seriously the idea of reasonable pluralism as an enduring feature of free human reason 
under democratic institutions, then we cannot pay the price of annihilating reasonable plural-
                                                        
1389 I have already explained that ‘when an overlapping consensus obtains, each person’s payoff table has the following 
structure: the payoffs are such that it is rational for a person to honour the terms of cooperation and treat the political 
conception of justice as authoritative only when she has the assurance that all others, or a sufficient number of others, 
also adhere to the terms and treat the conception as authoritative’ (Paul Weithman, “Inclusivism, Stability, and Assur-
ance,” 85-86). 
1390 Supra. See also Larry Krasnoff, “Consensus, Stability, and Normativity in Rawls’s Political Liberalism,” and Paul 
Weithman, “Inclusivism, Stability, and Assurance.” 
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ism for the sake of stability. In few words, from a normative perspective what matters is sta-
bility for the right reasons, not stability tout court.  
In conclusion, in this section I have explained why I think that public reason citizenship 
represents a more attractive normative conception for contemporary Western European socie-
ties if compared with two theoretical alternatives that are still close to it: liberal multicultural-
ism and critical republicanism. In the next section, I show how public reason can resolve the 
problem I pointed out in the first chapter. 
 
5.2.C Reconciliation Through Public Reason. 
In the previous section and in 1.2.a.1, I maintained that liberal multiculturalism alone 
seems unable to resolve the problem of mutual assurance that Western European democracies 
face with regard to their Muslim citizens. As I have said, however, I am not interested in con-
futing the philosophical foundations of liberal multiculturalism. Instead, what I am saying is 
that, regardless of the specific merits of (or problems raised by) liberal multiculturalism, one 
should be public reason liberal before being multicultural.1391 Otherwise, the problem of mu-
tual assurance cannot be efficaciously solved. In addition to this, in the previous section I said 
that critical republicanism does not represent an adequate framework for including Muslim 
citizens qua Muslims. Thus, one can doubt that critical republicanism too is a suitable theoret-
ical perspective for assuring stability for the right reasons (that is, one can doubt that the bases 
for Muslims’ endorsement that it provides are solid enough). In Weithman’s terms, one may 
say that critical republicanism does not solve the generalised prisoner’s dilemma, because it 
does not consider a notion like the Rawlsian idea of an overlapping consensus, so it cannot 
show that everyone’s ‘balance of reasons tilts in favor of acting justly when others do, even 
from the “self-interested point of view”,’1392 that is, that everyone has sufficient reasons to 
‘continue to act justly rather than defect.’1393 On the other hand, liberal multiculturalism does 
                                                        
1391 For this idea, see Sebastiano Maffettone, “From Liberal Multiculturalism to Multicultural Liberalism,” 129. In the 
same way, Maffettone suggests that we should shift from liberal multiculturalism to ‘multicultural liberalism,’ follow-
ing the intuition that ‘substantives count more than adjectives’ (ibid. 130). See also 142, 142-160, and 160-162). 
1392 Paul Weithman, Why Political Liberalism?, 49. 
1393 Ibid. 
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not solve the mutual assurance problem, because it does not make publicly known the fact 
that everyone’s ‘balance of reasons tilts in favor of acting justly when others do, even from 
the “self-interested point of view”.’ In conclusion, neither critical republicanism, nor liberal 
multiculturalism are suitable conceptions of citizenship for securing social stability for the 
right reasons (and not a mere modus vivendi or a Hobbesian ‘imposed’ stability,1394 see foot-
notes above) in contemporary European societies. 
In 1.2.a, I said that the crisis that Western European societies are facing in relation to their 
Muslim citizens concerns the normative content of a shared conception of citizenship. The 
latter seems deficient or seriously impaired. More specifically, I have claimed that we cannot 
resolve the problems of exclusion, discrimination, and mutual distrust examined in 1.1.a.1 
without a normative conception of citizenship that at the same time (a) establishes the ground 
on which a common political identity can be structured, and (b) provides shared standards for 
political and social criticism. Both these elements are of crucial importance if we want to fair-
ly include Muslim citizens and to solve the problem of mutual assurance. While the two ele-
ments are inseparable, the first (a common political identity) has a particularly strong relation 
to the solution of the mutual assurance problem. On the other hand, the second element 
(shared standards for political criticism) is a fundamental condition for fair inclusion of citi-
zens in general, and of members of minority groups in particular.1395 In Laborde’s terms, 
shared standards for denouncing political and social injustice are of crucial importance for 
non-dominated citizenship.  
Now I will consider these two elements in turn, and I will try to show that public reason 
citizenship is able to secure stability for the right reasons in European societies. If my argu-
ment succeeds, then a conception of citizenship grounded in public reason is not only norma-
tively available in existing European societies (i.e., it could be followed in those societies), 
but it is also normatively preferable than its rival conceptions and able to play the role re-
quired of it. Then, it should be followed as ideal conception of citizenship for European socie-
ties.  
                                                        
1394 Ibid. in particular 5-6, 44-45, 50-51, 56, 176. 
1395 Here “in particular” must be understood in comparative terms. 
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(1) For a normative conception of citizenship, it is of vital importance to provide citizens 
with shared standards and criteria for discerning reasonable from unreasonable, legitimate 
from illegitimate, and just from unjust political demands. As I have explained (see in particu-
lar 3.2.b.2 and 4.2), political liberalism as a meta-theory of legitimacy and toleration is mainly 
concerned with the first two kinds of distinctions. With regards to the case of Muslim citizens, 
I argued in chapter one that, while I do not specifically address the specific questions of jus-
tice involved in contemporary phenomena of social and political discrimination and exclusion 
of Muslims, I am deeply convinced that any serious normative conception of citizenship 
should address such problems from the perspective of protecting citizens’ political status as 
free equals. In other words, such a conception should enable citizens to appeal to shared 
standards for publicly exposing and criticising unreasonable or unjust demands placed upon 
them. That those standards are shared is essential: whenever a citizen appeals to common 
standards for social and political criticism, other citizens are urged to listen to her voice. If 
they do not even listen to her, they can be morally blamed for not recognising her equal status 
as a citizen. Thus, the fact that a normative conception of citizenship provides citizens with 
shared standards of criticism empowers all the citizenry, and citizens who are members of 
disadvantaged groups in particular.1396 Such standards are of capital importance for political 
inclusion. Moreover, this aspect is important not only in negative, but also in positive terms: 
indeed, it is self-evident that the existence of common standards and criteria for political criti-
cism also makes citizens able to recognise the positive contributions of individuals and groups 
to the overall legitimacy and justice of the social and political system. In line with this, I have 
already mentioned Tariq Ramadan’s claim that ‘the actual problem is to know what the con-
tribution [made by Muslim citizens’] is, not only for themselves, but for Europe,’ and his as-
sertion that ‘Europe will begin to change its perception about Islam only when it realises that 
Islam represents a resource and not only a problem.’1397 Ramadan’s call requires that Europe-
an societies are able to recognise the positive contributions made by their Muslim citizens to 
their social and political life, thus, shared standards for political criticism are necessary. I ar-
gue that public reason citizenship provides such standards. As Solum points out: 
                                                        
1396 Again, comparatively. 
1397 Tariq Ramadan in Islam in Europa / Islam in Italia tra diritto e società, 326, my translation. 
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‘An ideal of public reason can serve […] as a standard for the political criti-
cism of argument in the public sphere. One can ask, “When is it proper for me to 
criticize the argumentation of a fellow citizen on the ground that the reasons of-
fered transgress the limits of civility?” An ideal of public reason answers this 
question by defining standards for political criticism of reasons given in public. 
[This] role of public reason does not assume coercive enforcement by the state, as 
such enforcement would violate the political right of freedom of expression. But 
[this] role of public reason does not rule out the use of social pressure to encour-
age compliance with the ideal.’1398 
This passage emphasises two important questions. First, the requirements of public reason 
specify the criteria for assessing whether the claims made by others concerning fundamental 
political questions conflict with the demands of political legitimacy. This happens when such 
claims exceed the two levels of the duty of civility (4.2).1399 Political claims that violate reci-
procity between cooperating reasonable free and equal citizens can and should be critically 
exposed, denounced, and rejected. Second, the public availability of standards for social polit-
ical criticism empowers those who would be subject to those dominating claims. In addition, 
through the progressive elimination of unjust social structures and distributions and the rejec-
tion of unreasonable claims (that is, claims that violate citizens’ freedom and equality), shared 
standards for social criticism provided by a conception of citizenship grounded in public rea-
son also bring society’s basic structure closer to the ideal of a well-ordered society. In this 
way, public reason accomplishes its role as a regulative moral ideal (see the introduction of 
chapter four and 5.2.a). 
 
(2) As I have just mentioned, a common public political identity is an important element 
for solving the problem of mutual assurance. If all citizens share a public political identity, 
then they have reasons to think that others’ ‘individual rationality of compliance’1400 with the 
                                                        
1398 Lawrence B. Solum, “Constructing an Ideal of Public Reason,” 733. 
1399 For a similar interpretation of the role of public reason as an instrument for social and political criticism, in 4.1.a I 
also quoted David A. J. Richards, “Public Reason and Abolitionist Dissent,” in particular 835-837. 
1400 Paul J. Weithman, “Inclusivism, Stability, and Assurance,” 83. 
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public political conception of justice can be framed within a common public perspective. 
Such a perspective, I argue, is best represented by the idea of public reason. Citizens internal-
ise the existence of an overlapping consensus which unifies their individual full justifications 
(see chapter two). On this basis, they know that, despite their disagreements about the deep 
sources of their full moral identities, they can nonetheless share a public or institutional iden-
tity with their fellow citizens, that is, they can share an identity as citizens (see chapter three). 
Such an identity governs their reciprocal public interactions and embodies their ‘disposition 
to be reasonable and their desire to be recognized by others as reasonable,’1401 thus regulating 
how they should address their fellow citizens in public political forums (see chapter three and 
the analysis of the proviso in 4.2). Importantly, then, such an identity is not morally empty: it 
is grounded in the idea of reciprocity of the reasonable (see the introduction of chapter four 
and 4.2). Moreover, as I have said (see 3.2.b.1), Rawls’s public reason not only provides the 
ground for such public identity, but also ideally fits within citizens’ fuller moral identities 
through the idea of an overlapping consensus. In Rawls’s words, public identity grounded in 
public reason is a ‘module’ of citizens’ fuller identities, which draw on their comprehensive 
doctrines. I return to these considerations about public reason, political identity, and mutual 
assurance shortly. Now I want to clarify an important question: is the political identity speci-
fied by public reason defined once and for all? Notice that the significance of the connection 
between public reason and the common political identity of citizens is also stressed by Onora 
O’Neill, who observes that  
‘The power of Rawls’s conception of public reason is drawn from its connec-
tion to his account of citizens. Being a citizen with a sense of political identity is 
much more than being one of a plurality of beings capable of rational and reason-
able justification, and cognizant of the limits placed on reasonableness by the bur-
dens of judgement: it is constitutive of reasonableness.’1402  
However, O’Neill is sceptical about how Rawls’s public reason structures such identity. In 
particular, she argues that Rawls seems to predefine this identity rather than seeing it as con-
tinuously constructed and reconstructed through political processes. According to her, in 
Rawls’s view of a closed and idealised society,  
                                                        
1401 James W. Boettcher, “Public Reason and Religion,” 129-130. 
1402 Onora O’Neill, “Political Liberalism and Public Reason,” 418. 
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‘[A]mong [citizens] there is in effect prior understanding that they form “a 
people.” That is why he can speak explicitly of citizens as sharing a political iden-
tity […] Yet it is all too well known that in real life persons are often unsure about 
their sense(s) of political identity […] A central objective of politics may be the 
reconstrual of political identities […] Boundaries and identities are a central do-
main of thinking about justice rather than its fixed parameters.’1403 
Hence, according to O’Neill, the idea of a common political identity in Rawls’s closed so-
ciety is not simply a ‘mere abstraction,’ but a dangerous idealisation which has to be ‘handled 
with care in practical reasoning,’ because ‘[it] assumes predicates which are false of all exist-
ing human societies,’ and one risks ‘to conclude that the world rather than the idealization is 
at fault.’1404 In this sense, it has been argued that ‘[a]bstractions are sometimes powerful 
lies.’1405 But why −even in a well-ordered society− should one think that Rawls predefines a 
homogeneous political identity? What he assumes ex ante is a general set of ideas implicit in 
democratic public culture (supra). However, Rawls maintains that public reason in itself is 
not specified at a certain moment once and for all, but that it changes over time (3.2.b.1): 
‘[Rawls] does not conceive of public reason as static or unchanging.’1406 Pace O’Neill, public 
reason does not predefine or assume an unchanging shared political identity. Rather, public 
reason is the vector −or the channel− through which citizens’ public or institutional identity is 
continuously structured and restructured, built and rebuilt, shaped and reshaped. O’Neill is 
right in affirming that identities are not static and that they cannot be predefined, but saying 
this does not amount to a refutation of public reason, since the latter does not assume but 
shapes a common political identity. Having clarified this important point and coming back to 
the question of assurance, I said that the fact that public reason represents the ground on 
which this public identity can be built explains why public reason is able to solve the problem 
of mutual assurance and to ensure stability for the right reasons. Examining the second level 
of the duty of civility in 4.2, I explained that a wide view of public reason solves the problem 
                                                        
1403 Ibid. 419-420. 
1404 Ibid. 419. 
1405 Peter F. Lake, “Liberalism Within the Limits of the Reasonable Alone: Developments of John Rawls’ Political Phi-
losophy, its Political Positivism, and the Limits on its Applicability,” Vermont Law Review 19, no. 3 (1995), 629. For 
Lake’s criticism of Rawls’s use of abstraction, see in particular ibid. 626-631.  
1406 Lawrence B. Solum, “Novel Public Reasons,” 1485. 
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of mutual assurance firstly by allowing the introduction of non-public reasons in public dis-
cussions of fundamental political questions, provided that other citizens can be publicly and 
adequately assured of the commitment to the fair terms of social cooperation. The crucial 
threshold for meeting the requirement expressed here by the adverb “adequately” consists of 
the respect for the criterion of reciprocity of the reasonable. Moreover, other citizens must be 
able to see that such non-public reasons enhance civic friendship and a spirit of political reci-
procity (because, as I argued in chapter four, “the reasonable is intelligible to reasonable peo-
ple”), and this explains the meaning of the adverb “publicly.” I also said that the introduction 
of non-public reasons can strengthen the ideal of public reason, and this explains why an ex-
clusive view of public reason is inadequate (see 4.1). Thus, satisfying the requirements of 
public reason and the proviso (at least as specified by B2) is the first way to solve the mutual 
assurance problem, that is, to guarantee public knowledge of the fact that everyone continues 
to be committed to the ideal of public reason and to preserve her sense of justice by honouring 
the fair terms of social cooperation specified by a liberal political conception of justice. How-
ever, public reason importantly contributes to avert the mutual assurance problem also in a 
second way. As I have demonstrated, the wide view of public reason permits the establish-
ment of a common political identity despite the differences in citizens’ deepest moral identi-
ties without obliterating or annihilating them (rather, their essential role in achieving an over-
lapping consensus is publicly known). In doing this, we follow the same path leading from an 
overlapping consensus to the idea of public reason illustrated in Figure 3, but in the opposite 
direction (bottom-up rather than top-down). Within such a public or common political identi-
ty, citizens recognise one another as free equal citizens, who hold different comprehensive 
doctrines and broader moral identities, but also endorse an idea of public reason which ex-
presses their sharing a common political identity. To participate in the practice of public justi-
fication and to show a commitment to the political moral requirements of public reason (the 
reciprocity of the reasonable) means affirming that one embraces the shared political identity 
of citizens as citizens. In turn, this assures other fellow citizens of one’s allegiance to shared 
fair terms of social cooperation. With reference to Muslim citizens, public reason can provide 
a solid ground for solving many cases of mistrust and suspicion. If citizens (Muslims and 
non-Muslims) show one another that they all embrace a common political identity structured 
around the idea of public reason and that they act accordingly, then the problem of mutual as-
surance is solved. Their participation in public justification in conformity with the require-
ments of wide public reason and their endorsement of the related moral criterion of reciproci-
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ty of the reasonable is what is required for giving assurance of their political allegiance to the 
democratic system of social cooperation. An important consequence of this interpretation of 
public reason as the ground for citizens’ public identity is that it does justice to those Muslim 
citizens who complain about the repeated and never conclusive questions and doubts about 
their allegiance to constitutional democracy and their sense of belonging (see 1.1.a.1 and 
1.2.a). 
In conclusion, my thesis is that public reason produces a decompression of the public 
space that makes it possible to reabsorb reasonable pluralism without annihilating it. Such 
reabsorption of reasonable pluralism within the common discursive platform of public reason 
is possible because public reason (1) resolves the problem of mutual assurance both by speci-
fying an extensive interpretation of the proviso (see 4.2) and by grounding an inclusive com-
mon public political identity within which citizens can recognise one another as free equals 
cooperating on fair terms, and (2) empowers citizens through the recognition of shared stand-
ards for denouncing unjust demands placed upon them and this secures their political inclu-
sion on an equal footing. If public reason is able to perform such a role, then the idea of rec-
onciliation through public reason reveals itself in its deepest meaning. In the next chapter, I 
will try to demonstrate this claim by applying the justificatory evaluative theoretical frame-
work developed so far. In other words, my aim is to show that the three requirements of pub-
lic reason citizenship (RR, CR, and CiR) can be satisfied by a plausible European Muslim ap-
proach. If the evaluation concerning RR, CR, and CiR can demonstrate that there is no incon-
sistency between the requirements of public reason citizenship and at least one plausible ac-
count of how to be a European Muslim, then one can conclude that (on at least that account) 
European Muslims can be included in the political identity and benefit from the shared stand-
ards provided by public reason.  
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Chapter Six 
Tariq Ramadan’s European Muslims and 
Public Reason. 
 
Entre l’Islam et l’Occident, c’est 
moins une affaire de violence 
qu’une question de justice. 
 
 
 
This is the ultimate liberation that 
founds fraternities [:] to be with 
God and to live with men. 
 
 
In this final chapter, I apply the justificatory evaluative theoretical framework in order to 
show that the normative model of public reason citizenship that I developed can both include 
European Muslim citizens and assure citizens about social stability for the right reasons. As I 
have said in the conclusion of the last chapter, my purpose is to demonstrate that a plausible 
European Muslim approach can fulfil the requirements of public reason citizenship, namely 
RR, CR, and CiR. If this is so, then it is possible to say that (as regards at least that approach) 
there is no obstacle that prevents European Muslims from benefitting from both the political 
identity and the shared standards provided by public reason. Actually, a European Muslim 
                                                        
 Tariq Ramadan, Aux sources du renouveau musulman: D’al-Afghānī à Hassan al-Bannā, un siècle de réformisme 
islamique, third edition (Lyon: Tawhid, 2013), 459. 
 Tariq Ramadan, Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity (Leicester, UK: The Islamic Foundation, 2001), 
311. 
  
 European Muslims and Liberal Citizenship 
Ph.D. Thesis successfully discussed on April 21, 2016.  
The total or partial use of the Ph.D. Thesis is subject to copyright restrictions. 
 
  
454  
 Giovanni Vezzani 
 
LUISS-ULB 
approach already displays –at least implicitly− such identity and standards if it satisfies the 
requirements of public reason citizenship (RR, CR, and CiR). Finally, once it is proven that 
this identity and these standards are publicly available to citizens as citizens (to Muslim citi-
zens as far as this study is concerned, but I will assume for the sake of simplicity also to other 
non-Muslim citizens), then the complex problem outlined in 1.2.a can be solved, because then 
public reason citizenship is a viable normative model from the perspective of at least one 
plausible European Muslim perspective. 
I repeat here a crucial aspect of the justificatory evaluative approach that I adopt, since it 
will become apparent in the following sections and it is better to avoid confusion from the 
very beginning. In contrast with justificatory comparative political theory (i.e., conjecture), 
justificatory evaluative political theory is not concerned with assessing the degree of correct-
ness or plausibility of the arguments advanced from the standpoint of a specific religious tra-
dition, for instance the Islamic tradition of legal, theological, and philosophical thought. Ra-
ther, it is concerned only with an evaluation of those arguments from a public perspective. 
Thus, when in what follows I refer to arguments that the European Muslim approach under 
consideration presents as authentically or genuinely Islamic (or as more genuinely Islamic 
than other alternative arguments), in no way am I expressing my own judgment about the cor-
rectness or soundness of those arguments from the standpoint of Islamic doctrine. In other 
words, I do not enter into the issue of Islamic correctness or plausibility of the arguments pre-
sented by the Muslim approach I am analysing. I leave this important critical task to histori-
ans and experts of legal, theological, and philosophical Islamic thought, as well as –
obviously− to Muslim believers. Here I am only interested in considering how and why those 
arguments are presented from the viewpoint of public reason.  
 
6.1 A (Contested) Biography. A European Muslim Approach. 
In this chapter, I apply the evaluative framework to the conception of citizenship emerging 
from the work of Tariq Ramadan. In other words, here I consider Ramadan’s conception of 
citizenship in the light of the three main requirements of public reason citizenship (RR, CR, 
CiR) and their specifications (see Table 2). However, one could ask: why Ramadan? After all, 
the main title of this research relates “liberal citizenship” to “European Muslims,” not to 
“Tariq Ramadan.” Is it legitimate to homogenise and unify the rich universe of Muslims in 
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Europe under the umbrella of Tariq Ramadan’s thought? Does he represent a universal para-
digm of European Islam or –more in harmony with the logic of this study− of how to be Eu-
ropean Muslim citizens? My answer to these questions, stated in these terms, is a resolute 
“no.” It would be dreadfully naïve to think that any single approach or label can subsume the 
complexity and variety of human spirituality and social conditions, above all when the two 
are combined in ways that puzzle even the most experienced sociologists, as in the case of 
Muslims in contemporary Europe. Thus, in analysing Tariq Ramadan’s approach here, I am 
not suggesting that it is the only, nor even the best, the most suitable, or the most complete 
way of being Muslim in contemporary European societies. I am perfectly aware (and very 
happy to acknowledge) that there are many possible alternative ways of being a European 
Muslim. I do not want to force them to stay on a single path, nor am I saying that this path is 
inevitably the most advisable (note, en passant, that the same Tariq Ramadan has never 
claimed for himself the role of sole reference for European Muslims, a role that would be at 
odds with the whole historical development of Muslim societies and communities, for in Is-
lam there is not a single or central earthly religious authority). However, from an analytical 
viewpoint, Ramadan’s work has an important double advantage. First, to my knowledge he 
has produced the most extensive and exhaustive reflection on Muslims’ citizenship in Eu-
rope.1407 This allows the achievement of a greater level of detail in the evaluation carried out 
in this study. Second, while far from being hegemonic (and in no way desiring such hegemo-
ny) within Muslim communities around Europe, his thought is nonetheless very popular.1408 
To be clear: his audience is not so much composed of young people of the banlieue, but rather 
of the lower to high, socially active, and quite educated, middle class.1409 The core of his au-
dience is mainly represented by French speaking second and third generations with immigrant 
origins from the Maghreb, rather than, for instance, by German speaking Turks.1410 On the 
                                                        
1407 For some alternative references, see the footnotes of the first chapter. 
1408 See for instance Frank Frégosi, “Les contours discursifs d’une religiosité citoyenne: laïcité et identité islamique 
chez Tariq Ramadan,” in Paroles d’islam: Individus, sociétés et discours dans l’islam européen contemporain / Islamic 
Words: Individuals, Societies and Discourses in Contemporary European Islam, edited by Felice Dassetto, (Paris: Mai-
sonneuve & Larose, 2000), 206 and Nina zu Fürstenberg, Chi ha paura di Tariq Ramadan? (Vicenza: Marsilio, 2007), 
17. 
1409 Ian Hamel, La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan. Sa famille, ses réseaux, sa stratégie (Lausanne: Favre, 2007), 284 and 
Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 21, 30-31, and 35.  
1410 Ian Hamel, La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan, 182. 
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other hand, his academic work is mainly addressed to the Anglo-American world, where he 
built his academic career (see infra for his biography), also thanks to his publications with 
Oxford University Press, such as Radical Reform, What I Believe, and Islam and the Arab 
Awakening.1411 In any case, his voice is undoubtedly one of the most influential and listened 
to (not necessarily favourably, to be sure) with reference to the question of Muslims’ citizen-
ship in Europe. His intellectual production is extremely prolific: many books in French, Eng-
lish, German, Italian, and Spanish; numerous tapes recorded with the publisher Tawhid 
(Lyon); a very efficient website in French, English, and Arabic;1412 a strong presence on so-
cial networks (Facebook and Twitter), YouTube, and on television shows (he presents the 
show “Risalat al Islam” on Iqraa satellite TV in French, while on the Iranian channel PressTV 
he presented “Islam and Life” in English until 2014 and now “Islamic Awakening – Conver-
sations with Tariq Ramadan”);1413 a remarkable number of (very well-attended) conferences 
all around Europe; a large number of networks (the first was the association Coopération 
Coup de Main, created in 1988, which did not contain an explicit Islamic reference; rather, it 
was aimed at increasing awareness –particularly among young people− toward the problems 
of the Third World, and organised trips to Africa, South America, and Asia;1414 then the asso-
ciation Musulmans, Musulmanes de Suisse, founded in 1994 and based in Bern;1415 third, Pré-
sence Musulmane also known as Muslim Presence, which is an informal network created in 
19961416 that aims ‘to establish a platform for dialogue, convergence and mutually enriching 
discussion from an Islamic perspective’1417 through the training and cooperation of associa-
                                                        
1411 Tariq Ramadan, Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009), What I Believe (cit. supra), and Islam and the Arab Awakening (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012). 
1412 URL = http://tariqramadan.com/.  
1413 Videos can be found on Ramadan’s website: http://tariqramadan.com/english/category/en/medialibrary/islam-life/.  
1414 Ian Hamel, La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan, 155. 
1415 Paul Landau, Le Sabre et le Coran, 82. 
1416 Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 29 and 111-113, and Ian Hamel, La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan, 
241. 
1417 See the Muslim Presence’s website, URL = http://muslimpresence.com/?page_id=426.  
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tions working on the ground;1418 the European Muslim Network, a think tank based in Brus-
sels of which Ramadan is President;1419 finally, the Research Centre for Islamic Legislation 
and Ethics, CILE, of which Ramadan is Executive Director, founded in 2012 within the Qatar 
Faculty of Islamic Studies, Hamad Bin Khalifa University of the Qatar Foundation for Educa-
tion, Science and Community Development1420 and based in Doha, Qatar; the CILE organises 
an annual conference, seminars, training and teaching activities on an international level –the 
2015 annual conference was held in Brussels from 14 to 15 March). TIME Magazine named 
him among the most important religious innovators of the twenty-first century in 2000 and 
among the most influential people in the world in 2004; also, during the last decade, he has 
been cited many times among the hundred leading global public intellectuals by Foreign Pol-
icy and Prospect magazine. In 2007, both the weekly New York Time Magazine and the peri-
odical magazine The New Republic devoted two long profiles to him, respectively by Ian Bu-
ruma and Paul Berman.1421 Moreover, an entire strand of literature has flourished in support 
of or against Ramadan,1422 and on the internet his name is present in a profusion of articles, 
blogs, chats and so on.  
This surely makes Ramadan’s theoretical production a serious contender for the applica-
tion of the evaluative framework that I worked out. In chapter two, I said that if it is not pos-
sible to evaluate the European Muslim approach, then the best alternative is to consider an 
approach that could be plausibly defined as a European Muslim one. Thus, I defined the crite-
rion for selecting the European Muslim approach as the plausibility principle, which affirms 
that: 
                                                        
1418 Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 111. 
1419 See the EMN’s website: http://www.euro-muslims.eu/.  
1420 See: http://www.cilecenter.org/en/vision-mission/.  
1421 Ian Buruma, “Tariq Ramadan Has an Identity Issue,” The New York Times Magazine (February 4, 2007), available 
on the website of The New York Times, URL 
=http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/04/magazine/04ramadan.t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; and Paul Berman, “Who’s 
Afraid of Tariq Ramadan?” The New Republic (June 4, 2007), available on the website of The New Republic, URL = 
https://newrepublic.com/article/60961/whos-afraid-tariq-ramadan. In both cases, page references are to the version of 
the article downloaded from the internet. 
1422 See the references in this chapter. 
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(PP): The necessary and sufficient condition for plausibly considering a view x 
as representative of a European Muslim approach to the issue of citizenship is 
that x is widespread among Muslim citizens in European liberal democracies. 
This is the best non-optimal solution: it allows us to take into account a European Muslim 
approach to the question of Muslims’ citizenship, while at the same time avoiding essential-
ism. It is non-optimal because, as I have just said, the evaluation cannot be applied to “the on-
ly legitimate” Muslim conception of citizenship in Europe. Simply, there is no such single 
conception. This is why the approach chosen can only be “plausibly” defined as a European 
Muslim approach. The consequence, then, is that other legitimate European Muslim ap-
proaches are excluded from the analytical and evaluative scope of this research: the evalua-
tion conducted here neither rejects nor ratifies them. They are simply out of focus. Thus, this 
is not the only possible evaluation, nor does it claim to be definitive. However, if the notion 
of “plausibility” has some sense, the fact that the approach considered can be plausibly de-
fined as a European Muslim one implies that, if the evaluation shows that the approach in 
question satisfies the requirements of public reason citizenship, then it is possible to say that 
Muslim citizens can be included in public reason citizenship through (at least) one plausible 
European Muslim approach to the issue of citizenship. 
It should now be clear (with the caveat that I expressed in chapter two) that Tariq Rama-
dan’s approach fulfils PP: it can be plausibly considered as representative of a European Mus-
lim approach because it is widespread among Muslim citizens in Europe (supra). Before ex-
amining in depth how he constructs his European Muslim approach to the question of Mus-
lims’ citizenship in Europe, I must now briefly introduce Ramadan’s biography.  
Ramadan was born in 1962 in Geneva. He is the son of Said Ramadan (1926-1995) and 
Wafa al-Banna (1933-), the daughter of Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949), the founder of the Mus-
lim Brotherhood in 1928. His father was very attached to his father-in-law.1423 He was also 
one of his closer assistants. After his graduation in law in Cairo, and after having been named 
editor of the monthly review of the Brotherhood, in 1948 Said fought in Palestine against the 
                                                        
1423 Tariq Ramadan in the interview with Orsola Casagrande in Europa domani: conversazione con Tariq Ramadan 
(Rome: Jouvence, 2008), 35. 
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creation of Israel.1424 After the assassination of al-Banna in 1949, he travelled a lot: initially in 
Pakistan, where he was close to Abu al-A‘la Mawdudi (1903-1979, the founder of the Ja-
ma‘at-i Islami, a prominent political figure in Pakistan after the partition with India in 
1947)1425 and where he obtained a Pakistani diplomatic passport; later he returned for some 
time to Egypt before definitively leaving the country in 1954 when the repression of the 
Brotherhood by the regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970) became more rigid. He then 
lost his Egyptian citizenship and was not able to come back until his burial in 1995 [the pray-
er at his funeral would be pronounced by Yusuf al-Qaradawi1426 (1926-), the Egyptian Islamic 
theologian and jurist and leading public intellectual who is also very famous thanks to the 
show al-Sharī‘a wa-l-Hayat (Sharī‘a and Life), on the Qatari channel Aljazeera and for being 
the president of the European Council for Fatwa founded in 1997,1427 whose first collection of 
fatwas would later be prefaced by Tariq Ramadan himself1428]. After five years of continuous 
travels in Jerusalem, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia,1429 Said finally settled in Ge-
neva with his wife and his first three sons: Aymen (1952-), Bilal (1954-), and Yasser (1955-). 
The fourth son –Hani− was born in Geneva in 1959. The last two children of the Ramadan 
family were born in 1962 and 1963: Tariq and the only girl, Arwa. Then, Said founded the Is-
lamic Centre of Geneva in the neighbourhood of Eaux-Vives in 1961,1430 ‘the first institute of 
this kind in Europe.’1431 Generously financed by Saudi Arabia for almost ten years, since 
1971 the Islamic Centre has gone through serious financial straits, because Riyadh did not ap-
preciate Said’s independence and interrupted any funding, sponsoring the creation of a great 
                                                        
1424 Ian Hamel, La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan, 85-87. 
1425 See the entries “Jama‘at-i Islami” and “Mawdudi, Abu al-A‘la” by Irfan Ahmad in The Princeton Encyclopedia of 
Islamic Political Thought. 
1426 Ian Hamel, La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan, 119. 
1427 See “al-Qaradawi, Yusuf” by Yasir Qadhi in The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought. 
1428 Recueil de fatwas, avis juridiques concernant les musulmans d’Europe, first volume (Lyon: Tawhid, 2002), quoted 
in Lionel Favrot, Tariq Ramadan dévoilé, 294-295 note 148, Caroline Fourest, Frère Tariq. Le double discours de Ta-
riq Ramadan, 121 note 1, and Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 85 note 2. 
1429 Ian Hamel, La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan, 91-93. 
1430 Ibid. 96-97. 
1431 Ibid. 97, my translation. 
  
 European Muslims and Liberal Citizenship 
Ph.D. Thesis successfully discussed on April 21, 2016.  
The total or partial use of the Ph.D. Thesis is subject to copyright restrictions. 
 
  
460  
 Giovanni Vezzani 
 
LUISS-ULB 
new mosque in Chemin Colladon (Petit-Sacconex, close to Geneva’s airport) in 1978.1432 
When Said died in 1995, Aymen became the president of the Islamic Centre of Eaux-Vives, 
Hani its director, and Yasser its treasurer, while Wafa, Arwa, Tariq, and Bilal are members of 
the association that runs it.1433 Tariq is married to Iman, a French woman who converted to Is-
lam, and whose previous name was Isabelle.1434 They have four children. In his youth, Tariq 
Ramadan attended the Coudriers and Sismondi schools in Geneva.1435 Very athletic, he 
played with dedication in the Star Sécheron and de Perly football teams (where he was also a 
trainer for some years).1436 He then graduated in philosophy and French literature (with a 
master thesis entitled “The Notion of Suffering in Nietzsche’s Philosophy”)1437 and then he 
became professor at the Collège de Saussure in Geneva. He also became dean (the youngest 
dean of a secondary school in Switzerland)1438 of the same school, a position that he held 
from 1988 to 1992. In 1992, he settled in Egypt with his family, where he spent approximate-
ly a year and a half receiving one-to-one training in Islamic sciences.1439 This is certainly an 
important moment in Ramadan’s life.1440 Two facts that occurred in 1993 have been repeated-
ly quoted by Ramadan’s critics as evidence of his “doublespeak.”1441 First, he was somehow 
involved in the cancellation of Voltaire’s pièce Mahomet (original title: Le fanatisme ou Ma-
homet le Prophète) from the programme for the celebration of the tercentennial of Voltaire’s 
                                                        
1432 Ibid. 113-114. These circumstances are confirmed by Tariq Ramadan himself in Orsola Casagrande, Europa 
domani: conversazione con Tariq Ramadan, 27. 
1433 Ian Hamel, La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan, 119; see also 124-125 and 130. 
1434 See what Tariq Ramadan says about her conversion in Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 106. 
1435 Lionel Favrot, Tariq Ramadan dévoilé, 90. 
1436 Ibid. 91. 
1437 Tariq Ramadan, What I Believe, 12. 
1438 Ian Hamel, La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan, 157. 
1439 Ramadan explains the circumstances of his stay in Egypt on several occasions: see for instance Orsola Casagrande, 
Europa domani: conversazione con Tariq Ramadan, 34-35 (for his first visit to Egypt when he was seventeen years old, 
see ibid. 32-33). Ramadan says ‘In twenty months of intensive study and one-to-one courses, I covered the five-year 
program of Islamic sciences in specialised universities. This was my purpose, I wasn’t interested in a diploma,’ Aziz 
Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 105, my translation.  
1440 Ian Hamel even affirms that with this period in Egypt ‘starts Tariq Ramadan’s second life,’ La vérité sur Tariq 
Ramadan, 166. 
1441 See for instance Lionel Favrot, Tariq Ramadan dévoilé, 98-101 and 153-157. 
  
 European Muslims and Liberal Citizenship 
Ph.D. Thesis successfully discussed on April 21, 2016.  
The total or partial use of the Ph.D. Thesis is subject to copyright restrictions. 
 
  
461  
 Giovanni Vezzani 
 
LUISS-ULB 
birth. According to critics like Fourest and Favrot, Ramadan had applied pressure through two 
friends of his (the socialist politician Jean Ziegler and his wife Erica Deuber Ziegler, at that 
time director of the Department of Culture of the city of Geneva) for obtaining the cancella-
tion of the “blasphemous” play.1442 Instead, according to Ramadan and his defenders, he had 
simply written an opinion column in Swiss newspapers after the cancellation of the show de-
nouncing the play as a disrespectful portrayal of the Prophet, and recommending greater sen-
sitivity toward the feelings of Muslims, above all during the tragic events occurring at that 
time in the former Yugoslavia.1443 Second, in December he travelled to Sudan (with the polit-
ical scientist François Burgat),1444 where –during the Popular Arabic and Islamic Conference, 
‘an international forum for well-known Muslim radicals with its headquarters in Khar-
toum’1445− he met the Islamist leader Hasan al-Turabi, who went on to define Ramadan as 
‘the future of Islam.’1446 Ian Hamel ironically but correctly1447 observes that ‘this is the kind 
of compliment that persecutes you until the end of your days.’1448 At the beginnings of the 
‘90s, Ramadan also established tighter and tighter contact with the Union des Organisations 
Islamiques de France (UOIF, created in 1983) and, above all, with the Union des Jeunes 
Musulmans (UJM, launched in 1987 by the UOIF) and its publishing house Tawhid (founded 
in 1989), which published many books and tapes by Tariq Ramadan.1449 The social roots of 
                                                        
1442 Caroline Fourest, Frère Tariq. Le double discours de Tariq Ramadan, 144-145 and Lionel Favrot, Tariq Ramadan 
dévoilé, 98-101. Ramadan confirms that he and Jean Ziegler are good friends: Orsola Casagrande, Europa domani: 
conversazione con Tariq Ramadan, 30. 
1443 Ian Hamel, La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan, 180-182. For Ramadan’s position on the Voltaire affaire, see: Aziz Ze-
mouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 169-170. 
1444 Ibid. 167. 
1445 See The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought, entry “al-Turabi, Hasan” by Rüdiger Seesemann. 
1446 Ian Hamel, La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan, 168. 
1447 Correctly because critics often refer to Ramadan’s acquaintance with Turabi to attack him. For instance, Landau 
says that ‘Turabi −who some have called the “black pope”– is without any doubt one of the Islamist leaders who have 
most left their mark on Tariq Ramadan,’ (Le Sabre et le Coran, 72, my translation). However, Landau does not provide 
any conclusive evidence to support this thesis. For a similar position, see also Caroline Fourest, Frère Tariq. Le double 
discours de Tariq Ramadan, 116-117. 
1448 Ian Hamel, La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan, 168 my translation. 
1449 Ibid., above all 195-199; Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 15-17 and 109-110; Lionel Favrot, Ta-
riq Ramadan dévoilé, 110; Paul Landau, Le Sabre et le Coran, 76-77; Caroline Fourest, Frère Tariq. Le double dis-
cours de Tariq Ramadan, 118-128. 
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the UJM and Tawhid are in the neighbourhood of les Minguettes (municipality of Vénissieux, 
Lyon), from which the “Marche pour l’Égalité” (also known as “Marche des Beurs”) started 
in 1983, demanding equal rights and social inclusion (the evolution of this march subsequent-
ly led to the foundation of the association SOS-Racisme in 1984,1450 which fights against eve-
ry kind of discrimination). After a decade of frustrated demands for social and economic in-
clusion, these banlieues were now much more prone to religious reference for advancing po-
litical claims, and this changing feeling within them explains the success of the UJM and sim-
ilar organisations.1451 The link with the UJM and Tawhid was of crucial importance to Rama-
dan, since it represented the springboard for the diffusion of his voice and celebrity in the 
“Hexagone.” However, Tariq was not the first Ramadan in contact with the UJM: his brother 
Hani was already in contact with the association at the end of the ‘80s.1452 The popularity of 
Tariq Ramadan in France was sharply increasing when the country was struck by a wave of 
terrorist attacks related to the civil war in Algeria (such as the RER bombing in Saint Michel, 
Paris, on July 25, 1995). French intelligence suspected that Hani and Tariq Ramadan were 
somehow related to the Algerian Islamist groups (the Front Islamique du Salut, FIS, and the 
Groupe Islamique Armé, GIA), since Hani had previously participated in a demonstration or-
ganised by the FIS in Geneva, before the European headquarters of the United Nations.1453 
Much less evident, if at all, was the support of Tariq to the FIS, also taking into account his 
determined and repeated condemnation of any kind of terrorist violence.1454 In any case, some 
have been persuaded that Tariq Ramadan was actually involved,1455 and this was the line en-
dorsed by the French Ministère de l’Intérieur, which forbade him to enter into France until the 
administrative Tribunal of Besançon declared the ban void in 1996 (after a great mobilisation 
of public intellectuals in France, Switzerland, and Belgium for supporting him). On his part, 
Ramadan accused the Egyptian government of having put pressure on France to ban him after 
                                                        
1450 The egalitarian-rights oriented associations of this kind and the new Islamic ones have different goals; proof of this 
can be found in the critique that Ramadan raises against the positions of SOS-Racisme about the affaire du foulard, see 
Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 193 and 196.  
1451 Ian Hamel, La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan, 197 and Lionel Favrot, Tariq Ramadan dévoilé, 128-129. 
1452 Lionel Favrot, Tariq Ramadan dévoilé, 74. 
1453 Ian Hamel, La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan, 209.  
1454 For instance (and very clearly) in Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 299-302. 
1455 This is the firm belief of Caroline Fourest: see Frère Tariq. Le double discours de Tariq Ramadan, 162-171. 
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the publication of his critique of Mubarak’s rigid suppression of the Islamist opposition and, 
effectively, Egypt did prevent him from entering the country for the burial of his father in the 
same year.1456 Furthermore, his brother Hani was banned from France between 1997 and 
2001.1457 However, the main scandal involving Hani Ramadan is represented by the publica-
tion of his article “La charia incomprise” by Le Monde on September 10th, 2002, in which he 
claims that stoning has mainly a dissuasive function because it is difficult to fulfil the condi-
tions established for its application. However, he also affirms that AIDS is a divine punish-
ment for human lust, since (according to him) this infection does not touch those who respect 
God’s commandments.1458 Hani had already been under attack for his book La femme en is-
lam published by Tawhid in 1991,1459 which many blamed as defending the subjugation of 
women.1460 Owing to his article, Hani Ramadan has been at the centre of a major controversy: 
in January 2003 he was removed from his teaching position in public schools and, after a long 
judicial battle between him and Geneva authorities, he was dismissed with a severance pay-
ment of 345,000 Swiss francs.1461 Coming back to Tariq, in 1996 he spent one year at the Is-
lamic Foundation in Leicester and published To Be a European Muslim. This academic visit 
to the Islamic Foundation has also been profusely discussed by Ramadan’s critics, since the 
Foundation was created in 1973 by Islamists close to Mawdudi and his Jama‘at-i Islami (su-
pra) and was among the first Islamic actors in the UK to campaign against Salman Rushdie in 
                                                        
1456 Ibid. 167-171, and Ian Hamel, La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan, 205 and 209. 
1457 Ian Hamel, La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan, 209-210, Caroline Fourest: see Frère Tariq. Le double discours de Tariq 
Ramadan, 171-172, and Lionel Favrot, Tariq Ramadan dévoilé, 74-75. 
1458 Hani Ramadan, “La charia incomprise,” Le Monde September 10th, 2002. 
1459 Hani Ramadan, La femme en islam (Lyon: Tawhid, 1991). 
1460 Lionel Favrot, Tariq Ramadan dévoilé, 76-77, Caroline Fourest: see Frère Tariq. Le double discours de Tariq Ra-
madan, 136-137. 
1461 Ibid. 80-84, Ian Hamel, La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan, 125-128, Caroline Fourest: see Frère Tariq. Le double dis-
cours de Tariq Ramadan, 138-140, and Marc Lalive d’Epinay, “L'État de Genève débourse 345 000 francs pour se dé-
barrasser de Hani Ramadan,” Le Temps January 17, 2008, available at URL = 
http://www.letemps.ch/Page/Uuid/01536816-a9f9-11dd-bf59-
ad3d6140ad87/LEtat_de_Gen%C3%A8ve_d%C3%A9bourse_345_000_francs_pour_se_d%C3%A9barrasser_de_Hani
_Ramadan.  
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1988.1462 While many emphasise the connections between Said Ramadan (Tariq’s father) and 
the Pakistani Islamic movement (supra) and claim that the choice of the Islamic Foundation is 
simply yet more evidence of Tariq Ramadan’s doublespeak, Ian Hamel suggests a different 
interpretation. According to him, Ramadan’s choice, while ‘far from being naïve,’1463 re-
sponds to two threads of logic: ‘simply this foundation, beyond the fact that it offered a schol-
arship to him, corresponded to Ramadan’s militant commitments of that time.’1464 In other 
words, after being prohibited to enter into France had given him real international fame by 
making him a “victim,” the choice of the Islamic Foundation had the function of creating a 
more Islamic and politically engaged image. Ramadan then needed real academic credibility, 
so that the he could present himself as an ‘activist scholar;’ a public role that he still proudly 
claims for himself.1465 Consequently, he defended a Ph.D. thesis on Islamic reformism at the 
University of Geneva; a thesis that raised a controversy, for it was deemed an apologia of his 
grandfather by his first supervisor who finally rejected it, but a new committee went on to ac-
cept it and Ramadan successfully defended it.1466 The thesis was then published with the title 
Aux sources du renouveau musulman: D’al-Afghānī à Hassan al-Bannā, un siècle de réfor-
misme islamique. His academic career started with a professorship at the Institut de Science 
des Religions of the University of Fribourg, where he taught from 1997 to 2004.1467 The sec-
ond half of the year 2003 was characterised by two major events. On October 3, just before 
his participation in the second European Social Forum in Paris that November, Tariq Rama-
dan published an article entitled “Critique des (nouveaux) intellectuels communautaires” on 
                                                        
1462 Lionel Favrot, Tariq Ramadan dévoilé, 112-113 and 162, Paul Landau, Le Sabre et le Coran, chapter five, Ian Ha-
mel, La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan, 210-212, Caroline Fourest: see Frère Tariq. Le double discours de Tariq Ramadan, 
85-87, Paul Berman, “Who’s Afraid of Tariq Ramadan?” 4-5. For Ramadan’s comments about his stay in Leicester, see 
Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 117-119. 
1463 Ian Hamel, La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan, 211. 
1464 Ibid. 212. My translation. 
1465 Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 126. 
1466 For a reconstruction of the events, see Ian Hamel, La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan, chapter nineteen. 
1467 Ian Hamel, La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan, 219-222. 
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the website Oumma.com,1468 which both Le Monde and Libération had previously refused.1469 
In this article, Ramadan voiced a strong criticism against ‘Jewish French intellectuals who 
were previously considered as universalist thinkers [and who] have begun, at a national and 
international level, to develop analyses which are more and more oriented toward communi-
tarian concern.’1470 He then listed some of those ‘Jewish communitarian’ thinkers: Alain 
Finkielkraut, Alexandre Adler, Bernard Kouchner, André Glucksman, Bernard-Henri Lévy, 
and even Pierre-André Taguieff (who is not Jewish).1471 Obviously, this article and the very 
unfortunate (to say the least) idea of listing names of Jewish intellectuals –immediately com-
pared to The Protocols of the Elders of Zion by Bernard-Henri Lévy1472− provoked a great 
controversy. Ramadan’s defence was (and is) that, as in his other speeches and books, there is 
nothing anti-Semitic in the article, while at the same time he defended (and defends) his right 
to criticise Israel for its policies.1473 Ramadan has repeatedly argued that his position is that 
‘criticism is legitimate, but racism is not. Antisemitism is never justified.’1474 The second im-
portant event of 2003 is Ramadan’s appearance on the television show “100 Minutes pour 
Convaincre” on France 2 on November 20, in which he faced Nicolas Sarkozy (who was Min-
ister of the Interior at that time) and famously proposed a moratorium on stoning, which later 
became an “International Call for Moratorium on Corporal Punishment, Stoning, and the 
                                                        
1468 “Critique des (nouveaux) intellectuels communautaires,” published on the website Oumma.com on Octobre 2, 2003, 
URL = http://oumma.com/Critique-des-nouveaux. The text of the article can also be found in Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il 
faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 323-326. 
1469 Ian Hamel, La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan, 263. 
1470 See Ramadan’s article in Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 324, my translation. Alternatively, see 
the online version. 
1471 Ian Hamel, La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan, 264. 
1472 Ibid.  
1473 Ibid. 264-267. See Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 263-289. 
1474 Quoted in Ian Hamel, La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan, 265, my translation.  
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Death Penalty in the Islamic World.”1475 The fact that he had advocated a moratorium rather 
than an immediate abolition scandalised many people. I will devote more attention to this 
proposal later in this chapter. Subsequently, he was invited to join the faculty of Notre Dame 
University, Indiana, at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, starting in the aca-
demic year 2004-2005, recruited by Professor Scott Appleby, today Marilyn Keough Dean of 
Notre Dame’s Keough School of Global Affairs.1476 Having already obtained a visa for his 
whole family, arranged their relocation to the U.S.A., and enrolled his children in American 
schools,1477 in the summer of 2004 he was informed that his visa had been revoked by the 
Homeland Security Department invoking the Patriot Act, without any further explanation. He 
finally gave up his position.1478 Nonetheless, a political case exploded: the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU), the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), and 
the Pen American Centre (among other associations and individual intellectuals) took his side 
in a media campaign for freedom of expression and against ideological exclusion.1479 In an ar-
ticle published in the Washington Post, Ramadan argues that the prohibition was subsequently 
motivated (after a new visa application in September 2005 and a judicial order forcing the 
State Department to reply to the applicant)1480 by the fact that between 1998 and 2002 he had 
donated a small amount of money to two charitable organisations (the Committee for Charity 
and Support for the Palestinians and the Association de Secours Palestinien), which in 2003 
the U.S. Treasury Department listed among terrorist fundraising organisations for their al-
                                                        
1475 This is the full title of a document published by Ramadan later in April 2005 (available on his website: URL = 
http://tariqramadan.com/blog/2005/04/05/an-international-call-for-moratorium-on-corporal-punishment-stoning-and-
the-death-penalty-in-the-islamic-world/). He expressed the same concepts during the show “100 Minutes pour Convain-
cre,” although on that first occasion his message was more prone to be misunderstood. The transcript of the debate is 
available in Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 345-357. He also wrote an article for Le Monde (“Pour 
une moratoire sur l’application de la charia dans le monde musulman,” April 1, 2005, available at URL = 
http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2005/04/01/pour-un-moratoire-sur-l-application-de-la-charia-dans-le-monde-
musulman_634114_3232.html?xtmc=tariq_ramadan&xtcr=207), which was also translated in English (“For a Morato-
rium on the Application of Sharia in the Muslim World,” available at URL = http://www.truth-
out.org/archive/component/k2/item/53443:tariq-ramadan--for-a-moratorium-on-sharia).  
1476 Caroline Fourest: see Frère Tariq. Le double discours de Tariq Ramadan, 187. See the personal page of Professor 
Appleby on the Notre Dame University website: URL = http://kroc.nd.edu/facultystaff/faculty/r-scott-appleby.  
1477 Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 125. 
1478 Ian Hamel, La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan, 277-278. 
1479 Ibid. 279. 
1480 Tariq Ramadan, “Why I’m Banned in the USA,” Washington Post October 1, 2006, available at URL = 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/29/AR2006092901334.html. 
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leged links with Hamas.1481 Notwithstanding the fact that Ramadan had stopped his donations 
to these organisations before they were blacklisted by the U.S. administration, he was told 
that his 2004 visa was revoked because he ‘should reasonably have known’ the affiliation of 
the two organisations.1482 In his article, Ramadan remarks:  
‘[T]he U.S. Embassy claims that I “reasonably should have known” that the 
charities in question provided money to Hamas. But my donations were made be-
tween December 1998 and July 2002, and the United States did not blacklist the 
charities until 2003. How should I reasonably have known of their activities be-
fore the U.S. government itself knew? I donated to these organizations for the 
same reason that countless Europeans −and Americans, for that matter− donate to 
Palestinian causes: not to help fund terrorism, but because I wanted to provide 
humanitarian aid to people who desperately need it. Yet after two years of inves-
tigation, this was the only explanation offered for the denial of my visa. I still find 
it hard to believe.’1483 
Finally, the ban was lifted in 2010 by the U. S. State Department with an order signed by 
Hillary Clinton, due to the lawsuit launched by the ACLU.1484 The 2004 prohibition was not, 
however, the end of Ramadan’s projection toward the Anglo-Saxon world. In fact, the turning 
point was in 2005. Firstly, he was invited by the Saint Anthony’s College of Oxford Universi-
ty, where he is now H.H. Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani Professor of Contemporary Is-
lamic Studies and teaches Contemporary Islamic Ethics, Islam in the West, and Contempo-
rary Islamic Movements.1485 Secondly, in the same year Ramadan was appointed by Blair’s 
government to join a task force (a ‘working group on tackling extremism’), following the 
                                                        
1481 Ibid. See also “Muslim Scholar Barred by U.S. Denies Support for Terrorism,” The New York Times Europe Sep-
tember 26, 2006, available at URL = http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/26/world/europe/26scholar.html?_r=0.  
1482 Tariq Ramadan, “Why I’m Banned in the USA.” 
1483 Ibid. 
1484 Sheldon Chad, “Ramadan’s Visa Ban Lifted,” The Guardian January 23, 2010, available at URL = 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2010/jan/23/tariq-ramadan-clinton-visa.  
1485 See his personal page on Saint Anthony’s College: URL = http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/people/tariq-ramadan and 
http://www.orinst.ox.ac.uk/staff/iw/tramadan.html. Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani was the Emir of Qatar from 
1995 to 2013. 
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London bombings on July 7, 2005.1486 In 2007 he began a professional partnership with the 
City of Rotterdam and the Erasmus University, where he taught a course about identity and 
citizenship, but in 2009 the local authorities and the university decided to interrupt any col-
laboration with Ramadan due to his English-language show (“Islam and Life”) on the Iranian 
channel PressTV (supra).1487 Ramadan brought an action against both the Erasmus University 
and the City of Rotterdam in August 2009 and finally won his lawsuit against the university 
in November 2012 and against the municipality in March 2013: the court ordered compensa-
tion for his unfair dismissal.1488 Beside his Oxford professorship and his role as Director of 
the Centre for Islamic Legislation and Ethics (CILE), he is currently Senior Research Fellow 
at Centre for Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions at Doshisha University (Ja-
pan),1489 and Visiting Professor in the following universities: Faculty of Islamic Studies (Qa-
tar),1490 Mundiapolis (Morocco), and Perlis (Malaysia).1491  
Ramadan’s work has been discussed from different angles. In the first place, as I men-
tioned above, Ramadan is accused of doublespeak, of being Janus-faced, and of practicing 
taqiyya (see chapter one for the definition of taqiyya). As I said, doublespeak consists in ‘say-
ing something before an audience so as to flatter or mislead it and something different, with 
other content, elsewhere before another audience or in another language.’1492 Thus, double-
speak is essentially a deceitful and fraudulent discourse. Ramadan is often accused of being 
                                                        
1486 Ian Hamel, La vérité sur Tariq Ramadan, 293. See also the article by Vikram Dodd, “Blair Backs Banned Muslim 
Scholar,” The Guardian August 31, 2005, available at URL = 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/aug/31/religion.terrorism.  
1487 Caroline Fourest, Frère Tariq. Le double discours de Tariq Ramadan, 193-194; Mark Hoogstad, “Rotterdam Fires 
Tariq Ramadan Over Iranian TV Show,” NRC Handelsblad August 18, 2009, available at URL = 
http://vorige.nrc.nl/article2332245.ece; and Toby Sterling, “Dutch University Fires Islamic Scholar Ramadan,” The 
Guardian August 18, 2009, URL = http://www.theguardian.com/world/feedarticle/8662988.  
1488 “Décision du Tribunal de Rotterdam, 8 11 2012,” available on Tariq Ramadan’s website: URL = 
http://tariqramadan.com/blog/2012/11/09/decision-du-tribunal-de-rotterdam-08-11-2012/ and “Tariq Ramadan gagne 
son second procès, contre la municipalité de Rotterdam,” available at URL = 
http://tariqramadan.com/blog/2013/03/19/tariq-ramadan-gagne-son-second-proces-contre-la-municipalite-de-rotterdam/.  
1489 See URL = http://www.cismor.jp/en/researchers/, accessed on August 2, 2015.  
1490 See URL = http://www.qfis.edu.qa/about-us/our-faculty, accessed on August 2, 2015. 
1491 See URL = http://tariqramadan.com/elements-de-biographie/, accessed on August 2, 2015. 
1492 Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 65, my translation. 
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the example of Muslim doublespeak in Europe par excellence.1493 The fil rouge of this line of 
criticism can be easily resumed in these terms: ‘a simple reading of [Ramadan’s] books al-
lows the experts to see him for what he is, that is, an Islamist preacher who takes part in the 
da‘wa (propaganda [sic!]), rather than an enlightened academic and a reformer.’1494  
Secondly, with a similar perspective, there are those who are sceptical about Ramadan’s 
idea of ‘Salafi reformism,’ a concept elaborated in his first works1495 and deeply revised in his 
book Radical Reform. Actually, one could argue (as suggested by Andrew March) that the ad-
jective “radical” has definitively substituted the adjective “Salafi” with reference to his reli-
gious reformism, meaning that Ramadan has gradually ‘dissolved’ Islamic law into ethics by 
                                                        
1493 This kind of criticism is present, of course, in the famous book by Caroline Fourest Frère Tariq. Le double discours 
de Tariq Ramadan and constitutes its main argument, but also in Paul Landau, Le Sabre et le Coran, 75 (‘everyone can 
choose “her own” Tariq Ramadan,’ my translation), chapter 8 (in which he refers to Ramadan the following metaphor: 
‘the incendiary fireman who fires up the Islamist flame when he speaks to a Muslim audience, and pretends to extin-
guish the fire when he speaks to a Western audience,’ my adapted translation from page 141), 203, and in Lionel 
Favrot, Tariq Ramadan dévoilé, 94, 105, and 204-207.  
1494 Lionel Favrot, Tariq Ramadan dévoilé, 105, my translation. 
1495 The concept of Salafi reformism represents the core of the methodology elaborated by Ramadan in his early works, 
such as Les musulmans dans la laïcité: responsabilités et droits des musulmans dans les sociétés occidentales, revised 
edition (Lyon: Tawhid, 1998), in particular 70-72, To Be a European Muslim (in which the concept is explicitly men-
tioned at 241-242), and Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 26-27. Note that he develops the historical frame-
work of the origins of Salafi reformism in his doctoral thesis, published as Aux sources du renouveau musulman: D’al-
Afghānī à Hassan al-Bannā, un siècle de réformisme islamique. In few words and simplifying greatly, the basic idea of 
Salafi reformism is that Muslims should remain faithful to the universal core principles of Islam, ‘but in a manner rele-
vant to [their] context [that] permits Muslims to understand their presence in Europe positively’ (To Be a European 
Muslim, 4). The rationale behind this approach is that ‘Muslims must develop an understanding of the Western context 
that will make it possible for them to do what all Muslims have done throughout history: to integrate whatever there is 
in the culture where they live that does not contradict what they are and what they believe,’ Western Muslims and the 
Future of Islam, 216. Methodologically, Ramadan claims that Muslims should consider eternal and universal principles 
of Shari’a (which he translates as ‘the way’ or ‘the path leading to the source,’ Western Muslims and the Future of Is-
lam, 257) only those principles expressed in the ‘ibādāt (which refers to matters related to worship), and the ‘aqīda [‘all 
the matters related to the six pillars of al-īmān’ (faith), (Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 253), that is believ-
ing in God, the angels, the book, the prophets, the day of Judgement, and predestination], while those parts of the fiqh 
(Islamic jurisprudence) that are related to mu‘āmalāt (social affairs) are not fixed once and for all and can be interpreted 
in light of the context through three key notions: ijtihād (‘effort exercised by a jurist to extract a law or a ruling from 
non-explicit scriptural sources or to formulate a specific legal opinion in the absence of texts of reference’ To Be a Eu-
ropean Muslim, 259), maslaha (considerations of public interest, To Be a European Muslim, 76), and fatwā (‘explicit 
legal ruling’ as answer to a question concerning a legal issue, To Be a European Muslim, 259). For this approach, see in 
particular To Be a European Muslim, 3, 10, 43, 60,76-99, and 130, and Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 26-
27, 35, 37-49, 62, 115, 214, and 216. 
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the means of concepts provided by Islamic law itself.1496 However, the methodology and con-
tent of Ramadan’s religious reformism is a question that concerns mainly conjecturers and 
justificatory comparative political theorists, and I limit myself to merely mentioning it. What 
matters here is that some have interpreted his reformism as aiming at producing ‘an Islamic 
counterculture within the West’ and claiming ‘a share of the public space, not just a share of 
                                                        
1496 For this idea and a thorough and exhaustive analysis of Ramadan’s religious reformism, see Andrew F. March, 
“Law as a Vanishing Mediator in the Theological Ethics of Tariq Ramadan,” European Journal of Political Theory 10, 
no. 2 (2011), 177-201. Briefly, March pinpoints three phases in Ramadan’s work, which progressively lead to the disso-
lution of Islamic law through concepts that Ramadan derives from the law itself: the idea that ‘whatever is not prohibit-
ed is in fact permissible’ from an Islamic perspective (Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 64), and the two no-
tions of maslaha (public interest, supra) and maqāsid al-Sharī‘a (objectives of Sharī‘a). Precisely for this reason March 
defines Islamic law as a ‘vanishing mediator’ in the thought of Tariq Ramadan: finally, ‘[i]t is these concepts [derived 
from Islamic law itself] which have facilitated, mediated, a turn to a conception of Islamic ethics which is now free to 
leave behind the specific constraints and forms of standard juridico-ethical reasoning,’ thus Ramadan ‘dissolve[s] the 
formal constraints of law without ever declaring this as an objective or requirement for its own sake but rather by ap-
propriating the conceptual resources and contents provided by the law itself’ (Andrew F. March, “Law as a Vanishing 
Mediator in the Theological Ethics of Tariq Ramadan,” 180). The first phase is the one represented by To Be a Europe-
an Muslim (1999), in which Ramadan theorises a return to classical sources of legal theory to show that it is possible for 
Muslims to be European citizens and to live together with non-Muslims through the idea of a binding contract: this is 
the phase that March calls ‘classical legal theory as a mandate for political moderation’ (“Law as a Vanishing Mediator 
in the Theological Ethics of Tariq Ramadan,” 180). The second phase corresponds to the elaboration of the two works 
Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity (2001) and Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (2004). In this 
phase, there is no substantial change in Ramadan’s discourse about Muslims’ allegiance to the authentic tradition of Is-
lam, but he introduces two new elements. First, Ramadan emphasises ‘legal theory’s mandate for change in the area of 
[Islamic] applied positive law’ (“Law as a Vanishing Mediator in the Theological Ethics of Tariq Ramadan,” 187). Sec-
ond, he carries out ‘a reduction in status of the kinds of questions which admit of distinctly legal answers’ (ibid.). This 
is done thanks to the already mentioned notions of maslaha (public interest) and maqāsid al-Sharī‘a (objectives of 
Sharī‘a). In this way, Sharī‘a becomes a ‘substantive moral matrix’ (ibid. 188) rather than a fixed legal code of pre-
scriptions and prohibitions. For this reason, as I have said, Ramadan defines Sharī‘a as ‘the way’ or ‘the path leading to 
the source’ (Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 257) and not simply “the law.” The third and final phase corre-
sponds to Radical Reform (2009), in which there is an ‘explosion of the very idea of the law from within’ (“Law as a 
Vanishing Mediator in the Theological Ethics of Tariq Ramadan,” 192): those concepts which from the very beginning 
he has derived from the law now allow him to dissolve law into ethics. Effectively, he is persuaded that the limits of his 
previous approach have been reached (Tariq Ramadan, Radical Reform, 2). Then, in this third phase there is a move 
from Salafi reformism as an ‘adaptation reform’ to radical reformism as a ‘transformation reform’ (ibid. 3 and 30-33). 
The latter ‘raise[s] the issue of the sources of usūl al-fiqh [(fundamentals of Islamic law and jurisprudence)],’ and it 
aims ‘to revisit not only the tools and concrete, historical implementations of fiqh, but also their sources, their categori-
zation, and at the same time […] the range of their authority’ (ibid. 3). Thus, his new approach goes beyond a mere re-
form of fiqh. Instead, it touches the question of the sources of fiqh itself and their authority. Effectively Ramadan’s rad-
ical reformism is “radical” precisely because it ‘suggest[s] a new geography of the sources of usūl al-fiqh’ (ibid. 5). 
Concretely, this means that Ramadan includes within the authoritative sources of Islamic law and jurisprudence not on-
ly the knowledge deriving from revelation [the scriptural sources (the Qur’an and the Sunna –tradition− of the Prophet) 
and the methods of legal reasoning developed by scholars during the centuries], but also the ‘book of the universe’ and 
the knowledge deriving from the study of the context in which one lives (ibid. 3-5, 34-38, and chapters eight and ten). 
For March, this last phase in Ramadan’s thought is very demanding from a theological and methodological perspective, 
because it entails a ‘radical displacement of law from the centre of Islamic normative inquiry and its substitution with a 
more elusive conception of “ethics”,’ [see Andrew F. March, “Review Essay: The Post-Legal Ethics of Tariq Ramadan: 
Persuasion and Performance in Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation,” Middle East Law and Governance 2, 
no. 2 (2010), 254], but it is much less innovative when it comes to the practical dimension of his applied ethics (in part 
four −‘case studies’− of Radical Reform). For this, see the conclusions of March’s article “Law as a Vanishing Media-
tor in the Theological Ethics of Tariq Ramadan,” 195-197. 
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the private sphere.’1497 According to Paul Berman, for instance, Ramadan does not want to 
deceive his Western audience.1498 Rather, Salafi reformism is problematic because it ‘look[s] 
for modern concepts, and for Qur’anic equivalents, and [fills] the modern with the 
Qur’anic.’1499 However, Berman seems to suggest that this expropriation of modernity is dan-
gerous because finally it cannot reach a compromise with the proper and specific terms of 
modernity itself: Berman cites the examples of antisemitism, terrorism, and the subjugation of 
women to show that filling the “modern” with the “Islamic” is not a good strategy if one 
wants to be true to the former.1500 
Thirdly, other authors have argued that Ramadan’s thought is unable to trigger a process of 
evolution in European Islam. This is the opinion of the well-known grand mufti of Marseilles, 
who affirms that ‘Ramadan’s discourse is disastrous [in French: néfaste] for the future of Is-
lam in Europe,’ claiming that the French ‘Republic must not have more complexes toward 
Muslims than toward Catholics.’1501 Finally, others have compared Ramadan to the evangeli-
cal pastor Jerry Falwell, one of the founders of American Christian fundamentalism.1502 
On the other hand, Ramadan has prominent defenders. Just to name a few examples, the 
professors Olivier Roy, Jørgen Nielsen, and Frank Frégosi, and the journalists Ian Hamel and 
Ian Buruma manifest their appreciation (certainly in different ways and sometimes with some 
                                                        
1497 Paul Berman, “Who’s Afraid of Tariq Ramadan?” 27. 
1498 Ibid. 23. 
1499 Ibid. 
1500 Ibid. 27-51. 
1501 Soheib Bencheikh, “Foreword,” in Lionel Favrot, Tariq Ramadan dévoilé, page not numbered. 
1502 Bruce Bawer, While Europe Slept, 67-68. For a historical and comparative analysis of American fundamentalism, 
see Enzo Pace and Renato Guolo, I fondamentalismi (Rome and Bari: Laterza, 2002), in particular 11-28. 
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reserves) for Tariq Ramadan’s contribution toward a new conceptualisation of Muslims’ citi-
zenship in Western Europe.1503 
Importantly, some authors have also recently considered Ramadan’s theoretical production 
from the perspective of Rawls’s political liberalism. Note that Ramadan is aware of Rawls’s 
political theory. To my knowledge, however, he cites Rawls only two times and always quite 
critically.1504 Hence, Ramadan does not claim to be a Rawlsian. Nonetheless, both Andrew 
March and Cristopher DeVito have explored some Rawlsian implications of Ramadan’s 
work.1505 Then, the obvious question is this: what (if at all) is the difference between my re-
search and their analyses? The answer can be found in Figure 5 above: March and DeVito 
mainly focus on the full Islamic justification of the liberal political conception of citizenship 
(that is, they are concerned with conjecture),1506 whereas I try to evaluate whether the concep-
tion of citizenship proposed satisfies the requirements of a model of citizenship based on pub-
lic reason. As I have already said (see chapter two for further details), the two approaches are 
                                                        
1503 Olivier Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam, 10, 24-25, 44-45, 51, 95, and 97. For Jørgen Nielsen, see his foreword to 
Tariq Ramadan’s To Be a European Muslim, xiii. Frank Frégosi, “Les contours discursifs d’une religiosité citoyenne: 
laïcité et identité islamique chez Tariq Ramadan,” notably 207, 210, 216-17, and 218. Ian Hamel, La vérité sur Tariq 
Ramadan, 20-22, 170, 187, 189-190, 299-300, and 312. Ian Buruma, “Tariq Ramadan Has an Identity Issue,” 3 and 7, 
while on pages 4 and 5 Buruma expresses two of the reserves that I have mentioned, about, respectively, Ramadan’s 
criticism of capitalism and his article “Critique des (nouveaux) intellectuels communautaires,” (supra). 
1504 Tariq Ramadan, Radical Reform, 267 and The Quest For Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism, 147. Ac-
tually, Ramadan provides a very concise (and even oversimplified) reading of Rawls’s political liberalism, since he lim-
its himself to saying that ‘[f]or some, like Rawls, pluralism can only exist by stressing the need for public space to be 
neutral,’ while Ramadan underlines the obvious truth that in reality ‘no public sphere can be wholly neutral culturally or 
religiously’ (Radical Reform, 267). 
1505 For Andrew F. March, see “Reading Tariq Ramadan: Political Liberalism, Islam, and ‘Overlapping Consensus’,” 
Ethics and International Affairs 21, no. 4 (2007), 399-413; “Review Essay: The Post-Legal Ethics of Tariq Ramadan: 
Persuasion and Performance in Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation;” and finally “Law as a Vanishing Medi-
ator in the Theological Ethics of Tariq Ramadan.” For Christopher DeVito, see “Who is the Real Tariq Ramadan?” Al 
Nakhlah − The Fletcher School Online Journal on Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization (Spring 2009), available at 
URL = http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Al-Nakhlah/Archives/spring2009. Incidentally, note that also Nina zu Fürstenberg (in 
Chi ha paura di Tariq Ramadan?, 25) draws a parallel between Ramadan’s work and Rawls’s political theory (she ex-
plicitly mentions public reason). However, she does not elaborate further that intuition, nor does she explain the connec-
tion between Rawls’s public reason and Ramadan’s citizenship theory. 
1506 See for instance: Christopher DeVito, “Who is the Real Tariq Ramadan?” 6. Andrew F. March, “Reading Tariq 
Ramadan: Political Liberalism, Islam, and ‘Overlapping Consensus’,” 405-412; “Review Essay: The Post-Legal Ethics 
of Tariq Ramadan: Persuasion and Performance in Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation,” 254 and 257-263, 
and the entire “Law as a Vanishing Mediator in the Theological Ethics of Tariq Ramadan.” 
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complementary1507 but different, and the difference between the two perspectives goes back to 
the difference between justificatory comparative political theory and justificatory evaluative 
political theory. Roughly, while JCPT and JEPT are part of the same Rawlsian logical frame-
work, one could say that the centre of gravity of the two is not the same: JCPT revolves 
around Islamic doctrine and the effort to find (conjecture) Islamically persuasive arguments to 
fully justify the political conception of citizenship, while JEPT gravitates toward the public 
perspective expressed through the idea of public reason. In other words, JCPT is more inter-
ested in considering the merits of Ramadan’s religious reformism, while JEPT is concerned 
with his conception of the public space (Rawls’s public political forum) from the perspective 
of the public space itself as conceived through public reason.  
Therefore, before getting to the heart of the evaluation concerning RR, CR, and CiR, I 
must explain in a few words the main features of Ramadan’s European Muslim paradigm, 
limiting myself (for the reasons that I have just clarified) to the dimensions related to citizen-
ship. First of all, Ramadan describes the situation of Muslims in contemporary Europe in 
terms of five facts, listed in To Be a European Muslim: 1508 
1. ‘There is a revival of Islamic spirituality and practice as well as a feeling of belong-
ing to a religious community;’ 
2. ‘The number of indigenous European Muslims is increasing either through conver-
sion to Islam or through birth;’ 
3. ‘The number of places of worship have multiplied;’ 
4. ‘The number of Islamic organisations in Europe is increasing daily;’ 
                                                        
1507 For instance, March explicitly acknowledges that it is also possible to consider Ramadan’s work from a perspective 
similar to justificatory evaluative political theory. For instance, he argues that ‘we have an obligation to evaluate the 
political thought of someone like Ramadan from this perspective: Is he endorsing the liberal terms of social cooperation 
on principled grounds or not? Is Ramadan calling on Muslims to endorse European citizenship or is he peddling an eso-
teric doctrine of subversion from within liberal societies, which a close reading of his utterances will reveal?,’ Andrew 
F. March, “Reading Tariq Ramadan: Political Liberalism, Islam, and ‘Overlapping Consensus’,” 403. Note from this 
statement how the two approaches (JCPT and JEPT) are complementary and connected, to the point that sometimes 
JCPT tends to fade in JEPT, as the subtle difference between March’s two questions suggests. 
1508 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 120-121. 
  
 European Muslims and Liberal Citizenship 
Ph.D. Thesis successfully discussed on April 21, 2016.  
The total or partial use of the Ph.D. Thesis is subject to copyright restrictions. 
 
  
474  
 Giovanni Vezzani 
 
LUISS-ULB 
5. ‘At least 80% of Muslims do not practise their religion regularly and do not, for ex-
ample, perform their daily prayers. Less than 40% attend the Friday gathering at the 
mosque. About 70%, however, do fast during the sacred month of Ramadan.’ 
These considerations concern mainly the sociological aspect of the matter. However, from 
a more substantial point of view, he adds three important remarks about the condition of Mus-
lims in Europe along three pivotal dimensions:1509 
1. Concerning their rights and the constitutional and legal framework in which these 
rights are inscribed, he says that Muslims are ‘generally allowed to practise their 
religion in peace, to build mosques (even if they sometimes have to face adminis-
trative hindrances) and to found Islamic organisations.’ Crucially, this is, according 
to Ramadan, ‘clear evidence that the various European constitutions and laws re-
spect Islam as a religion and Muslims as believers who have the right, as others to 
enjoy freedom of worship.’1510 He also maintains that ‘[o]ccasionally, on a specific 
issue, one can identify a discriminating decision or a tendentious way of reading 
the law, but by and large there is no European constitution which is anti-Islamic 
per se.’ 
2. Concerning social inclusion, he observes that Muslims in Europe can generally 
‘live in an atmosphere of security and peace concerning religious matters.’ He adds 
that one should not confuse religious discrimination in its proper meaning with po-
litical, social, and economic problems such as racism, unemployment, and poverty, 
as I have underlined many times in the first chapter. 
3. Concerning religious practice, on the other hand, he complains that ‘[t]he Europe-
an context –and generally life in an industrialised and modern society− makes reli-
gious duties difficult to perform and respect,’ since ‘[r]eligion, spirituality or any 
manifestation of Faith have almost completely disappeared from the public face 
[sic].’ 
                                                        
1509 Ibid. 121-122.  
1510 Emphasis added. 
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This three-layered description of Muslims’ conditions of life in Europe is quite complete. 
Clearly, I will focus on the first two dimensions mentioned above (on the one hand, rights and 
the constitutional and legal framework and, on the other, social inclusion). However, what is 
important here is the fact that Ramadan draws the picture of a complex world,1511 in which ‘it 
is impossible to stick to an old, simple and binary vision of reality,’1512 such as the one sug-
gested by the traditional distinction in ‘Islamic political geography’1513 between dār al- ḥarb 
(abode of war), dār al-islām (abode of Islam), and –possibly− dār al-ṣulḥ (abode of truce) or 
dār al-‘ahd (abode of treaty).1514 From the Muslim perspective, he thus suggests to under-
stand European societies in a new way, as dār al-shahāda or abode of testimony:1515 a space 
in which the Muslim ‘as a Believer among human beings […] has to bear witness’1516 to her 
faith and her Muslim identity through her speech but also through her acts. It is all the more 
important to be willing and able to act as a shahīd (witness) in Europe, for ‘Muslims settled in 
the West are at the centre, at the heart, at the head of the system which produces the symboli-
cal apparatus of Westernisation.’1517 To be sure, Ramadan is entirely aware of the weight of 
Europe’s colonial past on mutual perceptions and on the formation of a European Muslim 
identity.1518 Obviously, this past has an impact on the degree to which both Muslims and non-
Muslims in Europe are open to a certain kind of discourse. However, the plausibility of Ram-
adan’s approach as paradigmatic of a European Muslim view springs from the fact that his en-
tire work openly tries to answer the question “how to be a European Muslim citizen?,” or, 
                                                        
1511 Ibid. 127: he describes the world as ‘a world which has become a village, where populations are in constant flux and 
within which we are witnessing a process of increased complexity regarding financial and political power as well as a 
diversification in strategic allegiances and spheres of influence.’ 
1512 Ibid. 
1513 Andrew F. March, “Reading Tariq Ramadan: Political Liberalism, Islam, and ‘Overlapping Consensus’,” 408. 
1514 See the corresponding entry “Abodes of Islam, war, and truce” by Sohail H. Hashmi in The Princeton Encyclopedia 
of Islamic Political Thought. 
1515 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 145-150 and Dār ash-shahāda: l’Occident, espace du témoignage 
(Lyon: Tawhid, 2002), in particular 63 and 65-73. 
1516 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 146. 
1517 Ibid. 148. 
1518 For instance, see Ramadan in Edgar Morin and Tariq Ramadan, Au péril des idées: les grandes questions de notre 
temps, interview with Claude-Henry du Bord (Paris: Presses du Châtelet, 2014), 15 and 35. See also Ramadan in Orsola 
Casagrande, Europa domani: conversazione con Tariq Ramadan, 50-51. 
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more appropriately, ‘how can the Muslim identity blossom in European societies, respecting 
the principles and the framework of existing constitutions, without denying or cut itself 
off?’1519 In raising this question, Ramadan addresses the core issue of this research. He sum-
marises the purpose of his project in the following terms: ‘to understand the universality of 
the message of Islam and to highlight the means we are given to help us live in our time, in 
the West, with respect for ourselves and for others. The approach I propose is anchored in the 
Islamic tradition and amplified from within it: in this sense it is both deeply classical and rad-
ically new.’1520 After all, he is optimistic about the fate of this project: 
‘We are currently living through a veritable silent revolution in Muslim com-
munities in the West: more and more young people and intellectuals are actively 
looking for a way to live in harmony with their faith while participating in the so-
cieties that are their societies, whether they like it or not. French, English, Ger-
man, Canadian, American Muslims, women as well as men, are constructing a 
“Muslim personality” that will soon surprise many of their fellow citizens.’1521  
Interestingly, Ramadan’s diagnosis of Europe’s predicament with its Muslim citizens is 
very close to the description of the problem I have drawn in chapter one. I began that chapter 
by speaking about perceptions, and, more specifically, about the perception of Muslims as a 
problem and I maintained that, on a first level, it can be said that what makes problem is that 
perception of Muslims as a problem. In 1.2.a, I then detailed this first formulation of my re-
search problem, saying that, in order to reconcile politically the new form of pluralism that 
characterises contemporary Europe, we need a common discursive platform which is able to 
provide both a basis for a shared political identity and shared critical standards, so that one 
can assure both inclusion and compliance with the fair terms of social cooperation (the prob-
lem of mutual assurance described in chapter four). Now, it is intriguing to note that he has 
formulated the problem in a similar way, in particular because this way of framing my re-
search problem came much before my in-depth study of Ramadan’s works. As a matter of 
                                                        
1519 Tariq Ramadan, Les musulmans dans la laïcité: responsabilités et droits des musulmans dans les sociétés occiden-
tales, 19, my translation. For other examples, see also: ibid. 52-53; What I Believe, 32-33; To Be a European Muslim, 3-
4, 11, 42, 118, 153; Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 6; Alain Gresh and Tariq Ramadan, L’Islam en ques-
tions, interview with Françoise Germain-Robin, new edition (Paris: Actes Sud - Babel, 2002), 304. 
1520 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 3. 
1521 Ibid. 4. 
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fact, according to him, the first thing that one should take into account in analysing contempo-
rary European predicaments with Islam and Muslims is precisely the perception of Muslims 
as a problem. In Ramadan’s view, the deep root of such a perception is a double crisis: the 
first crisis concerns confidence in one’s own identity, while the second concerns mutual 
trust.1522 In his words, Muslims in Europe are often perceived as ‘aliens,’1523 as ‘foreign citi-
zens,’1524as ‘potential suspects who threaten the stability of the nation.’1525 This vocabulary 
should remind us of the problem of mutual assurance just mentioned. He is persuaded that 
‘[t]he question of Islam is above all a problem of presentation and mentality,’1526 and he 
claims that Muslims share their part of responsibility for this state of affairs,1527 and even 
talks of an ‘abdication of civic responsibility.’1528 But he also thinks that ‘a coexistence which 
rejects both assimilation and isolation is possible.’1529 Thus, he calls for a better mutual un-
derstanding, which is of capital importance for both parties, since ‘the manner in which Mus-
lims in Europe are perceived and questioned puts them in a reactive and defensive posture and 
this prevents them from producing an original and serene attitude.’1530 Only mutual under-
standing and knowledge can deconstruct distrustful and fearful perceptions: he insists that 
‘[o]ur enemies, today, are caricature and prejudice.’1531 Because of this double crisis, any 
public affirmation or the simple visibility of Muslims’ religious identity and practice can be 
                                                        
1522 See in particular Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 9, 113-114, 216-217, 234, 250. See also The Quest For 
Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism, ix , 45, 76-80; What I Believe, 24-29; De l’islam et des musulmans: 
réflexions sur l’Homme, la réforme, la guerre et l’Occident, 184; Dār ash-shahāda: l’Occident, espace du témoignage, 
53; Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity, 267-270 and 290-297; and Ramadan in Alain Gresh and Tariq 
Ramadan, L’Islam en questions, 304. 
1523 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 217. 
1524 Edgar Morin and Tariq Ramadan, Au péril des idées: les grandes questions de notre temps, 28, my translation. 
1525 Tariq Ramadan, De l’islam et des musulmans: réflexions sur l’Homme, la réforme, la guerre et l’Occident, 184, my 
translation. 
1526 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 234. 
1527 Ibid. 218. 
1528 Ibid. 223. 
1529 Ibid. 234. 
1530 Ibid. 10. 
1531 Ibid. 226, italics in the original. 
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easily interpreted as a sign of a potential radicalisation or self-isolation.1532 Moreover, as men-
tioned above, negative perceptions produce an identity block, that is, a paralysis or stagnation 
in the process of re-definition of one’s own identity. This is exemplified in the reactive con-
struction of a Muslim identity by means of binary oppositions (lawful-forbidden, Muslim-
Western, we-they, and so on), above all among young people. With reference to this, Rama-
dan speaks of a  
‘double simplification and distortion [which, first,] makes the youth believe 
that Islamic identity is confined within cold Islamic rulings defining what is law-
ful and unlawful (al-halāl wa al-harām), and this is a misconception. Second, it 
leads to an infantile and childish process within which the young generations are 
imprisoned without being able to turn to good advantage what they have experi-
enced by growing and living in a European society, and this is nothing less than a 
guilty negligence.’1533 
What is the solution proposed by Ramadan? From a religious perspective, he calls for a re-
newal of European Muslims’ relationship with Islamic sources, promoting his Salafi (and lat-
er radical) reformism.1534 As I have explained, I am not interested in discussing Ramadan’s 
strategy of religious reform (for instance, the plausibility of his account of the maqāsid al-
Sharī‘a, or objectives of Sharī‘a law). Rather, I am interested in the goals that this reformism 
pursues. Indeed, this interest is quite palpable if one considers that Ramadan understands his 
Salafi (and later radical) reformism as a way ‘to protect […] Muslim identity and the practice 
of worship, to recognise the constitutional framework in Europe, to be involved at the social 
level as citizens and to live in sincere allegiance to the country to which [one] belong[s],’1535 
and to create a new ‘European Muslim identity,’1536 which can only exist in the dynamic in-
terplay between the revealed sources (Qur’an –Arabic: al-qur’ān− and Sunna, or tradition) 
                                                        
1532 Tariq Ramadan, Les musulmans dans la laïcité: responsabilités et droits des musulmans dans les sociétés occi-
dentales, 96: ‘between the “moderate” Muslim and the “radical” Muslim, the reality of the simply “practicing” Muslim 
has vanished.’ My translation. 
1533 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 116. 
1534 See the footnote above in which, following March, I reconstruct the three moments of Ramadan’s reformism. 
1535 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 242. 
1536 Ibid. 254. 
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and the European context of life. The ground for this operation is represented by his concep-
tion of modernity. While he refuses a notion of modernity as ‘breaking away from tradition’ 
(which would produce ‘a state of being that has no landmarks, no history, no principles, no 
vision’),1537 he acknowledges that the concept of modernisation issued from the historical de-
velopment of European societies means ‘liberation, the breaking of the chains of all intangible 
dogmas, stilted traditions and evolving societies. It represents accession to progress. Within 
this, reason, science, and technology are set in motion. Finally, it is also man brought back to 
his humanity.’1538 Without denying the consequences and the results of European modernity, 
Ramadan claims that the European experience and heritage do not represent the only legiti-
mate path to modernity: ‘[a]nother civilisation can, from within, fix and determine the stakes 
in a different fashion. This is the case of Islam at the end of this twentieth century.’1539 How-
ever, his call for a modernity reached through (and not in opposition to) Islam as an ethical 
tradition does not radically depart from what he sees as the original content of European mo-
dernity: ‘a claim of liberty [and] a call for autonomy of reason.’1540 The problem, according to 
Ramadan, originates from ideological abuses of the concept of modernity, which ultimately 
lead to a loss of ethical meaning.1541 Thus, in his understanding Islam can play the role of a 
liberating force (‘[a]gainst local customs, ancestral traditions, despotic patriarchy and daily al-
ienation […] more Islam means more rights and more freedom’),1542 more or less the same 
role played in European history by the idea of secularism that faced the predominance of the 
Catholic Church, but in this case without losing the ethical guidance provided by the religious 
                                                        
1537 Tariq Ramadan, Radical Reform, 27. 
1538 Tariq Ramadan, Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity, 3. 
1539 Ibid. 8. 
1540 Ibid. 7. 
1541 For Ramadan’s conception of modernity and a detailed account of how he sees the two different historical trends of 
Western and Muslim societies, see Les musulmans dans la laïcité: responsabilités et droits des musulmans dans les so-
ciétés occidentales, 41-54 and 81-93. 
1542 Tariq Ramadan, Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity, 58. For the idea of Islam as a liberating force, see 
also Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 160; Aux sources du renouveau musulman: D’al-Afghānī à Hassan al-
Bannā, un siècle de réformisme islamique, 92; and Radical Reform, 152 and 317. 
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message. Islam is, then, an ‘ethical counter-power.’1543 In this perspective, remaining faithful 
to one’s tradition does not mean being stuck on a static past. Rather, it means being projected 
toward the future with the ethical guidance of eternal Islamic principles. Then, Ramadan’s ul-
timate goal is not an “Islamisation of modernity,” but the definition of Islamic ethics for the 
modern condition.1544 Therefore, in his words, ‘[a]pplied ethics is […] the method a religious, 
spiritual, or philosophical tradition gives itself to think out its modernity.’1545 Hence, tradition 
must represent a horizon of meaning and moral guidance rather than the outer border or limit 
of what is allowed or conceivable.1546 Then, as I have said, Ramadan’s project of creating a 
new European Muslim identity is tightly connected to his conception of Islamic tradition as a 
source of moral guidance providing ethical principles which orientate the believers’ life in the 
modern world and in their relationships with other fellow citizens (on this point, see infra). 
This new European Muslim identity is based on four elements:1547 
1. ‘Living one’s own faith, practice, and spirituality;’ 
2. ‘Developing a real awareness [in French intelligence] of the fundamental texts and 
of one’s context of life;’ 
3. ‘Educating and witnessing;’ 
4. ‘Acting and participating.’ 
Crucially, the definition of this new European Muslim identity is not an endeavour which 
involves Muslims alone. This project is not solipsistic, self-isolating or excluding. On the 
contrary, it takes into account the rest of society and tries to include all contributions in the 
                                                        
1543 Ramadan in Edgar Morin and Tariq Ramadan, Au péril des idées: les grandes questions de notre temps, 160, my 
translation. 
1544 Tariq Ramadan, Radical Reform, 146-148.  
1545 Ibid. 158. 
1546 Tariq Ramadan, The Quest For Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism, 152. 
1547 Tariq Ramadan, De l’islam et des musulmans: réflexions sur l’Homme, la réforme, la guerre et l’Occident, 188, my 
translation. 
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creation of a larger common identity that he calls a ‘new We’ (see below).1548 To do this, it is 
first necessary to establish the conditions for a ‘serene dialogue,’1549 but the most important 
task is to make ‘accessible for the other one’s own cultural universe and identity in order to 
better walk together.’1550 
Ramadan uses a very sharp formula for summarising his final aim: ‘normalizing [Muslim 
citizens’] presence without trivializing it.’1551 This is, according to him, the only way for 
building ‘true civic ethics’ and for developing in Muslim citizens, not a ‘sense of Otherness 
but rather […] an awareness of their belonging and commitment to society in general.’1552 
In conclusion, Ramadan certainly satisfies the principle of plausibility (PP) mentioned 
above, because, as Olivier Roy puts it, he develops a ‘theory of the legitimacy and practice of 
a minority Islam.’1553 Jørgen Nielsen too welcomes Tariq Ramadan’s approach to the question 
of citizenship in European societies as a serious effort to build a bridge between a commit-
ment to Islamic tradition from a mainstream Muslim viewpoint and the larger European social 
environment.1554 Finally, Cristopher DeVito argues that ‘Ramadan is pursuing a rather simple 
yet undoubtedly challenging mission. He is laying the framework for an authentically Euro-
pean and Muslim identity. [… And, m]oving beyond issues of identity, Ramadan is most in-
terested in establishing an ethic of citizenship for Western Muslims.’1555 
It is precisely Ramadan’s ethics of citizenship for European Muslims that I analyse in the 
following three sections. 
                                                        
1548 Tariq Ramadan, What I Believe, 90-95 and Appendix II, but see also 35, 36-37, 57, 69-70 and The Quest For Mean-
ing: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism, 174-175. 
1549 Tariq Ramadan, Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity, 270. 
1550 Ibid. 272. 
1551 Tariq Ramadan Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 168, italics in the original. 
1552 Ibid. emphases added. 
1553 Olivier Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam, 51. 
1554 See Jørgen Nielsen’s foreword to Tariq Ramadan’s To Be a European Muslim, xiii. 
1555 Christopher DeVito, “Who is the Real Tariq Ramadan?” 2 and 3. 
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6.2 [RR] Is Ramadan Committed to Political Reciprocity? 
As specified in Table 2 (see 5.1), the first question that must be considered in the evalua-
tive stage of this study is the following one: does the European Muslim perspective consid-
ered here affirm the criterion of reciprocity of the reasonable? The question can be restated in 
these terms: does Tariq Ramadan’s conception of Muslims’ citizenship in European societies 
reflect the criterion of reciprocity of the reasonable, which expresses the reciprocal recogni-
tion between reasonable, free and equal cooperating fellow citizens who possess the capacity 
for a sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of the good? If the answer is positive, 
then Ramadan’s conception of citizenship satisfies the first requirement (namely, the reciproc-
ity requirement, RR) specified by public reason citizenship.  
To answer this question, I must consider whether Ramadan not only recognises the fact of 
reasonable pluralism, but also affirms the importance of the distinction between, on the one 
hand, public or institutional identity, and on the other hand, moral or non-institutional identity 
(see 3.2.b.1). From there, it would be possible to anchor fair social cooperation in a common 
conception of citizenship in terms of equal rights and a shared public identity (what, in the 
previous chapters, has also been called institutional or common political identity). Therefore, 
this section is articulated in a logical sequence of questions: 
1. Does Ramadan recognise reasonable pluralism? 
2. Does Ramadan satisfy what in 4.2 I have called the forced conversion test? Re-
member that satisfying this test means respecting the criterion of reciprocity and 
avoiding the two kinds of political unreasonableness described in 4.2 (U1 as unrea-
sonableness in the content of non-public reasons, and U2 as unreasonable enforce-
ment upon others).  
3. Does Ramadan accept the idea of state neutrality (understood as the recognition of 
the specificity of the domain of the political and the autonomy of state institutions 
toward the authority of comprehensive doctrines)? 
4. Does Ramadan distinguish between citizens’ public identity and their moral non-
institutional identity? 
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5. Is Ramadan committed to a conception of citizenship centred on fundamental rights 
and liberties and a shared political identity? 
6. Does Ramadan make room for fair social cooperation? 
 
Starting from the issue of reasonable pluralism, Ramadan certainly recognises the fact of 
reasonable pluralism as ‘a permanent feature of the public culture of a democracy.’1556 First, 
he acknowledges the specificity of reasonable pluralism as experienced in modern liberal de-
mocracies by distinguishing it from other forms of pluralism and tolerance, such as in Muslim 
Andalusia or in the history of the Ottoman empire. Those historical examples, he claims, were 
certainly commendable, but they failed to match tolerance with ‘equality in rights’1557 for citi-
zens. I will return to his conception of citizenship as equal rights later. Moreover, he clearly 
affirms that in contemporary liberal democracies reasonable pluralism is a fact: 
‘[M]ulticultural society is a fact; there is no being for or against it. […] Wheth-
er we want it or not, our Western societies, in the United States or Europe, Canada 
or Australia are culturally diverse […] This must be accepted […] The challenge 
of diversity requires practical solutions and compels citizens, intellectuals, and re-
ligious representatives to develop a balanced critical mind, always open to evolu-
tion, analysis, empathy, and of course self-criticism.’1558 
Such recognition of the fact of reasonable pluralism can easily be found all throughout 
Ramadan’s work. Indeed, he aims at developing a ‘philosophy of pluralism.’1559 This project 
is even announced in the title of one of his last books: The Quest For Meaning: Developing a 
Philosophy of Pluralism. He claims that one should ‘recognize the legitimacy of other peo-
ple’s convictions [: n]ot to share them is one thing, but not to recognize, deep in one’s heart, 
                                                        
1556 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 36. 
1557 Tariq Ramadan, Radical Reform, 268. 
1558 Tariq Ramadan, What I Believe, 13-14.  
1559 Ibid. 90. 
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their right to be is another,’1560 and this for two orders of reasons. First, from a religious per-
spective, pluralism is a necessity because it is a test: ‘[d]iversity of religions, nations, and 
peoples is a test because it requires that we learn to manage difference,’ and this difference is 
of fundamental importance for the believers because ‘it is willed by the Transcendent,’1561 as 
manifested in the verse ‘[i]f God had so willed, He would have made you one community, but 
He wanted to test you through that which He has given you’ (Qur’an, 5:48). Thus, religious 
difference is natural and good, because Nature as created by God only wants what is good for 
human beings, and for this reason Ramadan includes pluralism among the higher objectives 
of Sharī‘a.1562 This is a comprehensive understanding of pluralism1563 which goes in the direc-
tion of an overlapping consensus. Second, from a political perspective, reasonable pluralism 
is a necessity because ‘without a purposeful policy aimed at managing cultural and religious 
diversity within democratic societies, the very principles of democracy will be endangered, 
along with the fundamental assets of political pluralism in which the West justly takes 
pride.’1564 This is because he thinks that ‘the constitutional community covers both Muslim 
and non-Muslims,’1565 as he maintains on another occasion. This amounts to the recognition 
of the existence of a social political bond among citizens who live under the same democratic 
public political culture and cooperate within the same constitutional regime (infra, section 
6.3). In passing, note that he also formulates something similar to the political (epistemologi-
cal and moral) concept of the burdens of judgment (in the following quotation, with reference 
to the macro or aggregate level of human communities): ‘in the realm of transient cultural, so-
                                                        
1560 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 210. 
1561 Ibid. 202. 
1562 Tariq Ramadan, Radical Reform, 89, 94, 142, and see also 193. 
1563 A textbook example of which can be found in the following formulation, which shows that Ramadan takes part in 
the overlapping consensus: ‘for me it is not a question of relativizing the universal principles of Islam in order to give 
the impression that we are integrating ourselves into the rational order. In my view, the issue is to find out how the Is-
lamic universal accepts and respects pluralism and the belief of the Other […]: it is in the very name of the universality 
of my principles that my conscience is summoned to respect diversity and the relative’ (Western Muslims and the Future 
of Islam, 5-6, emphases added). See also On Super-Diversity (Rotterdam and Berlin: Witte de With and Sternberg 
Press, 2011), 19: ‘[n]ot only it is necessary to observe and to acknowledge the reality of human diversity, it is necessary 
to assert this diversity as a fundamental positive dimension of our being, well-being, and peaceful future. […] We shall 
try to follow that path from the intimate to the public […].’ 
1564 Tariq Ramadan, What I Believe, 90-91. 
1565 Tariq Ramadan, Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity, 105. 
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cial, and political realities that correspond to the manifold choices of human communities [… 
t]he rule is that there is no single rule, no natural law standardizing the historical fates, cultur-
al systems, social fabrics, or collective psychology of human communities.’1566 He interprets 
this concept not only in epistemological, but also and mainly in moral terms, because it con-
veys an attitude of respect.1567 He also establishes an important and explicit connection be-
tween his version of the idea of the burdens of judgement and the idea of reasonableness.1568 
From the very beginning of his work,1569 Ramadan repeats that Muslim citizens must know 
and internalise within their cultural and normative horizon the constitutional and institutional 
framework, the laws, the history, the symbols, the collective memory, and the references of 
the European societies in which they live because they are at home there.1570 Consequently, he 
calls for an ‘age of “post-integration” discourse’, because ‘for those who were born in the 
West or who are citizens, it is no longer a question of “settlement” or “integration” but rather 
of “participation” and contribution”.’1571 He thus advocates a ‘deeper mutual knowledge’1572 
between fellow citizens. Ramadan also adds an important remark: 
‘[I]f the message of Islam is really universal, many of the values it promotes 
should inevitably be accessible to and shared by human beings of other traditions 
who live with other convictions. On the level of values, of morality, of the de-
mand for social justice and resistance to discrimination of all kinds, Muslim citi-
zens find a great number of potential partners in all Western societies. After all, 
their values are shared by the vast majority of the population, even if committed 
                                                        
1566 Tariq Ramadan, Radical Reform, 95.  
1567 Tariq Ramadan, The Quest For Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism, 49. 
1568 Ibid. 
1569 Tariq Ramadan, Les musulmans dans la laïcité: responsabilités et droits des musulmans dans les sociétés occiden-
tales, 98-99. 
1570 Tariq Ramadan, Noi musulmani europei, 14. See also 16. See as well Tariq Ramadan, What I Believe, 52. 
1571 Tariq Ramadan, What I Believe, 5-6. 
1572 Tariq Ramadan Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 156. 
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Muslims find themselves engaged on the ground with only the small, actively re-
sistant minority.’1573  
This observation is important because it shows not only that Ramadan recognises reasona-
ble pluralism, but also −at a deeper and more basic level− that he avoids what in chapter two I 
called ontological unreasonableness. In few words, the notion of ontological unreasonable-
ness conveys the idea that the way in which one’s own comprehensive doctrine assesses the 
relation between political and religious (or philosophical) values is completely unintelligible 
to outsiders. In 2.2.b I said that, if other citizens are unable to see why a comprehensive doc-
trine conflicts with one or more political values because that doctrine is “sealed” and denies 
the very possibility of being approached in terms of political reasonableness and public justi-
fication, then outsiders can only recognise that doctrine as politically unreasonable. I have 
said that during the stage of full justification we have four possible outcomes: first, full justi-
fication may be (1) present or (2) absent. Furthermore, in the case of absence of full justifica-
tion, we may have three different situations. At first, (2a) outsiders can try to reason from 
conjecture and, if they succeed and full justification is finally attained, then the comprehen-
sive doctrine is reasonable. But, (2b) full justification may be simply impossible because of a 
conflict between the political values and the values of the comprehensive doctrine (thus the 
comprehensive doctrine is unreasonable). Finally, (2c) it may be that full justification is not 
simply impossible because of a conflict such as this, but more profoundly because it is 
claimed that the way in which it manages political and non-political values is absolutely unin-
telligible from a political perspective. Since that specific comprehensive doctrine tries to 
evade any evaluation from a political perspective open to citizens as citizens, I call this par-
ticular instance of unreasonableness ontological unreasonableness. Now, this is precisely the 
kind of unreasonableness that Ramadan rejects in the aforementioned quotation: according to 
Ramadan, not only are Islamic values intelligible to non-Muslims, but they are often the very 
same human values, their political relevance is usually easy to understand, and frequently 
they can be invoked by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. For this reason Ramadan speaks of a 
moral ‘majority’ that brings together Muslims and non-Muslims, and says that the relevant 
difference (crossing religious boundaries) simply concerns the level of political activism (the 
‘small, actively resistant minority’). 
                                                        
1573 Ibid. 
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With reference to the second point, the importance of the affirmation that faith must be 
lived freely in accordance with one’s own conscience must be highlighted, thus refusing com-
pulsion in religious affairs (e.g., enforcement of religious morality or habits, particularly ac-
tive and “aggressive” forms of proselytism, and so on) and making room for conversion from 
Islam to other faiths or no faith. Indeed, this affirmation openly shows the recognition of the 
existence of an equal public identity through the acceptance of the fact that citizens can have 
(and actually do have) different non-public moral identities. It is possible to recognise other 
citizens as free and equal persons notwithstanding their different faiths only if one does not 
think that there should be complete congruence between citizens’ public identity and their 
wider (non-public) moral identity. Ramadan fully endorses the political idea of freedom of re-
ligion, which –he claims− can be fully justified from the Islamic perspective by relying on the 
Qur’anic verse ‘there is no compulsion in religion’ (Qur’an, 2:256). He accepts conversions 
from Islam to other faiths or to no faith,1574 and the right to change religion goes with the 
dismissal of the idea of prosecuting apostates, since apostasy is not a criminal offence punish-
able by political institutions. The only recommendation is to ‘not insult and prejudice’ the re-
ligious group that one leaves.1575 In the same vein, Ramadan also claims that the Islamic con-
cept of da‘wa (“invitation,” “call”) does not imply a struggle for proselytising and converting 
others, but ‘rather the idea of presenting and expressing the message of Islam, because con-
version, which must be a free act, is a matter entirely between God and the human heart.’1576 
Similarly, he even argues that ‘the idea of conversion is alien to Islam,’ because ‘to pass on 
the message is to call and invite people to a real knowledge of the presence of God,’ while 
‘[c]onversion is something that only God can accomplish, through His revelation, with each 
individual, and no other human being has the right to get involved in it. It is an affair of the 
heart and so does not lie within anyone else’s role or prerogative. This is the real meaning of 
                                                        
1574 See for instance Tariq Ramadan, “They Live in a Bleak, Devastated Universe,” page 2 of the printable version (em-
phasis added): ‘the prohibition of apostasy arose at a time when the first Muslim followers of the prophet Mohammed 
were at war with neighboring tribes. At the time, challenging one’s faith was tantamount to high treason or desertion. 
Nowadays this context has changed completely. […] Even the concept of the infidel is misleading, because the infidel is 
normally someone with a different faith, someone who refuses to recognize the truth of the words of the Koran […] He 
has every right to do so, as long as he does not question my right to believe in my truth.’ 
1575 See the interview to Tariq Ramadan and Alain Boyer by Sophie Gherardi and Jean-Luc Pouthier in Le Monde des 
débats January 2, 2002, quoted in Caroline Fourest, Frère Tariq. Le double discours de Tariq Ramadan, 225. 
1576 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 240 note 15. 
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the expression “bear witness to the message before humankind”.’1577 To this end, he has 
stressed with great emphasis the necessary relation between freedom and authentic faith in a 
recent video, which is part of a series posted on his personal website for the month of Rama-
dan in 2015.1578 This position emerges frequently in Ramadan’s work.1579 As I have said, the 
recognition of freedom of religion is essential for the distinction between public and non-
public identities (infra), and Tariq Ramadan apparently endorses in an overlapping consensus 
the idea of political reciprocity and equal civic standing: ‘[a]ny moral teaching, on the part of 
any religion, spirituality or philosophy, that might lead us to ignore the common humanity of 
all men, to deny the dignity of some men, or to establish distinctions and an ontological hier-
archy between beings must, as we said, be critically evaluated because it can have serious and 
dangerous implications.’1580 As the language used shows (‘common humanity of all men,’ 
‘dignity,’ ‘beings’), this is not merely a political conception of citizens as free equals, but a 
view derived from a more comprehensive (religious) perspective. However, since this view is 
consistent with the idea of political equality, it simply demonstrates that Ramadan believes 
that an overlapping consensus is possible. 
 
With reference to the issue of state neutrality (as I have said, understood as the recognition 
of the specificity of the domain of the political and the autonomy of state institutions toward 
the authority of comprehensive doctrines), Ramadan speaks in terms which are remarkably 
similar to those adopted by Rawls’s public reason (analysed in chapters three and four) when 
he says that ‘the separation of church and state [does] not mean wiping out religions but rather 
regulating their presence in the pluralistic (and more or less neutral) public space to ensure 
                                                        
1577 Ibid. 81. 
1578 “Ramadan’s Chronicles: Day 6 – Freedom,” 2015. See URL = http://tariqramadan.com/english/2015/06/23/day-6-
freedom/.  
1579 See for instance Tariq Ramadan, De l’islam et des musulmans: réflexions sur l’Homme, la réforme, la guerre et 
l’Occident, 65 and 70, and the interview to Ramadan in Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 76-77, 79, 
187, 206-207, 216, and 243. See Andrew F. March, “Reading Tariq Ramadan: Political Liberalism, Islam, and ‘Over-
lapping Consensus’,” 408-409. 
1580 Tariq Ramadan, The Quest For Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism, 69. 
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equality.’1581 Here we are very close to the core of the concept of reciprocity of the reasonable 
as defined above. This proximity is all the more evident in the following excerpt: 
‘[U]nable to devise fair, egalitarian policies on the social and political levels, 
politicians justify inconsistencies, contradictions, and sometimes hypocrisies 
through racial, cultural, and religious considerations that are supposed to explain 
or justify differential treatment. What Muslim citizens must urgently demand is 
recognition of their status and the equal treatment that society has to provide at 
all levels. […] The point is to accept that economic relationships should be ad-
dressed politically: because they are obsessed with identity issues and keep focus-
sing the debate on “values,” “culture,” or “civilization,” Western societies avoid 
such issues as the rule of law, equal treatment, objective relations of domination, 
denigration, and economic and social marginalization, of political discrimination, 
racism, and xenophobia.’1582 
This passage is extremely relevant, because it shows that Ramadan believes that political 
problems must be resolved by political means, that is, within the boundaries of the domain of 
the political, and that within this domain what is important are citizens’ equality before the 
law, fair equality of opportunities, and a form of civic friendship that rejects social marginali-
sation. This passage also confirms a notion that I repeated several times in the first chapter: 
the solving of these political problems is in the interest of all, in particular of those whose 
voice has been underrated in public debates so far. Ramadan attempts to awaken Muslims’ 
awareness of their equal rights as citizens and invites them to make their voice heard in public 
precisely because too often they have passively suffered political discrimination. However, he 
also reminds Muslims of their duties as citizens, provided that their equal rights as citizens 
(including those rights that allow them to fulfil their religious obligations) are respected as 
well: 
‘[S]o long as the two basic rights (freedom of conscience and freedom of wor-
ship) are recognized and protected, as they are in all Western societies, Muslims 
have to respect the law, which is binding on them as it is on all other citizens and 
                                                        
1581 Tariq Ramadan, What I Believe, 31-32. 
1582 Ibid. 77, emphases added. 
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residents. Muslim Westerners have understood that when secularism and reli-
gious neutrality are not instrumentalized by ideologues […] opposed to any pres-
ence of religion, they guarantee religious pluralism in Western societies and pro-
tect their legitimate rights.’1583  
It is noteworthy that this understanding of state neutrality as a common space of equal 
rights is characteristic of Ramadan’s more recent works, while in his first books he advocated 
a different view.1584 The latter recognised the significance of the history of secularism and of 
the process of separation between church and state in Europe.1585 In fact, in this first phase, 
Ramadan argues that the new organisation of the public space in Europe relies on ‘the birth of 
a social morality which does not find its legitimacy in the religious field anymore.’1586 Fur-
thermore, he underscores the fact that in Europe ‘secularisation almost invariably corresponds 
to an acquisition of freedoms’1587 and that violent struggles have been waged to ‘free the so-
cial field from an authority which, on behalf of God’s right, had muzzled social, political, and 
scientific action.’1588 However, he also thinks that this historical account of secularism should 
not be applied sic et simpliciter to Islam: Islam and Europe have two radically different histo-
ries.1589 Consequently, in this first phase Ramadan argues that European secularism should 
adjust to Muslims’ presence, since Muslims were not there when its doctrine was elaborated 
in the first place.1590 As a matter of fact, he affirms that Islam –thanks to its internal harmony 
between faith and reason, the absence of an institutionalised church, and its ability to adapt to 
different historical, geographical, and political contexts− naturally possesses what in Europe 
has been painfully acquired by the means of secularisation as a reaction against the worldly 
                                                        
1583 Ibid. 52, emphases added. 
1584 Ramadan openly declares that he revised his opinions about this matter, for instance in ibid. 97-98. 
1585 Tariq Ramadan, Les musulmans dans la laïcité: responsabilités et droits des musulmans dans les sociétés occiden-
tales, 41-54. 
1586 Ibid. 46, my translation. 
1587 Ibid. 48, my translation. 
1588 Ibid. 50, my translation. 
1589 Ibid. 81 and 143-144. 
1590 Tariq Ramadan in Au péril des idées: les grandes questions de notre temps, 23. 
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political power of the Catholic Church. 1591 As long as political rulers were enlightened by di-
vine justice and followed Islamic precepts, freedom of conscience was protected in the Islam-
ic world in virtue of religion itself (as I have already said, here Ramadan quotes the Qur’anic 
verse −2:256− ‘there is no compulsion in religion’), and not −like in Europe− by means of the 
socially highly costly concept of secularism.1592 In other words, according to Ramadan, in the 
Islamic world there is no need for a political liberation from the religious. Incidentally, it must 
be noted that he believes that a Muslim majority society per se is neither theocratic (for in the 
Sunni world there is not an official clerical organisation) nor secular (for a Muslim society 
‘never empties or cuts itself off from the general finalities of its religious and ethical point of 
reference’).1593 Rather, a ‘Muslim society has as a fundamental point of reference the Qur’ān 
and the Sunna of the Prophet,’1594 which represent the fundamental sources of moral princi-
ples for the believers and the moral framework from which they should judge national legisla-
tions.1595 Having said this, according to Ramadan (both in his first and more recent books) in 
Islamic history a fundamental differentiation has always been made between the eternal and 
unchangeable ‘divine authority’ as expressed in the articles of faith (‘aqīda) and in the ‘ibādāt 
(matters related to worship), and ‘human authority’ as expressed in the mu‘āmalāt (matters re-
lated to social affairs), which is dynamic by definition.1596 For Ramadan the distinction be-
tween these two epistemological orders corresponds to an implicit and natural conceptual dis-
tinction (not a divorce like in Europe) between spheres and authorities.1597 Thus, from Rama-
dan’s perspective, a Muslim majority country could be ideally defined as a ‘theocentric’ (here 
I borrow Massimo Campanini’s definition)1598 rather than as a theocratic political regime. 
However, coming back to the central question, the first version of Ramadan’s conception of 
                                                        
1591 Tariq Ramadan, Les musulmans dans la laïcité: responsabilités et droits des musulmans dans les sociétés occiden-
tales, 55-93. 
1592 Ibid. 88-89. 
1593 Tariq Ramadan, Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity, 332-333. 
1594 Ibid. 332. 
1595 Ibid. 80. 
1596 This distinction is frequently repeated in Ramadan’s work. See for instance Islam and the Arab Awakening, 81. 
1597 Tariq Ramadan, The Quest For Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism, 35-36. 
1598 Massimo Campanini, Islam e politica, 28. 
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state neutrality is problematic. As a matter of fact, it seems to imply that, if political power 
were exercised in compliance with Islamic religious justice, there would be no need for rec-
ognising the domain of the political and the autonomy of state institutions from the authority 
of Islam as a comprehensive doctrine, because religion itself could protect the same funda-
mental rights and freedoms which state institutions’ neutrality was originally aimed at guaran-
teeing. Assuming reasonable pluralism, the problem is that in this case it would be impossible 
to provide a genuine public justification (that is, a justification addressed to free equals) for 
the institutions and policies concretely protecting those rights and freedoms, because it would 
be unreasonable to expect an agreement on the comprehensive conception of justice which af-
firms the necessity of protecting those rights and makes those religiously-justified political in-
stitutions accountable for them. However, Ramadan has always been fully aware of the im-
portance of distinguishing what is justified and justifiable from what is unjustified and unjus-
tifiable. For instance, as I have said, with reference to Muslims’ life in European societies, he 
distinguishes their publicly justified freedom of religion (which he appreciates) from unjusti-
fied and unjustifiable social and economic discriminations (which he condemns).1599 Thus, he 
progressively moves toward the egalitarian and universal conception of state neutrality men-
tioned above: state secular neutrality should apply equally to all citizens, thus advocating an 
‘egalitarian treatment of [religious] confessions’.1600 Therefore, while he remains negatively 
critical toward a secularist conception of neutrality hostile to religion per se,1601 one can un-
derstand the importance of the shift from the earlier differentialist view to the later view of 
state neutrality as a public horizon of equal rights for citizens. It is in this vein that he con-
demns what he calls the ‘dogmatic mind,’1602 that is, the incapacity to recognise and respect 
the political (not “metaphysical”) specificity of the domain of the political with its reasonable 
pluralism. Thus, state neutrality protects such pluralism from dogmatism: 
                                                        
1599 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 121. 
1600 Ramadan openly underscores this change in his thought: Tariq Ramadan in Au péril des idées: les grandes ques-
tions de notre temps, 23-24, 235, 261. 
1601 This is a common theme in his work. See for instance Tariq Ramadan Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 70. 
1602 Tariq Ramadan, Les musulmans dans la laïcité: responsabilités et droits des musulmans dans les sociétés occiden-
tales, 82; To Be a European Muslim, 155; The Quest For Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism, 21-22; Ra-
dical Reform, 263; What I Believe, 49 and 108-109; Au péril des idées: les grandes questions de notre temps, 53 and 81. 
For the same reasons, he also criticises dogmatic comprehensive liberals: To Be a European Muslim, 243 and 247 note 
9. 
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‘There is no religion or spirituality whatsoever that is not in one way or another 
related to politics, to a conception of politics […] Similarly, there is no political 
system […] that is completely cut off from religious points of reference, even if 
the latter are only represented in the society’s cultural background –France is cul-
turally Roman Catholic just as China is nurtured by Confucianism− and political 
systems and politicians cannot neglect or ignore those dimensions. […] What 
matters here is not to know whether religion has anything to do with politics –
since they are always related− but rather to know what type of relation should be 
considered and encouraged. The central issue is that of authority […] The confu-
sion of orders occurs when the mind longing for divine truths turns into a dogmat-
ic mind and wishes to impose its truths on the political and social community. 
What endangers political pluralism is indeed, on the one hand the imposition of a 
religious power whose legitimacy is seen as transcendent, and on the other, emer-
gence of a dogmatic mind deaf to other people’s belief.’1603 
This formulation seems fully consistent with Rawls’s account of reasonableness. Nonethe-
less, some questions are still open or unclear in his conception of state neutrality. For in-
stance, when he talks of homosexuality, he says that he personally disapproves of homosexu-
ality, because it breaks the harmony and plans of God’s creation, but that he ‘respect[s homo-
sexuals] and respect[s] their choice.’1604 He adds: ‘I cannot agree with what they do, but I re-
spect what they are. I know, work, and fight with women and men who are homosexual: their 
sexual life concerns [only] them and everybody must respect the choice of everybody else, 
provided that it is not imposed on others.’1605 So far, political reciprocity is not violated, since 
Ramadan does what a political liberal can reasonably expect from him: while he is not sup-
posed to support homosexuality from a religious perspective, he defends homosexuals’ rights 
and freedoms as citizens and accepts to cooperate with them within society. Nonetheless, 
problems arise immediately after, when Ramadan makes a sharp distinction between the 
French hijab ban in public schools and laws concerning same-sex marriage or civil unions. He 
maintains that:  
                                                        
1603 Tariq Ramadan, Radical Reform, 261-263. 
1604 Interview to Ramadan in Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 179, my translation. 
1605 Ibid. 179-180, my translation. 
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‘In the case of the law on religious symbols, it was a discriminatory restriction 
of the exercise of individual freedom. The question of homosexuality raises the 
opposite question of promoting new liberties which demand a reconsideration of 
existing law. […] Every citizen has the right and the duty of asking herself about 
the implications of such reforms. Everyone is free to decide in function of her 
conception of the life and her relationships, but you cannot impose on people the 
thought that the only good solution is the institution of same-sex marriage.’1606 
Now, it seems that this way of framing the question of same-sex marriage is quite contro-
versial. Indeed, one may think that, at least once that some conditions guaranteeing society’s 
orderly reproduction over time and children’s care and education have been satisfied, prevent-
ing same-sex marriage or civil unions (also through a simple vacuum legis) is an instance of 
limiting personal rights and liberties, precisely as in the case of forbidding hijab in public 
schools.1607 In fact, if one limits herself to what Ramadan says (thus, without taking into ac-
count the above mentioned considerations about society’s reproduction over time and chil-
dren’s care and education), it would be difficult to say that failing to recognise homosexuals’ 
rights does not amount to a ‘discriminatory restriction of the exercise of individual freedom.’ 
A law prohibiting same-sex civil unions or marriages (or the mere absence of any legislation 
on this matter having similarly impeding effects) on these bases would be difficult to justify 
in public, because the only genuinely public reasons for limiting same-sex marriage or civil 
unions have not been considered by Ramadan. He limits himself to a religion-driven scepti-
cism about ‘reforms’ introducing same-sex marriage or civil unions, while such reforms may 
simply represent a remedy to a previous injustice. In the terms that I used in chapter four, here 
Ramadan apparently fails to provide a public justification for his scepticism not only at the 
first level of the duty of civility (A), but also at the second level, because he does not present 
                                                        
1606 Ibid. 181, my translation. 
1607 I cannot analyse the question of how to balance relevant rights, liberties, and duties with reference to the issue of 
same-sex marriage. I limit myself to remind the reader of Rawls’s position about same-sex marriages. After having not-
ed that the state has a legitimate interest in family in so far as it must organise ‘institutions needed to reproduce political 
society over time’ (John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 456) and that ‘reproductive labor is socially 
necessary labor’ (ibid. 467), Rawls also says that ‘[g]iven this interest, the government would appear to have no interest 
in the particular form of family life, or of relations among the sexes, except insofar as that form or those relations in 
some way affect the orderly reproduction of society over time’ (ibid. 457). Thus, he argues that ‘this observation sets 
the way in which justice as fairness deals with the question of gay and lesbian rights and duties, and how they affect the 
family. If these rights and duties are consistent with orderly family life and the education of children, they are, ceteris 
paribus, fully admissible.’ Ibid. 467 note 60.  
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a supportive public reason which goes together with his religious argument (thus, he fails un-
der B1), nor does he respect the spirit of reciprocity of the reasonable when he refuses to rec-
ognise other citizens’ rights due to his religious values (thus, he fails under B2). The follow-
ing remark by Christopher Eberle seems then correct: ‘laws discouraging homosexual rela-
tions are so controversial because there is no credible nonreligious reason to believe that ho-
mosexual behaviour is immoral or otherwise aberrant. So anyone who supports a law that dis-
courages homosexual behaviour must […] be relying on some sort of religious rationale.’1608 
 
According to Ramadan, a sense of justice, fairness, and contract abidance permeates Mus-
lim identity and limits Muslims’ attachments to their religious community (umma) and even 
to their families.1609 Ramadan is clear about the centrality of justice in Islamic ethics: ‘justice 
has the priority over emotion, be it affection or aversion,’ and ‘the principle of justice is in-
deed the parameter.’1610 This observation may represent the basis for a sincere commitment 
(via an overlapping consensus) to the Rawlsian idea of social cooperation based on fair terms, 
thus supporting the notion of reciprocity of the reasonable. It must be noted that Ramadan un-
derstands this sense of justice as “belonging to God first” rather than as “seeking fair terms 
for just social cooperation,” that is, in comprehensive rather than in political terms. However, 
this comprehensive way of conceiving justice is not problematic as long as one remains with-
in the limits of an overlapping consensus. Yet, when there is a conflict between this compre-
hensive sense of justice as “belonging to God first” and the sense of political justice as will-
ingness ‘to act from the public conception of justice which characterizes the fair terms of so-
cial cooperation,’1611 then problems arise and Ramadan is sometimes ambiguous on this point. 
For example, he claims that there is no contradiction between being a Muslim and being a Eu-
ropean citizen ‘as long as the Muslim fulfils his engagement to act according to the law and 
                                                        
1608 It is interesting to note that this position is expressed by Christopher Eberle (Religious Conviction in Liberal Poli-
tics, 9), who, as I have said, is an advocate of the public role of religions (supra).  
1609 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 155, 159-161. For another approach which uses the centrality of the 
idea of justice as a cornerstone for an Islamic reform toward democracy, see Khaled Abou El Fadl “Islam and the Chal-
lenge of Democracy,” in Islam and the Challenge of Democracy, ed. Joshua Cohen and Deborah Chasman (Princeton 
and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), in particular 18-23. 
1610 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 159 and 160. 
1611 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 19. 
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that he is not asked to sever himself from a part of his identity.’1612 What is the meaning of 
this condition? To what extent can the preservation of what one perceives as her Muslim iden-
tity be relevant for exempting her from binding laws? What are (if any) the limits of what 
Muslims can do to preserve their religious identity in relation to public laws and institutions? 
Since Ramadan does not answer these questions clearly, one may legitimately wonder wheth-
er he is really committed to the idea of political reciprocity and able to fulfil RR. Doubts to 
this end have been expressed by Caroline Fourest and Ian Buruma (note, however, that Bu-
ruma is much more optimistic than Fourest about the possibility of reading the condition 
enunciated by Ramadan in a way consistent with the spirit of political reciprocity),1613 while 
Andrew March and Paul Landau have touched on this point without explicitly recognising the 
problem.1614 Also Franco Cardini has indirectly noted this issue, drawing an interesting paral-
lel between the situation of contemporary Muslim citizens in Europe as described by Rama-
dan and the condition of Italian Catholics when the Church abrogated the non expedit doctrine 
(no political participation for Catholics in the Kingdom of Italy) in 1919.1615 Then, for the 
first time after the unification of Italy, Catholics had to decide how to balance their religious 
and political identities. However, this clause (I call it the “suspect clause”) is particularly 
problematic with reference to the consistency requirement (CR), because it may express an 
idea of suspensive conditionality: in other words, it may suspend the cogency of the idea of 
public reason when specific conditions are present. Hence, I consider this question in the fol-
lowing section when I analyse PR3. For the moment, it is enough to notice that Ramadan rec-
ognises the discontinuity between the religious and the political and makes room for the ex-
istence of a public or institutional identity, which can and should include Muslims. This 
emerges clearly in the following quotation: 
‘[F]aith and nationality, as understood within the framework of the current na-
tional constitutions, are not of the same nature. To be a Muslim signifies to up-
hold a trust (amāna) which gives a meaning to one’s life. […] The concept of na-
                                                        
1612 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 196. Emphases added. 
1613 Caroline Fourest, Frère Tariq. Le double discours de Tariq Ramadan, 21, 296-300, in particular 299; Ian Buruma, 
“Tariq Ramadan Has an Identity Issue,” 7. 
1614 Andrew F. March, “Reading Tariq Ramadan: Political Liberalism, Islam, and ‘Overlapping Consensus’,” 411 and 
Paul Landau, Le Sabre et le Coran, 180. 
1615 Franco Cardini, “Presentazione,” in Orsola Casagrande, Europa domani: conversazione con Tariq Ramadan, 15. 
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tionality […] is a concept of a completely different nature: as an element of iden-
tity it structures –within both a given constitution and a given space− the way one 
is to deal with his fellow citizens […] Muslim identity is an answer to the ques-
tion “Why?” while national identity answers the question “How?” […] All things 
considered, it all depends on what we are speaking about. Thus, in the context of a 
philosophical debate, an individual is a Muslim of British or French or Belgian 
nationality.[…] If the discussion is carried out on the social or political level, then 
this individual is British, French or Belgian and of Muslim faith.’1616 
Therefore, Ramadan accepts the distinction between the political and the religious and, like 
Rawls, thinks that a reconciliation between these two is possible. The two are distinct because 
they answer different questions and have a different scope: on one side, how to live a good 
life and achieve eternal salvation and, on the other, how to live in a political society and co-
operate with others who do not share our deepest moral, philosophical, and religious beliefs. 
Ramadan openly says that ‘every society must establish a distinction between the two spheres 
of the religious and the public, which protects the public space of rationality and debate and 
which allows public voice not to be stifled under the yoke of dogma or of religious authori-
ties.’1617 Nonetheless, the political and the religious can be reconciled through an overlapping 
consensus: ‘[t]here is no confusion between the restraining authority of the religious and the 
civic independence of the individual.’1618 From a Muslim point of view, the two domains can 
be recognised as distinct and yet linked within the Islamic frame of reference thanks to the 
traditional distinction between ‘ibādāt (matters related to worship which express God’s abso-
lute authority) and mu‘āmalāt (matters related to social affairs which are always contextual 
and express human authority). It is within the notion of mu‘āmalāt and its order of authority 
                                                        
1616 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 163, italics in the original. This idea recurs in Ramadan’s books. For 
instance, in What I Believe (36-37) he says: ‘there are different orders within which one will have to define oneself dif-
ferently. Asking whether one is primarily “Muslim” or “American,” “Australian,” “Italian,” “French” or “Canadian” 
opposes two identities and affiliations that do not belong to the same realm. In the realm of religion and philosophy, 
[…] a human being is first and foremost an atheist, a Buddhist, a Jew, a Christian, or a Muslim: her or his passport or 
nationality cannot answer the existential question. When an individual must vote for a candidate at an election, she or 
he is first an American, Italian, French, or British citizen involved in national affairs. Depending on the realm or the 
field of activity, the individual therefore puts forward one identity or another, and that is not contradictory. […] In other 
words, you have more than one identity and you give priority to one of those identities or the other depending on the 
environment or situation, without this affecting your loyalty to one order of affiliation or the other.’ 
1617 See Ramadan in Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 200, my translation. 
1618 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 145. 
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that Ramadan retraces a possible Islamic ground for what Rawls calls the domain of the polit-
ical. This is the essence of the idea of an overlapping consensus (infra), and Ramadan makes 
precisely this point when he says that, even if the opposition ‘between private practice and en-
try into the public arena […] seems complete,’ Muslims’ ‘consciousness should build a reci-
procity between the state of the heart and the nature of one’s acts. The link, the connection be-
tween them must be intimate and personal.1619 It is clear that for a citizen of faith the ultimate 
relationship is the one with God, but, from a political liberal perspective, the question is 
whether and how such a relationship may support a political relation between free and equal 
citizens in a society characterised by reasonable pluralism. Thus, Ramadan is extremely close 
to Rawls when he claims that: 
‘In the end, the question is not to know the nature of [one’s] philosophy [of 
life] (religious, humanistic, atheistic, or other), but how one refers to it and how 
one is inspired by it in the public space. Does it prevail on the public law? […] Is 
it to be imposed on all? Does it prescribe an absolute view, a dogmatic treatment 
[… ?] This is the real question. One can rely on a religious teaching and be in-
volved in social debates in a very open and democratic way. On the contrary, one 
can be an atheist […] and want to impose [her belief] on others […] The source of 
inspiration is not the problem, which is rather in the spirit and the behaviour of the 
person who refers to it.’1620 
Elsewhere, he also argues that: 
‘[T]he true question is not, from a Muslim point of view, to justify the first at-
tachment of believers –which, naturally, is to God and their faith− but, more spe-
cifically, to clarify the nature of the articulation which exists between the pre-
scriptions of the Islamic references and the concrete reality of citizenship in a Eu-
ropean country. Do the Islamic sources allow a Muslim to be a genuine European 
                                                        
1619 Ibid. 123. 
1620 Ramadan in Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 178. My translation. 
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citizen, or is there such a contradiction that would make the union “Muslim-
European” impossible to actualise?’1621 
This is a clear reference to what Rawls calls the idea of an overlapping consensus (as I 
have said, I limit myself to point out the public importance of Ramadan’s affirmation of a 
possible overlapping consensus, while for the content of the latter as sketched out by Rama-
dan see Andrew March’s aforementioned articles). Ramadan rephrases the idea of an overlap-
ping consensus when he acknowledges its relevance for achieving legal integration. He says 
that the latter ‘will succeed only if Muslims will find within their sources elements which are 
consistent with the legislations of the countries of which they are citizens, because this would 
resolve the question of [their] double loyalty.’1622 Moreover, Ramadan invites Muslims to be 
always constructively critical about their attachments (both political and religious). For in-
stance, he asserts the need for abandoning the Manichaean view according to which what the 
members of one’s group do is always good (i.e., “Islamic”), while what the others do is al-
ways wrong or bad (i.e., “anti-Islamic”).1623 This is because ‘the criteria for evaluating an ac-
tion, a production, or a custom are not to be found in the identity of its promoter or its origin 
but in its respect or lack of respect for the ethical principles we hold.’1624 This reference to 
ethical principles is of pivotal importance, since it shows how Ramadan bases moral respon-
sibility for political reciprocity (as for any other human interpersonal relationship) on human 
responsibility toward God.1625 This represents a comprehensive anchorage of the political re-
lation between free equals, in accordance with the mechanism of an overlapping consensus. 
Effectively, Ramadan agrees with Rawls in thinking that something like a mere modus viven-
di is not enough in a liberal democracy. Talking about toleration, he affirms: 
‘[W]e are dealing with equal relationships between free human beings, rela-
tions between the citizens […] Calling upon powers to be tolerant once meant 
asking them to moderate their strength and to limit their ability to do harm: this 
                                                        
1621 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 163-164. 
1622 Ramadan in Alain Gresh and Tariq Ramadan, L’Islam en questions, 327, my translation. 
1623 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 219. 
1624 Ibid. 219-220. 
1625 He also says: ‘for the human being, to think of God is to think of his individual responsibility.’ Tariq Ramadan, De 
l’islam et des musulmans: réflexions sur l’Homme, la réforme, la guerre et l’Occident, 195, my translation. 
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actually implied an acceptance of a power relationship, of a potential relationship 
of authority […] Deviations, infractions and a few differences could be “tolerat-
ed” … they were “suffered or endured.” But when it is no longer a question of re-
sisting and limiting power, the positive dimension of tolerance is inverted: it be-
comes a disinterested generosity on the part of those who dominate and hold polit-
ical, religious and/or symbolic authority, the authority of the majority or of 
wealth. […] When it comes to relations between free and equal human beings, [… 
w]hen we are on equal terms, it is no longer a matter of conceding tolerance, but 
of rising above that and educating ourselves to respect others. This requires a very 
different intellectual and emotional attitude. It begins with the recognition that the 
presence of the other within my own conception of the world is both a fact and a 
necessity.’1626 
This long passage is essential because it echoes Rawls’s theory leading from a modus vi-
vendi to an overlapping consensus in which a spirit of civic friendship and political reciproci-
ty between free and equal reasonable citizens can flourish. Moreover, the last sentence per-
emptorily demonstrates the acceptance of the fact of reasonable pluralism. 
 
Then, we are led quite naturally to the fifth question, namely the question of citizenship as 
equal rights and common public political identity. Ramadan also seems to fulfil this require-
ment. To begin with, he defines citizenship as a status of equality before the law and among 
free fellow citizens: ‘[e]very individual must be treated equally before the law, without any 
discrimination as to sex, colour, religion, social status, or anything else.’1627 He also maintains 
that ‘in the order of citizenship, of relationship to the law, or of the treatment of individuals, 
the minority concept is inoperative: there is no such thing as “minority citizenship”!’1628 He 
thus advocates a new public political identity for citizens as citizens, based on positive ‘con-
                                                        
1626 Tariq Ramadan, The Quest For Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism, 47-48. 
1627 Ibid. 73. 
1628 Tariq Ramadan, What I Believe, 58. 
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tributio[n] and sharing,’1629 ‘common values,’1630 and ‘mutual respect and trust.’1631 Accord-
ing to Ramadan, this involves going beyond a discourse focused on mere “integration.” Ra-
ther, this is a ‘post-integration approach’1632 centred on a new public political identity that he 
calls ‘a new We.’1633 Such a ‘new We’ is ‘anchored in citizenship,’1634 and premised on a 
‘revolution of [mutual] trust and confidence.’1635 In 2006 he even published a “Manifesto for 
a New ‘We’: An Appeal to Western Muslims and Their Fellow Citizens,” in which he de-
clares: 
‘Such a “We” would henceforth represent this coming together of citizens con-
fident in their values, defenders of pluralism in their common society, and re-
spectful of the identities of others; citizens who seek to take up the challenge in 
the name of their shared values at the very heart of their societies. As loyal and 
critical citizens, as men and women of integrity, they join forces in a revolution of 
trust and confidence to stem the onrush of fear.’1636 
To be sure, while the civic dimension of this idea was fully expressed in 2006, its core was 
already present in his earlier writings. He then preferred another expression: ‘integration of 
                                                        
1629 Ibid. 69. 
1630 Ibid. 70. 
1631 Ibid. 71. 
1632 Ibid. 69. 
1633 Ibid. 90-95. See also the “Manifesto for a New ‘We’: An Appeal to Western Muslims and Their Fellow Citizens,” 
written in 2006 and available on Tariq Ramadan’s website (URL = 
http://tariqramadan.com/english/2006/07/07/manifesto-for-a-new-we/) and in What I Believe as Appendix II (123-133). 
Finally, for a less political and more ethical and spiritual declination of this idea, see The Quest For Meaning: Develop-
ing a Philosophy of Pluralism, 172-175. 
1634 Tariq Ramadan, “Manifesto for a New ‘We’: An Appeal to Western Muslims and Their Fellow Citizens,” in What I 
Believe, 131. 
1635 Ibid. 132. 
1636 Ibid. 130. 
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intimate lives’ (in French ‘intégration des intimités’)1637 The moral political substance, how-
ever, was not radically different. For instance, in To Be a European Muslim he wrote: 
‘[A] Muslim does not simply ask for acceptance or tolerance in its etymologi-
cal meaning of suffering the presence of someone because there is no alternative. 
Along with freedom of faith and worship, he or she needs a recognition based on 
protection that, in itself, is based on respect. Freedom of worship, human respect 
and the social, economic, and political protection of one’s rights are the three fun-
damentals of a true recognition of human dignity and integrity.’1638  
This point is connected both −explicitly− with the previously analysed rejection of a mere 
modus vivendi, and –implicitly− with his conception of citizenship as a status of equal rights 
that I have just mentioned. Note, however, that in his later formulation of the public identity 
of citizens he emphasises more the spirit of mutual respect and trust. In the first period, on the 
other hand, he focuses more on the rights that would allow Muslims’ inclusion. Then, he lists 
the rights that, if granted, would imply that there is no contradiction between being a Muslim 
and being a European citizen. They are the following: the ‘right to practise Islam,’ the ‘right 
to knowledge,’ the ‘right to found organisations,’ the ‘right to autonomous representation,’ 
and finally the ‘right to appeal to the law.’1639 He then notes that in all Western European so-
cieties those rights are protected.1640 Since the only condition imposed (that is, the respect of 
equal rights) is generally respected in Europe, there are no external obstacles to the possibility 
for Muslims to be European citizens, because through those rights they are also able to affirm 
and live their Muslim identity.1641 As I have said, this approach to citizenship is distinctly 
based on rights. For instance, Ramadan claims that ‘[i]t is essential that the social structure 
                                                        
1637 Tariq Ramadan, “Pour une laïcité ouverte,” extended version of an article published in Le Monde October 13, 1994 
and now included in Les musulmans dans la laïcité: responsabilités et droits des musulmans dans les sociétés occi-
dentales, 162-164; To Be a European Muslim, 216 (I take the English translation ‘integration of intimate lives’ from 
here); recently, he has made reference to this early label in the book Au péril des idées: les grandes questions de notre 
temps, 261. 
1638 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 133. 
1639 Ibid. 135-137. Elsewhere, he also specifies seven rights which are fundamental for complying with the ‘social mes-
sage of Islam.’ They are: the right to a decent life, the right to family, the right to housing, the right to education, the 
right to work, the right to justice, the right to solidarity (Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 149-152). 
1640 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 135 and supra, section 6.1. 
1641 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 138. 
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guarantees respect for the rights of each person, and this must be expressed in two ways: ob-
viously, judicial power must apply the laws fairly to every member of society, but it is equally 
important that society stretches itself to meet all the organizational requirements necessary for 
the provision of the rights we have already mentioned.’1642 The demand that society is able to 
arrange within itself what is required to effectively exercise citizen’s rights (think, for exam-
ple, to the question of building mosques and Islamic cemeteries, or authorising halal slaugh-
ter) is combined with the demand that Muslims practice an active ‘civic awareness.’1643 As I 
have said, the ground on which reciprocity is based is a religious one (a sense of ‘responsibil-
ity before the Creator and among humankind’1644), but this is consistent with the idea of an 
overlapping consensus, for Ramadan says that ‘an awareness of responsibility by each person 
is the only way to protect the rights of all.’1645 Thus, although the call for claiming Muslims’ 
rights and social reform is made on religious grounds (‘in the Muslim mind [the idea of re-
sponsibility before the Creator and among humankind] is the root of the idea that Muslims 
have a mission of social reform to accomplish’),1646 the same rights are understood in a genu-
inely public way: ‘[a]ll people as citizens, are responsible for claiming their rights and gaining 
respect. Society does not hand out rights as one offers privileges: they are a matter of law, re-
spect, even compulsion.’1647 Muslims seek political and social reform sustained and motivated 
(also) by their religious pursuit of justice, but they are fully able to recognise the public politi-
cal dimension of both fundamental rights and social reform understood as civic emancipation, 
as Ramadan shows in the following passage: ‘if glaring injustices are visible and sometimes 
institutionalized, then we must say so and reject them and fight, with all the others who are 
fighting, to demand our rights, and not simply hope for kindness or say compassion.’1648 This 
is a Muslim approach to political rights which is fully consistent with the idea of an overlap-
ping consensus and fulfils the requirement RR as expressed by the idea of public reason. 
                                                        
1642 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 151. 
1643 Ibid. 152. 
1644 Ibid. 153. 
1645 Ibid. 
1646 Ibid. 
1647 Ibid. 154. 
1648 Ibid. 
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Therefore, we are brought back to the idea of a ‘new We’: it is not by chance, I think, that the 
last quotations are all from Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, which is published in 
2004, only two years before the “Manifesto.” Indeed, already in this book there is the idea of 
a ‘commitment “together” in the name of values held in common by virtue of sharing a citi-
zenship lived in an egalitarian fashion,’ which makes it ‘possible to find areas of agree-
ment.’1649 This is precisely the essence of what I have called a public political identity. Ac-
cording to Ramadan, such an identity is not something natural or obvious. Rather, it is some-
thing that citizens should acquire through education and the concrete practice of living to-
gether, discussing, and struggling for social justice.1650 Only in this way can they develop a 
‘common sense of belonging,’1651 a ‘shared citizenship.’1652 Effectively, moreover, if one 
compares Ramadan’s definition of education (‘[e]ducation means giving individuals the tools 
they need if their minds, being and individuality are to be autonomous; this is not simply a 
matter of acknowledging the power of their will, but of becoming its agent. Education is what 
allows human beings to become the true “subject” of freedom. It is a necessity, and it is a 
right’)1653 with Rawls’s conception of children’s education (which should include the 
‘knowledge of their constitutional and civic rights,’ ‘prepare them to be fully cooperating 
members of society,’ ‘enable them to be self-supporting,’ and ‘encourage the political vir-
tues’)1654 it should be evident that considerations about enabling children’s future freedom of 
choice and critical capabilities are equally important in both accounts. Finally, Ramadan 
states three necessary and sufficient conditions to include Muslims within this public political 
identity (what he calls ‘the three Ls that should grant [Muslims] recognition as citizens’): ‘re-
spect for the law, knowledge of the language, and critical loyalty.’1655 If these are the bounda-
                                                        
1649 Ibid. 157 and 157-158. 
1650 For instance, see Tariq Ramadan, The Quest For Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism, 56 and 172; 
What I Believe, 94; and Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 158.  
1651 Tariq Ramadan, The Quest For Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism, 175. 
1652 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 107 and 157. 
1653 Tariq Ramadan, The Quest For Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism, 56. 
1654 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 199. See also Rawls’s caveat about the risk of falling into comprehensive liberal-
ism at 199-200. 
1655 Tariq Ramadan, The Quest For Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism, 171. For Ramadan’s invitation to 
be always critical of one’s own attachments and affiliations (both political and religious), see supra. 
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ries of the public political identity according to Ramadan, he also emphasises the order of pri-
orities for Muslims as citizens (what he calls ‘the seven Cs’): confidence, consistency, contri-
bution, creativity, communication, contestation, and compassion.1656 
 
We come then to the sixth point. Some of the priorities just mentioned (in particular con-
tribution and contestation) are specifically linked to the role of social and political criticism 
which, according to Ramadan, is not only a right, but also a duty for every citizen. In particu-
lar, he defines this kind of criticism from a Muslim perspective as a ‘social jihād,’ a personal 
and collective ‘engagement in social reform [and] mobilisation against injustice.’1657 Note 
that, even if Ramadan does not exclude jihād as violent armed struggle,1658 he mainly under-
stands jihād as a moral notion toward one’s own and society’s perfection, and as the actuali-
sation of one’s moral responsibility toward God, toward herself, and toward the others.1659 So, 
it is first and foremost a ‘jihād of trust’1660 (or also a ‘revolution of trust’):1661 a relentless en-
gagement toward justice which presupposes awareness, confidence, and solidarity. In politics, 
jihād must ‘be carried out in the name of active and responsible citizenship,’ and take the 
                                                        
1656 Tariq Ramadan, What I Believe, 87-88. 
1657 Tariq Ramadan, Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity, 66-68. See also De l’islam et des musulmans: 
réflexions sur l’Homme, la réforme, la guerre et l’Occident, 163-167 and the video “Ramadan’s Chronicles: Day 4 – 
Jihād,” 2015 at URL = http://tariqramadan.com/english/2015/06/21/day-4-jihad/.  
1658 In case of ‘military occupation’ (Ramadan makes the examples of Chechnya and Bosnia), he says that a ‘direct con-
frontation’ is inevitable (Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity, 68). One can find Ramadan’s just war doc-
trine in Orsola Casagrande, Europa domani: conversazione con Tariq Ramadan, 102. He justifies jihād as a violent 
armed struggle in terms of a proportioned self-defence against an armed attack. He even justifies suicide attacks, but 
only when three conditions occur: (1) they are legitimate only during formally declared wars, (2) they must be a solu-
tion of last resort after that all other means of resistance have failed, and (3) they can be directed only against an ene-
my’s armed forces and never against civilians. With reference to Palestine, he provides a political interpretation of the 
conflict and says that Palestinians ‘have the right to fight for their independence from Israel’ (as a part of their right to 
self-defence and self-determination), but in no way does this authorise terrorist acts: ‘[n]othing legitimizes the killing of 
innocent civilians. The suicide bomber who blows up Israeli children cannot transform himself into a martyr. The Pales-
tinian problem is not an Islamic problem’ (Tariq Ramadan, “They Live in a Bleak, Devastated Universe,” page 3 of the 
printable version). 
1659 Ibid. 61: ‘jihād is to man’s humanity what instinct is to an animal’s behaviour. To be free, for man, is to be respon-
sible and such responsibility is linked to a choice which always seeks to express the goodness and respect of oneself and 
others.’ 
1660 Tariq Ramadan, What I Believe, 114. 
1661 Ibid. 93. 
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form of ‘a constant and balanced effort [… aiming at] the defense of civil responsibilities and 
rights and the promotion of pluralism, freedom of expression, and the democratic process.’1662 
Political participation is thus based on religious grounds (as allowed by the idea of an over-
lapping consensus): ‘there is no Islamic consciousness without social consciousness [… and] 
there is no social consciousness without political consciousness.’1663 However, as previously 
noted with regard to rights, this religiously charged interpretation of social and political coop-
eration and criticism is not the only one presented by Ramadan. In fact, he is careful in under-
lying the public dimension of political criticism, such as when he says that ‘social problems 
should not be “Islamized” and such issues as unemployment, social marginalization, and oth-
ers should be addressed politically,’1664 and that ‘Muslims must tackle them by getting in-
volved as citizens and fighting against injustice, racism, discrimination, populist stigmatiza-
tion discourse, hypocrisies [… and] paternalistic, often neo-colonialist discourse and infan-
tilizing treatment.’1665 This conception of political criticism is public, because it concerns all 
the body of citizens (‘with and for their fellow citizens, [Muslims] must raise their voice’)1666 
and because it involves capacities which are properly political (‘demanding consistency, fair 
social policies, and equal treatment,’ ‘political integrity,’ ‘competence,’ and a ‘civic evalua-
tion of local policies’).1667 Since this kind of social and political criticism is addressed to citi-
zens as citizens, since it uses the resources of public reason, and since it appeals to their pub-
lic identity, one can understand what Ramadan means when he states the operating principle 
                                                        
1662 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 113 and 114. 
1663 Tariq Ramadan, Les musulmans dans la laïcité: responsabilités et droits des musulmans dans les sociétés occiden-
tales, 137, my translation. 
1664 Tariq Ramadan, What I Believe, 6. Ramadan often repeats the idea that political problems must be solved political-
ly. For instance, with reference to the question of terrorism, he provocatively but appropriately notes: ‘in one of the 
tapes [circulated after 2005 bombings in London], one of the bombers says: “you are killing our brothers in Baghdad 
and we will kill you here.” This is wrong, what he says is unacceptable, but he is making a political link [and it] must be 
answered politically. It is wrong to say that this is a Muslim problem, this is a political problem.’ Ramadan in Orsola 
Casagrande, Europa domani: conversazione con Tariq Ramadan, 100, my translation. See also “They Live in a Bleak, 
Devastated Universe,” 2 of the printable version: ‘[t]he attempt to Islamicize [sic] social issues perverts and falsifies 
political discourse.’ 
1665 Tariq Ramadan, What I Believe, 58-59. 
1666 Ibid. 89. See also To Be a European Muslim, 229 (emphases added): ‘[a]ll citizens, whatever their beliefs, must take 
part in this effort towards social reform and justice […] Fighting unemployment, opposing employment discrimination 
[…], promoting social welfare, intervening against suburban violence or looking after marginalised persons (the poor 
and the elderly) are so many challenges that we must take up together, as partners and fellow citizens.’ 
1667 Tariq Ramadan, What I Believe, 73. 
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of this kind of criticism in these terms: ‘I criticise the way in which you define yourself and I 
do that not from the outside but from the inside.’1668 Crucially, for Ramadan Muslims as citi-
zens can and should adopt this civic internal perspective. Consequently, social cooperation is 
defined in terms of citizens’ ‘positive contribution’1669 (or, to use the language of Radical Re-
form, ‘transformation’)1670 to society as a whole. For Ramadan, then, discourses about Mus-
lims’ integration in European societies should be replaced by discourses about Muslims’ con-
tribution to European societies, for contribution goes far beyond mere integration. This is the 
post-integration approach mentioned above.1671 One can thus understand why I argue that 
Ramadan expresses something similar to what I have called shared standards for social and 
political criticism when he urges citizens to fight a ‘social jihād’ against discrimination and 
injustice across social, economic, and religious groups.1672 If we move from Ramadan’s con-
ception of Muslim participation to the activity of political criticism to the broader question of 
his understanding of social cooperation, we can generally find a similar argumentative struc-
ture. Firstly, Ramadan notes that, even though Islam is a communitarian religion,1673 this does 
not imply a closed communitarian or ghetto mentality or the demand for special rights,1674 be-
cause what is important for Muslims is ‘access to the equal status of citizenship’1675 (thus con-
firming Cécile Laborde’s observations, supra). Secondly and in connection with the previous 
point, he insists that from an Islamic perspective nothing in principle prevents Muslims from 
                                                        
1668 Ramadan in Orsola Casagrande, Europa domani: conversazione con Tariq Ramadan, 57, my translation. 
1669 Tariq Ramadan, Les musulmans dans la laïcité: responsabilités et droits des musulmans dans les sociétés occiden-
tales, 34, 135, and 137; To Be a European Muslim, 114, 229, and 230; Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 55 
and 110-112. 
1670 Tariq Ramadan, Radical Reform, see for instance 3-4, 30-34, 34-38, 119-124, and 153. 
1671 Tariq Ramadan, Les musulmans dans la laïcité: responsabilités et droits des musulmans dans les sociétés occiden-
tales, 34; Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 55 and 110-112; What I Believe, 68-69; De l’islam et des musul-
mans: réflexions sur l’Homme, la réforme, la guerre et l’Occident, 182-183; Au péril des idées: les grandes questions 
de notre temps, 82.  
1672 For instance, Tariq Ramadan in Au péril des idées: les grandes questions de notre temps, 253 and The Quest For 
Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism, 74. 
1673 See for instance Tariq Ramadan, Les musulmans dans la laïcité: responsabilités et droits des musulmans dans les 
sociétés occidentales, 56, 58, 59, 60, 63, 65, 66, 67. 
1674 Ibid. 105 and 107-108. 
1675 Cécile Laborde, Critical Republicanism, 97. 
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cooperating in society with non-Muslims, and that these relationships should be based on jus-
tice and mutual respect and trust rather than on a simple modus vivendi. He also draws upon 
the example of the Prophet Muhammad, who ‘worked together and dealt with non-Muslims 
on the basis of trust and competence, not only because he and his community were in the mi-
nority but as an expression of a fundamental principle directing relations between Muslims 
and non-Muslims. His respect for the latter was high when they excelled in their work and 
were true proponents of justice and equity.’1676 This is another instance of Ramadan’s presen-
tation of a full Islamic justification (in this case regarding social cooperation, before regarding 
rights and political participation and criticism) toward an overlapping consensus. This strate-
gy for anchoring social cooperation in Islamic tradition is also evident in Radical Reform, in 
which among the maqāsid al-Sharī‘a (the objectives which are characteristic of Islamic law) 
he lists some objectives which markedly refer to social cooperation and how it should work: 
peace, development, equality, justice, love, fraternity, solidarity, diversity, rule of law, delib-
eration, pluralism, evolution (as change in society), and memories.1677 Moreover, the religious 
foundation for social cooperation is also conveyed by Ramadan’s representation of Western 
European societies as dār al-shahāda or abode of testimony.1678 This understanding of Euro-
pean societies is possible only because freedom and security are granted to Muslims. Shahāda 
has a double dimension: the first is internal (to witness one’s faith in God’s oneness) and the 
second is social (to explain the universal message of Islam). Within this notion, then, there is 
enough space for social cooperation, because testimony is based on a commitment to free 
faith and moral reciprocity (which is deeper than mere political reciprocity). But to say that 
there is enough space does not specify whether on this account social cooperation can also be 
understood politically. Therefore, one should ask: on what kind of relation is social coopera-
tion based? According to Ramadan, this relation has two dimensions. First, there is the moral 
(comprehensive) dimension, that is, a relation between human beings who hold different mor-
al and religious views. Second, there is the political dimension, that is, a relation between fel-
                                                        
1676 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 169. Emphases added. 
1677 Tariq Ramadan, Radical Reform, 136-144. For the sake of simplicity, here I do not do justice to Ramadan’s distinc-
tion of the maqāsid al-Sharī‘a both vertically (from the general to the specific ones) and horizontally (on the basis of 
their referent: the inner being, the individual, or the society). 
1678 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 145-150; Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 70, 73-77; and Dār 
ash-shahāda: l’Occident, espace du témoignage, in particular 63 and 65-73. 
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low citizens.1679 Again, this shows Ramadan’s closeness to Rawls’s distinction between the 
domain of the political and the domain of our deepest religious and philosophical beliefs. In 
Rawls’s words, Ramadan argues that social cooperation is fully justified from an Islamic 
point of view, because Muslim identity moves Muslims ‘in the direction of participation, 
which clearly expresses the idea of action with another, in a given society, with the fellow cit-
izens of whom it is composed.’1680 Therefore, Ramadan justifies social cooperation as ‘joint 
action.’1681 As before for rights and political criticism, even if Ramadan anchors social coop-
eration in religious considerations concerning Muslims’ moral awareness of the Islamic mes-
sage, he also offers a properly public articulation of social cooperation. Indeed, for him social 
cooperation mainly concerns citizens’ social participation side by side, the exercise of rights, 
struggle against injustice (which Ramadan does not clearly define), which can blossom only 
in an atmosphere of mutual trust and freedom, since ‘[c]itizens who are afraid do not go out to 
change the world.’1682 
 
To conclude, in this section I have demonstrated that the political liberal evaluation of 
Ramadan’s conception of citizenship answers positively to the question does Tariq Rama-
dan’s conception of Muslims’ citizenship in European societies reflect the criterion of reci-
procity of the reasonable, which expresses the reciprocal recognition between reasonable, 
free and equal cooperating fellow citizens who possess the capacity for a sense of justice and 
a capacity for a conception of the good? In few words, the analysis developed in this section 
has shown that Ramadan satisfies the first requirement that I have extracted from the ideal of 
public reason (RR). 
 
 
                                                        
1679 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 75. 
1680 Ibid. 82. 
1681 Ibid. 211. 
1682 Ibid. 173. 
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6.3 [CR] Is Ramadan’s Account of Public Reasoning Consistent with the 
Idea of Public Reason? 
In this section, I consider the second requirement specified by public reason citizenship, 
namely the consistency requirement (CR). The question that I address here is: is Ramadan’s 
account of public reasoning consistent with the features of public reason as expressed by 
PR1, PR2, and PR3? In what follows, I thus analyse in order the three specifications of CR: 
1. PR1, which says that to endorse public reason involves a commitment to political 
reconciliation; 
2. PR2, which says that to endorse public reason involves the recognition of belong-
ing to a common democratic public political culture; 
3. PR3, which says that to endorse public reason involves being committed to its re-
quirements when discussing (i) in a public political forum (ii) political questions 
involving fundamental constitutional rights and liberties and chief questions of 
basic justice. In discussing PR3 I also take into account the question of what I have 
called the “suspect clause,” which apparently suspends Muslims’ commitment to 
the idea of public reason when certain conditions apply. This is a central issue and I 
will devote greater attention to it than to the other two points. 
(PR1) I have defined political reconciliation in terms of a respectful political reabsorption 
of reasonable pluralism, and in particular in terms of a fair political inclusion of citizens of 
faith compatible with stability for the right reasons. The analysis of Ramadan’s work shows 
that he is committed to a similar notion of reconciliation. Take for instance this telling pas-
sage from What I Believe: 
‘I mean to build bridges between two universes of reference, between two 
(highly debatable) constructions termed Western and Islamic “civilizations” (as if 
they were closed, monolithic entities), and between citizens within Western socie-
ties themselves. My aim is to show, in theory and practice, that one can be both 
fully Muslim and Western and that beyond our different affiliations we share many 
common principles and values through which it is possible to “live together” 
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within contemporary pluralistic, multicultural societies where various religions 
coexist.’1683 
With reference to the theme of Muslims’ contribution to Western societies, he also affirms 
that ‘[i]f there is a contribution that Muslim Westerners can bring to their respective societies, 
it is surely that of reconciliation [… T]hey are ideally placed to engage their fellow citizens in 
reconciling these societies with their own ideals.’1684 Even if Ramadan does not specify which 
ideals these may be, one may infer that they can only be public ideals (which, from Rama-
dan’s religious view, should be supported through an overlapping consensus), for he recog-
nises the fact of reasonable pluralism (supra and infra). Moreover, apparently he also shares 
the idea that this kind of reconciliation should consist in what I have defined as a “reabsorp-
tion without annihilation” of reasonable pluralism, because he promotes a ‘coexistence which 
rejects both assimilation and isolation.’1685 In this view, avoiding assimilation is tantamount 
to rejecting annihilation of one’s own specificity, while refusing isolation is equivalent to 
promoting fair social cooperation (supra) and, consequently, some form of political reabsorp-
tion of pluralism. He then pursues a form of political reconciliation that he also calls ‘living 
together in participation,’1686 which is public in essence, even though it is always endorsed via 
an overlapping consensus. The duality that characterises the mechanism of the overlapping 
consensus is exemplified in the following reference to both Islam and ‘democratic reason’ 
(which is more or less equivalent to public reason) in choosing the relevant criteria for voting 
in elections: 
‘Participating citizenship should be based on the awareness of one’s responsi-
bilities and not on a vague feeling of belonging. […] For a Muslim European, po-
litical choice must be based on the principles to which his conscience and intelli-
gence are attached, rather than on identity considerations alone. It is not enough 
for a man or for a woman to have an Indian, Pakistani, North African, or more 
generally Muslim sounding name, to justify choosing him or her. The reference to 
                                                        
1683 Tariq Ramadan, What I Believe, 20, emphases added. 
1684 Ibid. 129. 
1685 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 234. 
1686 Ibid. 219. 
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Islam demands of our conscience, just as democratic reason requires it of our in-
telligence, that the true criteria of a genuine citizen’s choice, concerning elections 
for instance, be founded on the candidate’s honesty and competence, whether he 
or she be a Muslim or not.’1687 
This quotation is important for a number of reasons. First, as I have just said, it shows 
Ramadan’s recognition of the difference between the religious and the domain of the political 
(see 6.2) and of something similar to the idea of overlapping consensus. Second, the two cri-
teria −honesty and competence− on which Islamic ethics and ‘democratic reason’ (that is, 
public reason) converge via the overlapping consensus are ultimately public criteria, and this 
fact demonstrates Ramadan’s commitment to the idea of public reason in such a matter as vot-
ing for representatives, a question that Rawls views as central to the idea of public reason. (As 
I mentioned above, Rawls says: ‘the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal legis-
lator, and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate pub-
lic reason, is one of the political and social roots of democracy, and is vital to its enduring 
strength and vigor’1688). Third, it implicitly reaffirms the importance of being critical about 
one’s membership to a political or religious community (supra 6.2). In addition to this, the 
model of children’s education that he proposes (rather than founding parallel Islamic schools, 
he defends children’s attendance in public schools, plus a ‘complementary plan’ of religious 
education in ‘after-school schools’ –two hours twice a week− organised by single Muslim 
communities)1689 also openly goes in the direction of promoting civic awareness and in-
volvement.1690 Political reconciliation must be accomplished through the development of 
common political memories and ‘synergies’ among social and political actors,1691 because cit-
                                                        
1687 Ibid. 224. See also Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 170: ‘it is not about voting for a candidate capable of 
protecting our interests or of voting only for a Muslim […] The best candidate, at whatever political level, is the one 
who brings together the three most essential qualities when it comes to seeking a political mandate [… :] integrity, abil-
ity, and willingness to serve.’ Emphasis added. 
1688 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 445. 
1689 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 134-137. 
1690 Ibid. in particular 136. 
1691 Ramadan in Alain Gresh and Tariq Ramadan, L’Islam en questions, 325. 
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izenship entails not only a legal status, but also a real ‘feeling of belonging.’1692 In fact, as 
long as citizenship concerns only the legal status and not also the deeper aspect of one’s polit-
ical identity and self-perception (as well as others’ recognition) as citizen, there is only a par-
tial political reconciliation and Muslims can only be ‘foreign citizens [: c]itizens regarding 
their documents, foreigners regarding their self-identification and others’ perception.’1693 
Hence, political reconciliation has several dimensions at the same time: psychological, social, 
and political.1694 
 
(PR2) In anticipating the results of the analysis developed in this subsection, it is possible 
to argue that Ramadan also fulfils the second specification of CR. In other words, I now 
demonstrate that Ramadan is committed to the idea of belonging to a common democratic 
public political culture, as required by PR2. Not only does he recognise the fact of reasonable 
pluralism as ‘a permanent feature of the public culture of a democracy’1695 and the distinction 
between the religious and the domain of the political (supra, section 6.2), but he also defines 
loyal citizenship as a critical feeling of political belonging.1696 This feeling is “critical” be-
cause it does not prevent citizens from adopting the social and political critical perspective 
that I have already mentioned so many times. Thus, Ramadan argues that Muslims as citizens 
have the responsibility to be aware of the democratic public political culture of the society in 
which they live, and urges them to consider it as a part of their own horizon of life without 
any further hesitation.1697 This is part of their duties in developing what Ramadan calls an eth-
                                                        
1692 Ramadan in Edgar Morin and Tariq Ramadan, Au péril des idées: les grandes questions de notre temps, 27, my 
translation. 
1693 Ibid. 28, my translation. 
1694 For example, see ibid. 256-257 and 262. Here, he claims that, indeed, those who suffer from social discrimination 
have the right to want their victim status recognised, but that at the same time they must overcome the victim mentality 
and become active political subjects (257). 
1695 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 36. 
1696 Tariq Ramadan, “Manifesto for a New ‘We’: An Appeal to Western Muslims and Their Fellow Citizens,” 129, and 
in Edgar Morin and Tariq Ramadan, Au péril des idées: les grandes questions de notre temps, 27. 
1697 Tariq Ramadan, What I Believe, 71-72. 
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ics of citizenship or ‘civic ethics.’1698 For Muslims, answering the question “where do we 
live?” means taking into account the European political context ‘as it is.’1699 On many occa-
sions, Ramadan repeats that religious reformism must incorporate the historical and social 
conditions imposed by the political context in which it is developed.1700 Moreover, he implic-
itly presents the grounds for a full Islamic justification of democratic public culture, because 
he says that the four features that make a political organisation appropriate from an Islamic 
viewpoint are the following:1701 choice of rulers and representatives by the people, freedom of 
opinion, government alternation, and rule of law. Obviously, these Islamic features are fully 
consistent with democratic public culture, thus for Ramadan this latter can be endorsed 
through an overlapping consensus. This consistency between the fundamental principles of a 
democratic public culture and the principles that should shape a political regime according to 
Ramadan’s Islamic reformism is also explicitly confirmed in the following quotation: [t]he 
study of the higher goals of [Islamic] ethics and their possible categorization on the level of 
social and political vision bring to light five founding principles which are also those under-
lying democratic models in their diversity: rule of law, equal citizenship, universal suffrage, 
accountability, separation of powers.’1702 Similarly, according to Ramadan, in Islam there is 
enough space for the acceptance of the principle of political legitimacy because −especially 
with reference to social affairs, mu‘āmalāt− Sharī‘a law ‘is the work of human intellect.’1703 
If one puts together the emphasis on the role of human reason in Islamic jurisprudence con-
cerning social life with the recognition of the fact of reasonable pluralism, then it is clear that 
it becomes possible to accept from within an Islamic perspective the idea that −under condi-
tions of political freedom− only the oppressive use of state power could suppress reasonable 
                                                        
1698 Tariq Ramadan, What I Believe, 73 and Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 168. 
1699 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 122. 
1700 He often reminds the fact that al-Shāfi‘ī (the founder of one of the four main Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence 
or fiqh: the Hanafi school, the Hanbali school, the Maliki school, and the Shafi’i school) would have modified the con-
tent of his jurisprudence when he moved from Baghdad to Cairo because the social, and economic ‘realities of Baghdad 
were different to those of Cairo’ (see for instance Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity, 17).  
1701 Ibid. 93-94. 
1702 Tariq Ramadan, Radical Reform, 273, emphases added. For the same list of principles on which democracy is 
based, see also The Quest For Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism, 188 and Ramadan in Edgar Morin and 
Tariq Ramadan, Au péril des idées: les grandes questions de notre temps, 144. 
1703 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 34. 
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disagreement. In turn, this leads to the recognition of the principle of political legitimacy, 
which says that ‘our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in ac-
cordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reason-
ably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common 
human reason.’1704 Ramadan is extremely clear on this point (which brings us back to the dis-
tinction between the religious and the domain of the political analysed in 6.2): 
‘[T]here is indeed a difference in Islam between […] the religious and the po-
litical: it is true that the Transcendent one through His Revelation refers to all the 
areas of life and shows “the Way” [Sharī‘a], but the scriptural verses and the Pro-
phetic traditions, which are very precise and compelling (insofar as they refer to 
our relationship with God and to religious practice), are distinct from those that 
fix universal and general principles concerning the affairs of the world and the ul-
timate ideals that the believer must try to achieve […]. Sustained by faith […] a 
believing consciousness must live within his own time, at the heart of his society 
[…] In practice, the “Way to faithfulness” teaches us that Islam rests on three 
sources: the Qur’an, the Sunna, and the state of the world, or of our society.’1705 
In these lines we find both the distinction between the religious and the political already 
mentioned and −in the last sentence− the anticipation of a theme that we will find fully devel-
oped only in Radical Reform, that is, the idea that the full message of Islam cannot be under-
stood if one refers only to the traditional sources of Sharī‘a, even the most fundamental ones 
(the Qur’an and the Sunna), because they must be “completed” through reference to the ‘con-
text sciences’ (experimental and human sciences), which do not concern the ‘Revealed Book’ 
(the Qur’an and the Sunna), but the ‘Book of the Universe’ (i.e., the world in which we 
live).1706 If the context is so crucial also from an Islamic ethical perspective, then one can re-
alise why Ramadan advocates a form of education (supra) which is civically concerned with 
‘an in-depth knowledge of the environment […:] mastery of the language, familiarity with the 
history of the country, knowledge of the institutions, study of the culture, social dynamics, 
                                                        
1704 John Rawls. Political Liberalism, 137.  
1705 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 36-37. 
1706 Tariq Ramadan, Radical Reform, see in particular chapter ten. 
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and the political landscape and so on.’1707 As I mentioned above, this is for Ramadan the basis 
for developing a true ‘civic ethics,’1708 which is morally thicker and more demanding than the 
idea of public reason (for instance, Ramadan speaks of a ‘citizenship that never wants to be-
tray an ethics of life’1709 based on moral integrity, service to others and the preservation of the 
Creation), but which is nevertheless consistent with it. Thus, whatever the model of state-
religion relations in Europe (laïcité à la française, British multicultural approach, and so on), 
Ramadan insists that Muslims should be (and –by and large− they are already) part of the 
constitutional culture of their country and honour its constitution and laws.1710 This recogni-
tion of a common democratic public culture represents an improvement with reference to the 
strategy that Ramadan followed in his first works for justifying law abidance. This strategy 
consisted in affirming that the bond that originates from settling and living in European coun-
tries should be qualified as a binding contractual relationship.1711 Although he has never disa-
vowed this strategy, in his most recent works (roughly, from Western Muslims and the Future 
of Islam onwards)1712 he simply shifts the emphasis on such ideas as ‘civic ethics,’ ‘shared 
citizenship,’ and ‘a common sense of belonging’ to the same social and political community 
(supra). In other words, now he openly draws the attention to a common ‘political culture 
which means to know how to deal with democratic society and think of oneself as citizen.’1713 
                                                        
1707 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 129. 
1708 For instance, ibid. 168-171 and De l’islam et des musulmans: réflexions sur l’Homme, la réforme, la guerre et 
l’Occident, 214. 
1709 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 170. 
1710 Ramadan in Alain Gresh and Tariq Ramadan, L’Islam en questions, 324. 
1711 See for example Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 164: ‘Millions of Muslims –when coming into these 
countries as workers, students, refugees or after a family reunion− have tacitly or explicitly recognised the binding 
character of the constitution or the laws of the country they enter into and then they live in. By signing a work contract 
or asking for a visa, they acknowledge the validity and authority of the constitution, the laws and the state all at once. 
[…] As for young Muslims of second and subsequent generations, they are either citizens, and as such naturally bound 
by the legislation, or residents, who are bound by the agreement previously made by their parents.’ See also ibid. 162: 
‘contracts determine our status, fix our duties and rights and direct the nature and scope of our actions. Once agreed, the 
terms of a covenant should be respected and if there is a point which seems to work against Muslim rights […] this has 
to be discussed and negotiated since Muslims are, unilaterally, not allowed to breach a treaty.’ See also ibid. 171-172.  
1712 However, note that a reference to the importance of contractual binds is present also in later books: for instance in 
Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 92.  
1713 Orsola Casagrande, Europa domani: conversazione con Tariq Ramadan, 54. My translation. 
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Therefore, increasingly commonalities and cooperation seem to become more important than 
formal and legal bonds. 
 
(PR3) The close examination of Ramadan’s work has already brought to light several clues 
as to his commitment to the requirements of public reason when discussing political questions 
involving constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice in a public political forum. 
Ramadan repeats several times the need for providing a public justification that others can 
reasonably accept in public discussions about constitutional essentials and matters of basic 
justice. For instance, with reference to his own personal experience, he argues that he respect-
ed the restraints of public reason concerning public officials (devoir de réserve) when he 
taught in Swiss public schools.1714 As seen before, Ramadan also grounds this commitment in 
his comprehensive view, by saying that ‘Sharī‘a requires honest citizenship within the frame 
of reference constituted by the positive law of the European country concerned.’1715 As usual, 
however, he also presents a public reason for endorsing such a duty of restraint, because he 
claims that ‘Muslim Westerners have understood […] that […] secularism and religious neu-
trality […] guarantee religious pluralism in Western societies and protect their legitimate 
rights.’1716 With regard to this element, Ramadan’s call for turning to ‘democratic reason’ 
when voting in elections must also be remembered.1717 In addition, note that for Ramadan 
equal citizenship (one of the five pillars of his definition of democracy)1718 also includes re-
spect for minorities. Thus, one may argue that respect implies addressing those minorities 
when fundamental political questions are at stake, and that this in turn shows Ramadan’s 
recognition of the need for a public justification. As I have said, in Ramadan’s discourse this 
recognition is tightly connected with the defence of reasonable pluralism and the rejection of 
dogmatism: ‘[w]hat endangers political pluralism is indeed, on the one hand the imposition of 
                                                        
1714 See Ramadan in Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 104 and in Orsola Casagrande, Europa domani: 
conversazione con Tariq Ramadan, 31. 
1715 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 172. 
1716 Tariq Ramadan, What I Believe, 52. 
1717 Supra. 
1718 Tariq Ramadan, Radical Reform, 273; The Quest For Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism, 188 and 
Ramadan in Edgar Morin and Tariq Ramadan, Au péril des idées: les grandes questions de notre temps, 144. 
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a religious power whose legitimacy is seen as transcendent, and on the other, emergence of a 
dogmatic mind deaf to other people’s belief.’1719 Furthermore, the idea that Muslims must re-
spect the constitution and the law of their country is reiterated on several occasions. As an ex-
ample among many others, take the following statement: 
‘As a resident or a citizen, the Muslim is asked to respect the terms of the con-
stitution of the country he or she lives in […] He is not asked to like or to agree 
with every single law or rule which is in force in that country or to do all that is 
permissible according to the legislation but, more specifically, he is expected both 
to recognise […] the legislation and to act within the scope of the law […] Mus-
lims are bound by the conditions they have accepted.’1720 
This passage (which belongs to the phase of Ramadan’s work in which he stresses the con-
tractual basis for Muslims’ allegiance to European societies, supra) is of pivotal importance 
because it explains his conception of the relation between Muslim citizens and the law of their 
country. Like all other citizens, Muslims are bound by the law, even if they do not approve a 
specific law or policy. Moreover, since European laws usually only permit but do not man-
date behaviours or actions which Muslims object to in virtue of their religious beliefs (such as 
drinking alcohol or interest on loans, ribā), Muslims can simply avoid those behaviours or ac-
tions.1721 It is self-evident, however, that there can be cases in which positive legislation or 
public policies may conflict with Muslims’ religious obligations, by requiring Muslims to act 
or not to act in a way which is inconsistent with their religious views. Think for instance to 
the case in which a Muslim citizen is obliged to fight in a war against a Muslim majority 
country,1722 but also to prohibitions of ritual slaughter (above all for non-stunned animals, on 
the basis of animal welfare considerations), or compulsory insurance policies with some form 
of interest. What should a Muslim do in these and other similar cases? Ramadan’s answer is 
                                                        
1719 Tariq Ramadan, Radical Reform, 263. 
1720 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 173. 
1721 ‘[I]f European constitutions effectively allow such transactions or behaviour, they do not oblige Muslims to resort 
to them or to act in such a way. Therefore they must, on the one hand, respect the running legislation –since their pres-
ence is based on a tacit or explicit pact− and, on the other, avoid all kinds of activities or involvements which are in op-
position to their belief.’ Ibid. 171. 
1722 The literature has devoted great attention to this issue: not only Ramadan in To Be a European Citizen, 175-176 and 
Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 98, but also Andrew March in his book Islam and Liberal Citizenship, see for 
instance 113-127. For this reason, in what follows I have mainly in mind this question. 
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highly ambiguous and potentially problematic. Consider some of the following examples. 
With reference to the lawful obligations that can be in contrast with an Islamic principle, 
‘[t]he overall ruling […] is that Muslims are bound by the terms of their contract except for 
the specific case in which they would be constrained to act against their conscience.’1723 ‘[A 
Muslim] is under the authority of an agreement whose terms must be respected as long as 
they do not constrain him/her to act against his/her conscience.’1724 ‘There is no contradiction 
[…] between these two belongings [i.e., being a Muslim and being a European citizen] as 
long as the Muslim fulfils his engagement to act according to the law and that he is not asked 
to sever himself from a part of his identity.’1725 ‘[Muslims] are bound by the terms of the con-
stitution of the country they live in, so long as they are not obliged to act against their con-
science. Were they to find themselves in the latter situation, they could [...] resort to “moral 
objection”.’1726 Furthermore, Ramadan argues that obligations of citizenship are not absolute, 
since they are limited by a (not very well-defined) conception of justice morally shaped and 
enlightened by Islamic teachings and principles.1727 This is what he calls the ‘clause of con-
science’,1728 and I have renamed the “suspect clause.” To be clear, this clause is suspect only 
from the standpoint of a sincere commitment to public reason, since it may work as a suspen-
sive conditionality of the kind: if there is a conflict between a legitimate law which satisfies 
the requirements of public reason and Muslims’ religious obligations, then Muslims cannot be 
expected to feel bound by this law, thus they can (and, from a religious perspective, should) 
suspend their commitment to the idea of public reason. But if this is so, PR3 risks to become 
                                                        
1723 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 171. The first emphasis is added. See also Western Muslims and the Fu-
ture of Islam, 94. 
1724 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 172, emphasis added. 
1725 Ibid. 196, emphasis added. 
1726 Ibid. 213, emphasis added. 
1727 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 98 (the last emphasis is added): ‘for Muslims the princi-
ple of justice constitutes the fundamental criterion, after their faith in the oneness of God, for their social, economic, 
and political activities. This principle takes precedence over their own interest, their relatives, the rich, the poor, and so 
on, as far as the umma itself. The same applies to citizenship.’ See also ibid. 88. Another reference to a similar point can 
be found in Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity, 80: ‘[i]n the political domain, as also in social and eco-
nomic spheres, there exists a framework of the Islamic point of reference defined by the Qur’an and the Sunna which 
corresponds, more or less, to the status of a fundamental law –the constitution (in that it allows its formation)− vis-à-vis 
national legislations. One finds therein the general orientation, and the fundamental principles and laws which should 
respect the legislative instances of diverse communities.’ 
1728 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 175 and Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 96-101. 
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practically empty. Conceptually, the clause is constantly present all throughout his work. 
However, it is remarkable that after Western Muslims and the Future of Islam this clause ap-
parently becomes less important. Remember that this is also the moment from which Rama-
dan stresses more strongly the idea of a shared democratic public culture, rather than the idea 
of a contract between Muslim minorities and their European countries. As with the idea of a 
contract between Muslims and the larger society, also the idea of the conscience clause fades 
without disappearing completely, for it occasionally returns. Nevertheless, there is a major 
change in its relative weight within Ramadan’s discourse. Now it is most of the time men-
tioned only implicitly, and Ramadan tends to emphasise the elements that can reconcile con-
science integrity with a sincere commitment to a liberal political society. Notwithstanding 
this, I must demonstrate that Ramadan’s conscience clause does not substantially undermine 
his commitment to public reason when discussing fundamental political questions in public 
forums, as required by PR3. To do that, I must consider Rawls’s notion of conscientious ob-
jection, in order to show that the conscience clause is acceptable from a Rawlsian stand-
point.1729 Due to space limitations, I cannot analyse the entire question of conscientious objec-
tion. I limit myself to Rawls’s view. Thus, I do not claim that this reconstruction of conscien-
tious objection is complete or even satisfactory. It is just sufficient to answer the question I 
am dealing with, that is, whether Ramadan’s account of conscientious objection is consistent 
with Rawls’s view. To begin with, Rawls distinguishes between conscientious objection 
(‘conscientious refusal’) and civil disobedience.  
Civil disobedience is defined as ‘a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act con-
trary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the 
government.’1730 In Rawls’s account, civil disobedience may take place in nearly just societies 
(societies whose basic structure is reasonably just, but in which some deviations from justice 
may occur),1731 in order to draw the attention of the majority to a particularly unjust law and 
                                                        
1729 To reconstruct Rawls’s conception, I relied on: John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, chapter six; Kimberley Brownlee, 
“Civil Disobedience,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Winter 2013), URL = 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/civil-disobedience/; David Lyons, “Conscientious Refusal,” in The Cambridge Rawls 
Lexicon, eds. Jon Mandle and David A. Reidy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 139-140; Alexander 
Kaufman, “Political Authority, Civil Disobedience, Revolution,” in A Companion To Rawls, in particular 223-228. 
1730 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 364/320. 
1731 This explains why Rawls says that civil disobedience and conscientious objection fall into the partial compliance 
part of non-ideal theory. Ibid. 351/309. 
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to press it to change the legislation. In these situations, then, a minority appeals to the socie-
ty’s sense of justice to reform an unjust law in accordance with the public conception of polit-
ical justice.1732 Civil disobedience is a public act because it is done publicly and not covertly: 
the disobedient informs public authorities about her infringement of the law and tries to ex-
plain her reasons to the public. In other words, civil disobedience ‘takes place in the public fo-
rum.’1733 It is also a political act for two reasons: (1) because it ‘is addressed to the majority’ 
and (2) because ‘it is an act guided and justified by political principles, that is, by the princi-
ples of justice.’1734 Hence, the public political conception of justice is the ground for civil dis-
obedience. Nonetheless, thanks to the idea of wide public reason (see chapter four), civil dis-
obedience can also be based on an appeal to non-public grounds (for instance, one’s religious 
beliefs) which satisfy the proviso and the duty of civility: ‘so, even when justice figures 
prominently in a person’s decision to use civil disobedience, other considerations could legit-
imately contribute to her decision to act.’1735 The example of Martin Luther King Jr is mean-
ingful: ‘King was motivated by his religious convictions and his commitments to democracy, 
equality, and justice to undertake protests such as the Montgomery bus boycott’ in 1955-
1956.1736 Finally, civil disobedience must be non-violent because it is a form of address to 
support political justice and ‘any interference with the civil liberties of others tends to obscure 
the civilly disobedient quality of one’s act.’1737 In conclusion, one must be ready to accept the 
legal consequences of her infringement of the law. This ensures that, while opposing a specif-
ic law as unjust, one is nonetheless committed −on the whole− to the constitution and the le-
gal system of her reasonably just society. For this reason, Rawls claims that civil disobedi-
ence ‘expresses disobedience to law within the limits of fidelity to law, although it is at the 
outer edge thereof. The law is broken, but fidelity to law is expressed by the public and non-
violent nature of the act, by the willingness to accept the legal consequences of one’s con-
                                                        
1732 ‘When laws and policies deviate from publicly recognized standards, an appeal to the society’s sense of justice is 
presumably possible to some extent,’ ibid. 352/310. 
1733 For this reason Rawls adds: ‘[o]ne may compare it to public speech, and being a form of address, an expression of 
profound and conscientious political conviction, it takes place in the public forum,’ ibid. 366/321.  
1734 Ibid. 365/321. 
1735 Kimberley Brownlee, “Civil Disobedience,” 3. 
1736 Ibid. 
1737 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 366/321. 
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duct.’1738 However, civil disobedience is not always justified. In fact, ‘[i]n a state of near jus-
tice […] we normally have a duty to comply with unjust laws in virtue of our duty to support 
a just constitution.’1739 Thus, some conditions must be met before one can disobey unjust 
laws:1740 (1) since ‘[w]hen the basic structure of society is reasonably just […] we are to rec-
ognize unjust law as binding provided that they do not exceed certain limits of injustice,’1741 
civil disobedience is justified only in order to cope with ‘substantial and clear’ forms of injus-
tice; (2) civil disobedience must be a solution of last resort when ‘the normal appeals to the 
political majority have already been made in good faith and they have failed;’ and (3) if two 
or more minorities face equivalent or comparable injustices, they must coordinate their ef-
forts, so that, overall, disobedience does not have disruptive effects. When these conditions 
are met, civil disobedience is justified and works as a stabilising force within society, because 
‘[b]y resisting injustice within the limits of fidelity to law, it serves to inhibit departures from 
justice and to correct them when they occur.’1742 
Conscientious refusal, on the other hand, is ‘noncompliance with more or less direct legal 
injunction or administrative order.’1743 In itself, it is neither a public nor a political act, since it 
does not entail an appeal to the majority’s sense of justice in order to change laws that conflict 
with the public conception of political justice. Since it may be based on religious or philo-
sophical (rather than political) grounds, in conscientious refusal ‘[o]ne simply refuses on con-
scientious grounds to obey a command or to comply with a legal injunction [, but she] does 
not invoke the convictions of the community, and in this sense conscientious refusal is not an 
act in the public forum,’ even though authorities are normally informed about her refusal to 
obey.1744 Here I do not need to analyse the differences between conscientious refusal and civil 
objection in further detail. It is enough to note that Rawls points out a fundamental criterion to 
                                                        
1738 Ibid. 366/322. 
1739 Ibid. 354/311.  
1740 Ibid. 371-377/326-331. 
1741 Ibid. 351/308, emphasis added. 
1742 Ibid. 383/336. 
1743 Ibid. 368/323. 
1744 Ibid. 369/324. 
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settle possible conflicts between one’s religious principles and actions required by political 
justice. Can conscientious refusal always be invoked? In what circumstances does it violate 
the requirements of justice? Rawls’s answer is that conscience cannot grant immunity from 
the law and policies of the state when such immunity would infringe upon the principle of 
equal rights and liberties:  
‘[T]he legal order must regulate men’s pursuit of their religious interests so as 
to realize the principle of equal liberty; and it may certainly forbid religious prac-
tices such as human sacrifice, to take an extreme case. Neither religiosity nor con-
sciousness suffices to protect this practice. A theory of justice must work out from 
its own point of view how to treat those who dissent from it. The aim of a well-
ordered society, or one in a state of near justice, is to preserve and strengthen the 
institutions of justice. If a religion is denied its full expression, it is presumably 
because it is in violation of the equal liberties of others. In general, the degree of 
tolerance accorded opposing moral conceptions depends upon the extent to which 
they can be allowed an equal place within a just system of liberty.’1745 
If one adopts the expression that I proposed in chapter four, one may rephrase this passage 
(which goes back to the original edition of A Theory of Justice) by saying that conscientious 
refusal can be allowed only within the limits of public reason, and more precisely within the 
limits of the proviso understood in an extensive way, that is, as grounded in the criterion of 
reciprocity of the reasonable.  
Having clarified the main differences between civil disobedience and conscientious refusal 
in Rawls’s theory, I can now compare this account with Ramadan’s views. It is clear that 
Ramadan’s conscience clause cannot be interpreted as a form of civil disobedience. This is 
because this clause does not aim at addressing the majority’s sense of justice in order to 
change a law which is unjust from the perspective of public principles of justice. Thus, Ram-
adan’s conscience clause in neither political nor public: it is simply a refusal to obey legal in-
junctions which are in conflict with Islamic principles. Thus, the real question is to see 
whether it respects the criterion that makes conscientious refusal acceptable according to 
Rawls. Before considering this problem, however, note that Ramadan also talks about some-
                                                        
1745 Ibid. 370/325. Emphases added. 
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thing similar to Rawls’s notion of civil disobedience when he explains the concept of social 
jihād, defined as an ‘engagement in social reform [and] mobilisation against injustice.’1746 
Although he does not openly says whether social jihād may include actions against the law 
aimed at promoting justice (remember that by definition civil disobedience concerns acts 
against the law and not mere demonstrations or other legal means to achieve social or political 
reform), it seems plausible to argue that his doctrine of social jihād may support a Rawlsian 
account of civil disobedience. Indeed, it meets the three conditions mentioned above. First, he 
defines the content of his social jihād in terms of questions of substantial political injustice, 
which should be redressed by the majority through an appeal to the public conception of jus-
tice. For instance, he says that citizens (majority and minorities together) should reform pub-
lic policies and laws for ‘fighting unemployment, opposing employment discrimination […], 
promoting social welfare, intervening against suburban violence or looking after marginalised 
persons (the poor and the elderly).’1747 It would be hard to miss that this can be qualified as an 
appeal to the majority’s sense of justice in order to correct social injustices. To be clear, it is 
evident that Ramadan fluctuates between a political and a religiously inspired definition of 
justice (remember what I have said about his characterisation of Muslims’ sense of justice as 
“belonging to God first”).1748 It is also clear that only a political definition of justice may rep-
resent a ground for addressing the majority and reawaken society’s sense of justice. Nonethe-
less, as I have said, in a wide view of public reason, civil disobedience may also rest on reli-
gious grounds if the latter support public reason (remember the Montgomery bus boycott). 
Second, since he is sincerely committed to respecting the legal system and the constitution 
                                                        
1746 Tariq Ramadan, Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity, 66. 
1747 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 229. 
1748 Add to this observation the fact that in Au péril des idées: les grandes questions de notre temps (269), Ramadan 
qualifies civil disobedience in terms of conforming one’s conduct to a superior moral principle in circumstances of sub-
stantial injustice. He makes the example of those who saved Jews during World War II and for this reason acted against 
the law of their country. However, note that this could be hardly qualified as an act of civil disobedience, because it was 
performed secretly and not publicly, for obvious and very good reasons. Rather, it may represent an example of what 
Rawls calls ‘conscientious evasion,’ see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 369/324. Even more importantly, this exam-
ple cannot be qualified as civil disobedience in a Rawlsian sense for another reason: societies in which Jews were per-
secuted were clearly not in a state of near justice: they were patently unjust societies. The superior moral principle 
which Ramadan appeals to seems to be derived from his comprehensive view and not from a public conception of jus-
tice. However, in this example the latter is actually lacking, since those societies are manifestly unjust. Thus, in this 
case there cannot be an appeal to public principles of justice or to the sense of justice of the majority. However, in these 
conditions of profound injustice an appeal to religious moral principles may certainly advance and support a political 
conception of justice and the ideal of public reason in the long run. Thus, it may promote and strengthen a more just 
basic structure for the future. 
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(supra), one may legitimately infer that he considers civil disobedience as a last resort, and 
conclude that he also meets the second condition mentioned above. Actually, Ramadan him-
self confirms this conclusion.1749 Finally, since he unambiguously formulates the social jihād 
doctrine in terms of coping with injustices which concern the entire citizenry (that is, in gen-
eral and universal terms),1750 and since he also says that social jihād must include other mi-
norities in a common effort against injustice (for instance, remember that he says that he 
shared some struggles for justice with homosexuals in the past), also the third condition is 
met. In conclusion, Ramadan’s doctrine of social jihād may provide an adequate ground for 
civil disobedience from a Rawlsian standpoint. 
The question is now to see whether Ramadan’s conscience clause respects the limits of 
conscientious refusal mentioned above. In other words, the problem is to consider if Rama-
dan’s conscience clause respects the criterion of reciprocity of the reasonable, which I have 
defined as the critical threshold for honouring the duty of civility and which characterises an 
extensive interpretation of the proviso. Clearly, if the “suspect clause” (i.e., Ramadan’s con-
science clause) respects the limits established by the reciprocity of the reasonable, then it is 
consistent with the PR3 requirement. To demonstrate this, I will divide the discussion in sev-
eral points. Observe that: 
1. Ramadan minimises the scope of the conscience clause. Indeed, he claims that 
there are only three cases in which Muslim conscience and state laws may actually 
conflict. Firstly, there may be cases in which Muslims are requested to fight and 
kill other Muslims, which is an act prohibited by Islamic teachings. Secondly, there 
may be cases in which Muslims are obliged to act against other Islamic prescrip-
tions (for instance with reference to burial, compulsory insurance, and slaugh-
ter).1751 Thirdly, it may occur that Muslims are ordered to participate in an unjust 
war, that is, a war which is ‘unfair or based on the sole desire for power and control 
                                                        
1749 Ramadan in Edgar Morin and Tariq Ramadan, Au péril des idées: les grandes questions de notre temps, 263. 
1750 The quotation above continues: ‘[these] are challenges that we must take up together, as partners and fellow citi-
zens.’ Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 229. 
1751 Ibid. 176-177 and Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 98-99. 
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[…. ,] a war of colonisation or oppression.’1752 With reference to the last case, 
Ramadan argues that Muslim citizens should refuse to fight and −if necessary− be 
willing to accept the legal consequences of their act, because ‘[p]rison is better than 
committing injustice.’1753 Ramadan continues by saying that this kind of disobedi-
ence really means (in Rawls’s words) ‘resisting injustice within the limits of fideli-
ty to law,’1754 because refusing to join an unjust war ‘by no means signifies that 
Muslims are seeking to throw away the foundations of the nation or to appeal to 
“particular law for the Muslims”.’1755 Rather, they refuse to obey an unjust legal in-
junction. Note, moreover, that since such a war is unjust also from the point of 
view of political justice among peoples,1756 Muslims can appeal to political princi-
ples and address the majority to stop the war by calling upon its sense of justice. In 
this case, then, civil disobedience and conscientious refusal converge. The 
Rawlsian requirements of civil disobedience are met (fidelity to law, willingness to 
accept the legal consequences of the refusal, and so on); as Rawls notes,1757 the on-
ly exception is that in this case one does not have to wait until all other legal means 
have been exhausted before refusing to comply with the law (in this case, conscrip-
tion laws). This shows that the last hypothesis (Muslims’ refusal to participate in an 
unjust war) can be already justified in a Rawlsian account of civil disobedience and 
conscientious refusal. What is more, Ramadan adds that, apart from these three 
cases, it is not possible to invoke the conscience clause.1758 Therefore, his intention 
to limit the scope of the clause is quite evident. It can be argued that this intention 
proves his willingness to respect the criterion of reciprocity of the reasonable. 
                                                        
1752 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 175. 
1753 Ibid. 176. 
1754 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 383/336. 
1755 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 177. 
1756 See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, in particular 91-92 and 94-97. 
1757 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 371/326. 
1758 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 178 and Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 100. 
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2.  Moreover, he adopts a much more prudent and flexible approach with reference to 
the first two cases mentioned in the preceding point. This is so probably because he 
realises that, in contrast with the third case, the first and the second cannot be justi-
fied by an appeal to a public political conception of justice. Thus, Muslims should 
be very careful before invoking the conscience clause.1759 The favoured solution, 
according to Ramadan, is to seek a solution that reconciles Muslims’ conscience 
and the law. Indeed, this is not an easy task.1760 Then, he calls for dialogue and mu-
tual understanding between Muslims and non-Muslims and for knowledge of the 
legislation, Islamic principles, and the common social context, in order to balance 
public and non-public priorities in drafting rules and policies.1761 Furthermore, it 
must be underlined that in To Be a European Muslim he even maintains that Mus-
lims cannot unilaterally refuse to comply with the law when the latter conflicts with 
their conscience and that a conciliation must be found: ‘[o]nce agreed, the terms of 
a covenant should be respected and if there is a point which seems to work against 
Muslim rights –or even their conscience as Believers− this has to be discussed and 
negotiated since Muslims are, unilaterally, not allowed to breach a treaty.’1762 It is 
clear that this formulation must be read within the context of the contract-centred 
phase of Ramadan’s work, a view which is progressively weakened in his later 
books (supra). Notwithstanding this, it can be plausibly argued that this tension (or 
even ambiguity) between the duty to comply with the law and the conscience 
clause endures also in later stages. This is because what remains unchanged is the 
deepest foundation of the duty to comply with the law, which is –according to 
                                                        
1759 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 176-177 and Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 98-99. For in-
stance, he affirms that for Muslims citizens ‘the prohibition on killing Muslims remains the general rule,’ but also that if 
the country is fighting a just defensive war and the target is a Muslim leader of the aggressive enemy country, then that 
general rule must be balanced with considerations of justice and with Muslim citizens’ duty of loyalty toward their own 
country (Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 98). 
1760 Rawls himself is aware of this difficulty and says: ‘[i]t is a difficult matter to find the right course when some men 
appeal to religious principles in refusing to do actions which, it seems, are required by principles of justice. […] There 
is a temptation to say that the law must always respect the dictates of conscience, but this cannot be right.’ John Rawls, 
A Theory of Justice, 370/325.  
1761 Tariq Ramadan, Les musulmans dans la laïcité: responsabilités et droits des musulmans dans les sociétés occiden-
tales, 23 and Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 95. 
1762 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 162, emphasis added. See also ibid. 139. 
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Ramadan− Islamic ethics itself.1763 To be clear, this is evidence of an overlapping 
consensus. This also implies that, if there is a conflict between state law and an Is-
lamic rule (call it x), then the conflict is interior to Muslim conscience itself. In oth-
er words, in this case there is a conflict between two Islamic rules: complying with 
state law or complying with the other specific Islamic rule (x). One can then under-
stand why Ramadan is so concerned with calling for flexibility, balance, and prac-
tical solutions: he wants to solve a problem which is internal to Muslims’ con-
science and the only way to do that is to find a reconciliation (or, in Rawls’s terms, 
a reflective equilibrium). For instance, in case of a just war against a Muslim ma-
jority country, the conscience of a Muslim citizen is divided between two Islamic 
rules: the Islamic rule that forbids Muslims to kill other Muslims and the other Is-
lamic rule that oblige Muslims to be loyal to the country in which they live and to 
defend it in case of aggression. Thus, it is up to Muslim citizens themselves to find 
the right balance, that is, the most reasonable or just balance, because for Ramadan 
‘the principle of justice is indeed the parameter’1764 and limits one’s attachments, 
even to her own religious community. As I observed above, in virtue of these re-
marks we are brought back to the idea of an overlapping consensus. The latter pre-
supposes that ‘[i]t is left to citizens individually –as part of liberty of conscience− 
to settle how they think the values of the political domain are related to other values 
in their comprehensive doctrine,’ and how the latter may support political val-
ues.1765 This is precisely in line with what Ramadan says when he suggests that it is 
Muslim believers’ responsibility to find the right balance between political and re-
ligious values and obligations. 
3. The third point to consider is that Ramadan firmly declares that one should always 
defend and promote the achievements of democracy and equal liberties (the funda-
                                                        
1763 Again in terms of a contract, Ramadan argues: ‘Islamic law and jurisprudence order a Muslim individual to submit 
to the framework of positive law in force in his country of residence in the name of the tacit moral covenant which al-
ready underlies his very presence.’ Ibid. 172. In his later less contractual and more moral perspective, Ramadan also 
counts among the higher objectives of Sharī‘a the following: rule of law, neighbourhood and (on a higher level) frater-
nity and solidarity, which –according to him− should also shape Muslims’ conduct in society. Radical Reform, 142. 
1764 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 160. 
1765 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 140, emphasis added. Rawls continues: ‘the history of religion and philosophy 
shows that there are many reasonable ways in which the wider realm of values can be understood so as to be either con-
gruent with, or supportive of, or else not in conflict with, the values appropriate to the special domain of the political.’ 
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mental criterion pointed out by Rawls), even when the same European societies de-
part from them or fail to implement them.1766 One should not be misled by the fact 
that it may happen (and according to Ramadan it happens frequently) that Muslims 
defend and promote such achievements and equal liberties on religious grounds.1767 
As I explained in detail in chapters two and four, public reason (with the extensive 
interpretation of the proviso that I have suggested) is wide enough to include many 
of these religion-based appeals. First, they may resort to non-public reasons within 
the scope of public reason (that is, non-public reasons within a public form of rea-
soning: for instance, religious reasons for justifying a policy). Political liberalism 
accepts –upon condition− this use of non-public reasons in public reasoning 
through the formulation of the proviso (which is a condition for publicly appealing 
to non-public reasons within the scope of public reason; see chapter two for this 
definition and chapter four for my extensive interpretation of the proviso and its 
boundaries, which correspond to the second level of the duty of civility, that is, 
B2). They may also resort to non-public forms of reasoning that support their 
commitment to public reason “from outside.” Political liberalism provides two in-
struments: witnessing (which is a dissenting non-public discourse in accordance 
with the idea of public reason) and declaration (which is a confirmative non-public 
discourse in accordance with the idea of public reason; for this see chapter two). 
Finally, they may enter politics out of religious motivation. Political liberalism is 
also open to this possibility (see chapter five). What is really important is that 
Ramadan reaffirms the Rawlsian idea that the shared perspective of citizenship is 
the most relevant one when discussing fundamental political questions: verily, he 
claims that when it comes to policies which impact on fundamental rights and liber-
ties ‘we should work toward reform not as “Muslims” but as citizens, inspired of 
course by a message and a morality, but above all aware of our responsibilities and 
determined that the right of every person to be treated justly and fairly (as the 
                                                        
1766 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 172. 
1767 Ibid. 145-146. 
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common law guarantees) should prevail.’1768 Ramadan thus respects the criterion of 
reciprocity of the reasonable. 
4. In this way, we come quite naturally to the fourth and final point. For Ramadan, the 
shared perspective of citizenship is the cornerstone for discussing fundamental po-
litical questions. This is consistent with his remarks about the importance of the 
distinction between law and sin. Indeed, he maintains that, from a political perspec-
tive, the law should not prohibit and consider as illegal what is simply sinful from a 
religious perspective.1769 This is because the two notions of lawfulness and sinful-
ness correspond to two different orders of authority, and the concept of lawfulness 
must be consistent with what Rawls calls the liberal principle of political legitima-
cy. For the same reasons, he is against separate religious courts and defends an 
equal application of state law, which –he claims− is able to accommodate the moral 
principles of Sharī‘a if rightly interpreted.1770 Finally, he argues that a law that has 
been democratically approved −following public reason, I would specify− must be 
respected even if one disapproves (for whatever public or religious reason).1771 Le-
gitimate law expressing the democratic and reasonable will of the majority1772 
must be politically respected. For instance, while he thinks that the French ban on 
the foulard in public schools is wrong and unjust (on the basis of both religious and 
public considerations), he says that the ban must be respected and criticised from 
within public institutions, because girls’ right to education has the priority, both po-
litically and religiously.1773 Alternatively, consider what he says about same-sex 
marriage. Whilst he morally disapproves of same-sex unions and is ready to cam-
                                                        
1768 Ibid. 147. The quotation may continue: religious inspiration ‘shows the way, but says nothing about the choices, 
strategies, and priorities to be applied to social action in a given society. It is for the citizens, in the midst of their own 
realities to make their choices, work out the stages, and propose realistic and reasonable reforms,’ ibid. 147-148. 
1769 Ramadan in Edgar Morin and Tariq Ramadan, Au péril des idées: les grandes questions de notre temps, 267-268. 
1770 Ibid. 260-261. 
1771 Ramadan in Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 185 and in Edgar Morin and Tariq Ramadan, Au 
péril des idées: les grandes questions de notre temps, 262-263. 
1772 The respect of public reason is important precisely because it qualifies the majority principle in terms of reasona-
bleness. 
1773 Ramadan in Edgar Morin and Tariq Ramadan, Au péril des idées: les grandes questions de notre temps, 263. 
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paign against them, he maintains that, if the law recognises them, then in a demo-
cratic society Muslims must respect the political decision of the majority.1774 This 
is further evidence of Ramadan’s willingness to fulfil the criterion of reciprocity of 
the reasonable. 
In conclusion, in the preceding pages I demonstrated that, while Ramadan’s doctrine of so-
cial jihād may represent an adequate ground for a Rawlsian account of justified civil disobe-
dience, Ramadan’s conscience clause is consistent with the Rawlsian account of justified con-
scientious refusal, because the points 1-4 (and especially 3 and 4) show that it respects the cri-
terion of reciprocity of the reasonable. Thus, the conscience clause satisfies the PR3 require-
ment.  
Finally, I would add an important consideration. I argue that Ramadan’s conscience clause 
can be understood as falling between the two Rawlsian notions of conscientious refusal and 
witnessing. Remember that for Rawls civil disobedience and conscientious refusal can occur 
in nearly just societies, while witnessing can occur only in fully just societies, in which there 
is no room for conscientious refusal or civil disobedience.1775 Since existing European socie-
ties are not fully just but only nearly just (see chapter five), and since in nearly just societies 
public reason indeed allows conscientious refusal (under certain conditions, supra), if one 
wants to meet the requirements of public reason in European societies as they actually are, it 
would be enough to justify the conscience clause in terms of conscientious refusal. In other 
words, considering that the ideal of public reason aspires to have normative power also in not 
fully just and well-ordered societies (see chapter five), Ramadan’s conscience clause satisfies 
the requirements that public reason specifies in such nearly just societies, because I demon-
strated that the conscience clause can be justified as a form of conscientious refusal permitted 
by public reason in nearly just societies. However, there is a further question. Since ‘the idea 
of public reason […] belongs to a conception of a well-ordered constitutional democratic so-
ciety,’1776 one may wonder whether Ramadan’s conscience clause would respect public reason 
also in an ideally just society. In such a society there would be no case for conscientious re-
                                                        
1774 Ramadan in Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 185. 
1775 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 466 note 57. 
1776 Ibid. 440. Emphasis added. 
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fusal, thus Ramadan’s conscientious clause could not be presented as a justified form of con-
scientious refusal. What to do with that clause then? In fact, there is a gap: while public rea-
son’s requirements are normatively salient both in fully just and in nearly just societies, Ram-
adan’s conscience clause can be justified as conscientious objection only in nearly just socie-
ties (like European societies), but not in ideally just societies. Apparently, in a fully just socie-
ty Ramadan’s clause could not be justified and would be at odds with the requirements of 
public reason. How to fill this gap? Luckily, Rawls’s presents a second notion in light of 
which one can interpret the conscience clause in well-ordered societies in accordance with the 
requirements of public reason. This is the notion of witnessing. Recall Rawls’s definition of 
witnessing:  
‘[In politically well-ordered and fully just societies] it may happen that some 
citizens feel they must express their principled dissent from existing institutions, 
policies, or enacted legislation. […] While on the whole these citizens endorse 
reasonable political conceptions of justice supporting a constitutional democratic 
society, in this case they nevertheless feel they must not only let other citizens 
know the deep basis of their strong opposition but must also bear witness to their 
faith by doing so. At the same time, those bearing witness accept the idea of pub-
lic reason. While they may think that the outcome of a vote on which all reasona-
ble citizens have conscientiously followed public reason to be incorrect or not 
true, they nevertheless recognize it as legitimate law and accept the obligation not 
to violate it. In such a society there is strictly speaking no case for civil disobedi-
ence and conscientious refusal. The latter requires what I have a called a nearly 
just, but not fully just, society.’1777 
This description fits with the main points of Ramadan’s conscience clause that I have just 
considered. According to Ramadan, Muslim citizens generally accept the legal framework of 
their European societies as (nearly) just, and are loyal to the constitution and the public insti-
tutions of the basic structure of those societies. Nonetheless, if there is a sharp contrast be-
tween a law or policy and the dictates of their conscience, they can openly declare their prin-
cipled opposition to that law or policy. However, they comply with that law or policy, as 
point 4 above shows. Note that the only case of violation of the law that Ramadan explicitly 
                                                        
1777 Ibid. 466 note 57. 
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mentions –the case of refusing to participate in an unjust war− must be excluded in fully just 
and well-ordered societies: it is possible only as a case of conscientious refusal in a nearly just 
society (because the kind of war described by Ramadan is not only unjust from a religious 
perspective, but also from a political perspective, and for this reason it cannot occur in a well-
ordered and fully just society). On the other hand, the other two cases mentioned by Ramadan 
for invoking the conscience clause do not involve acts against the law (at least in Ramadan’s 
presentation) and theoretically they may occur also in fully just societies, because they con-
cern a conflict between reasonably just laws or policies and Islamic teachings (i.e., they con-
cern laws or policies which are politically just or at least reasonable, even though they are not 
true from the Islamic perspective). In these cases, as we have seen, Ramadan calls for practi-
cal wisdom but not for non-compliance with the law. This idea of respecting a law even if one 
thinks that it is not true or good can also be inferred by what Ramadan says when he explains 
the content of the conscience clause: the latter allows ‘to state that certain actions or behav-
iors are against [one’s] faith.’1778 In other words, Muslims just ‘state’ that they oppose a spe-
cific law or policy on religious grounds; they ‘bear witness to their faith’ by manifesting their 
conviction that such a law or policy is not true or good, but they do not act against it; they do 
not violate it. This demonstrates that Ramadan’s conscientious clause shares several im-
portant features with witnessing (see chapter two for a more detailed analysis of witnessing): 
1) Muslims do not address their fellow citizens on public political grounds, since they simply 
bear witness to their own faith; 2) Muslims do not expect that their act of witnessing may rep-
resent a ground for public agreement; 3) Muslims recognise and respect majority’s reasonable 
political decisions as legitimate law. Concerning the last point, note that the main difference 
between conscientious refusal and witnessing is that in the former (but not in the latter) one 
refuses to obey a legal injunction: only in conscientious refusal is there non-compliance with 
the law. On the contrary, in bearing witness one recognises the law as legitimate and obeys it. 
However, as I have just said, there is no inconsistency in saying that Ramadan’s notion of 
conscience clause can encompass both conscientious refusal (with its idea of non-compliance 
in a nearly just society) and witnessing (with its idea of necessary compliance with the law in 
a well-ordered society). In fact, remember that the only case in which Ramadan openly advo-
cates acts against the law –participation in an unjust war− should be impossible in a fully just 
society, at which point conscientious refusal drifts into witnessing. This is so because the only 
                                                        
1778 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 97, emphasis added. 
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case in which non-compliance is justified according to Ramadan is excluded (by definition) 
from a Rawlsian account of a well-ordered society. 
Since witnessing falls within the boundaries of public reason (that is, it is a non-public 
form of discourse in accordance with the idea of public reason) in fully just societies, and 
since Ramadan’s conscience clause is consistent with Rawls’s account of witnessing, then 
Ramadan’s clause would fulfil the requirements of public reason even in fully just societies. 
In other words, the conscience clause can also be part of a theory of citizenship in fully just 
and politically well-ordered societies. 
This section has conclusively demonstrated that Ramadan’s conception of citizenship for 
Muslims in Europe satisfies the requirement CR of public reason, because it is consistent with 
PR1, PR2, and PR3 which specify CR. In other words, it expresses a conception of public 
reasoning which is in accordance with the idea of public reason as specified by PR1, PR2, and 
PR3. 
 
6.4 [CiR] Does Ramadan Actually Respect Public Reason? The ‘Issue of 
Women.’ 
In this section I consider the question related to the requirement CiR*: how does Ramadan 
honour the duty of civility in practice? To answer this question, I must consider the three 
ways in which one can honour the duty of civility. In 4.2 I presented an extensive interpreta-
tion of the proviso and I differentiated two levels of this duty (the bifurcate model of the duty 
of civility). The strictest and purest form of compliance with the duty of civility is to present 
only public reasons for justifying a law or policy in public (A). The second level of the duty 
of civility is divided into two parts: the first corresponds to Rawls’s original account of the 
proviso (B1), whilst the second to my extensive interpretation of it (B2). Firstly, one may sat-
isfy the proviso by presenting non-public reasons which support public reasons, directly or 
even indirectly if the supportive connection between non-public and public reasons is clear 
enough in the eyes of other citizens (B1; note that I have left and I will leave open the ques-
tion of how to determine this clarity requirement: like Rawls, I limit myself to calling for 
practical wisdom and good sense). But one may also fulfil the proviso by offering non-public 
reasons alone (which are not in conflict with, nor directly supportive of, but simply independ-
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ent from any identified public reason), provided that they support the civic spirit of reciproci-
ty and respect the criterion of reciprocity of the reasonable, on which the duty of civility is 
grounded (B2). To answer the question about CiR*, then, I have chosen to consider a specific 
issue: the ‘issue of women,’ as Ramadan calls it.1779 I will also analyse the related question of 
his “International Call for Moratorium on Corporal Punishment, Stoning, and the Death Pen-
alty in the Islamic World,” since women are often among the most vulnerable victims of such 
practices. The choice of a practical example is the most effective way, I think, for studying 
how or the manner in which Ramadan honours public reason. The section is structured around 
the following problems: 
1. Are there genuinely public reasons which fall under the first level of the duty of ci-
vility (A) emerging from Ramadan’s conception of the status and rights of women? 
If the answer is positive, then one can argue that Ramadan concretely honours the 
idea of public reason in his discourse by presenting reasons that satisfy the first 
level of the duty of civility. 
2. Do the non-public reasons emerging from his conception of the status and rights of 
women fall within the limits of the second level of the duty of civility (because they 
support a public reason as requested by B1, or because they support civic friend-
ship and a civic spirit of reciprocity, and thus they respect the criterion of reciproci-
ty of the reasonable as requested by B2)? If the answer is positive, then one can ar-
gue that Ramadan also concretely honours the idea of public reason in his discourse 
by presenting reasons that fulfil the second level of the duty of civility. 
3. Can the call for a moratorium be interpreted as an example of “double discourse” 
that fosters the ideal of public reason? If the answer is positive, then one can argue 
that Ramadan’s double discourse is different from misleading doublespeak. 
Before analysing these specific questions, let me briefly present Ramadan’s general view 
about the ‘issue of women.’ First of all, he regards it as a central problem for Muslims to-
day.1780 He argues that Muslim thought has become sclerotic about this subject,1781 because it 
                                                        
1779 Tariq Ramadan, What I Believe: this is the title of the eleventh chapter of the book. 
1780 Tariq Ramadan, La foi, la Voie et la résistance (Lyon: Tawhid, 2002), 37. 
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has so far been unable to free itself from reactive, dogmatic, and formalist stances. Indeed, 
Ramadan draws a sombre picture concerning the status of Muslim women both in European 
and in Muslim majority societies, in which –he claims− a large number of girls and women 
‘still lack a genuine education [, … others] are obliged to wear the foulard, others are com-
pletely deprived of their autonomy, others have no access to schools or work … Once mar-
ried, many are treated in an outrageous and inhumane way: negligence, insults, and violence 
are everyday realities.’1782 For these reasons, Ramadan calls for an ‘Islamic feminism’ (de-
fined as ‘a movement of women’s liberation within and through Islam itself’),1783 in which the 
liberation of women passes through the rejection of the customary and paralysing way of con-
ceiving the woman primarily in terms of her family roles (as daughter, wife, mother). On the 
contrary, Ramadan’s Islamic feminism aims at making it possible to think of the woman as a 
woman, in terms of her ‘female being before God and among human beings [in the original: 
l’être féminin devant Dieu, parmi les hommes].’1784 To achieve this objective it is necessary to 
abandon both, on the one hand, literalist interpretations that disconnect Islamic sources from 
the context and the social environment, and, on the other hand, approaches based on the un-
critical acceptance of Western forms of feminism and women’s liberation.1785 Islamic femi-
nism presupposes a distinction between the message of Islam and the impact of cultural tradi-
tions and social customs and practices on women’s condition (Ramadan calls them ‘cultural 
projections’).1786 At the same time, however, the return to Islamic sources and their funda-
mental message must be combined with a full awareness of the substantial intellectual, social, 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
1781 Tariq Ramadan, De l’islam et des musulmans: réflexions sur l’Homme, la réforme, la guerre et l’Occident, 60. 
1782 Tariq Ramadan, La foi, la Voie et la résistance, 42-43. My translation. 
1783 I cannot analyse Ramadan’s ‘Islamic feminism’ in depth here. This approach is best described in Western Muslims 
and the Future of Islam, 138-143 (this section has also been translated in Italian and included as appendix in Orsola 
Casagrande, Europa domani: conversazione con Tariq Ramadan, 117-122); Radical Reform, 207-232; The Quest For 
Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism, 81-95; What I Believe, 62-66 and 100-102; and De l’islam et des 
musulmans: réflexions sur l’Homme, la réforme, la guerre et l’Occident, 81-87. For the ‘pedagogical function’ of the 
Islamic revelation and what Ramadan judges to be the real message of Islam and how to exploit these resources to im-
prove the condition of women in Muslim majority countries, see Appendix IV (“The Question of woman in the Mirror 
of Revelation”) in Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity, 335-342. 
1784 Tariq Ramadan, La foi, la Voie et la résistance, 40. See also De l’islam et des musulmans: réflexions sur l’Homme, 
la réforme, la guerre et l’Occident, 83-84. 
1785 Tariq Ramadan, Radical Reform, 208. 
1786 Ibid. 212, 213, and 215. 
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and economic achievements of liberal democratic societies with regard to the social status and 
rights of women.1787 Both elements (Islamic ethics and democratic accomplishments) must 
guide Muslim citizens in their active commitment to social criticism and reform. In Rama-
dan’s view, both of them are part of Muslims’ conscience as good democratic citizens. For 
sure, according to Ramadan, Islamic ethics condemns the most blatant violations of women’s 
rights: ‘keeping women illiterate and forbidding them to work, reach financial autonomy, or 
play a social and economic role, as well as such practices as female genital mutilation, forced 
marriages, the denial of divorce, or restraint against domestic violence, are absolutely contra-
ry to Islam’s message as shown through its evolution (over twenty-three years) and the 
Prophet’s own attitude.’1788 In his view, then, there is a consensus between Islamic ethical 
principles and the most fundamental tenants of democratic public culture about the rights of 
women. Therefore, he claims that ‘[t]o make any reference to Islam today […] is clearly to 
call for the liberation of women within and by Islam.’1789 To be clear, Islamic ethics –once 
freely accepted− obviously conveys a precise and specific moral order which goes much be-
yond what a political conception of justice can say about the role of women within the family 
and society. Such an Islamic moral order may be the ground for what Rawls calls a religion-
based ‘gendered division of labour within the family.’1790 What is important from a political 
perspective, however, is that such a moral order is freely accepted and that it does violate po-
litical justice (I will return to this point later). Take for instance the question of the hijab. Ac-
cording to the author, from an Islamic perspective it is indeed necessary to wear the veil, 
which is a symbol of modesty. However, the veil loses its genuine religious meaning if it is 
imposed. Ramadan criticises those who force their daughters to wear the veil and ‘pretend to 
apply the Sharī‘a […] starting with sanctions, penalties, and the restriction of liberties.’1791 
This is an error, a confusion between appearance and substance. True religious commitment 
cannot be imposed, because coercion irreparably corrupts the meaning of a practice that be-
                                                        
1787 Ibid. 209. 
1788 Ibid. 214. 
1789 Tariq Ramadan, Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity, 55. 
1790 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 471. 
1791 Tariq Ramadan, Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity, 52. 
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comes in the end an empty symbol.1792 However, empty symbols are surprisingly heavy, be-
cause they manifest ‘the reality of pressure, and oppression, that some Muslim women today 
are subjected to,’1793 as Ramadan notes. To be religiously meaningful, the veil must represent 
the freely adopted visible sign of a profound awareness of the message of Islam. From here, 
Ramadan comes back to the importance of education and freedom of choice: ‘[women’s re-
sponsibility before God and before other human beings] has no sense unless women possess a 
real freedom to determine and choose for themselves. […] The worst enemy of the rights of 
women is not Islam but ignorance and illiteracy, to which we may add the determining role of 
traditional prejudices.’1794 One can see in the background the reaffirmation of a theme that I 
have already pointed out, namely, Ramadan’s critique of the tendency to Islamise political 
problems (supra).1795 The latter, on the contrary, should be addressed politically. On the 
whole, Ramadan’s Islamic feminism can be substantially defined as a difference-based egali-
tarian approach. In few words, he claims that men and women are equal but not identical.1796 
According to Ramadan, men and women are not identical because their identities are different 
due to biological, psychological, and cultural factors.1797 However, men and women are equal 
with reference to two crucial dimensions. First, they are equal before God, because they are 
created human beings who walk together along the path that Ramadan calls ‘the quest for 
meaning.’1798 Second, they are equal as citizens.1799 Thus, for Ramadan men and women are 
by their very nature both equal and different (‘they are equal but not the same’).1800 The onto-
                                                        
1792 Ibid. and 53-54. Here Ramadan quotes again the Qur’anic verse ‘there is no compulsion in religion’ (Qur’an, 
2:256). 
1793 Tariq Ramadan, Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity, 53. Italics in the original. 
1794 Ibid. 54. 
1795 In the same spirit, he contends that, if in many Muslim majority countries women’s life is very difficult, this is not 
the fault of the Qur’an or the Sunna, but of Muslims (ibid. 342). 
1796 For what follows, see in particular Tariq Ramadan, The Quest For Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism, 
89-92; Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity, 54-55; and Au péril des idées: les grandes questions de notre 
temps, 37-39. 
1797 Tariq Ramadan, The Quest For Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism, 91-92. 
1798 Ibid. 94-95. 
1799 Ibid. 92. 
1800 Ibid. 94. 
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logical equality of men and women before God entails the actual political recognition of 
women’s equal rights and their equal status as citizens.1801 Interestingly, Ramadan contends 
that many women would defend his view, because they ‘want to be free and independent, to 
have access to work and to earn the same wages as men, but they also want to assume their 
status as women, their femininity and motherhood and even a family role. They expect more 
from men, but they are not men and recognise the differences between men and women. They 
want to be “equal” but have no desire to be identical.’1802 On the whole, it can be maintained 
that this difference-based egalitarianism looks quite traditionalist because it reaffirms the pri-
ority of the family in Islamic ethics and the fact that women’s specific responsibility concerns 
the family,1803 but, at the same time, it seems compatible with the idea of citizens’ freedom 
and equality (see what I have said about the veil). I will consider the question of the con-
sistency of Ramadan’s views about the status of woman within the family with political liber-
alism later. For the moment, I would merely underline that some points of Ramadan’s Islamic 
feminism are problematic, or at least controversial and unclear. First, if it is true that in gen-
eral his view of the role of women within the family is not radically new or liberating, some 
remarks seem to shift the balance in favour of a more prudent approach, openly winking at 
traditionalist positions. For instance, one should acknowledge that Ramadan is quite enigmat-
ic when he claims that men and women ‘must be aware of their respective rights and deter-
mined to defend them … but they must always be reasonable.’1804 What does “reasonable” 
mean here? In one plausible interpretation, it seems to suggest that struggles for women’s 
rights should not go too far or break the natural harmony of the family. This is not the only 
ambiguous passage. In fact, after having said that ‘[m]en, as well as women, must remember 
that Islamic commandments emphasize the centrality of the family,’ he contends that ‘[t]he 
desire for liberty and rights, for men as well as for women, cannot mean forgetting one’s in-
dividual, familial, and social responsibility.’1805 Although this phrase is apparently formulated 
                                                        
1801 Ibid. 92. 
1802 Ibid. 91. 
1803 For instance: Tariq Ramadan, Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity, 56. See also To Be a European 
Muslim, 154 and Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 143. 
1804 Tariq Ramadan, The Quest For Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism, 92. Emphasis added. 
1805 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 143. Emphasis added. 
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in an egalitarian fashion, it is obvious that it affects men and women differently, because tra-
ditionally the greatest share of women’s responsibility is limited to the family. The result is 
that this “egalitarian” remark may burden women unfairly, because it restricts their possibili-
ties of emancipation from the family. Finally, I suspect that some may question Ramadan’s 
idea that, at the end of the day, we (men?) must find a clear and unambiguous place for wom-
en (i.e., we want to situate them) within the great scheme of the world and society.1806 Such a 
pre-definition seems too rigid, no matter how close to men one places women. To be sure, this 
idea is completely understandable within the framework of a conception of human flourishing 
as defined from the angle of a religious doctrine. According to political liberalism, there is no 
obstacle preventing a citizen from believing in a particular conception of the true or good or-
der between sexes (provided that such a view is politically reasonable). However, the question 
is: why should one pre-define a place and a role for women in the family and in society? 
Again, this may be a legitimate aspiration for a religious view, but it may sound too paternal-
istic for an approach that aims at women’s liberation, as Ramadan proclaims for his view. 
 
It is now time to examine the first question mentioned at the beginning of this section: are 
there public reasons that fall under the first level of the duty of civility (A) emerging from 
Ramadan’s conception of the woman? The answer is positive. In the first place, he resolutely 
affirms that the discourse about women mainly concerns their legitimate rights.1807 To make a 
concrete example, on the issue of the veil, as I have said, he promotes state neutrality as a 
common space of equal rights for citizens and argues that ‘[c]ompelling a woman to wear the 
headscarf is against Islam, and compelling her to remove it is against human rights’1808 (note 
that here I am interested in the nature of the reasons which Ramadan appeals to, not in their 
soundness). According to him,1809 then, women must be free from all kinds of compulsion in 
deciding about the veil (either in wearing or in removing it), because such a decision is part of 
                                                        
1806 For example, he says: ‘we must determine and identify the feminine universal’s role in constructing the universal 
common to all human beings.’ Tariq Ramadan, The Quest For Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism, 88. 
1807 Tariq Ramadan, What I Believe, 65. 
1808 Ibid. 98.  
1809 Tariq Ramadan, Les musulmans dans la laïcité: responsabilités et droits des musulmans dans les sociétés occiden-
tales, 130-131. For his demand for equal rights, see also ibid. 107-108 and 128. 
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their equal rights as citizens and concerns their freedom of conscience and religion. In this 
sense, Ramadan demands equal rights and liberties, not special rights for Muslims. As I 
showed in 6.1, Ramadan believes that European constitutions and legislations generally guar-
antee those equal rights to Muslims and that in most cases real obstacles are not explicit legal 
discriminations but some form of vacuum legis or a prejudiced and discriminatory application 
of the law.1810 Therefore, for Ramadan the issue of women is first and foremost a question of 
political equality. This is also true with regard to the relationships between men and women 
and the role of the latter in society.1811 He thus advocates ‘women’s right to autonomy, work 
and equal treatment as […] citizens.’1812 In this sense, he also mentions three specific spheres 
in which men’s and women’s rights are still too unequal in several Muslim majority coun-
tries: education,1813 family law,1814 attendance and management of places of worship (because 
‘[m]osques today are essentially men’s places’).1815 All these remarks demonstrate that Ram-
adan speaks the language of public reason when he discusses the condition of women in pub-
lic forums. In conclusion, within Ramadan’s conception of citizenship the discourse about 
women resorts to genuinely public reasons, which respect the first and strictest level of the 
duty of civility (A). 
 
However, Ramadan does not appeal exclusively to public reasons. The second question on 
which this section focuses is the following one: do the non-public reasons emerging from his 
conception of women’s status and rights respect the limits of the second level of the duty of 
civility, either by supporting a public reason (as requested by B1), or by fostering civic 
                                                        
1810 ‘Cases of legal clauses which are discriminatory toward Muslims are extremely rare. Rather, one can find juridical 
gaps because the legal framework has been elaborated without the presence of Muslims. Sometimes, the sentiment of 
rejection is stronger than the application of the law in its real essence: such a sentiment leads those who are moved by it 
to a tendentious interpretation… But this is a matter of men, not of legislation.’ Ibid. 97 note 42, my translation. 
1811 Ramadan in Edgar Morin and Tariq Ramadan, Au péril des idées: les grandes questions de notre temps, 58. Here 
Ramadan mentions different dimensions of such equality: social equality, equality before the law, political equality, and 
equality in wages. 
1812 Tariq Ramadan, The Quest For Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism, 92.  
1813 Tariq Ramadan, Radical Reform, 230. 
1814 Ibid. 228. 
1815 Ibid. 222. 
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friendship and respecting the criterion of reciprocity of the reasonable (as requested by B2)? 
Surely, I cannot take into consideration every single non-public reason which Ramadan refers 
to when he discusses the condition of women. Rather, I limit myself to explaining how the 
clauses expressed by B1 and B2 are fulfilled in some notable cases. Concerning the proviso 
expressed by B1, one could return to the question of the veil. Ramadan presents two interest-
ing and intertwined grounds for justifying the permission of wearing the veil in public places, 
and in particular in public schools. First, he argues that the veil should not be banned from 
public places because the veil, as a visible symbol of submission to God, also expresses wom-
en’s rejection of any other form of submission, and in particular submission to men. Then, the 
veil is a form of emancipation which promotes women’s equality and rights.1816 In this case, 
the non-public reason for supporting the permission of wearing the veil in public schools (i.e., 
the veil expresses submission to God, the only relevant and justified form of submission for 
human beings) is supported by a public reason (i.e., the recognition of women’s rights and 
equal status passes through the rejection of male domination). Therefore, the appeal to this 
non-public reason meets the condition specified by B1. Furthermore, there is also a second 
kind of argument, which is similar to the previous one in its non-public part, but it supports a 
different public reason for allowing the hijab in public schools. Again, the veil is presented as 
a symbol of human equality before God, because it introduces a distance (not necessarily a 
separation) between women and men, it extracts (from the Latin: ex trahere) women from the 
sphere of male domination, and, in doing so, it publicly affirms both their equal standing and 
their specific identity. This amounts to the rejection of a male-dominated public sphere and 
the possibility of participating in it as a woman. Of course, “as a woman” here means “ac-
cording to a particular religious definition of what it means to be a woman with a specific re-
ligion-based identity and conscience”. Thus, this time the veil −as a symbol of a religion-
based affirmation of equality and female identity− functions as a facilitator of women’s equal 
participation in the public space. Ramadan openly puts this non-public reason together with a 
public reason by saying that ‘[w]omen must be able to play a social role.’1817 The supportive 
                                                        
1816 Tariq Ramadan, “Le voile islamique,” article originally published in Le Courrier of Geneva on November 19, 1993 
and now included in Tariq Ramadan, Les musulmans dans la laïcité: responsabilités et droits des musulmans dans les 
sociétés occidentales, 155: ‘the veil, which is chiefly the symbol of submission to God (literally: Islam), socially should 
be an element of the liberation of the woman [because] she does not submit her being to male imagination […] In virtue 
of these considerations, she is completely coherent when she claims her private and social rights.’ My translation.  
1817 Tariq Ramadan, Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity, 56. 
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relation between the public and the non-public reason is direct and explicit, because Ramadan 
states that ‘in the public space [… m]any women in the West now indicate their right to be re-
spected in their faith by wearing the headscarf.’1818 Hence, also in this case B1 is fulfilled. 
However, in his discussion about the veil, Ramadan also appeals to non-public reasons which 
are not related to a genuine public reason through a direct or indirect mutually supportive re-
lation. For instance, on certain occasions he seems to justify the legal permission to wear the 
veil in public only on the basis of the fact that the veil is prescribed by Islamic teachings. The 
question is: does such a reason respect the extensive interpretation proviso? To be sure, obvi-
ously there may be a strong connection between this non-public reason and freedom of con-
science. However, here I am interested in considering if such a reason alone (that is, as a self-
standing non-public reason, and leaving aside any supportive connection with a public reason) 
may satisfies B2. As B2 concerns the respect of the criterion of reciprocity of the reasonable, 
certainly the answer to the question depends on how the Islamic prescription of the veil is 
presented from a political point of view. It can be shown that Ramadan reconstructs the Islam-
ic obligation to wear the veil in terms that are consistent with the criterion of reciprocity of 
the reasonable.1819 Indeed, Ramadan observes that the obligation to wear the veil is firstly 
based on two Qur’anic verses: ‘tell believing women that they should lower their eyes, guard 
their private parts, and not display their charms beyond what [it is acceptable] to reveal; they 
should draw their coverings over their necklines and not reveal their charms’ (24:31) and 
‘Prophet, tell your wives, your daughters, and women believers to make their outer garments 
hang low over them so as to be recognised and not insulted: God is the most forgiving, most 
merciful’ (33:59). For the believing woman, Ramadan claims, the veil functions as ‘a protec-
tion and a reminder:’1820 it protects women’s dignity against men’s concupiscent gaze and it 
reminds women and men ‘the sacred dimension of her being.’1821 Moreover, Ramadan em-
phasises the fact that those verses were revealed to the Prophet only fifteen years after the be-
ginning of the Revelation. According to Ramadan, these circumstances are extremely im-
portant and must be taken into account, because they demonstrate that the prescription con-
                                                        
1818 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 142. 
1819 What follows is mainly based on Tariq Ramadan, “Le voile islamique,” in particular 152-154. 
1820 Ibid. 153, my translation. 
1821 Ibid, my translation. 
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cerning the veil was introduced only after a period of time in which Muslim men and women 
had been educated to the core of the Islamic message. Thus, he claims that such an obligation 
can only be based on a ‘deep spiritual education’ which ‘ensure[s] that this command [can be 
rooted] in the convinced hearts of Muslims.’1822 Consequently, it follows that in no way can a 
girl or a woman be obliged to wear the veil against her will or disregarding her deep convic-
tions. Ramadan is unambiguous on this point:  
‘[M]any Muslims act against the Qur’anic example –and against good sense− 
when they force their women […] to cover themselves with the veil. It is appro-
priate, firstly, to provide girls with a true religious education, a deep and complete 
one, so that they can understand the meaning and the significance of their rights 
and duties. This is the least we should do. This is also the maximum [we can do]. 
Beyond that, the relation is exclusive and concerns only the girl and God.’1823 
In conclusion, this appeal to a religious view is constructed in a reasonable way. It is rea-
sonable both in its content (then U1 is avoided) and in its spirit (then U2 is avoided). It fol-
lows that it respects the criterion of reciprocity of the reasonable and meets the condition 
specified by B2. 
 
Before analysing the third question, it is time to deal with an issue that I mentioned twice 
in the introduction of this section, in which I presented the main features of Ramadan’s Islam-
ic feminism. There I said that one may legitimately wonder whether the ‘gendered division of 
labour within the family’1824 that Ramadan advocates respects political reciprocity. Indeed, 
this is a central question for a Rawlsian theory, because Rawls claims that the family is part of 
the basic structure of society,1825 and thus it is important to understand whether and how a re-
ligion-based conception of the role of women in the family fits with the political conception 
of justice for the basic structure, which must satisfy the criterion of reciprocity. Rawls is clear 
                                                        
1822 Ibid. 154, my translation. 
1823 Ibid. my translation and emphasis added. 
1824 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 471. 
1825 Ibid. 467: ‘[t]he family is part of the basic structure, since one of its main roles is to be the basis of the orderly pro-
duction and reproduction of society and its culture from one generation to the next.’ 
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about this point: there should be a division of labour between, on the one hand, political prin-
ciples of justice that apply to the basic structure and, on the other hand, principles that apply 
to the specific associations in the background culture (churches, universities, clubs, and so 
on), which ‘is the culture of the social, not of the political.’1826 Therefore, one may think that 
political principles of justice ‘do not apply to the family, and do not secure equal justice for 
women and their children.’1827 Rawls rejects this view, and not only because the family is part 
of the basic structure. Actually, he acknowledges that ‘[w]e wouldn’t want political principles 
of justice −including principles of distributive justice− to apply directly to the internal life of 
the family,’1828 as we would not want that they directly apply to the internal life of a church 
(for instance, by prescribing fair universal elections for the Pope) or other associations in the 
background culture. In that spirit, Rawls clarifies that within the family the ‘principles [of jus-
tice] do not inform us how to raise our children […, because h]ere those principles are out of 
place.’1829 However, what the political principles of justice require is the protection of the 
equal rights and liberties of the children and women (and of the members of associations in 
the background culture) as citizens (or, with reference to children, as future citizens). Thus, 
one can understand Rawls’s remarks according to which, ‘[i]n order for public reason to apply 
to the family, it must be seen, at least in part, as a matter of political justice’1830 and ‘[e]ven if 
the basic structure alone is the primary subject of justice, the principles of justice still put es-
sential restrictions on the family and all other associations. The adult members of families and 
other associations are equal citizens first: that is their basic position. No institution or associ-
ation in which they are involved can violate their rights as citizens.’1831 Then, for gendered 
divisions of labour within the family (for instance on the basis of religion) to be acceptable 
                                                        
1826 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 14. 
1827 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” 468. 
1828 Ibid. 469. 
1829 Ibid. 470. 
1830 Ibid. 468. 
1831 Ibid. 470-471. Emphases added. 
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from the perspective of public reason and the criterion of reciprocity, Rawls pinpoints two 
fundamental requirements:1832 
1. The gendered division of labour within the family must be voluntarily accepted.  
2. Even when fully voluntarily accepted, the division of labour within the family must 
not ‘result from or lead to injustice;’ that is, for the sake of simplicity, it must not 
violate fundamental rights and liberties of family members as citizens (or future cit-
izens). 
Now the question is: does Ramadan’s Islamic feminism present an account of the division 
of labour within the family which is consistent with those two Rawlsian requirements? At 
first glance (as I mentioned in the introduction of this section), there are reasons to be scepti-
cal, or at least to think that Ramadan favours a rather traditionalist view of the family; a view 
in which the rights and liberties of women are often jeopardised. Not only does he defend the 
priority of the family within the Islamic conception of the good life (supra), which in itself 
may be a perfectly reasonable view from the perspective of political liberalism, but he also af-
firms that the responsibility of a woman toward her family limits her aspirations for claiming 
liberties and rights. At least, this is what one could conclude after having read the above men-
tioned statements according to which: (1) ‘[t]he desire for liberty and rights […] cannot mean 
forgetting one’s individual, familial, and social responsibility,’1833 and (2) women ‘must be 
aware of their […] rights and determined to defend them … but they must always be reasona-
ble.’1834 On other occasions, a conservative, patriarchal, and paternalistic message seems to 
come to the surface through the language that Ramadan uses. For instance, he defines ‘Islamic 
femininity’ as ‘a certain way of being and of feeling oneself –and wanting to remain− a 
woman before God and among other human beings.’1835 The least (but perhaps also the max-
imum) that one can say about such a view of Muslim women’s identity is that it lacks dyna-
mism and a developmental perspective. Thus, one may suspect that, with reference to the 
                                                        
1832 Ibid. 471. 
1833 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 143. Emphasis added. 
1834 Tariq Ramadan, The Quest For Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism, 92. Emphasis added. 
1835 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 143. Emphasis added. 
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place of women in the family, Ramadan’s Islamic feminism is actually too restrictive and 
does not promote women’s liberation as it pretends to do. This suspicion is echoed by Aziz 
Zemouri, who argues that Ramadan’s ‘rejection of discriminations based on sex only con-
cerns the life outside the family.’1836 In other words, Islamic feminism would be consistent 
with equal rights and liberties for women only at the price of excluding the family from the 
picture. Arguably, however, it is precisely from the family that women’s demands for rights 
and liberties begin. One could add that such a view of the family as an enclosed space is not 
plausible, because in the long run women’s emancipation in workplaces, in the media, and in 
public arenas is likely to have an impact on their condition within the family. Nevertheless, 
what really matters is the respect of the two requirements mentioned above. Does Ramadan’s 
Islamic feminism respect them? Concerning the first requirement, the answer is “yes:” as I 
demonstrated with reference to the veil, for Ramadan any religious obligation can only be 
grounded in a sincere and spontaneous commitment. Nobody can force a woman to wear the 
veil: it must be freely adopted by her on the basis of her conscience. Similarly, it is highly 
plausible to maintain that for Ramadan a woman cannot be a forced to accept an Islamic defi-
nition of what it means to be a good daughter, wife, or mother. Only her conscience can de-
termine her appropriate place and role within the family. Therefore, the first requirement is 
met: any gendered division of labour within the family must be voluntarily accepted. With 
reference to the second requirement (the respect of fundamental rights and liberties and basic 
justice within the family), one must acknowledge that Ramadan plainly urges Muslims to rec-
ognise women’s active engagement in various domains other than the family (places of wor-
ship, public institutions, workplaces, the media, and so on), also in executive positions.1837 
Thus, he implicitly recognises a form of “right of exit” from the family. Moreover, he con-
tends that women’s fundamental rights and basic liberties must also be protected and guaran-
teed within the family. I have already mentioned the importance of education in Ramadan’s 
theory of citizenship (supra), but he specifically stresses its relevance with reference to the 
                                                        
1836 Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 55. My translation. 
1837 Tariq Ramadan, Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity, 56: ‘[w]omen must be able to play a social role. 
And if Islam clearly stipulates the priority of the family, this has never meant that a woman cannot move out of this 
space. Priority conveys the idea of a hierarchy, but not the expression of an exclusivity.’ See also Radical Reform, 221-
232. 
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status of women.1838 Moreover, in a passage that I have already quoted, he repeats that ‘keep-
ing women illiterate and forbidding them to work, reach financial autonomy, or play a social 
and economic role, as well as such practices as female genital mutilation, forced marriages, 
the denial of divorce, or restraint against domestic violence, are absolutely contrary to Islam’s 
message.’1839 Furthermore, he openly recognises women’s reproductive rights (with some 
qualifications),1840 he categorically rejects any form of domestic violence,1841 he says that a 
woman’s free consent to marriage is always required,1842 and finally he strongly recommends 
that Muslim women do not content themselves with an Islamic marriage, but also demand a 
civil marriage so that their legitimate rights can be better defended.1843 One can then conclude 
that Ramadan’s Islamic feminism meets the necessary requirements of political reciprocity al-
so with reference to the status and rights of women within the family. 
 
                                                        
1838 Tariq Ramadan, Radical Reform, 230. 
1839 Ibid. 214. 
1840 Such as some natural birth control methods and −on some circumstances− abortion. Ramadan in Aziz Zemouri, 
Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 82 and 83-84. 
1841 Ibid. 91-92. In light of this open and clear rejection of domestic violence, it is difficult to agree with those critics 
(like Nicolas Sarkozy in his 2003 debate with Ramadan, see the transcript of the show “100 Minutes pour Convaincre” 
in Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 351) who blame Ramadan for having prefaced Asma Lamrabet’s 
book Musulmane tout simplement (Lyon: Tawhid, 2002). In this book, Lamrabet defends some forms of domestic vio-
lence (as a ‘tape légère,’ a soft tap, see Musulmane tout simplement, 71-75). Now, it is irrefutable that Lamrabet does 
not exclude the possibility of giving ‘soft taps’ to one’s own wife. However, from the general context (the book is a eu-
logy of what counts as an authentic Islamic femininity in the author’s eyes) and the spirit of the section, it seems that 
she is trying to minimise the applicability of an explicit Qur’anic verse [(4:34): ‘If you fear high-handedness from your 
wives, remind them [of the teachings of God], then ignore them when you go to bed, then hit them. If they obey you, 
you have no right to act against them: God is most high and great.’]. Moreover, she repeatedly affirms in the text that 
what is really fundamental is respect for women and their free acceptance of the Islamic teachings (ibid. for instance 80-
81, 165-168). On the whole, it seems that Lamrabet’s book promotes a very traditional view of the woman and her 
place in society, but it is generally sympathetic with the moral point of view of Muslim women. Seen from this angle, 
the permission of giving a tape légère represents an awkward attempt to reduce the impact of a textual reference (to be 
sure, this effort to explain Lamrabet’s intentions does not imply that I support or agree with her view). After all, in re-
plying to Nicolas Sarkozy Ramadan plainly says that he decided to write this foreword not because he entirely agreed 
upon the content of the book, but because he wanted to welcome the public contribution of a woman to the debate about 
the status of women in Islam and the contemporary world (in Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 351 
and 353). In conclusion, taking into account Ramadan’s explicit rejection of any form of domestic violence, his decision 
to write a foreword for Lamrabet’s book seems at most naïve, but this does not prove that he agrees with her on this is-
sue. 
1842 Ramadan in Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 89. 
1843 Ibid. 90. 
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Turning now to the last question of the section, I take into consideration Ramadan’s “In-
ternational Call for Moratorium on Corporal Punishment, Stoning, and the Death Penalty in 
the Islamic World.” As I mentioned above, such a call was brought to the attention of the pub-
lic during a television show (“100 Minutes pour Convaincre” on France 2) on November 20, 
2003, in which he debated in a lively way with the French Minister of the Interior Nicolas 
Sarkozy.1844 The proposal was further elaborated in April 2005 both in an article published in 
Le Monde1845 and in the document just mentioned.1846 During the 2003 show, the discussion 
focused on three main topics: antisemitism,1847 domestic violence1848 and stoning of adulterers 
(and particularly of women),1849 and secularism.1850 In what follows, I concisely consider the 
meaning of the call for a moratorium on stoning, death penalties, and corporal punishments 
(ḥudūd –“limits”− indicate the Islamic penalties prescribed for certain crimes which are con-
sidered crimes against God –e.g. fornication or theft− and involves corporal punishments like 
amputation, lashing, and death penalty including stoning).1851 Such a proposal reverberated 
both in the West and in Muslim majority countries: for many observers in the former suspend-
ing the application of ḥudūd was too little, while for many others in the latter it was too 
                                                        
1844 The transcript of the show is available in French in Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 345-357. 
1845 “Pour une moratoire sur l’application de la charia dans le monde musulman,” April 1, 2005 (available online at 
URL = http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2005/04/01/pour-un-moratoire-sur-l-application-de-la-charia-dans-le-
monde-musulman_634114_3232.html?xtmc=tariq_ramadan&xtcr=207). An English translation is also available online 
(“For a Moratorium on the Application of Sharia in the Muslim World,” at URL = http://www.truth-
out.org/archive/component/k2/item/53443:tariq-ramadan--for-a-moratorium-on-sharia).  
1846 Available on Tariq Ramadan’s website at URL = http://tariqramadan.com/blog/2005/04/05/an-international-call-
for-moratorium-on-corporal-punishment-stoning-and-the-death-penalty-in-the-islamic-world/.  
1847 With regard to Ramadan’s controversial article “Critique des (nouveaux) intellectuels communautaires,” which I 
mentioned above. 
1848 Sarkozy referred to Ramadan’s foreword to Asma Lamrabet’s book Musulmane tout simplement, a question that I 
considered in one of the preceding footnotes. 
1849 The French Minister criticised Hani Ramadan’s 1991 book La femme en islam, see supra.  
1850 Ramadan and Sarkozy discussed the issue of state neutrality and the application of the 1905 law on the separation of 
church and state in France. 
1851 For a concise definition, see the entry “constitutionalism” by Andrew F. March in The Princeton Encyclopedia of 
Islamic Political Thought, 114. 
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much.1852 Confining the discussion to the reactions in Western countries, critics have defined 
Ramadan’s call for a moratorium on stoning ‘a medieval discourse,’1853 a ‘moment of barba-
rism,’1854 or an example of how Ramadan practices taqiyya (dissimulation, supra).1855 On the 
other hand, defenders of Ramadan have maintained that his proposal is meaningful and im-
portant. For instance, Olivier Roy argues that: 
‘The paradox is that Tariq Ramadan’s celebrated declaration calling for a mor-
atorium on the application of hudud […] is much more in conformity with the 
concept of laïcité than the requirement that the very principle of these divine 
commandments be renounced. The state has no knowledge of the heavenly king-
dom and legislates only on terrestrial matters; it is therefore important for it that 
no sentence of corporal punishment be pronounced and even less executed here 
below. Hell can wait. The moratorium is a good compromise, to be sure a bit hyp-
ocritical, but what religion is not when it has to deal with earthly political reali-
ties?’1856 
‘When Ramadan proposes a moratorium on the punishments provided by sha-
ria, he is at bottom more secular than the government minister who asks him to 
declare the veil optional, because he recognizes the distinction between the two 
orders: public political space and religious space. The moratorium affects the pub-
lic space without touching the dogma. Ramadan, like any other Islamic leader, is 
required to explain himself only with regard to public space.’1857 
These quotations (and especially the last one) are of capital importance for what follows, 
because they disclose the relation between, on the one hand, the methodological intuition un-
derlying Ramadan’s call for a moratorium, and, on the other hand, the idea of public reason 
                                                        
1852 For example, take the article on the BBC News “Muslim thinker fights death penalty,” by Roger Hardy 30 March, 
2005, available at URL = http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4394863.stm. See also Nina zu Fürstenberg, Chi ha 
paura di Tariq Ramadan?, 122-130. 
1853 Nicolas Sarkozy in Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 353. My translation. 
1854 Paul Berman, “Who’s Afraid of Tariq Ramadan?” 50. 
1855 Paul Landau, Le Sabre et le Coran, 137-138. 
1856 Olivier Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam, 24-25. 
1857 Ibid. 95. Emphasis added. 
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and the meta-theoretical approach of political liberalism. On a closer examination of Rama-
dan’s proposal, the first −obvious− thing to say is that it does not concern European countries, 
but only those Muslim majority countries in which ḥudūd punishments are applied today 
(e.g., Saudi Arabia). In Western societies, Ramadan claims, ‘the infliction of corporal pun-
ishments, stoning, execution in the name of a religious standard that would impose itself on 
an entire society, cannot be accepted: these practices must be condemned without any other 
form of trial or inquiry.’1858 In this way, he affirms once more that Muslim citizens are part of 
European democratic public culture and willing to recognise and respect the fact of reasona-
ble pluralism (supra). With reference to those Muslim majority countries that apply ḥudūd 
punishments, his personal position is unambiguous, because he firmly condemns the death 
penalty and corporal punishments in any form: 
‘Personally, […] I’m against capital punishment, not only in Muslim countries, 
but also in the U.S. But when you want to be heard in Muslim countries, when 
you are addressing religious issues, you can’t just say it has to stop. I think it has 
to stop. But you have to discuss it within the religious context. There are texts in-
volved. I am not just talking to Muslims in Europe, but addressing the implemen-
tation of huddud [sic] everywhere in Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Middle East. 
I’m speaking from the inside to Muslims.’1859 
The idea emerging from this excerpt is quite clear: according to Ramadan, in order to 
achieve a real, deep, and enduring change in mentalities and practices, what matters is not on-
ly his personal opinion. If one truly wants to see the application of corporal punishments sup-
pressed, she had better try to find an effective way or method to produce long-lasting changes, 
rather than asking obsessively about the personal views of a single intellectual. This is not on-
ly a question of numbers and places. There are two other reasons. The first is linked to the 
question of consensus (ijmā‘) within the Muslim community, on which I will return in a mo-
ment. The second is related to the fact that external pressure often produces the opposite ef-
                                                        
1858 Tariq Ramadan, “Pour une moratoire sur l’application de la charia dans le monde musulman,” and “For a Moratori-
um on the Application of Sharia in the Muslim World,” in both cases see page 1 of the printable version. Emphasis add-
ed. 
1859 Ramadan in Ian Buruma, “Tariq Ramadan Has an Identity Issue,” 5. See also Ramadan in Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il 
faire taire Tariq Ramadan?, 219. 
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fect to that which it seeks,1860 a phenomenon that I have mentioned under the label of “reac-
tive identity.” Thus, here Ramadan is not concerned with stating his own views about ḥudūd, 
but with laying down a method. In itself, the content of the proposal is simple: to suspend 
immediately the application of ḥudūd punishments all around the Muslim world. The call has 
a double purpose: first, to ‘open the debate with ‘ulamā’’ (singular ‘ālim; the term indicates 
the Islamic scholar, the “learned” or “knowledgeable” in the field of Islamic religious scienc-
es), and, second, to ‘guarant[ee] justice and respect for the dignity of humankind, particularly 
of the poor and of women in Muslim majority societies.’1861 These remarks introduce the 
reader to the core of Ramadan’s discourse. In fact, he bases his call on two kinds of argu-
ments: there are two Islamic arguments and one public argument. The two Islamic arguments 
are grounded in two values that Ramadan puts at the heart of the Islamic message: the promo-
tion of justice and the protection of the integrity of the person.1862 On the assumption that 
these two values are essential in Islamic teachings, he argues that, in the absence of a clear 
consensus (ijmā‘)1863 among Muslims and Islamic scholars about the conditions and applica-
bility of ḥudūd punishments, it would be a blatant injustice and a violation of a person’s integ-
rity from the perspective of Islamic teachings themselves to continue to mutilate and kill in 
the name of Islam.1864 The second Islamic argument is that it is equally unjust to apply ḥudūd 
punishments if the victims are in the majority of cases the most vulnerable (the poor and 
women), as is often the case.1865 If one believes that ‘Islam is a message of equality and jus-
                                                        
1860 Tariq Ramadan, “International Call for Moratorium on Corporal Punishment, Stoning, and the Death Penalty in the 
Islamic World,” 3. 
1861 Tariq Ramadan, Radical Reform, 275. 
1862 Tariq Ramadan, “International Call for Moratorium on Corporal Punishment, Stoning, and the Death Penalty in the 
Islamic World,” 5. Ramadan also includes them in the list of the higher objectives of Sharī‘a in his Radical Reform: see 
139, 142 and 143. 
1863 Ijmā‘ (consensus) is traditionally considered one of the sources of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), along with the 
Qur’an, the Sunna, analogy (qiyās), and the interpretative effort (ijtihād) of the legal expert. Sabrina Mervin, L’Islam: 
Fondamenti e dottrine, chapter four. 
1864 Tariq Ramadan, “International Call for Moratorium on Corporal Punishment, Stoning, and the Death Penalty in the 
Islamic World,” 2 and 4; “Pour une moratoire sur l’application de la charia dans le monde musulman,” and “For a Mor-
atorium on the Application of Sharia in the Muslim World,” respectively on page 1 and 2 of the printable version. 
1865 Tariq Ramadan, Radical Reform, 275; “International Call for Moratorium on Corporal Punishment, Stoning, and the 
Death Penalty in the Islamic World,” 2; “Pour une moratoire sur l’application de la charia dans le monde musulman,” 
and “For a Moratorium on the Application of Sharia in the Muslim World,” respectively on page 1 and 2 of the printa-
ble version. 
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tice,’ then for Ramadan it is logical to conclude that ‘[i]t is our faithfulness to the message of 
Islam that leads us to recognize that it [is] impossible to remain silent in face of unjust appli-
cations of our religious references.’1866 Note, however, that these two Islamic arguments are 
not necessarily consistent with a democratic view. If there were an agreement among Muslims 
concerning ḥudūd punishments, and if those punishments were applied fairly to men and 
women, to the poor and the rich, then there would be no reason in this Islamic line of argu-
mentation for rejecting ḥudūd punishments. Here I do not address the question of the place (if 
any) of death penalty in democratic public culture, for example in the U.S.A. I simply observe 
that, if the death penalty is intensely criticised in Western democracies with regard to such 
crimes as murder, then it is all the more reasonable to expect deep disagreement on the quali-
fication of fornication as a crime punishable by death. This is so because fornication and the 
other crimes punished with ḥudūd are subject to the ḥudūd discipline precisely because they 
are considered as crimes against God and, then, they cannot be publicly justified in conditions 
of reasonable pluralism (on the contrary, prima facie one could try to argue in favour of the 
death penalty in liberal democracies by appealing to a public reason, for instance by saying 
that −as an extreme form of deterrence− the death penalty aims at protecting a public good 
such as the security of society. However, it would be difficult to maintain that adulterers pose 
a serious threat to the security of society and thus deserve such an exemplary punishment. 
Therefore, it would be very hard to justify capital punishment for adulterers from a public 
perspective. However, these considerations by no means imply that I want –or that I think that 
it is possible− to provide a general moral justification for the death penalty in liberal democ-
racies: nothing could be further from my mind. I can set aside this question, for I do not need 
to analyse it here). Therefore, Ramadan adds a public argument to those two Islamic asser-
tions, probably because he realises that the latter are not enough from a democratic perspec-
tive. Effectively, as I have already mentioned, many Western criticisms to Ramadan’s pro-
posal are based exactly on the charge that a moratorium on stoning and other corporal pun-
ishments is not enough from a liberal democratic viewpoint. The latter would not be satisfied 
with anything less than a durable and well-grounded elimination of such punishments, the 
                                                        
1866 Tariq Ramadan, “International Call for Moratorium on Corporal Punishment, Stoning, and the Death Penalty in the 
Islamic World,” 1. In Radical Reform (276), Ramadan affirms with regard to his call for a moratorium: ‘[t]he proposal 
was not directed against Islam’s teachings or against the texts –quite the contrary. In the name of the higher objectives 
of the message that call for respect for the life and dignity of women and men, equality, and justice, it was urgent to put 
an end to an instrumentalization of religion through literalist, formalist implementations that continued to affect poor 
people, women, and political opponents who have never had the means to defend themselves and who are punished for 
example’s sake and without justice.’ 
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critics continue, whilst a temporary suspension of their application based on something like 
the two Islamic arguments considered above would not be sufficient. It seems plausible to ar-
gue that Ramadan partially agrees with this view and demonstrates his commitment to liberal 
democratic values by appealing to a public argument that supports the ideal of public reason. 
Ramadan summarises this public argument in these terms: 
‘Islam can only be modernized from within. If I stand there and state that I 
condemn the practice of stoning, that this punishment is despicable, it changes 
nothing. My fellow Muslims will say: Brother Tariq, you became a European, a 
Swiss citizen, so you are no longer one of us. I want to trigger a process of con-
templation and thought within the Islamic community. Critique and attacks from 
the outside can produce tension.’1867 
Moreover, he continues: ‘it is not only my personal position that matters, but an evolution 
of Muslim mentalities.’1868 And: ‘the call for a moratorium is a direct and necessary interpella-
tion addressed to the Muslim world from its own standpoint because we are convinced that re-
flection and the evolution of thinking is possible only when societies’ endogenous dynamics 
are the point of departure.’1869 All these statements support the same view: the call for a mor-
atorium (through the immediate suspension of the application of ḥudūd punishments) aims at 
a decompression of the public space. In other words, the proposal is designed for creating a 
space in which the most severe injustices are suspended and mitigated, and in which one can 
start building a road toward a more just consensus through a debate that is internal to Muslim 
communities around the world. Crucially, justice is now understood in political terms, that is, 
stoning of adulterers is now seen as a violation of citizens’ fundamental rights as defined by a 
political conception of justice. Ramadan hopes that Muslim majority societies move in the di-
rection of a full recognition of fundamental rights and liberties: for this reason he speaks of 
‘evolution of mentalities,’ ‘reflection,’ ‘modernisation,’ and ‘a process of contemplation and 
thought.’ This is a public political wish which is fully consistent with and supportive of polit-
                                                        
1867 Tariq Ramadan, “They Live in a Bleak, Devastated Universe,” interviewed by Erich Follath and Romain Leick, 3 of 
the printable version. Emphases added. 
1868 Ramadan in the transcript of the show “100 Minutes pour Convaincre” in Aziz Zemouri, Faut-il faire taire Tariq 
Ramadan?, 353, my translation. Emphasis added. 
1869 Tariq Ramadan, “Pour une moratoire sur l’application de la charia dans le monde musulman,” and “For a Moratori-
um on the Application of Sharia in the Muslim World,” on page 1 and 2 respectively. Emphases added. 
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ical liberalism. In other words, in this public argument for the moratorium, Ramadan advo-
cates the latter on the ground that it is the best political strategy for triggering a development 
of Islamic jurisprudence toward an overlapping consensus on a liberal political conception of 
justice. Ramadan explains the fundamental intuition of such a strategy in another context (he 
is talking about female genital mutilation): ‘[we should] equip ourselves with the means to 
change mind-sets progressively, from within, so that people not only abide by [a] legal ban 
[…], but fundamentally agree with the principles and objectives of the process. Denunciation 
is not enough: [… we should teach] people to set aside any practices that do not respect hu-
man beings’ integrity, dignity, and rights.’1870 As Ramadan clearly and plainly maintains in 
this quotation, a political liberal is not satisfied with unilateral denunciations. Rather, what re-
ally matters is an overlapping consensus (or, at least, a progressive advance toward an over-
lapping consensus) on a political conception of justice. Therefore, the moratorium creates a 
space for discussing the Islamic foundations of ḥudūd punishments, while at the same time it 
protects fundamental political rights and liberties. The hope is that such an internal debate fi-
nally leads to a full Islamic justification of the conception of justice which secures those 
rights and liberties. If such an Islamic justification occurs, then the moratorium becomes a re-
dundant shield for the preservation of individual rights and liberties. The final goal is an over-
lapping consensus and the abolition of corporal and capital punishments. This objective is re-
vealed by Ramadan himself: ‘[i]t is urgent to set in motion a democratization movement that 
moves populations from the obsession of what the law is sanctioning to the claim of what it 
should protect: their conscience, their integrity, their liberty, and their rights.’1871 Although 
this formulation is quite general, it is clear that it goes far beyond what the two Islamic argu-
ments alone may suggest. Plainly, this is ultimately a call for the search of an overlapping 
consensus on a liberal political conception of justice. Thus, I argue that the final goal of the 
call for a moratorium is the promotion of an overlapping consensus on a political conception 
of justice. If this is so, then Ramadan’s call for a moratorium is fully consistent with the ideal 
of public reason. Whilst Ramadan does not disclose specific Islamic reasons against ḥudūd 
punishments (i.e., he does not say whether existing rules concerning stoning and other pun-
ishments are true or false from an Islamic perspective, and he does not enter into the content 
                                                        
1870 Tariq Ramadan, Radical Reform, 189, emphases added. 
1871 Tariq Ramadan, “International Call for Moratorium on Corporal Punishment, Stoning, and the Death Penalty in the 
Islamic World,” 7. 
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of a possible process of full Islamic justification of a liberal political conception of justice), he 
nonetheless presents a political method for protecting fundamental rights and liberties and for 
allowing a development of societies that are not well-ordered toward a more politically just 
conception of justice. Thus, Ramadan’s call for a moratorium promotes the ideal of public 
reason in societies which are not well-ordered. Moreover, it also strengthens the ideal of pub-
lic reason in nearly well-ordered societies, such as European societies, because he claims that 
his proposal cannot succeed without an active involvement of European Muslims and their 
commitment to equal fundamental rights and liberties in the process of full Islamic justifica-
tion for a definitive abolition of ḥudūd punishments.1872 Furthermore, note that this call is also 
a form of double discourse (and not of double speak, since it is not hypocritical, deceptive or 
misleading), because it appeals both to public and to Islamic reasons for advocating the sus-
pension of corporal punishments, and because it prompts a full Islamic justification (whose 
language is comprehensive and non-public) in the direction of an overlapping consensus on a 
political conception of justice. In other words, it is a form of double discourse both (1) with 
reference to the grounds on which the moratorium itself is justified (Islamic and public politi-
cal grounds, supra), and (2) with reference to its normative horizon (a full Islamic justifica-
tion of −and a public justification via an overlapping consensus on− a political conception of 
justice that supports public reason). In other words, the call for a moratorium is a form of 
double discourse because it is able to speak two languages at the same time and with no con-
tradiction: the language of Islamic thought and jurisprudence and the language of public rea-
son. The moratorium makes room for a process of justification of a conception of justice that 
guarantees fundamental right and liberties and supports public reason, and, in the meantime 
(pending such an Islamic justification), it concretely protects those rights in accordance with 
public reason. For all these reasons, I conclude that Ramadan’s proposal is an example of 
double discourse which fosters the ideal of public reason.  
 
 
 
                                                        
1872 Ibid. 4: ‘[Western] Muslim women and men who live in spaces of political freedom, who have access to education 
and knowledge […] have a major responsibility to attempt to reform the situation, open a relevant debate, condemn and 
put an end to injustices perpetrated in their name.’ 
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6.5 Conclusions. 
In this chapter, I have demonstrated that Tariq Ramadan’s conception of citizenship for 
Muslims in Europe is fully consistent with public reason, because it fulfils the requirements of 
public reason citizenship: RR, CR (as specified by PR1, PR2, and PR3), and CiR*. I have also 
demonstrated that Ramadan respects and upholds the two ways in which reconciliation 
through public reason solves the double problem which this research is concerned with: the 
lack of a common political identity and of shared standards for social and political criticism 
(see 1.2.a and 5.2.c). As I explained, Ramadan presents his own version of a common politi-
cal identity (which he calls the ‘new We,’ supra) and of standards for social and political crit-
icism (which he calls ‘social jihād,’ supra). Obviously, these notions are in the middle be-
tween the political and the comprehensive (as shown by the label social jihād). However, they 
are fully consistent with the common political identity and the standards for social criticism 
expressed by public reason citizenship (see 5.2.c for the way in which public reason specifies 
them and this chapter for the consistency between them and Ramadan’s ‘new We’ and ‘social 
jihād’). Therefore, Ramadan’s conception of citizenship supports the idea of a reconciliation 
through public reason and fits into the model of public reason citizenship that I have proposed 
with regard to the solution of the research problem analysed in 1.2.a. Ramadan’s European 
Muslims are good political liberal citizens, because they respect and support public reason. 
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Conclusions 
 
In these general conclusions, I recapitulate the main results of this study by starting from 
the three specific research questions (Q1, Q2, and Q3) and closing with a final remark about 
the general question from which my work began (Q). 
In the first chapter, I formulated the question Q1 in these terms: How can we reconstruct 
the idea of public reason so that we can identify its most salient normative requirements? I al-
so argued that answering this question would have involved a reconstructive task, and the en-
tire second part of this study has been devoted to the reconstruction of the idea of public rea-
son. The third chapter dealt with the history of the idea of public reason from Kant to Rawls 
and within Rawls’s work. Moreover, it analysed the Rawlsian conception of public reason and 
from this perspective it identified three specifications for the three normative political liberal 
evaluative requirements that I considered in chapter two: the reciprocity requirement (RR), 
the consistency requirement (CR), and the civility requirement (CiR). Furthermore, chapter 
three also unpacked CR in three different dimensions (PR1, PR2, and PR3). In chapter four, I 
presented an extensive interpretation of the proviso −defined in chapter two as a general 
threshold for public reasoning− and I specified two levels of the duty of civility (the bifurcate 
model of the duty of civility) grounded in the criterion of reciprocity of the reasonable. Then, 
I was able to restate CiR as CiR* in accordance with the bifurcate model of the duty of civili-
ty, so that the evaluation of civility takes into consideration the two levels of the proviso de-
scribed in 4.2. With the determination of the three evaluative requirements (RR, CR, and 
CiR*) specified by public reason, the reconstructive part of my study was complete. 
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In the first chapter of the third part (chapter five), I then turned to the second research 
question, which connects the reconstructive effort with the evaluative analysis: How can we 
put together the requirements identified in the reconstructive part into a coherent ideal of cit-
izenship, so that it can effectively represent a ‘normative yardstick of evaluation’ for consid-
ering the issue of Muslims’ citizenship in Europe from a public perspective? I modelled pub-
lic reason citizenship in light of the three political liberal evaluative requirements specified by 
the idea of public reason: it is thus a justificatory evaluative model of public reason citizen-
ship. I also reformulated the three evaluative requirements so that they could be referred more 
directly to the issue of Muslims’ citizenship in Western European societies. Having elaborat-
ed the justificatory evaluative model of public reason citizenship, in the second part of chapter 
five I tried to show that such a model is normatively more appealing than rival conceptions of 
citizenship for contemporary European societies with respect to fair inclusion of Muslim citi-
zens and social stability (I will return to this point in the final part of these conclusions). To 
do that, I firstly demonstrated that public reason citizenship could also be adopted as a regula-
tive ideal of citizenship in existing European societies (which are not well-ordered). Secondly, 
I showed that public reason citizenship is normatively more attractive than liberal multicultur-
alism and critical republicanism, because it can provide what they do not provide: namely, a 
conception of citizenship that both includes Muslims and assures citizens about social stabil-
ity. This is so because public reason citizenship may represent the ground for shared standards 
for social and political criticism and for a common political identity for citizens. Then, public 
reason citizenship solves the problem analysed at the beginning. Therefore, I argued that it 
should be adopted as a regulative ideal of citizenship. 
Q3 was addressed in the second chapter of the third part (chapter six). The question asked: 
What if we evaluate European Muslims’ claims concerning citizenship in Europe from the 
public standpoint specified by public reason? It is clear that such a question touches the very 
heart of the political liberal evaluation of this research. I firstly applied the plausibility princi-
ple (PP) articulated in chapter two, according to which “the necessary and sufficient condition 
for plausibly considering a view x as representative of a European Muslim approach to the is-
sue of citizenship is that x is widespread among Muslim citizens in European liberal democ-
racies.” In 6.1 I demonstrated that Tariq Ramadan’s views concerning Muslims’ citizenship in 
Europe meet this principle and can be plausibly considered as articulating a European Muslim 
conception of citizenship to which the evaluative framework can be applied. Notice that the 
  
 European Muslims and Liberal Citizenship 
Ph.D. Thesis successfully discussed on April 21, 2016.  
The total or partial use of the Ph.D. Thesis is subject to copyright restrictions. 
 
  
561  
 Giovanni Vezzani 
 
LUISS-ULB 
analysis developed in chapter six has reconstructed Ramadan’s conception of citizenship sys-
tematically enough to define the latter a citizenship theory. Thus, I considered one by one the 
requirements RR, CR (PR1, PR2, and PR3), and CiR* as specified by public reason citizen-
ship and I evaluated Tariq Ramadan’s claims and demands concerning citizenship in Europe 
from such public perspective. The result of the evaluation was that Tariq Ramadan’s theory of 
citizenship for Muslims in Europe satisfies all three requirements expressed by a justificatory 
evaluative model of public reason citizenship: RR, CR, and CiR*. 
In particular, with reference to CiR*, I have pointed out that with his call for a moratorium 
on ḥudūd punishments Ramadan develops a kind of double discourse that fosters the ideal of 
public reason, because it both promotes such an ideal in societies that are not well-ordered 
(through a decompression of the public space) and strengthens it in nearly well-ordered socie-
ties. Therefore, Ramadan’s double discourse is fully consistent with public reason and sup-
ports it: as such, it is radically different from a form of dangerous doublespeak. Actually, one 
may argue that the idea of public reason (especially in the wide view) allows or even requires 
a form of double discourse for supporting and strengthening public reason itself. Note that 
Ramadan himself observes that sometimes a form of double discourse is politically necessary 
and useful.1873 This use of double discourse by Ramadan is acknowledged by some of Rama-
dan’s supporters and critics, but often confusingly and without further elaboration. 1874 This 
research has the merit of showing precisely and with reference to a specific example how 
double discourse may support and foster public reason. 
I have also underlined the fact that Ramadan’s proposals for a renewed conception of the 
role of Muslim citizens in European societies (and for facing the challenges that such a new 
active role implies) on the one hand and the grounds for inclusion and stability for the right 
reasons provided by public reason on the other hand go in the same direction. Ramadan’s 
                                                        
1873 See Tariq Ramadan, What I Believe, 2 and 37. Here Ramadan talks of doublespeak, because he does not distinguish 
between doublespeak and double discourse as I do, but he is clearly referring to what I have called double discourse. 
1874 Olivier Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam, 15: ‘dual language is, in fact, a recognition of two spaces, that of religion 
and that of the order of the world, even if this is done with a longing for unity.’ Ian Buruma, “Tariq Ramadan Has an 
Identity Issue,” 3: ‘[Ramadan] presents different faces to different audiences. He is trying to bridge a divide and bring 
together people of diverse backgrounds and worldviews. He considers the opening he finds in his audience. Ramadan is 
in that sense a politician.’ While the fact that Buruma recognises the political role and value of Ramadan’s double dis-
course is interesting, it seems that he stops at the first and most popular (often pejorative) meaning of the word ‘politi-
cian,’ so he misses the connection between double discourse and the idea of public reason. See also Paul Berman, 
“Who’s Afraid of Tariq Ramadan?” 17. 
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concepts of a ‘new We,’ ‘shared citizenship,’ and ‘integration of intimate lives’ are consistent 
with the idea of a public political identity grounded in public reason. Similarly, the concepts 
of ‘social jihād,’ citizens’ ‘positive contribution,’ and ‘revolution of trust’ are consistent with 
the idea of shared standards for social and political criticism expressed by public reason. If a 
‘new We’ and a ‘revolution of trust’ are the real objectives of Ramadan’s conception of citi-
zenship in Europe, then the fact that he urges European citizens to stop talking of integration 
is not surprising, because a discourse centred on mere integration can produce nothing but 
‘foreign citizens.’1875 Effective citizenship entails much more than simple integration but it 
cannot be based on assimilation.1876 Rather, it requires something like a public political iden-
tity, which public reason citizenship can provide together with shared standards for social and 
political criticism. In other words, Ramadan’s ‘post-integration approach’ allows us to under-
stand the question of Muslims’ citizenship in European societies in line with the formulation 
of the problem in 1.2.a. Moreover, his answers to this problem are consistent with the answers 
provided by public reason citizenship. 
In turn, reading Ramadan in this way sheds a new light on his work. One can now better 
understand the real meaning of the claim that his citizenship theory ‘is in fact a theory of the 
legitimacy and the practice of a minority Islam:’1877 this study has shown that Tariq Rama-
dan’s conception of citizenship for Muslims is fully compatible with public reason and, in this 
sense, it is certainly ‘a theory of the legitimacy […] of a minority Islam’ in Europe. In addi-
tion, thanks to the two-level interpretation of the duty of civility, one can also better under-
stand how Ramadan’s theory of citizenship for Muslims factually does the work of articulat-
ing a ‘“civic religiosity” or a “believing citizenship” [in French: une “religiosité citoyenne” 
ou une “citoyenneté croyante”].’1878 For instance, in analysing the civility requirement 
(CiR*), I have explained how Ramadan honours the two-level duty of civility in practice with 
reference to the issue of women by considering the kind of reasons he appeals to (see 6.4). 
Similarly, the analysis of Ramadan’s conscience clause developed under the third dimension 
                                                        
1875 Tariq Ramadan, Au péril des idées: les grandes questions de notre temps, 28, my translation. 
1876 Tariq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim, 179-182 and Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 27. 
1877 Olivier Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam, 51. 
1878 Frank Frégosi, “Les contours discursifs d’une religiosité citoyenne: laïcité et identité islamique chez Tariq Rama-
dan,” 207, my translation. 
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of the consistency requirement (PR3, see 6.3) has clarified the mutual limits of the ‘civic’ and 
the ‘believing,’ of ‘religiosity’ and ‘citizenship.’ Without such evaluations, the idea of a ‘re-
ligiosité citoyenne’ or ‘citoyenneté croyante’ would remain obscure. 
Surely, social criticism and the promotion of social justice are among the central and recur-
ring themes of Ramadan’s work (this is not to say that he is always clear on what he means by 
social justice): he is profoundly persuaded that ‘[a] peace based on injustice and falsehood is 
not peace. It is rather a resignation of conscience.’1879 It is evident that his main motivation 
and political vocabulary are articulated in religious terms and that he has a morally substan-
tive and “thick” view of democracy and justice; a view that goes beyond the domain of the 
political. For example, in his persistent defence of the oppressed, he criticises ‘a liberalism 
without a soul.’1880 Moreover, he constantly rejects comprehensive forms of secularism,1881 
and firmly affirms the necessity that in their adaptation to European social and political envi-
ronments Muslims keep the fundamental sources and principles of Islam as stable references 
of their identity (what Rawls calls citizens’ ‘moral identity’). Accordingly, he is also pro-
foundly sceptical about external calls for a “renewed,” “more modern, progressive, and secu-
lar” Islam1882 (thus, Ramadan would probably refuse the label “European Islam” if it indicates 
a “new Islam:” for him, the fundamental sources, principles, and teachings of Islam are al-
ways the same because they are eternal, what changes is the context in which they are lived). 
However, these positions are wholly compatible with political liberalism, because they are 
framed within an approach politically based on equal rights and they are matched with the 
recognition of reasonable pluralism and of citizens’ freedom and equality. As we have seen, 
Ramadan entirely acknowledges the specificity of the domain of the political and the distinc-
tion, separation, and discontinuity between the latter and the domain of the comprehensive. 
However, he also believes that there is no contradiction between being pious Muslims faithful 
to Islamic teachings and duties and being good European citizens. Since citizens have ‘multi-
                                                        
1879 Tariq Ramadan, Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity, 297. 
1880 Ibid. 295. 
1881 For instance, see Tariq Ramadan, What I Believe, 97. 
1882 Tariq Ramadan, Les musulmans dans la laïcité: responsabilités et droits des musulmans dans les sociétés occiden-
tales, 126-127. 
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ple identities,’1883 they can share a public political identity and at the same time they can pre-
serve their different wider moral or non-institutional identities (which include both their polit-
ical and their non-political commitments and attachments). The commitment to the idea of a 
political (but, in his view, also of a morally deeper) reconciliation is a deeply-rooted element 
in Ramadan’s thought: such an idea is caught in the concept of ‘intégration des intimités,’ 
which can be found in his major works from Les musulmans dans la laïcité1884 to Au péril des 
idées: les grandes questions de notre temps.1885 
I have also remarked on the fact that, from Western Muslims and the Future of Islam on-
wards, two themes seem to be less and less relevant in the thought of Ramadan: namely, the 
conscience clause and the idea of a binding contract. I have noted that references to the first 
has become less evident and that Ramadan increasingly emphasises those elements that fa-
vour a political reconciliation between integrity of conscience of citizens of faith and their po-
litical commitments and duties. I have also noted that the idea of a binding contract progres-
sively gives way to a strengthened idea of a democratic public political culture shared by citi-
zens as citizens (so I interpret his stronger emphasis on such ideas as ‘civic ethics,’ ‘shared 
citizenship,’ and ‘a common sense of belonging’).  
Therefore, even though sometimes Ramadan seems to be inclined toward a civilisational 
and essentialist discourse à la Huntington in which a great Islamic civilisation is going 
through an identity crisis and faces a materialist and consumerist West,1886 he clearly rejects 
Huntington’s theses and the idea of monolithic and isolated civilisations1887 and affirms that 
                                                        
1883 See for instance ibid. 127-132; To Be a European Muslim, 163; What I Believe, 36-37; Noi musulmani europei, 18. 
1884 Tariq Ramadan, “Pour une laïcité ouverte,” in Les musulmans dans la laïcité: responsabilités et droits des musul-
mans dans les sociétés occidentales, 164. 
1885 Tariq Ramadan, Au péril des idées: les grandes questions de notre temps, 261. 
1886 Tariq Ramadan, Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity, 57: [w]e cannot be so blind as not to notice the 
consequences of this “very modern” life [in industrial societies], which makes out of speed a norm and out of meaning a 
secondary question. By essence, Islamic civilisation cannot recognise itself in such a strange inversion of priorities.’ 
Emphasis added. See also ibid. 290-291: ‘the clash between civilisations is not only theoretically possible, but we can 
also say that the signs of potential rupture are visible. […] The Islamic civilisation, with its reference to the Qur’an and 
the traditions of the Prophet (peace be upon him) […] is not reducible to the cultural, terminological or semantic catego-
ries of the USA or Europe.’ Moreover, see Aux sources du renouveau musulman: D’al-Afghānī à Hassan al-Bannā, un 
siècle de réformisme islamique, 57. 
1887 Tariq Ramadan, Islam, the West and the Challenges of Modernity, 290 and Radical Reform, 146. 
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such civilisational representations have more to do with political and geostrategic events and 
phenomena on the global level than with real cultural entities.1888 Thus, his own view of the 
cultural encounter refers to a dialogue between cultures within European societies and to an 
‘intra dialogue among Muslims,’ rather than to a global “clash” between civilisations.1889 
In conclusion, Ramadan comes close to the core of political liberalism because thanks to 
his conception of the reasonable as connected to the respect of reasonable pluralism and of 
fair social cooperation (what he calls ‘positive contribution’), and thanks to the distinction be-
tween religion and the domain of the political, he approaches the idea of a liberal democratic 
meta-theory of toleration and political legitimacy: 
‘I would like to say one thing about the theoretical character of democracy. 
[…] Democracy is not about truth because, finally and by the very nature of its 
principles, it is a structure which manages [political] opinions, not the truth. […] 
Managing the diversity of [political] opinions […] is of a different nature than 
managing convictions about the truth. With reference to the latter, we cannot be 
satisfied with the notion of toleration … or the idea that there would be an “ab-
sence of truth.” […] This means that […] we accept the truth of the other with 
“pain” [… this is implied in the] etymology of the verb “to tolerate.” […] This is 
problematic, because the notion of toleration entails a relation of authority, a rela-
tion of force between who “suffers” and who “is suffered.” To live out fully mu-
tual social toleration […] I must have access to the philosophical notion of “mutu-
al respect,” grounded in a horizontal relationship of equality.’1890 
This quotation shows that for philosophical-moral reasons Ramadan would prefer the ex-
pression ‘mutual respect’ to the word toleration, but the political substance of his discourse is 
clear: politically speaking, the comprehensive and the political belong to two different dimen-
sions and the political (the ‘management of political opinions’) has its own rules and princi-
ples that must be acceptable to all because the political relationship is grounded in citizens’ 
equality. Importantly, also a religious citizen can recognise that such a political distinction is 
                                                        
1888 Ramadan in Alain Gresh and Tariq Ramadan, L’Islam en questions, 315 and 327-328. 
1889 Tariq Ramadan, Radical Reform, 147 and 305; Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, 226. 
1890 Tariq Ramadan, Au péril des idées: les grandes questions de notre temps, 141-142. My translation. 
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not grounded in (and does not require) a sceptical stance about the truth. Simply, the political-
ly right or legitimate is not defined in terms of the religiously or philosophically good or true. 
Having said this, Ramadan also thinks that the notion of toleration is morally (philosophically 
and religiously) insufficient and should be replaced with the notion of ‘mutual respect’ which 
in his view is a philosophical and not a political concept. Such a notion would mirror the idea 
of persons’ moral equality in a fuller way than an idea of toleration understood as painful ac-
ceptance of something that one dislikes. Since the idea of toleration in Rawls’s political liber-
alism seems to entail more than mere painful acceptance (for instance, remember that Rawls 
qualifies reasonable pluralism as the standard condition of human life under free institutions 
and that he talks of a sentiment of civic friendship that is absent in a modus vivendi but that 
materialises when an overlapping consensus is achieved), I am inclined to think that also for 
Rawls painful acceptance is not an adequate basis for respect, even though in Rawls’s case the 
notions of respect and toleration are interpreted politically and not grounded in a philosophi-
cal and religious conviction about true ‘mutual respect’ as is the case for Ramadan. However, 
if these observations are correct, then this is just another example of the fact that Ramadan’s 
comprehensive view joins the overlapping consensus on a Rawlsian political conception of 
justice, because his religiously-grounded notion of ‘mutual respect’ is consistent with and 
supports Rawls’s political understanding of this notion. 
So, we should take notice of a final element by connecting the previous considerations 
with what I have said about the problem of social stability for the right reasons. Let me con-
cisely recapitulate some critical points. As we have seen, according to Weithman the central 
question for solving the problem of mutual assurance is making publicly known the fact that 
each citizen is ‘better off acting justly when others do’1891 and that collectively citizens are in 
a “Nash equilibrium” (a situation in which ‘each player’s strategy is his best reply to the strat-
egy played by the others’)1892 in which ‘everyone responds justly to the justice of others.’1893 
To secure stability for the right reasons, it is not enough to solve the generalised prisoner’s di-
lemma (that is, to exclude a generalised non-cooperative temptation to free-ride by showing 
the individual rationality of compliance with the principles of justice). In addition to this, this 
                                                        
1891 Paul Weithman, Why Political Liberalism?, 49. 
1892 Ibid. 49 note 9. 
1893 Ibid. 49. 
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very fact must be made publicly known and ‘each person must be assured […] that others will 
continue to act justly rather than defect.’1894 This second part of the problem of stability for 
the right reasons is the mutual assurance problem. While I have not dealt with the first part of 
the issue (the solution of the generalised prisoner’s dilemma) and I have focused only on the 
problem of stability from the perspective of Political Liberalism (that is, I considered only the 
account of stability ‘for the right reasons’ and not the account of ‘inherent’ stability stated in 
A Theory of Justice), I have repeated that –in Weithman’s words− solving the problem of mu-
tual assurance means making publicly known the fact that ‘[e]ach member of the well-ordered 
society judges, from within her comprehensive view, that the balance of her reasons tilts in 
favor of maintaining her desire to live up to the values and ideals [of the political conception 
of justice], at least when others live up to those values and ideals as well.’1895 In other words, 
all citizens must be assured that their respective ‘comprehensive views provide them reasons 
to maintain their sense of justice that are sufficiently weighty to counterbalance competing 
considerations.’1896 If the problem of mutual assurance is successfully resolved, then: 
‘[E]ach person knows that, at least under normal circumstances, no one else’s 
comprehensive view provides sufficient considerations of the good not to honor 
what justice requires and, indeed, each knows that other comprehensive views 
normally provide reasons to [emphasis in the original] honor what justice requires 
[… E]ach person knows that not only does no one’s view of what is good in life 
provides him sufficient incentive to cease being just, but each knows that others’ 
views normally provide them incentives to continue to be just.’1897  
This research has shown that Tariq Ramadan provides a public assurance to European so-
cieties’ citizens that Muslim citizens’ ‘balance of […] reasons tilts in favor of maintaining’ 
their sense of justice. In other words, he makes publicly known the fact that citizens of Mus-
lim faith can (and −from his normative perspective− should) be loyal and politically commit-
ted citizens of European societies and continue to abide by fair terms of social cooperation, so 
                                                        
1894 Ibid. emphasis added. 
1895 Ibid. 275. 
1896 Ibid. emphasis added. 
1897 Ibid. 280 emphases added. 
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that preemptive defection from those terms is avoided. For instance, it must be remembered 
that Ramadan affirms that European Muslim citizens cannot infringe the constitution, laws, 
and political institutions of the society in which they live and that protects their equal rights 
and liberties (see chapter six, in particular 6.2-6.4). Ramadan’s account of citizenship is con-
sistent with public reason’s solution of the mutual assurance problem (see 4.2 and 5.2.c) be-
cause it makes known to all citizens in a genuinely public perspective the fact that Muslims 
citizens can be effectively part of an overlapping consensus, as required by political liberal-
ism.1898 The justificatory evaluative analysis developed in this study has considered how 
Ramadan’s conception of citizenship honours public reason: more specifically, I evaluated 
whether Ramadan’s conception of citizenship reflects the criterion of reciprocity of the rea-
sonable (RR), whether his account of public reasoning is consistent with public reason (CR), 
and how it respects in practice the two levels of the duty of civility with reference to a particu-
lar issue (CiR*). Whilst I did not enter into the details of a full Islamic justification of the 
conception of justice (as a conjecturer would have done), I have observed from a public 
standpoint that according to Ramadan a full Islamic justification is possible and an overlap-
ping consensus can occur. This fact has important public consequences: as I did, one can ex-
amine from a public perspective whether and how Ramadan’s conception of citizenship fulfils 
the requirements of public reason and, in this way, can be framed within a Rawlsian account 
of social stability for the right reasons. The study of Ramadan’s citizenship theory in light of 
the extensive interpretation of public reason that I have presented shows that Ramadan pro-
vides citizens with an assurance that disagreement within their society can be understood as 
‘good faith disagreement,’1899 that is, as a form of reasonable pluralism which is politically 
reabsorbed without being annihilated. 
It is now possible to answer the general research question (Q): Which ideal conception of 
citizenship should provide the common normative perspective in contemporary Western Eu-
ropean societies, which are characterised by both (1) demands of inclusion of Muslims and 
(2) the need for solving the problem of mutual assurance concerning citizens’ commitment to 
the fair terms of social cooperation specified by a political conception of justice, so that those 
societies can be stable for the right reasons? In 1.1.a.1, 1.2, and 5.2.b I maintained that nei-
                                                        
1898 See ibid. See also John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 392, where Rawls says that the public justification of a concep-
tion of justice requires ‘the existence and public knowledge of a reasonable overlapping consensus.’ Emphasis added. 
1899 Paul Weithman, Why Political Liberalism?, 361. 
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ther liberal multiculturalism nor critical republicanism are able to reconcile the two demands 
of inclusion of Muslim citizens and of mutual assurance. In particular, critical republicanism 
does not solve the generalised prisoner’s dilemma, for it does not consider the need for Mus-
lims’ acceptance on principled religious grounds (that is, as Muslims) of the terms of social 
cooperation proposed by critical republicans. As I have said, from the point of view of La-
borde’s critical republican theory, it seems that Muslims may endorse or subscribe to those 
terms only on the basis of strategic considerations (like in a modus vivendi), or as critical sec-
ular citizens, but critical republicanism does not require a justification of those terms from 
their religious perspective, because there is not a theoretical mechanism corresponding to the 
ideas of full justification and overlapping consensus. Thus, critical republicanism is not an 
adequate conception of citizenship for contemporary European societies, because it does not 
permit a satisfactory inclusion of Muslim citizens as Muslims. On the other hand, liberal mul-
ticulturalism –according to its own supporters− does not solve the problem of mutual assur-
ance, because it does not consider civic trust-enhancing mechanisms that make publicly 
known the fact that the generalised prisoner’s dilemma has been resolved (if it has been re-
solved). Then, not even liberal multiculturalism is an adequate conception of citizenship for 
European societies with reference to the question of Muslims’ citizenship. Neither critical re-
publicanism nor liberal multiculturalism secure stability for the right reasons (see Table 4). 
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Table 4 Public Reason Citizenship as a common discursive platform and the solution of the research problem: Mus-
lim citizens and stability for the right reasons in contemporary Western European societies. 
 Liberal 
Multicul-
turalism 
Critical 
Republican-
ism 
Public 
Reason 
Citizenship 
Two dimensions of 
stability for the 
right reasons in 
contemporary 
Western European 
societies 
Inclusion - ✗ 
✓ 
Overlapping consensus and shared 
standards for political criticism 
provided by public reason. 
Mutual 
assurance 
✗ - 
✓ 
Common political identity ground-
ed in the criterion of reciprocity of 
the reasonable and bifurcate (or 
two-level) model of the duty of ci-
vility (extensive interpretation of 
the proviso). 
 
On the contrary, in 5.2.c I have demonstrated that the public reason citizenship secures sta-
bility for the right reasons in European societies because it is an adequate ground for political 
reconciliation: working as a common discursive platform, it provides the bases for a shared 
political identity and standards of social criticism. Thanks to these two elements, public rea-
son citizenship guarantees both mutual assurance (both by respecting the two-level concep-
tion of the duty of civility and by grounding a shared common political identity) and political 
inclusion (not only in terms of participation in the overlapping consensus, but also in terms of 
critical standards available to all citizens). 
This research has demonstrated the remarkable potential of the idea of public reason as an 
ideal of citizenship in societies that are sufficiently (even though not ideally) just, as is the 
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case in European societies. Public reason provides a common discursive platform anchored in 
a political ideal of liberal citizenship grounded in a criterion of political reciprocity, that is, in 
the spirit of civic friendship based on the mutual recognition between reasonable free and 
equal citizens cooperating on fair terms. Such a political ideal is the foundation for a public 
political identity of citizenship and specifies standards for social and political criticism avail-
able to all citizens. Whether public reason citizenship can play a similar role in different polit-
ical contexts (e.g., in Muslim majority societies) is a difficult question still to be demonstrated 
that I do not address here. What I can intuitively say about this point is that for public reason 
to work in the direction of a political reconciliation of reasonable pluralism (the non-
annihilating reabsorption of reasonable pluralism that I have mentioned), two conditions must 
be met: first, the respect of the necessary and sufficient moral threshold of the criterion of po-
litical reciprocity described above and, second, the existence of some minimal background 
conditions (those described by Rawls in Political Liberalism and that I mentioned in 5.2.a). 
In conclusion, the ideal of public reason citizenship is an appealing normative conception 
of citizenship for European societies, because it can express a common discursive platform 
that produces a decompression of the public space that makes it politically possible to reab-
sorb reasonable pluralism without annihilating it. In this reading, as the analysis of Tariq 
Ramadan’s citizenship theory has demonstrated, European Muslims can be involved fully and 
on an equal standing as citizens in political reconciliation through public reason.  
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